Filed 10/6/26 Habitat and Watershed Caretakers v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
HABITAT AND WATERSHED H052804
CARETAKERS et al., (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 21CV02683)
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
CITY OF SANTA CRUZ, (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 22CV00373)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 22CV00383)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
In 2021, the Regents of the University of California (Regents) approved a long-range
development plan (2021 LRDP) for the University of California, Santa Cruz (UC Santa
Cruz) (collectively, university). The plan was intended to “serve as the physical
development and land use plan for the campus for approximately the next 20 years.”
Among other things, the plan anticipated an increase of nearly 9,500 students by 2040, with
an additional 8,500 student housing beds and approximately 3.1 million assignable square
feet for academic and support building space. The 2021 LRDP was accompanied by an
environmental impact report (EIR) pursuant to CEQA1 to evaluate the environmental impact
of the anticipated campus growth.
Several parties—including Habitat and Watershed Caretakers, the City of Santa Cruz
(City), and the County of Santa Cruz (County)—filed petitions for writ of mandate and
complaints against the university, challenging the certification of the EIR and approval of
the 2021 LRDP under CEQA.2 Additionally, the City and the County alleged that the
university violated Education Code section 67504 by failing to analyze and mitigate the
impacts of increased student enrollment on the City.
The trial court granted the petitions on the grounds that the EIR’s analysis was
deficient with respect to housing, wildfire evacuation, and land use policies in violation of
CEQA and Education Code section 67504, subdivision (b)(1) (Education Code
1
California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Public Resources Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
This appeal encompasses three mandate petitions and complaints against the
Regents and UC Santa Cruz. The first petition and complaint (case No. 21CV02683) was
filed by Habitat and Watershed Caretakers, Don Stevens, Russell B. Weisz, Hal Levin,
Harry D. Huskey, and Peter L. Scott (collectively, Habitat). The second petition and
complaint (case No. 22CV00373) was filed by the City. The third petition and complaint
(case No. 22CV00383) was filed by the County. The City and the County in their operative
pleadings also named the University of California president and the UC Santa Cruz
chancellor as respondents. It does not appear from the record on appeal that either
individual was served with the pleadings or that either individual appeared in the actions
below. Neither individual is a party to this appeal.
2
section 67504(b)(1)). The court issued a writ of mandate requiring the Regents to set aside
the decision certifying the EIR and approving the 2021 LRDP.
On appeal, the university contends: (1) the trial court erroneously concluded that the
university’s goal to house all new students on campus should have been treated as a
mitigation measure, (2) the university properly declined to make payments to the City’s
affordable housing trust fund, (3) the EIR adequately addressed wildfire evacuation, (4) the
EIR’s response to a public comment regarding wildfire evacuation was adequate, (5) the
EIR’s analysis of consistency with land use policies was adequate, (6) the City and County
are not entitled to relief under Education Code section 67504, and (7) the County’s CEQA
and related claims should have been dismissed for failure to timely request a hearing.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment with certain
modifications. Specifically, we determine: (1) the university properly assumed in its
analysis of housing impacts that new on-campus housing proposed under the 2021 LRDP
would be fully occupied, (2) the EIR adequately discussed the 2021 LRDP’s consistency or
inconsistency with applicable local and regional plans or policies, and (3) the City and
County do not have a private right of action under Education Code section 67504(b)(1). We
will modify the judgment accordingly.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The 2021 LRDP
“Each University of California campus periodically develops a planning document
referred to as a Long Range Development Plan . . . to guide ‘physical development,
including land use designations, the location of buildings, and infrastructure systems, for an
established time horizon.’ [Citation.]” (Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of
University of California (2024) 16 Cal.5th 43, 49.) According to the 2021 LRDP at issue in
this case, “the overall objective of the 2021 LRDP is . . . to support the teaching, research,
and public service mission of UC Santa Cruz.” The 2021 LRDP is intended to “serve as the
long-term planning document that guides physical campus growth through 2040 on two of
3
the three UC Santa Cruz campus properties located in the City of Santa Cruz,” that is, “the
UC Santa Cruz main residential campus” and the Westside Research Park. The 2021 LRDP
“addresses academic and administrative space needs, housing, open space, circulation,
parking, infrastructure, and other land uses that ultimately facilitate the appropriate siting of
capital projects.” The 2021 LRDP contemplates “a compact academic core with housing
around the periphery.”
Under baseline conditions, for the 2018 to 2019 academic year with enrollment of
approximately 18,518 students,3 there were 9,283 beds provided on campus. For the 2,800
faculty and staff, there were “270 units of on-campus housing” provided.4
The 2021 LRDP “anticipates that the on-campus student population could grow . . .
to a potential enrollment of 28,000” students by the 2040 to 2041 academic year, or an
increase of 9,482 students. The number of faculty and staff is “also anticipated to increase”
during this timeframe from approximately 2,800 to 5,000, or an increase of 2,200. These
numbers for the 2040 to 2041 academic year represent a 56 percent increase in the on-
campus population over the baseline 2018 to 2019 academic year.
