Filed 7/9/26 Haining v. Gratitude Lodge CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CLINTON HAINING et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G064850
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01340666)
GRATITUDE LODGE LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly A. Knill, Judge. Affirmed.
Neale & Fhima, Aaron D. Fhima; Joseph S. Socher for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Foran Glennon, Gabriel Ullrich and Justin Berg for Defendant
and Respondent.
This case comes to us after the trial court sustained a demurrer
without leave to amend and dismissed a negligence complaint filed by a
couple against a private substance abuse treatment facility. The couple,
Clinton “Travis” Haining and his wife, Jennifer (collectively, the Hainings),1
lived in the vicinity of the facility, Gratitude Lodge LLC, and one night were
awakened by the sounds of an intruder. In terror, Travis shot—and to our
understanding, killed—the advancing intruder, who did not respond to
Travis’s demands that he identify himself, allegedly causing the Hainings
emotional distress. Only afterward did the couple discover the man was a
resident in treatment at Gratitude Lodge who had left the facility in the
throes of a mental health episode. The court sustained the demurrer because
it found Gratitude Lodge owed no duty to the Hainings with respect to the
intruder.
Because we find the harm to the Hainings was not reasonably
foreseeable, we agree Gratitude Lodge did not owe the Hainings a duty and
affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
Gratitude Lodge operated an addiction treatment facility
providing inpatient detoxification and rehabilitation services in a small-group
environment. The facility was located 260 feet away from the Hainings’
residence.
1 We refer to the Hainings individually by their first names for
purposes of clarity and intend no disrespect in doing so.
2 The facts we recite are taken from the Hainings’ operative
complaint. “On appeal after a sustained demurrer, the court must assume the
truth of the factual allegations of the complaint.” (Beauchene v. Synanon
Foundation, Inc. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 342, 344 (Beauchene).)
2
Henry Lehr was admitted to the facility on August 23, 2021, for
addiction treatment. At the time of his admission, he was going through
withdrawal symptoms.
On the night of August 25, 2021, two days after Lehr arrived at
Gratitude Lodge, staff members witnessed him having auditory and visual
hallucinations of dogs and demons. Support staff from the facility transported
him to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with hallucinations,
“polysubstance abuse, opioid withdrawal, [alcohol] abuse[,] and marijuana
use.” He was discharged at 2:30 a.m. on August 26, 2021, and returned to
Gratitude Lodge, where his hallucinations of dogs continued.
During this time, staff members asked Lehr whether he was
okay. They told him, if he was not okay, he could be transported to College
Hospital, which offers treatment for people under Welfare & Institutions
Code section 5150, often referenced as an involuntary “section 5150 hold.”3
(See, e.g., Jacobs v. Grossmont Hospital (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 69, 71–72.) A
staff member recognized Lehr was not under the influence of a controlled
substance but was experiencing a mental health episode. Staff members gave
3 This statute, which is part of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) provides in pertinent part: “When a
person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to
themselves, or gravely disabled, a peace officer, professional person in charge
of a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment, member
of the attending staff, as defined by regulation, of a facility designated by the
county for evaluation and treatment, designated members of a mobile crisis
team, or professional person designated by the county may, upon probable
cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody for a period of up to
72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention, or placement for
evaluation and treatment in a facility designated by the county for evaluation
and treatment and approved by the State Department of Health Care
Services.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5150, subd. (a).)
3
him Ativan and Clonidine and requested sleep medication from the
pharmacy.
Lehr’s symptoms continued. He began talking with “‘the devil,’”
and attempted to perform an exorcism in his room. He hallucinated the
pillows on the couch were breathing and was observed swatting at them.
Staff members turned off the white noise machine in his room as he indicated
he believed spirits were communicating with him through it.
Lehr went downstairs and asked for a knife to kill a demon he
claimed to have caught. He then told staff the house was threatening and
decaying from the inside and they would die if they stayed there. He asked
for his belongings so he could leave.
Staff members attempted to stall Lehr from leaving while calling
the clinical director of the facility. They were unable to reach the clinical
director, so they attempted to call the facility manager. By the time they were
finally able to reach the facility manager at approximately 4:13 a.m., Lehr
had already left the facility. Thirteen minutes after they spoke to the facility
manager, staff members called 911.
The Hainings were asleep in their bed when Jennifer awoke,
having heard something. She woke Travis and told him she thought someone
was in the house. After they heard a crash, Travis told Jennifer to stay back
and retrieved his pistol.
Travis yelled, “‘Who is it!?’” multiple times. (Capitalization
omitted.) Gun in hand, he proceeded to the top of the stairs. The front door
appeared to be closed, but the doorframe was damaged and there were noises
coming from downstairs.
