Filed 7/22/26 Hassien v. The Regents of the U. of Cal. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MICHEL HASSIEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064512
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01314184)
THE REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION, AND DENYING
Defendant and Respondent. PETITION FOR REHEARING;
NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
This court hereby orders that the opinion filed on June 22, 2026,
be modified as follows:
1. On page 19, first incomplete paragraph, after first complete
sentence, ending with “specific evidence,” add the following footnote:
FN In a rehearing petition, Hassien appears to argue
that the review hearing violated due process because
it was more similar to substantial evidence review
than de novo review. He contends that because the
termination decision preceded the review hearing,
the review hearing was “merely held to determine
whether the existing termination decision ha[d]
adequate support. Thus, a termination decision
exist[ed] before Mr. Hassien ha[d] any opportunity to
challenge it, in violation of his due process rights.” He
did not make this argument in his appellate briefs,
and “[a]rguments cannot be raised for the first time
in a petition for rehearing.” (Shapell SoCal Rental
Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 198, 216.) Further, due process only
required that UCI provide Hassien “an evidentiary
hearing at some point in the termination process,”
which includes the period after his termination.
(Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit
Development Bd., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 946.)
He was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to
his termination. (Ibid.)
2. On pages 18 and 19, delete the last incomplete paragraph that
starts at the bottom of page 18 and ends on page 19, that starts with “Finally,
the procedures,” and add the following paragraphs and foonote:
Further, the procedures UCI afforded Hassien at the
review hearing complied with due process. Hassien
was given a two-day hearing, where both sides were
represented by counsel and given the opportunity to
provide opening and closing statements. Both sides
could call witnesses who testified under oath, cross-
examine the other side’s witnesses, and make
objections. UCI bore the burden of proof at the review
hearing to prove the grounds for Hassien’s
termination.FN The burden of proof was explained to
the parties. A court reporter transcribed the
proceedings. And the hearing officer issued the 20-
page award outlining the grounds for her ruling with
citations to specific evidence. (See, e.g., Basurto v.
Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 211 Ca1.App.4th 866,
883–884 [administrative hearing with similar
procedures complied with due process].)
Citing Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit
Development Bd., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 949–
951, Hassien asserts UCI violated his due process
rights and failed to meet its burden of proof by not
producing the complainant or any of the 10
interviewed witnesses at the review hearing. In
2
Townsel, the employer argued that it lacked legal
authority to hold an evidentiary hearing because it
had no subpoena power. (Ibid.) The court rejected this
argument, explaining that an employer’s “lack of
subpoena power does not necessarily preclude it from
conducting an evidentiary hearing and meeting its
burden of proving the facts supporting [the
employee’s] discharge. . . . Nor does [the employer’s]
lack of subpoena power preclude [the employee] from
producing witnesses favorable to his position.” (Id.at
pp. 950–951.) Townsel did not hold that an employer
must present witnesses to meet its burden of proof,
much less identify which witnesses must be
presented. Rather, it suggests that an employer can
call some voluntary witnesses to meet its burden of
proof and should allow the employee to call its own
witnesses. Here, UCI met its burden of proof by
presenting witnesses—Martinez, Anderson, and
Buckley—and providing the report as evidence.
FN Hassien appears to argue that the burden of proof
at the review hearing was improperly flipped: he had
the burden of showing there was insufficient evidence
to support his termination rather than UCI having
the burden of proving his misconduct. But the
applicable policy states that “In cases of corrective
action or termination, the University will bear the
burden of proof and will present its case first.”
Likewise, the hearing officer began the review
hearing by stating that “[j]ust to be clear, the burden
of proof [is] on [UCI’s] side.” The award also stated
that “[UCI] bears the burden to establish by the
preponderance of the evidence that its version of the
relevant events is more likely than not the correct
version.” And the award found that the evidence
presented “show[ed] more likely than not that
misconduct occurred.”
3
This modification does not change the judgment. The petition for
rehearing is DENIED.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
4
Filed 6/22/26 Hassien v. The Regents of the U. of Cal. CA4/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MICHEL HASSIEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064512
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01314184)
THE REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Thomas S. McConville, Judge. Affirmed.
Hathaway Parker, Mark M. Hathaway and Jenna E. Parker for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Venable, Jean-Paul P. Cart and Mona Mujaddidi for Defendant
and Respondent.
* * *
Plaintiff Michel Hassien was employed as a maintenance
supervisor at the University of California, Irvine (UCI), which is governed by
defendant Regents of the University of California (the Regents).1 UCI
investigated Hassien after an employee he supervised (complainant) accused
him of stalking, sexual harassment, and bullying. During the investigation,
several people familiar with Hassien and complainant were interviewed, and
many of them corroborated complainant’s allegations. UCI terminated
Hassien’s employment based on the results of the investigation, which were
documented in a formal 50-page report (the report).