The 2021 LRDP “does not commit UC Santa Cruz to any specific enrollment level,
campus population, or development.” Instead, it “provides a guide to the land development
patterns and associated infrastructure that could be built to support a forecasted level of
enrollment and employment growth.”
“To accommodate the projected increase in campus population, the 2021 LRDP
provides for 8,500 student housing beds, approximately 550 employee housing units, and
approximately 3.1 million assignable square feet . . . of academic and support building
space.” The housing would accommodate “100 percent of the increase in student
3
All population figures for students, faculty, and staff were based on “full-time
equivalent” status.
4
According to the EIR, existing and new units may include apartments,
condominiums, townhomes, single family homes, and duplexes.
4
enrollment beyond 19,500,[5] and up to 25 percent of the additional anticipated 2,200 . . .
faculty/staff members in on-campus housing, conditional on demand.”
B. The EIR
CEQA requires public universities to “consider the environmental impact of
academic and campus population plans.” (§ 21080.09, subd. (d).) Consequently, an LRDP
“must be analyzed in an environmental impact report (EIR) under CEQA. [Citation.]”
(Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods v. Regents of University of California (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 226, 231 (Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods); see City of San Diego v. Board
of Trustees of California State University (2015) 61 Cal.4th 945, 962 (City of San Diego)
[explaining that “the whole of CEQA applies to [a public university’s] decision to approve
the [LRDP] for a campus”].) The Legislature has found that “the expansion of campus
enrollment and facilities may negatively affect the surrounding environment.” (Ed. Code,
§ 67504(b)(1).) “Consistent with the requirements of CEQA,” the university must
“sufficiently mitigate significant off-campus impacts related to campus growth and
development.” (Id., subd. (b)(1); see City of San Diego, supra, at p. 960; Save Berkeley’s
Neighborhoods, supra, at p. 231.)6 In this case, the Regents prepared a program EIR7 for
the 2021 LRDP.
5
The prior LRDP (2005 LRDP), which was adopted in 2006, projected enrollment of
19,500 students by 2020. The 2005 LRDP assumed on-campus housing could be provided
for 50 percent of undergraduates, 25 percent of graduates, 25 percent of faculty, and
3 percent of staff.
6
However, “[e]nrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute
a project” under CEQA. (§ 21080.09, subd. (d).)
7
“A program EIR . . . is ‘an EIR which may be prepared on a series of actions that
can be characterized as one large project’ and are related in specified ways. [Citation.]”
(In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1169.) “Adoption of a program EIR allows
for ‘tiering,’ in which a program EIR ‘cover[s] general matters and environmental effects’
and is followed by ‘narrower or site-specific’ EIRs as needed. [Citation.]” (Mission Bay
Alliance v. Office of Community Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160, 172
(Mission Bay); see § 21080.09, subd. (b) [authorizing tiering based on an LRDP].) “An
advantage of using a program EIR is that it can ‘[a]llow the lead agency to consider broad
policy alternatives and program wide mitigation measures at an early time when the agency
5
C. Certification and Approval
In September 2021, the Regents certified the EIR, adopted a mitigation monitoring
and reporting program, adopted CEQA findings and a statement of overriding
considerations, and approved the 2021 LRDP.
D. Writ Proceedings
1. Petitions for writ of mandate
Habitat filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint seeking to set aside the
certification of the EIR and approval of the 2021 LRDP. Relevant to this appeal, Habitat
alleged the following CEQA violations: (1) the EIR failed to sufficiently examine the
project’s potential inconsistencies with applicable land use plans; (2) the EIR failed to
adequately examine the project’s impact on housing, including off campus, and failed to
consider mitigation measures; and (3) the EIR failed to analyze the impact of increasing the
campus population in relation to evacuation during a wildfire.
Similarly, the City’s operative petition for writ of mandate and complaint alleged the
following CEQA violations: (1) the EIR failed to consider significant impacts to off-
campus housing and feasible and adequate mitigation; and (2) the EIR failed to adequately
analyze or mitigate for potential wildfire risks, including by preparing a wildfire evacuation
plan. The City also alleged a cause of action for violation of Education Code section 67504,
based on the university’s failure to analyze the impacts of increased enrollment on the City
and failure to mitigate the impacts.
Similar to the City’s action, the County filed a petition for writ of mandate and
complaint alleging the following CEQA violations: (1) the EIR failed to adequately
disclose, evaluate, and/or mitigate impacts on housing in the county; (2) the EIR failed to
has greater flexibility to deal with basic problems or cumulative impacts.’ [Citation.]