Just then, Travis saw someone running. The intruder was Lehr,
who had broken into the Hainings’ home. Lehr rounded the corner from the
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hallway to the staircase and began running up the stairs toward Travis.
Terrified, Travis continued to yell, “Who is it” and “Stop!” as Lehr continued
to come toward him. (Capitalization omitted.) Without hearing a response,
and not knowing if there was more than one intruder, Travis fatally shot
Lehr.
Jennifer called 911 at approximately 4:26 a.m. to report that an
intruder had kicked in their front door and her husband had shot him at
approximately 4:24 a.m. The Hainings have been coping with severe mental
and emotional distress in the aftermath of this incident.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Hainings filed a complaint against Gratitude Lodge, alleging
a single cause of action for negligence. The cause of action was based on
Gratitude Lodge’s alleged duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent Lehr
from engaging in dangerous behavior toward others. The Hainings alleged
Gratitude Lodge could have sent Lehr to College Hospital before the shooting
occurred, where he could have been evaluated for a Welfare & Institutions
Code section 5150 hold. They alleged Gratitude Lodge did not do so because it
feared losing Lehr’s $20,000 fee. They further alleged Gratitude Lodge was
cited by the Department of Health Care Services for its failure to refer Lehr
to a higher level of care that might have prevented this unfortunate incident.
Gratitude Lodge demurred, arguing the lawsuit was barred by
Beauchene, supra, 88 Cal.App.3d 342, which held a private rehabilitation
institution had no duty to protect the public from a criminal probationer who
left the premises and went on a violent spree. Gratitude Lodge further
argued leave to amend should not be granted as there was no statutory or
other legal precedent imposing a duty in this context.
5
The trial court sustained the demurrer and gave the Hainings
one opportunity to amend. The Hainings filed a first amended complaint,
which added more detail around the legal theories being alleged, as well as a
new theory that Gratitude Lodge undertook to provide care and services to
Lehr, and Lehr depended on Gratitude Lodge to refer him to the appropriate
level of care.4
Again, Gratitude Lodge demurred, and this time the trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The Hainings timely
appealed from the court’s signed order of dismissal of the lawsuit.
DISCUSSION
The Hainings argue the trial court improperly rejected their
special relationship and negligent undertaking theories of liability, and
instead sustained the demurrer based on inapplicable authority. We conclude
the demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend.
I.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“We apply two standards of review on appeal from a judgment of
dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. [Citation.]
“First, we review the operative complaint ‘de novo to determine
whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under
any legal theory or to determine whether the trial court erroneously
sustained the demurrer as a matter of law.’ [Citations.] We give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation and treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded that are not inconsistent with other
4 The Hainings’ trial counsel referred to this theory below as a
negligent undertaking theory.
6
allegations, exhibits, or judicially noticed facts. [Citations.] We need not
accept as true, however, deductions, contentions or conclusions of law or fact.
[Citations.]
“Second, we determine ‘whether the trial court abused its
discretion by sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.’ [Citation.]
Abuse of discretion is established when ‘“there is a reasonable possibility the
plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment.”’” (Morris v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.)
II.
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The law imposes a general duty upon all conduct. “In general,
each person has a duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances.”
(Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607,
619 (Regents); see Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)
“To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must
show that the ‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that
duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting
injury.’ [Citation.] Recovery for negligence depends as a threshold matter on
the existence of a legal duty of care. [Citation.] [¶] Duty is not universal; not
every defendant owes every plaintiff a duty of care. A duty exists only if ‘“the
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s
conduct.”’ [Citation.] Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be resolved
by the court.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213 (Brown).)
“In a case involving harm caused by a third party, a person may
have an affirmative duty to protect the victim of another’s harm if that
person is in what the law calls a ‘special relationship’ with either the victim
or the person who created the harm. [Citations.] [¶] A special relationship
7
between the defendant and the victim is one that ‘gives the victim a right to
expect’ protection from the defendant, while a special relationship between
the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an ability to
control [the third party’s] conduct.’ [Citation.] Relationships between parents
and children, colleges and students, employers and employees, common
carriers and passengers, and innkeepers and guests, are all examples of
special relationships that give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.
[Citations.] The existence of such a special relationship puts the defendant in
a unique position to protect the plaintiff from injury. The law requires the
defendant to use this position accordingly.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 215–216.)
In Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 209, the Supreme Court
clarified “whether to recognize a duty to protect is governed by a two-step
inquiry.” The court explained: “First, the court must determine whether there
exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of
circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Second, if so, the
court must consult the factors described in Rowland [v. Christian (1968)
69 Cal.2d 108] to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel
limiting that duty.” (Ibid.)