Hassien requested formal review of his termination. The final
step of this process involved a two-day hearing (the review hearing), in which
UCI and Hassien could call witnesses who were subject to cross-examination.
Neither UCI nor Hassien called complainant or any of the people interviewed
during its investigation to testify. UCI submitted the report as evidence and
called the report’s drafter and Hassien’s supervisor who had made the
decision to terminate him. After reviewing the evidence presented, the
hearing officer found there was adequate evidence to support Hassien’s
termination.
Hassien then filed this petition for writ of mandate in the trial
court (the petition), seeking an order directing the Regents to set aside the
hearing officer’s findings. The court denied the petition and entered judgment
1 Hassien initially filed this lawsuit anonymously as “John Doe.” The
Regents filed a motion to strike all references to “John Doe” and replace them
with his true name, which the trial court granted. However, the lower court
continued to refer to this case as Doe v. Regents of the University of
California. We have replaced the “John Doe” designation in the caption with
Hassien’s true name since there are no longer any privacy concerns. (Cf. Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b).)
2
against Hassien and in favor of the Regents. On appeal, Hassien argues the
court’s judgment should be reversed and the hearing officer’s findings set
aside. We find no error.
First, Hassien claims UCI denied him a full evidentiary hearing
with due process protections. Among other things, he argues that it failed to
call complainant or any of the individuals interviewed during the
investigation as witnesses at the review hearing, which denied him the
opportunity to cross-examine them. We find the relevant procedures satisfied
due process. At the review hearing, Hassien had no right to cross-examine
the complainant or any of the individuals UCI interviewed during its
investigation. Further, to the extent he sought to question these individuals,
it is undisputed that Hassien made no attempt to call them as witnesses
himself.
Second, Hassien contends UCI’s termination decision was
unsupported by substantial evidence because it was based entirely on
uncorroborated hearsay (i.e., the report). But Hassien has not shown that the
hearing officer could not rely entirely on hearsay in making her decision.
And, even if Hassien’s contention were true, the hearing officer’s decision was
not based solely on uncorroborated hearsay. Hassien’s supervisor provided
admissible, nonhearsay testimony that was corroborated by the alleged
hearsay evidence.
Third, Hassien asserts that several parties, including the hearing
officer, were biased against him. He has not shown that any of the relevant
parties were biased.
The judgment is affirmed.
3
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST HASSIEN
The Regents is the governing body of the University of California
public school system (the University of California), which includes UCI. UCI
employed Hassien as the Senior Building Maintenance Supervisor in the Palo
Verde student housing community from December 2006 to October 2020. In
August 2019, complainant, who was a custodian supervised by Hassien,
began contacting Jennifer Martinez, Hassien’s supervisor. During these
contacts, complainant indicated that she wanted to report something to
Martinez but wanted Martinez to promise “not [to] say anything to anybody
about it or act on it.” Complainant would leave when Martinez explained that
she would have to report any allegations of sexual harassment or violence.
According to Martinez, she and complainant “did this dance for a while,” but
complainant began to share small pieces of information over time.
After a few of these interactions, complainant informed Martinez
that Hassien had engaged in harassment and bullying over a seven-year
period. Martinez took notes and organized complainant’s allegations into
three categories: stalking, harassment and retaliation, and fear mongering.
Martinez forwarded her notes to UCI’s Office of Equal Opportunity and
Diversity (the EOD Office).
In September 2019, the EOD Office informed Martinez that it
would investigate complainant’s allegations along with UCI’s human
resources office (HR). The EOD Office prepared a memorandum summarizing
complainant’s allegations and noted that Hassien had potentially violated
several policies of both the University of California and UCI, including
4
policies on sexual harassment, discrimination and harassment, abusive
conduct, and workplace violence.2
II.
THE INVESTIGATION
The assigned investigators were Holly Hare, from the EOD
Office, and Susan Ha, from HR. Hare and Ha interviewed complainant three
times, Hassien twice, and interviewed 10 other witnesses. They also
examined documentary evidence Hassien submitted, including (1) a text log
from January 2019 to July 2019, (2) Hassien’s phone log from April 2019 to
September 2019, and (3) certain text message conversations between Hassien
and complainant that occurred from November 2018 to August 2019 (Hassien
provided select text message conversations, not all of the text messages sent
between these dates). The investigators also reviewed responses from both
Hassien and complainant to a draft of the report.