Accordingly, a program EIR is distinct from a project EIR, which is prepared for a specific
project and must examine in detail site-specific considerations. [Citation.]” (In re Bay-
Delta etc., supra, at p. 1169.)
6
adequately disclose, evaluate, and/or mitigate the impact on wildfire and wildfire response,
including evacuation; and (3) the EIR failed to adequately respond to comments. The
County also alleged a cause of action for violation of Education Code section 67504, based
on the university’s failure to analyze the impacts of increased enrollment on the County and
failure to mitigate the impacts.8
2. University’s motion to dismiss the County’s CEQA claims, and
County’s motion for relief
The County, approximately seven months later, filed a request for a hearing on its
CEQA claims. The university filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the County failed
to request a hearing within 90 days as required by section 21167.4. The County opposed the
motion and also filed a motion for discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473. The trial court granted the university’s motion to dismiss the County’s CEQA
claims, but also granted the County’s motion for discretionary relief from the dismissal after
finding excusable neglect.
3. CEQA Hearing
Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that the trial court consolidated
the City’s, the County’s, and Habitat’s cases for at least briefing and hearing.9 Relevant to
8
Habitat, the City, and the County also alleged other causes of action that were later
voluntarily dismissed.
9
The trial court initially consolidated the County’s and City’s actions for trial, and
later consolidated all three actions “for all purposes.” The court subsequently determined
that complete consolidation of the three cases was inappropriate because Habitat also
alleged additional claims regarding breach of a settlement agreement. Based on a
stipulation by the parties, all the CEQA related claims, including the Education Code claims
by the City and the County, were briefed and tried together first. Habitat’s remaining claims
were to be tried separately after the CEQA claims. Ultimately, after the court filed a
statement of decision regarding the CEQA related claims, all the parties agreed to dismiss
any remaining claims. A single judgment was filed containing all three case captions and
case numbers and indicating that the cases were related.
7
this appeal, in their opening trial briefs, the City, the County, and Habitat contended that the
EIR was legally inadequate for the following reasons:10
First, the EIR failed to adequately examine the project’s impact on housing, including
off-campus housing. The EIR also did not identify adequate mitigation, such as ensuring
housing is constructed before increasing enrollment or contributing to the City’s affordable
housing trust fund. Further, the housing proposed in the 2021 LRDP was “not presented as
binding policy in the LRDP or a mitigation measure in the EIR.” Second, the EIR failed to
adequately analyze or mitigate potential wildfire risks, including wildfire evacuation, for
proposed development in an area designated a high fire severity zone by the state. Third,
the EIR failed to adequately examine the project’s potential inconsistencies with applicable
land use plans. Fourth, the final EIR provided insufficient responses to public comments.
The university filed a single response to all the opening trial briefs. First, the
university contended that it properly and sufficiently evaluated the environmental impacts of
the 2021 LRDP, which contemplated a full buildout of the proposed housing. Under this
scenario of a full buildout, the university argued that the EIR’s analysis of the impacts on
housing and regarding mitigation complied with CEQA. The university also contended
there was no evidence that contributions to the City’s affordable housing trust fund would
be an effective mitigation. Second, the university contended that the EIR’s analysis of
wildfire impacts, including regarding evacuation, and mitigation measures complied with
CEQA. Third, the university argued that the EIR’s analysis of land use impacts was
adequate. Fourth, regarding the sufficiency of the responses to comments, the university
argued that this issue was not raised during the administrative process and that its responses
10
The City, the County, and Habitat each filed opening trial briefs. However, the
City and the County also joined in the arguments made in each other’s and in Habitat’s
briefs. Without objection from any party, the trial court treated the arguments raised in the
separate briefs “as though merged, and asserted by all” of them. For the most part, we do
the same in this opinion with respect to the CEQA claims, considering all the arguments
raised as to each issue without differentiating between the parties.
8
were adequate under CEQA. Lastly, the university contended that the City and the County
waived their Education Code claims by failing to raise them in their opening briefs, and that
the claims were without merit.
The hearing was conducted in two phases with the trial court issuing a tentative
ruling for each phase. Relevant to this appeal, in a tentative ruling in the first phase, the trial
court “reframed” one of the issues concerning housing as “whether the proposal to house
100% of the new students and 25% of the new staff on campus is a feasible mitigation
measure for population impacts. . . . In essence, the EIR’s impacts analysis relied on the
LRDP’s proposal to provide housing necessary to accommodate 100% of the new students
and up to 25% of the new staff as a mitigation measure for population impacts, without
analyzing whether this mitigation is feasible, in violation of CEQA.” The court provided
the parties with an opportunity file supplemental briefs addressing the court’s reframing of
the housing issue and “[a]nything” else they wanted to address.
