Filed 8/31/26 Hamid v. Watts Learning Center Foundation CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
VERONICA HAMID et al., B346649
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STCV22476)
WATTS LEARNING CENTER
FOUNDATION, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Elizabeth L. Bradley, Judge. Affirmed.
Nguyen Lawyers and Minh T. Nguyen for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
McCune & Harber, Stephen M. Harber and Amy A.
Evenstad for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________
Plaintiff and appellant M.R., a minor, by and through his
guardian ad litem Veronica Hamid, appeals from a judgment,
including orders granting summary adjudication in favor of
defendant and respondent Watts Learning Center Foundation,
Inc., (Watts) in this negligence action. On appeal, M.R. contends:
(1) the federal district court should not have granted summary
adjudication of claims alleged against Watts for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA; 42 U.S.C. § 12131,
et seq.), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section
504; 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.), and the Unruh Civil Rights Act
(Unruh Act; Civ. Code § 51, et seq.); (2) the state trial court
abused its discretion by not moving for reconsideration of the
federal court’s order, on the state court’s own motion, based on
new authority; and (3) summary adjudication should not have
been granted on the issue of punitive damages because as a
charter school, Watts is not a public entity exempt from punitive
damages claims.
We conclude the issues presented by Watt’s summary
judgment motion were not properly raised in state court to allow
review on appeal. The state trial court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to reconsider the issues raised by the
summary judgment motion on its own motion. We also conclude
that summary adjudication was properly granted on the issue of
punitive damages, because no evidence was presented to support
finding the charter school ratified a teacher’s alleged abusive
conduct. Therefore, we affirm.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Undisputed Facts
The parties agree that Watts is a charter school run by a
nonprofit public benefit corporation. M.R. enrolled at Watts for
seventh grade. After enrollment, Hamid told Watts’ office
manager that M.R. could not participate in physical education
(PE) because he had been diagnosed with osteogenesis
imperfecta, also known as brittle bone disease. The office
manager told Hamid to bring a doctor’s note that listed any
restrictions. The following week, Hamid provided a medical
record to a different person in the office, which did not list
restrictions or accommodations needed. Hamid was told to bring
a doctor’s note. M.R.’s diagnosis was not entered into Watts’
computerized record system. The parties disputed whether M.R.
told his PE teacher that he had a bone disease and was not
allowed to run. After three weeks of school, M.R. tripped while
running on the track during PE, breaking his left femur and right
scapula.
On June 12, 2020, M.R., through his guardian ad litem
Hamid, filed a complaint against Watts, the Los Angeles Unified
School District (LAUSD), and Doe defendants for violations of
Title II of the ADA applying to public entities, Title III of the
ADA applying to private entities that provide public
accommodations, Section 504; Government Code section 11135;
the Unruh Act; the Disabled Persons Act (DPA; Civ. Code, § 54,
et seq.); negligence; and negligent hiring, supervision, or
retention. The complaint sought punitive damages as to the
private entities.
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B. Removal to Federal Court and Motion for Summary
Judgment
Watts removed the action to federal court. On November 1,
2021, Watts filed a motion for summary judgment, or
alternatively, partial summary judgment, as to each cause of
action and the issues of punitive and treble damages. With
respect to the ADA claims, among other arguments, Watts
asserted M.R. could not show Watts had notice of the risk to
M.R., that Watts intentionally discriminated against M.R., or
that M.R. was denied full and equal benefits of school, since he
missed just one week of school. In addition, the ADA claims were
barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. With
respect to the Section 504 claim, Watts argued M.R. failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, could not show Watts
intentionally discriminated against him solely by reason of his
disability, and there was no evidence of deliberate indifference.
As to M.R.’s claim under the Unruh Act, Watts argued that it was
not a business establishment subject to the statutory scheme, and
there was no evidence that Watts failed to accommodate M.R.’s
disability or intentionally discriminated against him.