2 The specific policies were (1) University of California Policy on Sexual
Violence and Sexual Harassment (Section 11.B .1.d. Stalking), (2) UCI
Guidelines for Reporting and Responding to Reports of Sex Offenses (Section
C.1.d. Stalking), (3) University of California Sexual Violence and Sexual
Harassment Policy (Sections 11.B.2.a.ii. Sexual Harassment-Hostile
Environment), (4) UCI Guidelines for Reporting and Responding to Reports of
Discrimination and Harassment (Sections C.1.3. Sexual Harassment-Hostile
Environment), (5) University of California Policy on Discrimination,
Harassment, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, (6) UCI Guidelines for
Reporting and Responding to Reports of Discrimination and Harassment,
(7) University of California Guidance on Abusive Conduct and Bullying in the
Workplace, (8) University of California Statement of Ethical Values &
Standards of Ethical Conduct, (9) University of California Workplace
Violence Prevention Policy, and (10) Personnel Policies for Staff Members 62,
63, and 64.
5
A. Witness Interviews
The report contains nearly 20 pages summarizing the accounts of
complainant, Hassien, and the 10 interviewed witnesses. The descriptions
below are not meant to be exhaustive and only cover some of the salient
points that were mentioned during interviews.
1. Complainant’s account
Complainant stated that Hassien was “‘obsessed’ with her.” He
monitored her throughout the workday, constantly asking for her location
over the radio. Complainant was in a romantic relationship with another UCI
employee, who was identified as witness 10. Hassien would follow
complainant to and from her car to watch her pick up and drop off witness 10
during lunch breaks. Hassien would also get upset at complainant for
speaking with other staff members, particularly males. He purportedly told
her not to talk to any other employees except another female and one male
that Hassien believed “‘was gay.’” Hassien also repeatedly called complainant
over the phone and sent her text messages.
Complainant also mentioned that Hassien liked to hug employees
and kiss them on the cheek. He got mad at complainant when she asked him
not to hug her. Hassien told complainant that she was “‘pretty’” and
“‘deserved a better man.’” He also made comments about complainant’s sex
life. For example, he asked whether she “‘ha[d] sex’” during her lunch break.
On one occasion, he asked if she had “‘sucked some d*ck’” after she returned
from lunch. Another time, he asked if “she ‘wanted to f*ck around’ while
touching her leg with his leg.” These types of interactions occurred multiple
times.
Complainant also asserted that Hassien made comments about
her breasts and caught him staring at her breasts many times. He once
6
touched one of her breasts in 2017 while they were in an empty apartment
unit on campus. He then laughed and “said that he was ‘playing.’” He also
commented about the breasts and legs of female students on campus.
Hassien also engaged in other forms of verbal harassment,
allegedly calling complainant derogatory names like “‘b*tch,’ ‘motherf*cker,’
and ‘stupid.’”
Employees were afraid to report Hassien because he threatened
them with repercussions. Hassien purportedly once threatened to kill his
supervisor if he was fired. Complainant recalled him saying, “‘[i]f they fire
me, I’ll come and kill [the supervisor] and leave.’”
During interviews, complainant acknowledged that she was
angry at Hassien around 2019 because she believed he had reported her
relationship with witness 10 to the EOD Office.
2. Hassien’s account
Hassien denied having romantic feelings for complainant and
denied her sexual harassment allegations, calling them “‘ridiculous.’” He
likewise denied making any sexual jokes and denied ever commenting on
complainant’s appearance. But he conceded that “he ‘might have called her
pretty when [he] was consoling [her].’” He denied making remarks about
other women’s appearances, saying “it was a gross accusation.”
Hassien admitted that he told all his employees he loved them
“because he ‘genuinely loves people.’” He was “a ‘hugger’” and sometimes
greeted his staff with hugs and “a ‘peck on the cheek.’” He claimed “that
Complainant would reach over to him to initiate hugs and kisses with him.”
However, because English was complainant’s second language, he thought
she “may have misunderstood his ‘kindness and respect for something else,’”
so he stopped greeting her with a kiss on the cheek.
7
According to Hassien, he only monitored complainant to ensure
she followed her work schedule because he had been told she was taking
extra breaks to spend time with witness 10. He denied complainant’s
allegations that he had told her not to interact with other staff members
except for “one female employee and one ‘gay’ male employee.”
Hassien acknowledged cursing at work because that was the
workplace’s culture, but he denied ever calling complainant any of the terms
she had identified.
Hassien said most of the phone and text communications between
him and complainant were initiated by her and related to work. He provided
the documentary evidence listed above to support his claim.
Finally, Hassien claimed complainant was retaliating against
him because she thought he had reported her relationship with witness 10 to
the EOD Office, which he denied. He explained that she had “sent him a text
message threatening to ‘come after [him].’” He also believed certain
witnesses were biased against him. Specifically, he alleged that witness 2 had
romantic feelings for complainant and witness 5 disliked him due to friction
at work.