In supplemental briefing, the City, the County, and Habitat each addressed the
housing issue as reframed by the trial court. In addition, the City and the County contended
that Education Code section 67504 provided for a private right of action, and that they had
not waived their Education Code claims.
The university contended in supplemental briefing that the trial court
“mischaracterize[d]” the proposed housing as a mitigation measure when housing was
instead “part of” or “an element of” the “LRDP project.” The university also argued that
this issue was not raised by any party during the administrative process and therefore any
claim based on this issue was barred by the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
After a hearing regarding phase two of the proceedings, the trial court took the entire
matter under submission.
9
E. Statement of Decision
The trial court filed a statement of decision granting the petitions for writ of mandate.
The court found that the EIR for the 2021 LRDP was deficient, violated CEQA, and
violated Education Code section 67504 for the following reasons:
“1. The EIR’s analysis of housing impacts is inadequate, because of the unsupported
assumption that the goal of housing 100% of the new students on campus will be achieved,
and the EIR’s further reliance on this unidentified mitigation measure for its significance
determination as to the impact of increased student population on the demand for regional
housing;
“2. The analysis of the 2021 LRDP’s wildfire impacts with respect to evacuation is
inadequate, because it only considers the temporary impact of construction activities, and
relies on a successful campus evacuation during the pandemic when the campus population
was greatly reduced;
“3. The analysis of the LRDP’s consistency with regional land use policies is
inadequate, because it relies on the unsupported ‘belief’ that [Local Agency Formation
Commission] approval is unnecessary for the City to supply extra territorial water to areas
of new growth under the LRDP;
“4. The EIR’s mitigation measure for the LRDP’s impacts to wildfire with respect to
evacuation routes is ineffective;
“5. The EIR failed to adequately respond to the City’s proposed mitigation measure
for the significant impacts to the City’s tight housing market, by an ongoing contribution
from the University to the City’s [affordable housing trust fund]; and failed to demonstrate
that this proposed mitigation measure is facially infeasible; [and]
“6. The FEIR failed to adequately respond to Comment 07-25.”
In reaching the conclusion that the university violated Education Code section 67504,
the court determined that this section required the university to mitigate off-campus impacts
in compliance with CEQA, that the City and the County had a private right of action under
10
Education Code section 67504, and that the City and the County had not forfeited their
claims.
F. Voluntary Dismissal of Remaining Claims and Judgment
After the statement of decision was filed, the City, the County, and Habitat indicated
that they were dismissing any remaining causes of action and/or that the statement of
decision addressed all of their claims.
A judgment was filed in favor of Habitat, the City, and the County, granting their
petitions for writ of mandate “on the specific grounds and reasons set forth in the” statement
of decision, which was attached to the judgment as an exhibit. The judgment also directed
the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate, ordering the Regents to, among other things,
suspend any activities related to implementation of the 2021 LRDP approvals that could
result in a change to the physical environment until the Regents have taken all the actions
required by the judgment “to assure compliance with the requirements of the Statement of
Decision and CEQA.”
II. DISCUSSION
The university contends the following on appeal: (1) the trial court erroneously
concluded that the university’s goal to house all new students on campus should have been
treated as a mitigation measure, (2) the university properly declined to make payments to
the City’s affordable housing trust fund, (3) the EIR adequately addressed wildfire
evacuation, (4) the EIR’s response to a public comment regarding wildfire evacuation was
adequate, (5) the EIR’s analysis of consistency with land use policies was adequate, (6) the
City and County are not entitled to relief under Education Code section 67504, and (7) the
County’s CEQA and related claims should have been dismissed for failure to timely request
a hearing.
A. General CEQA Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘The foremost principle under CEQA is that the Legislature intended the act “to be
interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment
11
within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.” ’ [Citations.] ‘With narrow
exceptions, CEQA requires an EIR whenever a public agency proposes to approve or to
carry out a project that may have a significant effect on the environment. [Citations.]’
[Citations.] The basic purpose of an EIR is to ‘provide public agencies and the public in
general with detailed information about the effect [that] a proposed project is likely to have
on the environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be
minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project.’ [Citations.] ‘Because the EIR
must be certified or rejected by public officials, it is a document of accountability. If CEQA
is scrupulously followed, the public will know the basis on which its responsible officials
either approve or reject environmentally significant action, and the public, being duly
informed, can respond accordingly to action with which it disagrees.’ [Citation.] The EIR
‘protects not only the environment but also informed self-government.’ [Citation.]” (Sierra
Club v. City of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 511-512, fn. omitted (Sierra Club).)
“In general, judicial review of agency actions for CEQA compliance extends to
‘whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.’ [Citations.] ‘Abuse of discretion is
established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the
determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]”
(Protecting Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10
Cal.5th 479, 495 (Protecting Our Water).)