M.R. filed an opposition to the motion for summary
judgment. He expressly dismissed his claim against Watts based
on Government Code section 11135 because he no longer
attended the school. The appellate record in connection with the
instant appeal does not include the separate statements of facts
filed by the parties, the evidence submitted in connection with
the motion for summary judgment, or any reply brief filed by
Watts. There is also no reporter’s transcript of any hearing in
federal court on the motion for summary judgment.
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On March 23, 2022, the federal court entered an order
granting the motion for summary judgment in part. The federal
court noted that M.R. dismissed his claim against Watts for
violation of Government Code section 11135. Due to the parties’
convoluted citations to evidence, the court stated that it had
stopped searching their submissions for evidence and simply
concluded that neither party met its burden as to any issue which
required the court to consider facts or fact-based arguments.
With respect to the Unruh Act claim, the court noted that in
Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 367 (Brennon
B.), the California appellate court found public school districts
are not business establishments subject to the Unruh Act. The
federal court applied the reasoning of Brennon B. to conclude
charter schools share the characteristics of public school districts
that Brennon B. relied upon, and charter schools are in some
circumstances deemed to be school districts, so charter schools
are not business establishments subject to liability under the
Unruh Act. The court granted summary adjudication of the
Unruh Act claim in favor of Watts.
As to the ADA claims against Watts, the federal court
concluded public schools are subject to Title II of the ADA, and
charter schools are part of California’s public school system, so
were subject to Title II and not Title III of the ADA. The court
granted summary adjudication of the Title III ADA claim in favor
of Watts.
The federal court found M.R. was required to exhaust
remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.; IDEA) before bringing claims based on
the ADA or Section 504. The court granted summary
adjudication of the Title II ADA claim based on failure to exhaust
5
the IDEA administrative process. The court declined to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims
and remanded the case to state court.
C. After Remand, Second Motion for Summary
Judgment
On June 6, 2023, after remand to the state trial court,
Watts filed a second motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative, for summary adjudication of several issues, including
the claim for punitive damages. Watts argued that under
Government Code section 818, the charter school was not subject
to punitive damages, and there was no evidence of malicious,
oppressive, or fraudulent conduct. In addition, there was no
evidence to support finding Watts vicariously liable for the acts of
its employee because Watts had no advance knowledge that an
employee was unfit, Watts did not authorize or ratify the conduct
at issue, and Watts was not personally guilty of malice,
oppression, or fraud. Watts also argued that the negligence claim
was barred by the failure to exhaust administrative remedies
under IDEA.
In addition to submitting evidence in support of the motion
for summary judgment, Watts filed a motion requesting the state
trial court take judicial notice of pleadings filed in connection
with the motion for summary judgment in federal court.
On August 31, 2023, M.R. filed an opposition to the motion
for summary judgment and submitted supporting evidence. M.R.
argued that Government Code section 818 did not preclude
punitive damages because Watts was not a public entity. In
addition, M.R. argued there were triable issues of fact because
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the evidence showed M.R. told the PE teacher about his
disability, but the PE teacher displayed a dismissive attitude on
several occasions and ordered M.R. to run anyway. The PE
teacher was supposed to let a student sit out if the student
presented a medical excuse that could not be verified and call the
student’s parents, which the PE teacher did not do. M.R. argued
this was a conscious disregard for M.R.’s safety, which
constituted evidence of malice and amounted to oppression. With
respect to vicarious liability, M.R. argued he could present
evidence that Watts did not discipline the PE teacher, who
continued to be teaching at the time of his deposition. Failing to
remove or discipline the PE teacher was arguably ratification by
Watts.
On the negligence claim, M.R. argued a recent United
States Supreme Court case, Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Sch. (2023) 598
U.S. 142 (Perez), showed M.R.’s ADA claim should not have been
dismissed for failure to exhaust IDEA’s administrative remedies,
and even more so, exhaustion could not support dismissal of
M.R.’s negligence claim. In a footnote, M.R. stated that he
intended to file a motion for new trial to set aside the federal
court order granting summary adjudication in light of the new
authority. M.R. also filed a request for judicial notice of certain
documents, including the federal court order.
