Filed 10/21/26 Hale v. Drysdale CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
CHRIS HALE,
Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and
Respondent,
v. A172693
RAY DRYSDALE, et al.,
(Mendocino County
Defendants, Cross-
Super. Ct. No. 22CV00030)
complainants and Appellants;
RAQUEL HALE, et al.,
Cross-defendants and
Respondents.
Chris Hale (Hale) and Ray Drysdale (Drysdale) are former business
partners turned litigation adversaries. In this action filed by Hale, the trial
court appointed a receiver over the entities through which Hale and Drysdale
had operated their business and ultimately approved the receiver’s
settlement of the entities’ derivative claims against Hale and his associates.
Drysdale and his co-defendant Joan Griswold (Griswold) appeal from the
order approving the settlement.
In evaluating the settlement, the trial court improperly relied on
documents it reviewed in camera that were not disclosed to appellants or
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their counsel and did not make a record of its review. As a result, we must
reverse the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2018, Hale and Drysdale agreed to establish a business to market
and distribute commercial agricultural products. Three entities were formed
to carry out the enterprise: PC1 Holdings, Inc. (PC1 Holdings), PureCrop1
Disco Bay, Inc. (PureCrop1), and R.C. Formulas, LLC (collectively, the PC1
Entities). According to Hale, he and Drysdale agreed they would each hold
an equal ownership interest in the PC1 Entities, but Drysdale purported to
grant a 15 percent interest in PC1 Holdings to his mother, Griswold.
Drysdale claims Hale agreed to this arrangement, as Griswold was a
financial backer and investor in PureCrop1. Drysdale also has claimed that
he personally “discovered” the proprietary formula for the PC1 Entities’ main
product—which Hale maintains is owned by their former supplier.
A. Hale and Drysdale Accuse One Another of Embezzlement
Hale accused Drysdale of planning to seize control of the PC1 Entities’
business and embezzling funds from PureCrop1. In January 2022, he moved
PureCrop1’s funds to a new corporate account and filed this lawsuit against
Drysdale, Griswold, and the PC1 Entities, alleging breach of fiduciary duty
and related claims against Drysdale and seeking to remove him as a director
of PureCrop1. Hale filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining
order, an order to show cause concerning a preliminary injunction, and an
order appointing a receiver. Meanwhile, Drysdale and Griswold filed a cross-
complaint against Hale (individually and as trustee of his family trust), his
wife Raquel Hale, and the PC1 Entities, alleging it was the Hales who
embezzled funds from PureCrop1.
2
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and order to show
cause, then held a hearing at which both Hale and Drysdale testified. The
court concluded that neither party “should be running the company” and
ordered that a receiver be appointed. Hale and Drysdale each proposed an
individual to serve as the receiver.
B. The Trial Court Appoints a Receiver and Authorizes the Sale of
the PC1 Entities’ Tangible Assets and Intellectual Property
In March 2022, the trial court appointed Hale’s proposed receiver. The
receiver informed counsel for Drysdale and Griswold that he would cause
PureCrop1 to cease operating—which Drysdale and Griswold opposed. Over
their opposition, the court issued a supplemental order authorizing the
receiver “[t]o bring and defend lawsuits on behalf of the” PC1 Entities and
“negotiate and settle . . . any claims of the Entities against third parties and
any claims of third parties against the Entities”; to engage an “appraiser and
auctioneers if deemed necessary to the orderly administration or liquidation
of the receivership estate”; and to perform all acts necessary “to preserving,
protecting and/or liquidating the assets” of the entities. Drysdale and
Griswold did not appeal the original or supplemental orders appointing the
receiver.
The receiver reported to the trial court that the sole manufacturer of
what was, by then, the PC1 Entities’ only product had terminated its supply
agreement with one of the entities because Drysdale violated the agreement
by marketing the product for non-agricultural use. The receiver determined
that the PC1 Entities were insolvent and unable to continue operating
without a supply agreement in place. He filed a motion for authorization to
sell the entities’ intellectual property and tangible assets by public auction,
which the trial court granted. Hale was the successful bidder as to the
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intellectual property and PureCrop1 customer Craig Calandra was the
successful bidder on the tangible assets. Drysdale maintained that he was
prohibited from submitting a higher bid when the auctioneer imposed
previously undisclosed bidding requirements. However, Drysdale and
Griswold did not appeal from the order authorizing the auction or the order
denying their motion to decline confirmation of the resulting sales.