On appeal, “the appellate court’s review ‘is the same as the trial court’s: [It] reviews
the agency’s action [(here, the Regents)] not the trial court’s decision; in that sense appellate
judicial review under CEQA is de novo.’ [Citation.] The reviewing court independently
determines whether the record ‘demonstrates any legal error’ by the agency and
deferentially considers whether the record ‘contains substantial evidence to support [the
agency’s] factual determinations.’ [Citation.]” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 495.) For a substantial evidence challenge, “ ‘a reviewing court will resolve reasonable
doubts in favor of the administrative decision, and will not set aside an agency’s
12
determination on the ground that the opposite conclusion would have been equally or more
reasonable. [Citations.]’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515; see Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 14 (CEQA Guidelines),11 § 15384, subd. (a).) “If the agency’s determination ‘involves
pure questions of law, we review those questions de novo.’ [Citation.]” (Protecting Our
Water, supra, at p. 495.)
B. Housing
The trial court determined that the “EIR’s analysis of housing impacts is inadequate,
because of the unsupported assumption that the goal of housing 100% of the new students
on campus will be achieved, and the EIR’s further reliance on this unidentified mitigation
measure for its significance determination as to the impact of increased student population
on the demand for regional housing.” The court also determined that the university failed to
adequately respond to the City’s comment proposing an ongoing contribution to the City’s
affordable housing trust fund as mitigation.
On appeal, the university contends that the City, County, and Habitat failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies by raising the issue of the housing goal as mitigation
during the administrative process. Second, the university argues that the trial court erred in
determining that the housing goal amounted to a mitigation measure. Third, the university
contends that substantial evidence supported a reasonable conclusion that students are likely
to occupy planned student housing. Fourth, the university argues that requiring students to
11
“CEQA is implemented by an extensive series of administrative regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency, ordinarily referred to as the
‘CEQA Guidelines.’ [Citation.] Through long practice, we ‘afford great weight to the
Guidelines except when a provision is clearly unauthorized or erroneous under CEQA.’
[Citations.]” (Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019)
7 Cal.5th 1171, 1184, fn. omitted; see CEQA Guidelines, § 15000.)
13
live on campus would not be an effective mitigation measure. Fifth, the university contends
that it properly declined to make payments to the City’s affordable housing trust fund.
1. Background
The 2021 LRDP forecasted the campus population to increase by 9,482 students (for
a total of 28,000 students) and by 2,200 faculty and staff (for a total of 5,000 faculty and
staff) in the next 20 years. The EIR explained that UC Santa Cruz generally guaranteed
housing for incoming first-year and transfer students. Evidence in the record reflects that
the yearly on-campus housing occupancy rate was 96 percent to 99 percent from 2012
through 2017. However, there were 711 empty beds on campus during the winter of 2020,
immediately prior to the pandemic shutdown.12 At some point thereafter, the occupancy
rate increased to 96 percent, and by September 2021, there was a waiting list for on-campus
housing. Regarding off-campus housing in the region surrounding UC Santa Cruz, the EIR
found that there was currently a high demand and low vacancy rate, with some data
suggesting “a very tight housing market, especially as it relates to rental housing.”
The EIR explained that the 2021 LRDP provided for “physical development” at the
campus “to accommodate projected increases in” the on-campus population. “To account
for projected increases in the total on-campus population,” the 2021 LRDP contemplated
“additional housing on the main residential campus and potentially at the Westside Research
Park.” Specifically, the 2021 LRDP included “land for housing to accommodate
100 percent of the increase in student enrollment above 19,500 and for 25 percent of the
increase in the number of employees, based on demand.”13 This meant that the “project
would add up to 8,500 beds” for new students and “558 housing units” for employees on
12
This point was raised in a comment to the draft EIR, and the university in response
did not dispute the number. Instead, the university indicated that it was “considered
abnormal compared to historic vacancy rates within the LRDP area . . . and was considered
unlikely to last.”
13
Enrollment at UC Santa Cruz for the 2018 to 2019 academic year was 18,518
students, with 9,283 beds provided on campus. For the 2,800 faculty and staff, there were
270 units of on-campus housing provided.
14
campus. The EIR indicated, however, that “[t]his would result in a demand for an additional
982 beds” for students and “an additional 1,992 residences” for employees that would not be
provided on campus. After assuming students would share housing and some employees
may live outside the county, the EIR determined that “the 2021 LRDP may result in an off-
campus housing demand for 2,190 residential units within Santa Cruz County.”
After considering off-campus vacancy rates and other data, the EIR determined that
there might “not be adequate off-campus housing units to meet the housing demand of
additional students and employees in the years leading up to 2040-2041. Therefore,
implementation of the 2021 LRDP could further reduce the available housing market in the
County and induce unplanned levels of substantial housing demand because of the projected
increase in UC and non-UC employees.” The EIR indicated the impact was “significant” or
“potentially significant.” (Boldface omitted.)