III.
THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT SHOW GRATITUDE LODGE OWED A
DUTY TO CONTROL LEHR
In their opening brief, the Hainings argue they “adequately
pleaded a theory of liability based on the special relationship between Lehr
and Gratitude Lodge” giving rise to a duty to control Lehr. They do not argue
they pleaded the existence of a special relationship between Gratitude Lodge
and themselves and as such, they had a right to expect protection from
8
Gratitude Lodge. Instead, they assert in their opening brief “this is a duty to
control—not a duty to warn” case.
“[A] duty to control presupposes an ability to control ‘such that “if
exercised, [it] would meaningfully reduce the risk of the harm that actually
occurred.”’ [Citations.] The ability (and hence concomitant duty) to control
may be anchored in: (1) control imparted by virtue of the nature of the
relationship itself (as is the case with a parent-child or employer-employee
relationship) [citations]; or (2) control imparted by virtue of control over ‘the
environment’ where the plaintiff is injured (as is the case with schools being
able to control students on campus).” (Shalghoun v. North Los Angeles
County Regional Center, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 929, 945–946.)
The Hainings have not cited any post-Brown authority supportive
of its position that a provider of residential drug rehabilitation services such
as Gratitude Lodge, simply by virtue of its role of providing such services, has
an ability and concomitant duty to control its clients. Instead, the Hainings
contend Poncher v. Brackett (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 769 and Bragg v. Valdez
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 421 are applicable here. However, these cases are
inapt. In Poncher v. Brackett, supra, 246 Cal.App.2d at page 773, the court
recognized a duty by the defendant grandparents to control their minor
grandson who they knew was likely to cause bodily harm to others if not
controlled. The grandparents in that case were aware of similar acts
committed by the grandson and that he was “‘emotionally and psychiatrically
disturbed.’” (Id. at p. 770, fn. 1.) In addition, public officials had warned the
grandparents as to the grandson’s potential danger to the public. (Ibid.)
Here, the first amended complaint does not allege Gratitude
Lodge had the ability to control Lehr, who was a voluntary resident at
Gratitude Lodge. The complaint also does not allege Lehr had any history of
9
violence or was otherwise dangerous. Consequently, there is no basis on this
record to conclude Gratitude Lodge had a duty to control Lehr with respect to
the Hainings.
In Bragg v. Valdez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pages 430–432, the
court considered whether a treating psychiatrist owes a duty to warn or
protect third parties injured by the psychiatrist’s patient. The plaintiff in
Bragg alleged the treating psychiatrist was negligent in releasing the patient
who then killed an elderly woman. (Id. at p. 427.) In finding the psychiatrist
may be liable to a patient and any person the plaintiff injured, the Bragg
court considered the fact the patient had been involuntarily committed,
assaulted a security officer, was placed in emergency physical restraints, and
made “serious threats of physical violence against third parties.” (Id. at pp.
425, 426.) The first amended complaint in this case alleged Lehr voluntarily
sought out services at Gratitude Lodge’s “four-patient luxury detox and
addiction facility” for addiction treatment. It did not allege Gratitude Lodge
had any authority to restrict Lehr’s movements or those of any of its clients
at the facility. There are no allegations the facility was in lockdown or in any
way restricted its clients’ comings and goings vis-á-vis the facility. Given
these factual distinctions as well as the fact, as discussed ante, that the
Hainings do not allege a failure to protect but rather a failure to control, we
find the Bragg case inapplicable here.
IV.
EVEN IF WE ASSUME GRATITUDE LODGE HAD A DUTY TO CONTROL, THE
ROWLAND FACTORS COUNSEL AGAINST IMPOSING SUCH A DUTY HERE
In Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at page 113, the Supreme Court set
forth a list of factors courts must consider and weigh in determining whether
it should impose a duty in the context of a special relationship. These
10
considerations are “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Ibid.)
These factors “fall into two categories. The first group involves
foreseeability and the related concepts of certainty and the connection
between plaintiff and defendant. The second embraces the public policy
concerns of moral blame, preventing future harm, burden, and insurance
availability.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629.)
“‘The most important [Rowland] factor to consider in determining
whether to create an exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary
care . . . is whether the injury in question was foreseeable.’ [Citations.] In
examining foreseeability, ‘the court’s task . . . “is not to decide whether a
particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular
defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the
category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the
kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed.”’”
(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629.) Here, the foreseeability factors do not
weigh in favor of imposing a duty on Gratitude Lodge.