C. The Receiver Settles the PC1 Entities’ Derivative Claims
In January 2023, Drysdale and Griswold filed a separate action against
the Hales and other defendants (Drysdale, et al. v. Hale, et al. (Super. Ct. San
Mateo County, 2024, No. 23CV00080, the Trade Secrets Action)), alleging the
Hales had sold PureCrop1’s product to its largest customer (Raven Farms,
managed by Calandra) using newly formed entities they controlled (including
West Coast Ag Products, Inc. (West Coast Ag)), and had misappropriated
PureCrop1’s customer list and related information in doing so. In the last of
a series of rulings on demurrer, the trial court found that the claims alleged
in the Trade Secrets Action belonged to the PC1 Entities and only the
receiver had standing to pursue them. Judgment entered in the Trade
Secrets Action in April 2024, and Drysdale and Griswold appealed (Case
No. A171184). That appeal remains pending.
Meanwhile, the receiver filed a motion for approval of a settlement of
the PC1 Entities’ derivative claims against Hale, Drysdale, and others,
including those pending in this action and the Trade Secrets Action. Per the
proposed settlement, Hale and associated individuals and entities would pay
$415,000 for a release of the claims against them, as well as the assignment
of the claims against Drysdale and his associates, subject to an overbidding
procedure. Drysdale and Griswold opposed the motion, which the trial court
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denied without prejudice. They also filed a motion to terminate the
receivership, which the trial court denied.1
Several months later, the receiver filed a motion for approval of a
similar settlement, adjusted to account for the separate resolution of certain
claims against both Hale (for using corporate funds to buy real property) and
Drysdale (for using corporate funds to buy classic cars). The new settlement
provided that Hale and associates would pay $227,000 for the release of the
claims against them.
Hale informed the court that “at some yet-unknown party’s instigation,
[he] became aware of complaints made to law enforcement” and “was
subsequently subjected to a raid and search warrant served by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.” The receiver explained that these events had
delayed the settlement and proposed that in evaluating it, the trial court
review the Hales’ financial information in camera. Drysdale and Griswold
opposed the receiver’s motion to approve the new settlement and filed a
motion to remove or replace the receiver. As discussed in more detail below,
the court ultimately did review various documents in camera over Drysdale
and Griswold’s objections—without allowing them or their counsel to see the
documents.
In August 2024, the trial court heard oral argument on both appellants’
motion concerning the receiver and the receiver’s motion concerning the
settlement. By written order in November 2024, the court denied Drysdale
and Griswold’s motion to remove or replace the receiver and granted the
1 In October 2023, Drysdale and Griswold filed a petition for writ of
prohibition in this court, arguing that the trial court had erroneously denied
their motion to terminate the receivership and would likely grant a renewed
motion by the receiver to settle the derivative claims (Case No. A168839).
We denied the petition.
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receiver’s motion to approve the settlement of the derivative claims, with
modifications proposed by a creditor. The court issued a formal order setting
forth and approving the terms of the compromise on December 13, 2024.
Drysdale sought to overbid on the derivative claims, prompting the
receiver to file a petition for instructions to disqualify his request for failing
to include “(1) details about the bid including the amount, whether the bid
was all cash, and if not, the collateral offered to secure the bid, and (2) proof
of ability to perform upon reasonable request by Receiver.” In February
2025, the court issued an order disqualifying Drysdale’s request to overbid,
confirming the sale of the derivative claims against Hale and his associates to
Hale and his associates, and authorizing the receiver to dismiss those claims
with prejudice.2 On June 27, 2025, the court issued an order dismissing the
claims against Hale and his associates with prejudice per the settlement.3
Drysdale and Griswold filed a notice of appeal from the December 13,
2024 order, commencing this appeal. They also appealed from the June 27,
2025 order, but abandoned that appeal (Case No. A174631).
2 Drysdale and Griswold filed an ex parte application to stay further
proceedings concerning the settlement until this court resolved either
(1) their second petition for a writ of prohibition or an appeal concerning the
December 13, 2024 order or (2) the appeal in the Trade Secrets Action. The
trial court denied this request. We denied Drysdale and Griswold’s second
petition for a writ of prohibition in February 2025 (Case No. A172424).
3 We grant the Hales’ request for judicial notice of this order.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) Drysdale and Griswold oppose the
request on various grounds related to the order’s meaning, impact, and
effectiveness. We address these issues below insofar as they impact our
analysis, but they have no bearing on our ability to take judicial notice of the
fact that the order exists.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Appealability and Mootness
The Hales and the receiver4 maintain that the trial court’s December
13, 2024 order is interlocutory and not appealable, and in any case, the
appeal from that order is moot because Drysdale and Griswold failed to
obtain a stay of the sale of the derivative claims, which has now been
completed. We do not agree.