In support of the opposition, M.R. submitted his deposition
testimony. One or two weeks after the start of school, during
class, M.R. told his PE teacher that he had a bone disease and
could not run track. The PE teacher’s attitude was dismissive; he
scoffed and said, “Whatever.” M.R. was told to finish his run
within a time limit or his grade would be lowered. M.R. told his
PE teacher about his bone condition on two other occasions. On
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the day of the incident, M.R. told the PE teacher that he was not
supposed to be running and the PE teacher gave the same
reaction as before.
M.R. submitted the deposition testimony of the PE teacher,
Joshua Spencer. Watts has been Spencer’s employer for five
years and he was invited to teach the following year. He is a
teacher; he is not a board member and does not hold an
administrative services credential. He has received annual
training to write a report in the event of an injury. Kids have
given him a million excuses for why they could not run during
PE. When students say they have a disability that prevents them
from running, Spencer checks a mobile application provided by
the school to see if the disability is listed in the student’s records.
If not, Spencer allows the student to sit out, and then after class,
Spencer goes to the office to look at the student’s records. If the
information is not in the records, Spencer calls the student’s
parents. The student’s grade is not affected while Spencer is
getting to the bottom of it. If it turns out the student lied, the
student’s grade will be affected. Spencer stated that M.R. did not
tell him before the accident that he had a disability or a bone
condition and was not supposed to run. After M.R. was injured,
he told Spencer that he had a bone condition. Spencer looked it
up on the mobile application at that time, but the application did
not list that M.R. had a bone condition or could not participate.
M.R.’s separate statement of facts did not identify any
evidence to support that Watts ratified the PE teacher’s
purported conduct.
LAUSD also filed an opposition to the second motion for
summary judgment as to whether Watts requested records from
LAUSD or had access to information about M.R.’s medical
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condition through a different computer program, which is the one
that LAUSD uses.
Watts filed a reply to the second motion for summary
judgment arguing that it was not subject to punitive damages,
and there was no clear and convincing evidence of the type of
conduct necessary to support punitive damages. At most, M.R.’s
evidence established the PE teacher had a cavalier attitude
toward his disability, which was not enough to meet the standard
to impose liability. And even if the PE teacher were cavalier,
there was no evidence that a managing agent of Watts knew of
Spencer’s purported attitude toward M.R. and ratified it through
evidence indicating an intent to adopt or approve malicious acts.
A hearing was held on the second motion for summary
judgment. During the hearing, based on the trial court’s
statements, M.R.’s counsel mentioned that M.R. would like to
revive causes of action under the ADA and Section 504.
The trial court granted the second motion for summary
judgment in part. The court granted summary adjudication of
the cause of action for violation of the DPA. The DPA applies to
private schools, not public schools, and Watts is a public charter
school. The court concluded that neither party established the
federal court ruling had collateral estoppel effect. The motion
was also granted as to the DPA because the DPA is concerned
with physical access to public spaces, but M.R. did not allege
M.R. was physically denied access to a public facility.
The superior court granted summary adjudication of the
issue of punitive damages, finding that charter schools are part of
the public school system, and punitive damages may not be
recovered against a public entity. In all other respects, the
motion was denied.
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D. LAUSD Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
On September 7, 2023, LAUSD filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings as to causes of action alleged against LAUSD for
violations of the ADA, Section 504, Government Code section
11135, the Unruh Act, and the DPA. LAUSD argued that M.R.
could not succeed on the Unruh Act claim based on the reasoning
of Brennon B., supra, and could not succeed on the ADA and
Section 504 claims based on the federal court’s summary
adjudication order and the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
In support of the motion for judgment on the pleadings,
LAUSD submitted several documents, including Watts’ first
motion for summary judgment filed in federal court, M.R.’s
opposition to the motion for summary judgment in federal court,
and the federal court’s March 23, 2022 order granting in part
Watts’ first motion for summary judgment.