In analyzing mitigation measures for this impact, the EIR stated, “UC Santa Cruz is
planning to provide at least 8,500 student housing beds and 558 employee residences under
the 2021 LRDP. Additional beds and residences are expected to be provided under the
[prior] 2005 LRDP as part of the Kresge Housing and Student Housing West projects . . . .
As a result and in consideration of the 2021 LRDP objectives, no feasible mitigation
measures are available to reduce the anticipated impact. However, . . . with incorporation of
cumulative projects on and off campus, UC Santa Cruz anticipates that it will be able to
provide housing to all students projected under the [2021] LRDP, and the impact associated
with student housing demand is expected to be less-than-significant.” Regarding employee
housing demand, the EIR determined the impact to be “significant and unavoidable.”
(Boldface omitted.)
In a tentative ruling in the first phase, the trial court observed that the City, County,
and Habitat contended that (1) the university assumed, without substantial evidence, that
housing would be provided to 100 percent of new student enrollment, and (2) this resulted in
the EIR’s failure to properly analyze and mitigate significant on- and off-campus impacts
15
from the projected increase in campus population. In response, the university had
contended that the project contemplated a full buildout and the project was properly
analyzed as written. Alternatively, the university had argued that there was substantial
evidence to support the EIR’s assumption that the proposed housing would be built.
In its tentative ruling, the court stated: “While the parties frame the questions
presented by these core issues as relating to whether the University is required to support the
LRDP with substantial evidence, and the presence or lack thereof, the Court concludes that
the question should be reframed as whether the proposal to house 100% of the new students
and 25% of the new staff on campus is a feasible mitigation measure for population
impacts. . . . [T]he Court finds that the University is required . . . to analyze and mitigate the
significant on and off campus impacts of projected population growth when adopting a new
LRDP; and that the EIR must evaluate the feasibility of any proposed mitigation measures.
In essence, the EIR’s impacts analysis relied on the LRDP’s proposal to provide housing
necessary to accommodate 100% of the new students and up to 25% of the new staff as a
mitigation measure for population impacts, without analyzing whether this mitigation is
feasible, in violation of CEQA.”
Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court requested supplemental briefing
from the parties addressing (1) the court’s “tentative with regard to a CEQA violation that
did not appear to have been per se raised by [the City’s, County’s, and Habitat’s] counsel,”
and (2) “[a]nything” else the parties wanted to address. Without objection from any of the
parties, the court set a supplemental briefing schedule.
After supplemental briefing and a hearing, the trial court issued another tentative
decision. The court explained that although it continued to believe that the housing goal
was an “unidentified mitigation measure,” it “now concludes that the University did analyze
the feasibility of achieving this mitigation measure.” In particular, the EIR “analyze[d] the
feasibility of achieving the housing goal in analyzing the issue of cost . . . .” (Italics added.)
The court further determined, among other things, that: (1) the City and the County “argued
16
essentially this same issue in their opening briefs, asserting that the housing goal is an
unanalyzed ‘assumption’ ”; and (2) the university was “sufficiently apprised of the issue”
given that it “respond[ed] by arguing” in its opening brief that it was entitled “to evaluate
the project as described in the project description.”
In its subsequent statement of decision, the trial court concluded that “[t]he EIR’s
analysis of housing impacts is inadequate, because of the unsupported assumption that the
goal of housing 100% of the new students on campus will be achieved, and the EIR’s
further reliance on this unidentified mitigation measure for its significance determination as
to the impact of increased student population on the demand for regional housing.” In
reaching this conclusion, the trial court explained that the EIR properly assumed, based on
case law, that the proposed housing would be constructed. Specifically, “the EIR was
required to assume the eventual, full buildout of the physical plan to develop 8,500 new
student beds and 550 new units of faculty and staff when analyzing the impacts of the 2021
LRDP.”
However, the trial court determined that the proposal to provide housing for
100 percent of new students and 25 percent of faculty and staff on campus was a “goal”
rather than “part of the physical development plan.” The court explained that the housing
goal would “only be achieved if the new housing is fully occupied,” which in turn depended
on the university’s “future policy decisions.” The court observed that the EIR
acknowledged that the plan to house 100 percent of new students depended on the demand
for housing by students. The court reasoned that the demand would depend on “a variety of
factors, including future policy decisions affecting desirability and cost of the housing.”
The court observed that the EIR acknowledged as much when it indicated that the university
would adjust prices to ensure on-campus housing is occupied.