As Drysdale and Griswold contend, the December 2024 order is
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The doctrine has long been
applied in receivership proceedings and applies to an interlocutory order that
finally determines a collateral matter “distinct and severable” from the
general subject of the litigation and directs the payment of money or
performance of an act. (See Koshak v. Malek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1540,
1545–1546 [applying collateral order doctrine to an order requiring defendant
business partner to pay restitution to receiver over disputed business,
although funds could be returned as the underlying litigation was resolved].)
It was applied in analogous circumstances to ours in Fish v. Fish (1932)
216 Cal. 14, 14–15 (Fish), where a receiver was appointed in proceedings
concerning spousal support and division of property. The trial court entered
an order “settling the receiver’s account, fixing his compensation . . . , [and]
directing a named commissioner to sell, subject to confirmation, certain
property in the receiver’s hands to pay said fees . . . .” (Id. at p. 15.) Our
Supreme Court held the order was appealable under the collateral order
doctrine, reasoning that the plaintiff had an interest in the receivership
4 The receiver filed a responsive brief separate from the respondents’
brief filed by the Hales, which we have considered in the absence of any
objection by Drysdale and Griswold.
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property and the order for its sale, “if carried into execution, . . . will deprive
her of a portion of the property or the [sale] proceeds”: the order was
therefore “in effect final as to the matters therein determined . . . .” (Id. at
p. 16.) Similarly, here, the resolution of the derivative claims was collateral
to the ongoing proceedings, and the December 2024 order finally approved
their settlement on particular terms and directed the implementation of the
settlement through payment of funds to the receiver, subject to an
overbidding process. While the settlement remained to be finalized, that was
true of the sale in Fish as well. (See also City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 670, 683 (Horspool) [while receiver’s sale is not final until
confirmed by the trial court, “it has been held that an order approving the
sale of assets is final and appealable” under the collateral order doctrine].)
Moreover, the mere fact that the settlement has now been finalized,
and the derivative claims against Hale and his associates released and
dismissed, does not moot Drysdale and Griswold’s appeal from the December
2024 order. “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for
[a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief whatever.” ’ ” (Golden State Water Co. v. Public Utilities
Com. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 380, 393.) Here, trial court proceedings continue in
this action, and the judgment in the Trade Secrets Action is before us on
appeal. The Hales and the receiver do not explain why we could not remand
this matter to the trial court to direct the receiver to return the settlement
payments and vacate the orders confirming the settlement and dismissing
the derivative claims if appropriate, potentially allowing the Trade Secrets
Action to continue. (See Code Civ. Proc.,5 § 908 [when an “order is reversed
5 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise indicated.
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or modified, the reviewing court may direct that the parties be returned so
far as possible to the positions they occupied before the enforcement of or
execution on the . . . order”]; Beach Break Equities, LLC v. Lowell (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 847, 852 [even absent a specific order by the court of appeal,
the trial court “has the inherent authority to” grant such “restitutionary
relief”].) There is no indication that the settlement funds have been
expended, and the claims were not sold to a third party like the real property
in Horspool, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pages 682–683. The parties claiming
mootness have the burden to establish that an appeal is moot (Becerra v.
McClatchy Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 913, 927, fn. 4), and the Hales and the
receiver have failed to meet that burden here. (See Speirs v. BlueFire
Ethanol Fuels, Inc. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 969, 980 (Speirs) [appeal was not
moot due to enforcement of judgment where trial court could direct plaintiffs
to return shares, assuming they retained possession].)
In sum, Drysdale and Griswold’s appeal from the December 13, 2024
order is properly before us. But before we address its merits, we dispose of
certain issues raised by the appellants’ briefing that are not.
B. Receiver’s Appointment and Authority
Much of appellants’ briefing attacks the trial court’s authority to
appoint the receiver and authorize him to sell the PC1 Entities’ assets in the
first place. But the order and supplemental order appointing the receiver
were appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(7). Drysdale and
Griswold did not appeal from those orders, forfeiting their right to challenge
them on appeal. (See Schrage v. Schrage (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 126, 137–148
& fn. 11 [dismissing belated appeal from order appointing a receiver;
although styled as an appeal from a void judgment, the order was merely
voidable]; see generally § 906 [while we may review some intermediate
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rulings in certain appeals, this does not authorize review of an “order from
which an appeal might have been taken” but was not]; In re Baycol
Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761–762, fn. 8 [“California follows a ‘one
shot’ rule under which, if an order is appealable, appeal must be taken or the
right to appellate review is forfeited”].) We therefore do not address most of
Drysdale and Griswold’s arguments about the receiver’s appointment and
authority to sell the PC1 Entities’ assets.