Even if we assume Gratitude Lodge had a duty to control Lehr,
the question then is not whether Gratitude Lodge could have reasonably
foreseen the Hainings’ emotional injury but rather whether the type of harm
the Hainings suffered was reasonably foreseeable if Gratitude Lodge failed to
control a resident at their facility. The Hainings do not allege Lehr had any
11
criminal history, let alone any history of residential burglaries or trespass.
Additionally, the Hainings do not assert Gratitude Lodge had the ability to
control Lehr. Lehr entered the facility on a voluntary basis and there are no
allegations Gratitude Lodge had the authority to restrict Lehr’s movements.
Given the facts here, we cannot say it is reasonably foreseeable that, if
Gratitude Lodge had control over Lehr and failed to exercise such, Lehr
would, after leaving the facility, break into another’s home, and as a result of
this break in, be killed by the homeowner.
As to the additional foreseeability factors under Rowland, we
assume, since this is an appeal involving a demurrer, the Hainings suffered
severe mental injury because of the incident. Yet, “‘[g]enerally speaking,
where the injury suffered is connected only distantly and indirectly to the
defendant’s negligent act, the risk of that type of injury from the category of
negligent conduct at issue is likely to be deemed unforeseeable. Conversely, a
closely connected type of injury is likely to be deemed foreseeable.’” (Regents,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 630–631.) The Hainings’ injury occurred after Lehr
left the facility and only after Lehr unlawfully entered their home. The
Hainings do not contend Gratitude Lodge was on notice that Lehr was going
to illegally enter their home or any home in the neighborhood. The emotional
injury they incurred as a result of such conduct is not closely connected to
Gratitude Lodge’s failure to adequately care for and supervise Lehr.5
As for the public policy factors under Rowland, the Hainings
argue these policy considerations weigh in favor of imposing a duty while
Gratitude Lodge contends even if a duty existed, the policy factors would
militate against such an imposition. To this end, the parties devoted much
5 In reaching this conclusion, we do not in any way wish to
minimize the trauma this incident likely created for the Hainings.
12
time in their briefing and at oral argument trying to distinguish or analogize
the holdings in Beauchene, Cardenas v. Eggleston Youth Center (1987)
193 Cal.App.3d 331, and Rice v. Center Point, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
949. These cases, however, predate the two-step analysis of duty discussed
ante and set forth in Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th 204. These cases also rely on
specific legislative policies regarding treatment facilities for those involved in
the criminal and juvenile justice systems. Notwithstanding this factual
distinction, both parties agree there is a societal benefit to the
availability/existence of facilities like Gratitude Lodge for addiction
treatment.
On balance, given the foreseeability issues discussed ante, even if
Gratitude Lodge had a duty to control Lehr, the Rowland factors weigh in
favor of not imposing such a duty.
V.
NEGLIGENT UNDERTAKING
As an alternative source of duty, the Hainings allege the
negligent undertaking doctrine applies to this case.
“As the traditional theory is articulated in the Restatement
[Second of Torts, section 324A], a negligent undertaking claim of liability to
third parties requires evidence that: (1) the actor . . . undertook, gratuitously
or for consideration, to render services to another . . . ; (2) the services
rendered were of a kind the actor should have recognized as necessary for the
protection of third persons (plaintiffs); (3) the actor failed to exercise
reasonable care in the performance of its undertaking; (4) the failure to
exercise reasonable care resulted in physical harm to the third persons; and
(5) either (a) the actor’s carelessness increased the risk of such harm, or (b)
the undertaking was to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
13
persons, or (c) the harm was suffered because of the reliance of the other or
the third persons upon the undertaking.” (Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998)
18 Cal.4th 604, 613–614.)
Here, the services rendered by Gratitude Lodge were not of a
kind necessary for the protection of third persons like the Hainings. The
facility was providing inpatient drug rehabilitation and treatment services to
its own clients. If anything, the treatment services it was alleged to have
negligently undertaken were for the protection of Lehr, not the residents of
the neighborhood. The trial court did not err in rejecting this basis for duty.
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND
When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured
by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.
[Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on
the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; see Schifando v.
City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.)
“Absent an effective request for leave to amend the complaint in
specified ways, an abuse of discretion can be found ‘“only if a potentially
effective amendment were both apparent and consistent with the plaintiff’s
theory of the case.”’” (Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013)
216 Cal.App.4th 497, 507, disapproved on another ground in Yvanova v. New
Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 939, fn. 13.)
The Hainings do not argue in the trial court, and have not argued
on appeal, much less demonstrated in either court, there is a reasonable
possibility the defects in the pleading of their claim against Gratitude Lodge
14
in the complaint can be cured by further amendment. We therefore conclude
the demurrer to the complaint was properly sustained without leave to
amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Gratitude Lodge to
recover its costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DELANEY, J.
SCOTT, J.
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