The trial court further determined that the “ ‘housing goal’ [was] better characterized
as an unidentified mitigation measure, and that the EIR was not authorized to assume that
this ‘housing goal’ will be achieved in the absence of substantial evidence.” The court
17
found that there was not substantial evidence to support the goal of housing 100 percent of
new students on campus. In this regard, the court observed that to be effective, CEQA
requires a mitigation measure to be fully enforceable. The court observed that the EIR:
(1) acknowledged that housing affordability was a concern to some students, (2) set forth
past on-campus occupancy rates, (3) identified some factors affecting rental rates and
indicated that options existed for increasing affordability, and (4) stated UC Santa Cruz’s
“commit[ment]” to providing “affordable housing options” for students who “want to live
on campus.” The EIR otherwise assumed that the university would respond to market
forces in setting rents. The court found, however, that there was “no enforceable condition
or policy identified for setting affordable campus rents in the future,” the EIR “impliedly
acknowledges that some students may not want to live on campus,” and there was no
requirement that new students live on campus.
The trial court determined that “[t]he EIR’s assumption that the goal of housing
100% of the new students on campus will be achieved, and its reliance on this unidentified
and unsupported mitigation measure for its significance determination, skewed the EIR’s
analysis of the impact of student demand on regional housing.” The court explained that
“the EIR found that sufficient housing would be provided ‘to house all students projected
under the LRDP’, and, therefore, that ‘the impacts associated with student housing demand
is expected to be less than significant.’ . . . In other words, the EIR relied on the
unidentified mitigation measure of housing all new students on campus for its significance
determination. [¶] This upside-down process for determining the significance of student
demand on housing, coupled with the EIR’s unsupported assumption that 100% of all new
students would be housed on campus, constitutes error.”
The trial court concluded that these errors “amount[ed] to prejudicial violations of
CEQA . . . .” The court stated that “the EIR’s housing analysis does not constitute an
adequate and good faith effort at disclosure . . . . This deprives the public and decision
18
makers of sufficient information to evaluate the impact of the increased student population
on regional housing demand, and constitutes a prejudicial error and violation of CEQA.”
2. Analysis
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Forfeiture
On appeal, the university contends that the City, County, and Habitat failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies by raising the “precise argument – that the EIR should
have included a mitigation measure ensuring housing is occupied – . . . during the
administrative process.” The university contends that the parties instead argued during the
administrative proceedings that the university could not meet its housing goal because the
university was unlikely to build the housing planned in the LRDP, rather than raising an
issue about whether the housing would actually be occupied by students. Second, the
university argues that the parties “also waived this argument by failing to plead it or raise it
in their opening [trial] briefs” According to the university, the “argument was raised sua
sponte by the [t]rial [c]ourt.”
“As a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintenance of a CEQA action, the rule of
exhaustion serves ‘ “to provide an administrative agency with the opportunity to decide
matters in its area of expertise prior to judicial review.” ’ [Citation.] The requirement ‘ “is
satisfied if ‘the alleged grounds for noncompliance with [CEQA] were presented . . . by any
person during the public comment period provided by [CEQA] or prior to the close of the
public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination.’ ” ’
[Citation.] While it takes something more than ‘ “generalized environmental comments at
public hearings” ’ to exhaust administrative remedies, ‘ “less specificity is required to
preserve an issue for appeal in an administrative proceeding than in a judicial proceeding.” ’
[Citations.]” (Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 517, 541-542 (Preservation), italics added.) “That said, ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘bland and
general references to environmental matters’ ” ’ ” or “ ‘ “ ‘isolated and unelaborated’ ” ’ ”
comments do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement . . . . [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Because
19
the purpose of the exhaustion requirement ‘ “is that the public agency should have the
opportunity to receive and respond to articulated factual issues and legal theories before its
actions are subjected to judicial review,” ’ objections must ‘ “ ‘fairly appris[e]’ ” ’ the public
agency of relevant issues to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. [Citations.]” (United
Neighborhoods for Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1091
(United Neighborhoods).) “ ‘The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the
issues raised in the judicial proceeding were first raised at the administrative level.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 536.)
We determine that the university was “fairly apprised of the relevant issues to satisfy
the exhaustion requirement.” (United Neighborhoods, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088.)
The comments to the draft EIR expressed concern about whether the university would meet
its goal of housing 100 percent of new students, including in the context of occupancy rates,
mitigation, and an enforceable on-campus living requirement. The comments included the
following:
In a letter with a section entitled, “The EIR Needs to Formulate an Enforceable
Mitigation for the LRDP’s Impact on Housing Demand,” one commentor wrote, “While the
LRDP articulates a goal of housing 100 percent of new students, the LRDP makes no legally
binding commitment to meet the goal. Nor is there a mitigation in the Draft EIR that would
bind the University to the goal. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The assumption of meeting housing
goals cannot be substantiated by the terms of the LRDP or any mitigation in the Draft
EIR. . . . [¶] There are formidable structural obstacles to meeting the goal of housing 100%
of new students and 25% of new staff. The principle obstacle is the cost of housing on
campus. . . . [S]tudents are motivated to find cheaper (but still expensive) housing off
campus. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Without a credible plan to provide affordable housing, it can be
assumed that meeting the housing goal is infeasible. In the absence of an enforceable
means of achieving housing targets, the EIR would need to analyze the impacts of the more
20
likely scenario in which the housing goals of the LRDP are not met.” (Underscoring &
boldface omitted, italics added.)