3. Other witness accounts
Many of the interviewed witnesses believed that Hassian had
romantic feelings for complainant and noted that he constantly tracked her
at work. Witness 10 stated that he had lunch with complainant every day,
and Hassien would constantly show up or drive by to watch them. Witness 2
believed Hassien had romantic feelings for complainant and recalled Hassien
frequently calling complainant on her work radio to ask her location and “was
‘aggressive and heavy handed.’” Witness 2 stated Hassien “would ‘badger and
8
harass’” complainant by telling her things like, “‘let’s go into these [housing]
units and mess around.’”
Likewise, witness 3 believed that Hassien had romantic feelings
for complainant and was “‘obsessed’ with her.” Hassien frequently asked
about complainant’s location or why she was gone. Witness 3 remembered
hearing Hassien “‘scream’ for Complainant over the radio when he could not
find her.” Witness 3 said this happened four to five times a day, and “only for
Complainant, not other coworkers.” Witness 5 stated that Hassien called
complainant on the radio more than other employees, and Hassien’s
“behavior seemed ‘more attentive than it needed to be.’”
Witness 8 recalled that Hassien frequently asked for
complainant’s location on the radio “with anger in his voice.” Hassien also
followed complainant around so much, witness 8 once asked Hassien if he
was “‘stalking [her].’” Witness 9 stated that on certain days Hassien made
many radio calls asking for complainant and sounded frustrated.
Several witnesses also noted that Hassien appeared to get jealous
if complainant spoke to other men. Witness 3 claimed that Hassien would
follow complainant around work and would get mad if she spoke to male
coworkers. According to witness 3, “Complainant was only allowed to talk to
Witness 3 and one other coworker.” Witness 3 once saw complainant talking
to a contractor and overheard Hassien say something like, “‘[h]e’s cute,’ and ‘I
want to kill him,’” which scared witness 3.
Witnesses also stated that Hassien made sexual comments about
complainant. Witnesses 2 and 8 both recalled Hassien making comments
about complainant’s breasts, and witness 2 remembered Hassien joking
about “‘play[ing] with [complainant’s] tits’” a few years prior. Witness 2 told
investigators that Hassien asked complainant several times “whether she
9
was having sex during her lunch break.” Witness 2 also remembered Hassien
asking complainant if she had been “‘f*cking around’” during lunch.
Similarly, Witness 8 stated that Hassien would frequently “ask Complainant
if she had had sex during the [lunch] break.” Witness 8 also recalled a specific
incident in July 2019, when Hassien “asked Complainant if her hair was
messy because she was ‘sucking [Witness 10’s] d*ck’ over the lunch break.”
Other witnesses had heard Hassian make sexual comments not
involving complainant. For example, witness 5 had heard Hassien making
sexual jokes in the past and had “spent many hours” talking with Hassien
about “‘boundaries.’” Witness 8 stated that everyone joked at work but
Hassien sometimes “‘crossed the line.’” Specifically, witness 8 recalled that
Hassien made “jokes about penises and sex” and talked about breasts and
vaginas. When witness 8 confronted Hassien about his sexually charged
comments, Hassien asked, “Witness 8 whether Witness 8 was gay.” Witness 9
stated that Hassien made sexual jokes but only to men.
Many witnesses also noted that Hassien had a temper and
referred to coworkers using derogatory terms. Witness 1 once observed
Hassien engage in a shouting match with another employee. Likewise,
witness 7 averred that Hassien had a quick temper and that concerns about
his swearing had been raised in the past. Witness 9 reported that Hassien
sometimes raised his voice with others. Witness 3 stated that Hassien had a
temper and that his yelling scared witness 3. Witness 3 also recalled hearing
Hassien threaten to shoot another coworker on one occasion. Witness 5
likewise described Hassien “as being angry and hostile more often than he
need[ed] to be.”
According to witness 8, Hassien frequently used profanity and
called his colleagues derogatory names. For example, he called another
10
employee “a ‘fat b*tch’” several times the year prior to the investigation.
Witnesses 2, 8, and 10 all stated that Hassien called complainant a “‘b*tch’”
and “‘c*nt’” numerous times.
B. The Report’s Preparation
After completing the above interviews, Hare left UCI for another
position. She was replaced by Cris Buckley from the EOD Office, who drafted
a 50-page report dated June 26, 2020 (defined above as the report). Buckley
prepared the report after consulting the investigators, reviewing their notes,
and looking “at the consistency of the information, the plausibility of it,
corroboration, actual knowledge, omissions, demeanor, and then bias or
motive to falsify or exaggerate.”
The report concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that
Hassien had violated numerous policies of the University of California and
UCI by (1) engaging in unwelcome physical or verbal conduct of a sexual
nature that constituted sexual harassment, (2) engaging in repeated conduct
of a sexual or romantic nature towards complainant that constituted
stalking, (3) directing abusive conduct towards complainant and other staff
members, (4) exhibiting conduct inconsistent with UCI’s commitment to
respect and dignity, and (5) making threatening comments about shooting or
harming others.