M.R. filed an opposition to the motion for judgment on the
pleadings. First, M.R. dismissed, as to LAUSD only, the causes of
action under Title III of the ADA, Government Code section
11135, the Unruh Act, and the DPA. Second, as to the causes of
action for violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504, M.R.
argued that collateral estoppel did not apply. In addition, M.R.
argued that the trial court was not required to adopt the federal
court’s ruling on Watts’ first motion for summary adjudication.
The court had the power to reconsider the federal court’s ruling
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. M.R. argued that the
“law of the case” doctrine did not preclude reconsideration and
the court should revoke the federal court’s order. New United
State Supreme Court authority, Perez, supra, made clear that
10
exhaustion under the IDEA was not required. M.R. requested
reconsideration of the federal court’s ruling as to exhaustion.
On October 25, 2023, the trial court denied the motion for
judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded LAUSD had not
established the federal court’s order had collateral estoppel effect.
The federal court ruling was an interlocutory order, which was
not part of a final judgment, and did not have collateral estoppel
effect precluding relitigation of the issue in the state court. M.R.
was not required to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies
before bringing his ADA claim in this case. The court explained
that M.R. had requested reconsideration of the federal court’s
ruling under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c),
which gives the court discretion to modify an order at any time if
the court determines a change in law warrants reconsideration of
a prior order. LAUSD argued M.R. had not met the requirements
for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008,
but the court concluded it had authority to reconsider the order
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (c), which
limits a party’s ability to file repetitive motions but does not limit
the court’s ability to reconsider its prior interim orders to correct
its own errors, and additionally, the court had discretion to
reconsider an order on its own motion based on its constitutional
authority.
The trial court also found that the federal court was
“unavailable” to reconsider the order because it no longer had
jurisdiction, which had been returned to state court. The court
concluded, under the guidance of Perez, that M.R. was not
required to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies before
pursuing his Title II ADA and Section 504 claims. Therefore, the
11
court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to those
causes of action against LAUSD.
E. Trial and Judgment
At a final status conference on January 24, 2024, Watts
noted there was no ADA claim against it. M.R. argued that based
on a request in opposition to LAUSD’s motion for judgment on
pleadings, the trial court reconsidered the ADA and Section 504
claims against Watts on the court’s own motion. M.R.
acknowledged, however, that the court never expressly stated the
claims were revived as to Watts. The court noted that Watts was
not even a party to the motion for judgment on the pleadings,
M.R. had not requested reconsideration as to Watts, and Watts
had no notice of any potential reconsideration or opportunity to
brief the issues. The court concluded the ADA and Section 504
claims brought against Watts had not been reconsidered and
remained dismissed. The court noted, however, that while the
claims remained dismissed at present because no one asked,
“ ‘What about Watts?’ ”, the claims against Watts could come
back. M.R.’s counsel indicated that he would talk to opposing
counsel about the situation.
A jury trial was held in March 2025. No reporter’s
transcript of the trial proceedings has been incorporated in the
appellate record. After M.R.’s presentation of evidence, the trial
court granted LAUSD’s motion for nonsuit on the causes of action
for negligence and negligent hiring. On the negligence issue
presented to the jury, the jury found in favor of M.R. and against
Watts. On March 14, 2025, the court entered judgment in favor
of M.R. in the amount of $12,960 as against Watts and entered a
12
judgment of dismissal as to LAUSD. M.R. filed a timely notice of
appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Federal Court Order
M.R. contends the federal court erred by granting summary
adjudication of claims against Watts for violation of the ADA,
Section 504, and the Unruh Act. M.R. first asks this court to
directly review the federal court’s summary adjudication ruling
de novo. Alternatively, M.R. attempts to frame the Superior
Court’s purported refusal to revisit and redetermine the ADA,
Section 504 and Unruh Act claims in M.R.’s favor as trial court
error subject to our review. These issues have not been properly
raised on appeal.