Briefly, we do consider appellants’ argument that the order and
supplemental order appointing the receiver did not actually authorize the
receiver to settle claims against the Hales, because the supplemental order
authorized the receiver “[t]o negotiate and settle . . . any claims of [the PC1
Entities] against third parties . . .” (italics added), and the claims addressed
by the December 2024 order include claims against parties to the action.
Assuming appellants are correct and this provision of the supplemental order
did not specifically authorize the receiver to settle derivative claims against
parties to the action, the order went on to broadly grant the receiver “all of
the powers and authority provided by law to receivers,” in addition to those
specified in the order. Even if the order did not expressly authorize the
receiver to settle derivative claims against parties to the action, it “did not
preclude that possibility,” and the trial court was correct to conclude that
such power was included in the order’s broad grant of authority to the
receiver, so that the receiver had the power to sell and settle the derivative
claims “subject to [the] court[’s] confirmation.” (Cal-American Income
Property Fund VII v. Brown Development Corp. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 268,
274 (Cal-American); see generally De Forrest v. Coffey (1908) 154 Cal. 444,
451–452 [trial court “ ‘may direct claims in favor of the corporation to be sued
on by the receiver in other tribunals or may leave him to adjust or settle
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them without suit, as in his judgment may be most beneficial to those
interested in the estate’ ”].)
We turn to Drysdale and Griswold’s remaining arguments concerning
the December 13, 2024 order itself.
C. No Conflict with Prior Trial Court Statements
As an initial matter, Drysdale and Griswold claim the first trial court
judge, who initially oversaw both this and the Trade Secrets Action, made
statements in a ruling denying their ex parte application to postpone the sale
of the PC1 Entities’ assets and in a tentative ruling in the Trade Secrets
Action that, either individually or “certainly . . . in combination,” amount to a
ruling that they could pursue the derivative claims against the Hales and
their associates. Appellants claim it was error for the second trial court judge
who issued the December 13, 2024 order to contradict this ruling by allowing
the receiver to settle these claims.
We disagree. The statements that appellants rely on were not
components of the trial court’s rulings on the matters before it. Drysdale and
Griswold do not show that the first trial court judge ever ruled that they, and
not the receiver, had standing to pursue derivative claims on behalf of the
PC1 Entities.
D. The Trial Court Improperly Relied on Documents Reviewed In
Camera to Approve the Settlement
We turn to the merits of the trial court’s approval of the settlement.6
On appellate review, “court rulings on receivership matters are afforded
6 During oral argument, the Hales asserted for the first time that
Drysdale and Griswold were not interested parties to the settlement of
derivative claims and were required to receive “less stringent” due process.
That argument is forfeited. (Goldstein v. Superior Court (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 736, 746, fn. 8.)
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considerable deference[,] . . . even where the court confirms extraordinary
action by the receiver, such as a sale of real property.” (City of Santa
Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 931.) “ ‘Where there is no evidence
of fraud, unfairness, or oppression, the court has wide discretion in approving
the receiver’s proposed actions,’ ” and we review for abuse of discretion.
(County of Sonoma v. Quail (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 657, 671, quoting City of
Santa Monica; see also People v. Stark (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 184, 205–206
[“ ‘ “Generally speaking if no good reason appears for refusing to confirm a
receiver’s sale, such as chilling of bids or other misconduct or gross
inadequacy of price, the sale should be confirmed . . . .” ’ ”].) “An abuse of
discretion is demonstrated if the court’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence or the court applied an improper legal standard or
otherwise based its determination on an error of law.” (City of Crescent
City v. Reddy (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 458, 466.)
1. The Receiver’s Motion and the Trial Court’s Ruling
The receiver’s motion to approve the settlement was based on his
assessment that it would be difficult and costly to collect a substantial
judgment from the Hales and associated entities. The motion was supported
by the receiver’s own declaration as well as a declaration by Shelby Hale,
Hale’s daughter and a former vice president of PureCrop1—but not any
sworn statement by Hale. Appellants objected to both the receiver’s
declaration and the declaration by Shelby Hale on various grounds.