11
C. Hassien’s Termination
After reviewing the report, Martinez concluded that Hassien’s
termination was warranted under Personnel Policy 64 (Policy 64).3 She sent
Hassian a Written Notice of Intent to Terminate dated July 31, 2020 (the
termination notice). The termination notice explained that the EOD Office
and HR had conducted a joint investigation of allegations concerning sexual
harassment, stalking, workplace bullying, and threats. It then summarized
the investigation and the report’s findings.
The termination notice informed Hassien that based on the
report’s findings, UCI intended to terminate his employment effective August
11, 2020. It closed by informing Hassien of his right to respond to the
termination notice orally or in writing. A copy of the report was included with
the termination notice, as well as copies of the policies that Hassien had
violated.
3 Under the relevant portion of Policy 64, “[r]egular status professional
and support staff may be terminated from employment because of misconduct
or failure to maintain appropriate work performance standards. Normally,
termination is preceded by corrective action . . . unless immediate dismissal
is warranted.”
12
III.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
A. The Skelly Hearing4
As directed by the termination notice, Hassien submitted a
response to Lisa Anderson, Director of Finance and Business Operations,
Student Housing. He denied complainant’s allegations and argued the
report’s findings were unsupported by evidence. He requested a Skelly
hearing prior to his termination.
A Skelly hearing was held with Hassien and his counsel in
August 2020. At this hearing, Hassien claimed that complainant had lied and
was retaliating against him because she believed he had reported her
relationship with witness 10 to the EOD Office. He also argued that he had
not received a fair investigation and there was a lack of corroborating
evidence. Anderson found that there were reasonable grounds to terminate
Hassien. She sent this recommendation to Martinez, who formally
terminated Hassien’s employment.
B. Request for Review
Hassien requested formal review of his termination under
University of California policy. The first step was a review of the documents
supporting Hassien’s termination by the Executive Director of Student
4 “Skelly [v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194] requires that
civil service employees be given notice of proposed disciplinary action, the
reasons for the action, a copy of the charges and the written materials upon
which they are based, and an opportunity to respond either orally or in
writing. [Citation.] A ‘Skelly hearing’ refers to the employee’s opportunity to
respond, and it has been described as an ‘informal probable-cause-type
proceeding.’” (Chaplin v. State Personnel Bd. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1104,
1109, fn. 2.)
13
Housing. The Executive Director concluded the report’s findings were
supported by the evidence and Hassien’s termination was appropriate.
Hassien then proceeded to the next step in the review process: a
hearing on his termination. UCI appointed a hearing officer, and the hearing
occurred over two days on UCI’s campus (defined above as the review
hearing). Among the issues considered at the review hearing was whether
“[u]nder [Policy 64], UCI’s management decision to terminate Mr. Hassien for
misconduct in the performance of his duties was proper, including that it was
based upon adequate evidence.”
UCI and Hassien were represented by counsel at the review
hearing. Both parties were given the opportunity to present opening
statements but waived that right. Several witnesses testified, and each party
had the opportunity to cross-examine the other side’s witnesses. UCI called
Martinez, Anderson, and Buckley. Hassien testified and called two witnesses:
(1) a former coworker from Palo Verde (known as witness 11),5 and (2) his
brother who was a groundskeeper at UCI. The parties also filed briefs after
the review hearing.
The hearing officer issued a 20-page opinion and award finding in
favor of UCI (the award). The award explained the various issues that were
the subject of the review hearing, the background facts, the applicable
policies, and the parties’ positions. It then set forth the hearing officer’s
analysis, including citations to evidence, and concluded that there was
adequate evidence to support Hassien’s termination.
5 Witness 11 had declined to participate in the EOD Office and HR’s
investigation.
14
IV.
THE WRIT PROCEEDING
Hassien filed the petition in the trial court under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5, seeking an order directing the Regents to set aside
the award and his termination. He argued that (1) UCI’s hearing was unfair
because he was denied the chance to cross-examine complainant or any of the
10 witnesses interviewed during the investigation; (2) his termination was
not supported by substantial evidence because it was based entirely on
uncorroborated hearsay; and (3) Buckley, Martinez, and the hearing officer
were biased against him.
The trial court denied the petition. First, it concluded that
Hassien had no right to cross-examine complainant at the award hearing.
Also, nothing in the review hearing’s procedures prevented him from calling
complainant or any other witnesses at the review hearing. Since he called
other witnesses, he presumably knew he could call complainant or any of the
10 interviewed witnesses to testify. But “[f]or whatever reason, [Hassien] just
did not do so.”