1. No Basis for Direct Review of the Federal Court
Order
First, with respect to direct review of the federal district
court’s order granting partial summary judgment, that order
became appealable to the Ninth Circuit at the time the district
court entered its remand order, even though several state claims
had not been addressed by the federal district court. (See Haase
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (5th Cir. 2014) 748 F.3d 624,
628 [order granting partial summary judgment, although not
final disposition of all claims, was final as to the claims already
adjudicated].) As the Haase court explained: “remand orders are
‘appealable’ final judgments [to the federal appellate court]
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because as a practical matter, remands end federal litigation and
leave the district court with nothing else to do. [Citation.]” (Id. at
629) Despite the opportunity to do so, M.R. did not make any
attempt to seek review of the federal district court’s grant of
partial summary judgment in the federal appellate court. M.R.
cites to no authority where a California appellate court has
directly reviewed the summary judgment ruling of a federal
district court under these, or indeed any circumstances.
Second, even if it could be argued that this court has
authority to review the federal district court’s order, our
appellate record is inadequate to allow review of the partial
summary judgment motion at issue here. Watts’ first motion for
summary judgment raised several arguments as to each cause of
action, many of them based on the evidence submitted with the
motion. However, our appellate record does not include the
separate statements or any of the evidence submitted in
connection with the summary judgment motion. Accordingly,
this appellate court has no basis to independently review the
issues from Watts’ first motion for summary judgment. Error
must be affirmatively shown through an adequate record, and no
error has been shown. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th
1122, 1140–1141.)
2. No Showing of Trial Court Error
Nor are we persuaded by M.R.’s effort on appeal to seek to
overturn the federal district court’s partial summary judgment
orders indirectly, by claiming the Superior Court erred in not
doing so itself. In assessing M.R.’s claim of error, we assume,
without deciding, that the Superior Court had the authority to
14
redetermine the summary judgment motion filed in federal
court.1 In the present case, in ruling on LAUSD’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings after remand, the trial court expressly
stated that it was not bound by the federal court’s summary
adjudication ruling and issue preclusion did not apply. To the
extent the issues in Watts’ first summary judgment motion could
have been relitigated in state court after remand, M.R. did not
request relitigation of the summary judgment motion as to Watts.
As a result, there is no ruling by the trial court on the issues in
Watts’ first summary judgment motion for this appellate court to
review.
M.R. next contends the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to reconsider the federal court order granting summary
adjudication of the ADA and Section 504 claims against Watts on
its own motion. To the extent that the trial court had authority
to consider the issues on its own motion, we find no abuse of
discretion has been shown. “Under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1008, subdivision (c), if the court ‘at any time determines
1 If a federal district court’s determination of an issue in
connection with a remand order is not reviewable, it is not
preclusive and may be relitigated in state court. (See Whitman v.
Raley’s Inc. (9th Cir. 1989) 886 F.2d 1177, 1181 [federal court’s
preemption ruling had no preclusive effect on state court’s
consideration of same issue after remand]; In re Loudermilch
(11th Cir. 1998) 158 F.3d 1143, 1146 [district court preemption
ruling in connection with remand order had no preclusive effect
on subsequent state court resolution of preemption defense].)
The law of the case doctrine applies only to appellate court
decisions and does not apply if intervening decisions clarified
controlling law. (AT&T Communications, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1673, 1680; Adams v. Pacific Bell Directory
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-100.)
15
that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider
a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion.’ This
subdivision does not define what constitutes a ‘change of law,’
and its terminology gives the court very broad power. (Weil &
Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The
Rutter Group 2012) ¶ 9:340, p. 9(1)-135 (rev. #1, 2012).).”
(Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
96, 106–107, fn. omitted.) A trial court may also exercise its
inherent authority, on its own motion, to reconsider interim
rulings that the court concludes were erroneous, without
satisfying the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section
1008, subdivision (c). (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094,
1103; In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301,
1311–1312; Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court, supra, 218
Cal.App.4th 96, 106–107, fn. 17.) The trial court’s ruling on a
motion for reconsideration, including a court’s decision not to
exercise its discretion to reconsider an issue, is reviewed under
the abuse of discretion standard. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v.