The receiver declared that the PC1 Entities did not maintain directors
and officers liability insurance, the Hales had “less than $110,000 in non-
exempt assets and unsecured liabilities in excess of that amount,” and their
entity West Coast Ag would pledge its assets as collateral for the $227,000
settlement. The receiver explained that he or his counsel had reviewed
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documents concerning the Hales’ finances and those of West Coast Ag, which
would be produced for “in camera inspection should the Court wish to review
them.” In support of his initial motion for approval of a derivative
settlement, the receiver had attested to his conclusion that success in
pursuing the derivative claims was uncertain at best, and the cost of doing so
was likely to exceed any recovery.
Shelby Hale declared that when the PC1 Entities’ supplier ceased doing
business with those entities, they did not have enough product on hand to
supply their former customer Raven Farms. West Coast Ag “requested the
Supplier supply a similar but not identically blended product,” which it
provided “until later when West Coast Ag purchased PureCrop1’s assets
through the court-overseen auction process.” West Coast Ag sold the new
product to Raven Farms. But West Coast Ag and a related LLC had negative
net income after depreciation. Like the receiver’s declaration, Shelby Hale’s
declaration stated that relevant financial documents would be “made
available for in camera inspection if required.”
At an August 2024 hearing on the motion to approve the settlement,
the trial court overruled appellants’ evidentiary objections to the declarations
but noted it would “want to see these documents,” specifically, “the spread
sheets,” “the tax return,” and “however it’s been put to paper, the assets and
liabilities of Hale that support . . . available security” for the settlement.
(Capitalization omitted.) The court also raised a concern that the receiver
had not required Hale “to sign declarations under penalty of perjury attesting
to statements made on spreadsheets and itemizations of assets and liabilities
and so on . . . .” (Capitalization omitted.) The court indicated that without
such an attestation, it was “probably going to be inclined to have Mr. Hale
come in and give sworn testimony whether it’s in camera or not.”
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(Capitalization omitted.) In response, counsel for Hale and for the receiver
explained that Hale was not providing declarations under penalty of perjury
because he was asserting his Fifth Amendment rights in connection with the
pending criminal investigation, and this is why they had instead offered the
declaration by Shelby Hale.
Appellants’ counsel objected to the proposed in camera review, urging
that “this whole process contemplates you and these counsel looking at
documents which I and my clients can’t see.” (Capitalization omitted.) He
further objected that no authority to support such a procedure had been
identified. Appellants’ counsel alleged that Hale was “a millionaire many
times over based upon his misappropriations” and accused him of having
“Shelby Hale making the false statements for him because he’s still under
investigation.” (Capitalization omitted.) The trial court concluded the
hearing by reiterating that it would “look at the documents” and directing the
receiver’s counsel to “forward” them to the court. (Capitalization omitted.)
Appellants’ counsel requested a copy of any documents that were sent to the
court, and the court merely noted the request for the record.
The trial court granted the motion to approve the settlement in a
written ruling preceding the order on appeal, issued in November 2024. This
order stated that the court had considered the declarations by the receiver
and by Shelby Hale and had also “received in camera on September 21, 2024
financial information pertinent to the Hales which it has subsequently
evaluated in connection with the motion.” The order did not describe the
information the court had considered. Nor did it indicate that a record of the
court’s review had been created. In their appellate briefing, appellants assert
and the Hales do not dispute that the information the court reviewed in
camera was never provided to appellants or their counsel, and the parties do
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not suggest any record of the court’s review exists. On December 13, 2024,
the court issued the order on appeal, which set forth and approved the
specific terms of the settlement.
2. Analysis
Drysdale and Griswold correctly urge that, to approve the sale and
settlement of the derivative claims, the trial court was required to find both a
need to sell the claims and that the terms were fair and reasonable. (See
Cal-American, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at pp. 274–275 & fn. 7 [receiver must
show necessity for both the sale and its timing].) They claim the record lacks
admissible evidence to support either showing.
Appellants assert that their hearsay and other objections to the
receiver’s evidence “were meritorious,” but do not further explain their
position in their briefing on appeal. These evidentiary objections are
accordingly forfeited. (See Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 822, 842 [declining general request to revisit trial court’s
rulings on evidentiary objections unsupported by “reasoned argument
concerning . . . specific evidentiary objections . . .”].)