Second, the trial court found there was sufficient evidence to
support Hassien’s termination. It noted that UCI’s policies permitted the use
of hearsay in administrative proceedings. Further, the evidence presented in
the report was reliable because several witnesses corroborated each other’s
accounts.
Finally, the trial court ruled that Hassien had not provided
actual evidence of bias. Rather, he “re-weigh[ed] the evidence from his
perspective, and conclude[d] that, because [the relevant parties] reached a
decision different from his, [they] lack[ed] impartiality.”
15
The trial court entered judgment against Hassien and in the
Regents’ favor. On appeal, Hassien challenges the denial of the petition and
seeks an order vacating the award. He generally makes the same arguments
on appeal as he did below.
DISCUSSION
I.
BACKGROUND LAW
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, “[a] trial court may
issue a writ of administrative mandate where an agency has (1) acted in
excess of its jurisdiction, (2) deprived the petitioner of a fair hearing, or
(3) committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘Abuse of discretion
is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in a manner required by law,
the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not
supported by the evidence.’” (Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48
Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169.)
“In an appeal from a judgment denying the writ, we focus upon
the decision of the . . . agency rather than the superior court, with the burden
being on the appellant to prove the decision was unreasonable or unlawful.
[Citations.] We uphold the agency’s factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence, indulging in the presumption that the record supports
the agency’s findings of fact.” (Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of
Fremont (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 345, 354.) “We review the fairness of the
administrative proceeding de novo. [Citation.] ‘The statute’s requirement of a
“‘fair’” trial means that there must have been “a fair administrative
hearing.”’” (Doe v. Regents of University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1073.)
16
II.
FAIRNESS OF THE REVIEW HEARING
A. Process Provided
“It is well settled that a public employee subject to discharge only
for cause has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued
employment.” (Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd.
(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 946.) As such, “a permanent . . . public employee
facing a termination for cause has a due process right to challenge the factual
basis for the termination in a full evidentiary hearing at some point in the
termination process. Furthermore, the governmental employer bears the
burden of proof in the evidentiary hearing, as ‘[i]t is axiomatic, in disciplinary
administrative proceedings, that the burden of proving the charges rests
upon the party making the charges.’” (Id. at p. 949.)
Hassien claims he was denied a full evidentiary hearing in which
UCI had the burden to prove facts supporting his termination. Rather, he
appears to claim the scope of the review hearing was limited to procedural
issues, specifically, whether UCI complied with Policy 64 in its investigation
and decision to terminate his employment. This claim is belied by the record.
While a portion of the review hearing focused on whether UCI
had complied with Policy 64, this inquiry included a review of whether
Hassien’s termination was supported by sufficient evidence. As set forth in
the award, “[t]he issues framed at the [review] hearing” included “Under
[Policy 64], UCI’s management decision to terminate Mr. Hassien for
misconduct in the performance of his duties was proper, including that it was
based upon adequate evidence.” (Italics added.)
Moreover, the award expressly addressed and weighed the
evidence presented by both parties concerning Hassien’s termination. In
17
particular, it considered Hassien’s argument and evidence that complainant
had a motive to lie because she believed Hassien had reported her
relationship with witness 10 to the EOD Office. The award found that text
message evidence presented by Hassien on this point did “not . . . shift the
scales significantly” because it “was pulled out of context and it [was] unclear
why or when [the messages were] sent.”
As to the evidence presented by UCI, the hearing officer noted
that complainant appeared reluctant to report Hassien’s behavior to
Martinez. She only did so after multiple visits and after receiving assurances
that she would be protected from retaliation. This evidence cut against
Hassien’s argument that complainant had lied for purposes of revenge.
Further, multiple witnesses corroborated many of complainant’s allegations,
including that Hassien (1) talked about complainant’s breasts, (2) asked
complainant about her sex life, including whether she had sex during lunch
breaks, and (3) was “‘obsessed’” with complainant. The hearing officer also
observed that “[w]hile these are demonstrative of only a few of the incidents
that were corroborated amongst the witnesses and complainant, this same
pattern can be found for many of the allegations.” Based on the evidence
presented at the review hearing, the hearing officer concluded that it was
“more likely than not that [UCI’s] decision to terminate Hassien was proper
and based on adequate evidence.”
Finally, the procedures UCI afforded Hassien at the review
hearing complied with due process. Hassien was given a two-day hearing,
where both sides were represented by counsel and given the opportunity to
provide opening and closing statements. Both sides could call witnesses who
testified under oath, cross-examine the other side’s witnesses, and make
objections. The burden of proof was explained to the parties. A court reporter
18
transcribed the proceedings. And the hearing officer issued the 20-page
award outlining the grounds for her ruling with citations to specific evidence.