Superior Court, supra, at p. 106.)
Even if the trial court was not precluded by the federal
district court order from reconsidering issues in Watt’s motion for
summary judgment on its own motion after remand to state
court, no abuse of discretion has been shown in this case. In
opposition to LAUSD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
M.R. requested that the trial court reconsider the federal court’s
ruling on the issue of IDEA exhaustion based on new legal
authority. But M.R. never requested the trial court exercise its
discretion to reconsider the issues summarily adjudicated by the
federal court in favor of Watts. The parties requested that the
court take judicial notice of pleadings filed in federal court, but
16
the separate statements and evidence submitted in connection
with Watts’ first motion for summary judgment were not
provided to the trial court (just as they have not been provided to
us). Watts’ first motion for summary judgment contained several
arguments about factual issues in addition to the exhaustion
argument. We cannot say on this record that the trial court
abused its discretion, when there was no request by any party to
exercise any authority that the trial court might have to
reconsider the issues presented by Watts’ first motion for
summary judgment, and the necessary record was not provided to
the trial court.
B. Punitive Damages
In M.R.’s opening brief on appeal, he contends the issue of
punitive damages should not have been summarily adjudicated
because Watts is a private nonprofit public benefit corporation,
not a public entity exempt from punitive damages. In response,
Watts asserts that even if the charter school were subject to
claims for punitive damages, the evidence showed M.R. could not
satisfy the requirements to award punitive damages. In reply,
M.R. failed to address the factual basis for punitive damages. We
conclude that, even assuming Watts is a private entity subject to
punitive damages, and even assuming triable issues of fact
existed as to whether the PE teacher’s alleged conduct
constituted malice or oppression, there was no evidence
submitted from which a trier of fact could find Watts vicariously
liable for punitive damages based on the PE teacher’s conduct.
Civil Code, section 3294 authorizes an award of punitive
damages “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence
17
that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice.” (§ 3294, subd. (a).) An employer is not vicariously liable
for punitive damages based on an employee’s act, however,
“unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of
the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard
of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the
wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was
personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to
a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious
disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud,
or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing
agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) Civil
Code section 3294, subdivision (b) does not require an employer
with advance knowledge of an employee’s unfitness to terminate
the employee based on the employee’s abusive conduct, but
rather, the statute imposes a duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent the employee from continuing to be abusive. (Weeks v.
Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1157.)
“ ‘[W]here the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof will be by
clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard of proof must
be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is to
prevail on a claim for punitive damages, it will be necessary that
the evidence presented meet the higher evidentiary standard.’
[Citation.]” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159.)
“Summary judgment or summary adjudication ‘ “ ‘on the issue of
punitive damages is proper’ only ‘when no reasonable jury could
find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of
malice, fraud or oppression.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
18
No evidence was submitted or identified in M.R.’s separate
statement of facts to support a finding that Watts was aware of,
approved, or ratified the PE teacher’s alleged conduct. In
opposition to the motion in the trial court, M.R. asserted he could
submit evidence that the PE teacher was never disciplined for the
incident and continued teaching, which he argued supported
finding that Watts ratified the teacher’s conduct, but no evidence
about a lack of disciplinary action was submitted or identified.
Standing alone, the fact that the PE teacher continued to be
employed at the school was not sufficient to establish that no
disciplinary action was taken, that the school has not taken
reasonable steps to prevent abusive conduct in the future, that
the school failed to investigate the conduct, or that the school
ratified the PE teacher’s conduct. On appeal, after Watts noted
the lack of evidence of ratification, M.R. failed to address any of
the factual issues concerning vicarious liability in his reply brief.
We conclude the trial court properly granted summary
adjudication of the punitive damages issue because there was no
evidence from which a trier of fact could find the statutory
requirements were met to hold Watts vicariously liable for
punitive damages based on the PE teacher’s conduct.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Watts Learning
Center Foundation, Inc., is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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