Putting these objections aside, we are inclined to agree with the Hales
that the record evidence supports a finding that settling the derivative claims
was necessary. Appellants fail to engage with the merits of the well-
supported conclusion that it was necessary to respond to the loss of the PC1
Entities’ sole supplier due to Drysdale’s marketing of the product for
nonagricultural use, conduct Drysdale appears to concede in his filings below.
Evidence suggested that litigating these positions would be costly and
collecting a large judgment would be unlikely.
But the trial court’s finding that the settlement terms were fair and
reasonable was based on its conclusions about the Hales’ financial
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condition—an issue Drysdale and Griswold continue to dispute.7 Appellants
claim the trial court violated their due process rights by considering
documents concerning the Hales’ finances in camera, without allowing them
or their counsel to review the documents. We agree, and because the court
failed to make an adequate record of the in camera review, we are unable to
find it did not prejudice appellants.8
Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309
(Concepcion) is instructive. There, the Court of Appeal reversed an award of
attorney fees and costs to class counsel issued after the trial court had
considered “ ‘information including time sheets and time records that [was]
submitted in camera’ ” but not disclosed to the opposing party. (Id. at
pp. 1318–1319, 1325–1328.) Concepcion reasoned that the opposing party
was entitled “to see and respond to” evidence presented to support the fee
request—indeed, such access is a fundamental “ ‘hallmark of our adversary
system.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1325–1326.)
Concepcion recognized that “[u]nder appropriate circumstances
Evidence Code section 915, subdivision (b), authorizes the trial court to
7 Without citation to the record, appellants argue that entities
controlled by the Hales may enjoy substantial revenues from sales of a
product “essentially identical” to the PC1 Entities’ product. They seem to
rely on a declaration by Drysdale filed in support of their ex parte application
for an order suspending the auction of the PC1 Entities’ assets. Given our
ruling, we need not discuss this issue in any detail, but leave it for the trial
court to address as appropriate.
8 Given this conclusion, we need not address Drysdale and Griswold’s
argument that the trial court’s approach renders the December 13, 2024
order reversible per se. We note that their briefing on due process, which
merely sets forth a string of citations concerning the general concept, does not
aid our analysis. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 412 [“the
problem with the string citations is that appellant’s counsel makes no effort
to explain how the authorities support her claim of error”].)
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receive in camera disclosure of information to assist in deciding whether it is
privileged and thus protected from disclosure.” (Concepcion, supra,
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326–1327, fn. 11.) But it emphasized that “[n]either
Evidence Code section 915 nor any other statutory provision authorizes the
court to use that information to decide the merits of a case if the other side has
not had an opportunity to review the material and be heard.” (Ibid., italics
added; see also Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040,
1055 [trial court appropriately did not consider sealed filings on summary
judgment because “under our adversarial system of justice, [the moving
party] was entitled to see and respond to any evidence offered . . . in
opposition to its motion . . .”].) Respondents’ authorities—which both concern
public access to court records and proceedings, not access by parties
themselves—are not to the contrary. (See Telegram-Tribune, Inc. v.
Municipal Court (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1075–1077 [affirming closure of
preliminary hearing to the public to protect the defendant’s right to a fair
trial]; Pack v. Kings County Human Services Agency (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
821, 837–838, fn. 14 [affirming juvenile court’s denial of press petitions for
disclosure of juvenile records, noting that in camera review is routine where
courts follow appropriate procedure that includes “preserv[ing] the in camera
record for later appellate review”].)
Here, the trial court requested and used the information it reviewed in
camera to decide the merits of the receiver’s motion, without explaining the
need to withhold the information, allowing appellants or their counsel to
review it, or preserving it for our review on appeal. As in Concepcion, this
was reversible error. (See also Conservatorship of Schaeffer (2002)
98 Cal.App.4th 159, 165 [court erred by failing to allow wife to view report by
husband’s attorney, which was unsupported by documentary evidence and
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“replete with hearsay”]; Rice v. Brown (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 100, 103–104,
107 [reversing judgment based on referee’s report that did not identify
documents or other evidence supporting its conclusions and was apparently
based in part on “ex parte conversations with counsel”].) We reverse the
order approving the settlement to allow the opportunity for a new hearing on
the motion, should the receiver continue to pursue it.
III. DISPOSITION
The December 13, 2024 order granting the receiver’s motion to
approve the settlement with the Hales is reversed and remanded for the
court to conduct a new hearing consistent with the views expressed herein.
In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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SMILEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
HUMES, P. J.
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
Hale v. Drysdale et al. / A172693
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