(See, e.g., Basurto v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 866,
883–884 [administrative hearing with similar procedures complied with due
process].)
B. Cross-Examination of Uncalled Witnesses
Hassien also highlights that UCI did not call complainant or any
of the 10 interviewed witnesses to testify. As such, he claims that he was
denied due process because he could not cross-examine any of them at the
review hearing. We find that he had no such right to cross-examine these
specific witnesses.
Our Supreme Court recently explained that “[w]hile live
adversarial questioning may be considered essential in the context of a
criminal trial [citation], there is no absolute right to a live hearing with cross-
examination in administrative proceedings, even where constitutional due
process applies. As courts have explained in other administrative contexts,
‘“[d]ifferences in the origin and function of administrative agencies ‘preclude
wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which
have evolved from the history and experience of courts.’ . . . The judicial
model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most
effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.”’” (Boermeester v.
Carry (2023) 15 Cal.5th 72, 93–94, italics added.)
Hassien attempts to distinguish Boermeester by arguing it
involved a private university, not a public institution, so no constitutional
rights were at stake. (Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 87.) Rather, he
contends that Boermeester only asked whether the petitioner had been given
19
“fair procedure,” which “is a more flexible judicially created concept
applicable to private organizations in limited situations.” (Ibid.)
Hassien is factually correct that Boermeester involved an
administrative hearing governed only by fair procedure and not due process.
(Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 86–87.) But his argument is
unpersuasive. Boermeester unambiguously states that “there is no absolute
right to a live hearing with cross-examination in administrative proceedings,
even where constitutional due process applies.” (Id. at p. 93, italics added.)
Thus, this holding extends outside the context of hearings governed only by
the fair procedure standard and covers hearings where due process rights are
implicated, as is the case here.6
In response, Hassien notes “that cross-examination is permitted
in public university disciplinary proceedings in certain contexts.” But the fact
that cross-examination may be permitted in certain contexts has no bearing
on whether cross-examination was required here.
Finally, Hassien could have sought to call complainant or any of
the 10 interviewed witnesses to testify at the hearing. Nothing in the
relevant rules prevented him from doing so. While it is unknown whether any
of them would have appeared since Hassien (and UCI) lacked subpoena
6 Boermeester did not address whether “a private university must
provide an accused student the opportunity to indirectly cross-examine the
accuser or third party witnesses outside of the context of a live hearing when
the credibility of the accuser or third party witnesses is central to the
adjudication.” (Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 96–97.) We do not
consider whether UCI was required to allow Hassien to indirectly cross-
examine complainant or any of the 10 interviewed witnesses outside of the
review hearing. Hassien’s argument on appeal focused on cross-examination
during the review hearing. We also note that Hassien had the opportunity to
review a draft of the report and provide the investigators with a response to
the statements of complainant and the interviewed witnesses.
20
power, he made no attempt to call any of them. Rather, he only blames UCI
for failing to do so.
III.
RELIANCE ON HEARSAY
Hassien claims the award is unsupported by substantial evidence
because it is based entirely on uncorroborated hearsay. Specifically, he
contends the hearing officer’s ruling was based on the report, which was
written by Buckley using notes from witness interviews conducted by other
people. Further, UCI did not call any witnesses at the review hearing with
firsthand knowledge of Hassien’s conduct to corroborate the hearsay in the
report. This argument is unpersuasive.
The hearing officer concluded that hearsay evidence was allowed
under applicable University of California policies. Hassien does not contest
this finding.
Rather, Hassien’s argument is based on authority stating,
“‘[m]ere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence.’” (Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 532,
536.) “There must be substantial evidence to support [an agency’s] ruling,
and hearsay, unless specially permitted by statute, is not competent evidence
to that end.” (Walker v. City of San Gabriel (1942) 20 Cal.2d 879, 881
(Walker), overruled on other grounds by In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th
1227, 1244.) This rule, known as “the residuum rule,” states that an agency’s
decision cannot be based solely on hearsay but must be supported by “at least
21
‘a residuum of legally admissible evidence.’”7 (The Utility Reform Network v.
Public Utilities Com. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 945, 960–961.)
However, Walker recognizes that hearsay alone can be
substantial evidence to support an agency’s decision when “permitted by
statute.” (Walker, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 881.) For example, our Supreme
Court has explained that “[t]here is no inherent problem with the use of
hearsay in [state] bar disciplinary matters. [Citations.] The reliability of
hearsay may vary widely, and even uncorroborated hearsay, without more,
may suffice to support an agency decision, provided that such is permitted by
statute.” (Conway v. State Bar (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1107, 1118, italics added.)
Here, Hassien had the burden of showing that the award could
not be based entirely on uncorroborated hearsay. (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 209, 225 [petitioner has burden of showing error].) But he has
not made any attempt to show that the residuum rule applies to UCI’s
administrative hearings. Hassien has not cited any authority (including the
University of California policies) applying the residuum rule to
administrative decisions by UCI or the University of California. Nor has he
explained why it should apply here; he simply assumes that it does. We will
7 Hassien also cites Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board (1938) 305 U.S. 197, 230, which states that “[m]ere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.”
But the United States Supreme Court later held that the residuum rule did
not apply to federal administrative hearings. (Richardson v. Perales (1971)
402 U.S. 389, 407–408.) Under federal law, “‘it is well-settled not only that
hearsay can be considered by an administrative agency but that it can
constitute substantial evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘[A]dministrative agencies may
consider hearsay evidence as long as it “bear[s] satisfactory indicia of
reliability,” [citation]; and hearsay can constitute substantial evidence if it is
reliable and trustworthy.’” (Lacson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec. (D.C. Cir.
2013) 726 F.3d 170, 178.)
22
not make this argument on Hassien’s behalf.8 (Allen v. City of Sacramento
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)
Besides, even if the residuum rule were to apply here, we find
that the award is supported by more than just uncorroborated hearsay.
Martinez testified at the review hearing (1) that Hassien had engaged in
misconduct under the relevant policies; (2) that it was her decision to
terminate Hassien; (3) about prior disciplinary measures taken against
Hassien, including warnings against using profanity and loudly arguing with
a subordinate employee in public view; (4) about complainant’s reluctance to
initially report anything about Hassien because she was scared of retaliation;
(5) about complainant’s reports that Hassien was engaged in stalking, sexual
harassment, and other nonsexual harassment; and (6) about how the
investigation started.
The above testimony was either not hearsay or was admissible
for nonhearsay purposes. For example, Martinez’s testimony about Hassien’s
prior discipline and complainant’s allegations was admissible to show
Martinez’s knowledge of these events and the effect these statements had on
her subsequent actions. (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 976, 988–989 disapproved of on other grounds by Lakin v.
Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 664; Holland v. Union
8 The application of the residuum rule is particularly unclear in cases
involving the University of California given its special constitutional status.
“[T]he California Constitution has granted the [Regents] quasi-judicial
powers regarding matters falling within its broad powers to organize and
govern the university, and this includes quasi-judicial adjudication of
employment rights.” (Do v. Regents of University of California (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 1474, 1485.) “‘[P]olicies established by the Regents as matters of
internal regulation may enjoy a status equivalent to that of state statutes.’”
(Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 320.)
23
Pacific Railroad Co. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 940, 947.) Among other things,
this testimony explains why Martinez initiated the investigation into Hassien
and why she believed his termination was warranted.
Martinez’s testimony, which the award referenced, was then
corroborated by the hearsay statements in the report. We need not repeat the
specific evidence supporting UCI’s decision to terminate Hassien. In short,
complainant’s claims that Hassien had stalked and sexually harassed her
were corroborated by multiple witnesses.
IV.
IMPARTIALITY
“‘When, as here, an administrative agency conducts adjudicative
proceedings, the constitutional guarantee of due process of law requires a fair
tribunal. [Citation.] A fair tribunal is one in which the judge or other decision
maker is free of bias for or against a party.’” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los
Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 215; Rosenblit v.
Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1448 [“The right to a fair
procedure includes the right to impartial adjudicators”].)
“[A] party seeking to show bias or prejudice on the part of an
administrative decision maker [must] prove the same with concrete facts:
‘“Bias and prejudice are never implied and must be established by clear
averments.” [Citation.] Indeed, a party’s unilateral perception of an
appearance of bias cannot be a ground for disqualification unless we are
ready to tolerate a system in which disgruntled or dilatory litigants can
wreak havoc with the orderly administration of dispute-resolving tribunals.’”
(Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1237.)
Hassien alleges Buckley, Martinez, and the hearing officer were
all biased against him. As to the first two individuals, Hassien has not shown
24
that the impartiality rule applies to them. Buckley and Martinez were not
part of the decision-making body at the review hearing. (See Today’s Fresh
Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 215.) Rather, they were called as witnesses on UCI’s behalf. Nor has
Hassien explained why this rule should extend to them, and we will not make
this argument for him. (Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th
at p. 52.)
As to the hearing officer, Hassien has not provided any concrete
facts showing bias. Rather, he believes she was biased because she did not
interpret the evidence in the same manner as him. His whole argument is
that she “bent over backwards to uphold the termination decision, even
determining that individuals whom she had never seen or observed were
credible and had no motive to lie based on her reading of their written
statements alone.” Hassien’s “‘unilateral perception of an appearance of bias’”
by the hearing officer is insufficient proof of actual bias. (See Breakzone
Billiards v. City of Torrance, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Regents are entitled to their costs
on appeal.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
26