The City specifically commented, “UCSC does not currently have mandatory on-
campus residence requirements, so students, faculty, and staff can live wherever they like
despite the analyzed percentages. . . . In order to adequately assess the impacts of the
project, the percentage of students, faculty, and staff living on-campus will need to be
clearly established, such as through on-campus living mandates, or alternative percentages
of on-campus residents should be analyzed, which would likely result in new or different
impacts.” (Italics added.) The City further commented, “While housing may be provided
for 100% of new student enrollment over 19,500, it does not address alternatives where
fewer than 100% of new students live on campus, as is likely, especially if on-campus
housing growth is not tied to enrollment and if on-campus living is not required of certain
students.” (Italics added.)
Another commentor stated, in a letter under the heading “Additional On Campus
Housing will not be fully occupied,” “The [draft EIR] claims that the campus will house all
of the projected 8,500 additional students contemplated under the 2021 LRDP. However,
even if UCSC were to build housing to accommodate the entire growth in student
population, there is no mechanism to ensure that those students live on campus.” (Italics
added.) The comment further stated regarding “Impacts and Mitigation Measures” in the
draft EIR, “[t]he [draft EIR] assumes that UCSC will build 8,500 additional beds and all of
them will be filled regardless of pricing, yet there is no evidence to back this up and every
reason to think that many of the additional students will seek housing Off Campus.” (Italics
added.)
An additional commentor stated, “I don’t understand when you say that 100 percent
of the new student FTEs will live on campus. Does that mean you will somehow force them
to live there the whole time that they’re here? Because most undergraduates find the
campus housing very expensive, and as soon as they can find students to live with, they
21
move off campus. So I don’t understand how they’re going to be forced to live on campus
their entire time here.”
Contrary to the university’s argument on appeal, these comments fairly apprised the
university of the “specific argument” that “housing is likely to sit empty.” Commentors
expressed doubt about on-campus housing being 100 percent occupied, how that goal could
be reached with students wanting to live elsewhere including due to affordability issues, and
the necessity of an on-campus housing mandate. The university in its responses
acknowledged the issues raised and indicated that housing would be occupied if built.
Specifically, in response to these comments, the university (1) acknowledged affordability
concerns; (2) admitted that “UC Santa Cruz does not require students to live on campus”;
(3) acknowledged that the 2021 LRDP “does not . . . include initiatives to force students to
reside on campus”; (4) stated that “[i]t would reasonably be expected that UC Santa Cruz,
like any other entity that manages housing, would adjust prices to ensure that on-campus
housing is occupied”; (5) further stated that “UC Santa Cruz has a record of high occupancy
of on-campus residences”; and (6) indicated that “based on historic housing data for the
campus and typically low vacancy rates within the LRDP area, it is reasonable to conclude
that if housing is made available on campus that students, faculty, and staff would attempt to
live on campus.” On this record, we determine that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirement was satisfied in this case.
The university also contends that petitioners forfeited the argument by failing to
plead it or raise it in their opening trial briefs. In support of this argument, the university
cites Doe v. California Dept. of Justice (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095. In that case,
however, the appellate court determined that the appellant had forfeited an argument raised
for the first time in the reply brief on appeal. (Id. at p. 1115.) The appellate court explained
that “[a]n appellant . . . forfeits an issue by failing to raise it in his or her opening brief.
[Citations.] ‘ “Obvious considerations of fairness in argument demand that the appellant
present all of his points in the opening brief. To withhold a point until the closing brief
22
would deprive the respondent of his opportunity to answer it or require the effort and delay
of an additional brief by permission. Hence the rule is that points raised in the reply brief
for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present
them before. . . . [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
In this case, to the extent the trial court articulated a theory that had not been stated in
precisely the same manner as the petitioners – that is, treating the EIR’s goal of housing
100 percent of new students as a mitigation measure – the court provided the university with
two additional opportunities for briefing to address the point by way of an “opening”
supplemental brief and a “reply” supplemental brief. The court thereafter issued a tentative
ruling and held a hearing on the issue (along with other issues that had been reserved for the
second phase of the proceedings), which provided the university with an additional
opportunity to be heard on the issue. Under these circumstances, the university fails to
show unfairness warranting forfeiture of the issue on the part of the City, County, and
Habitat. Further, although the university cites cases for the general proposition that a court
is not required to make arguments for a party, the university fails to cite a case for the
proposition that a court is precluded from raising or reframing an issue raised by a party.
In sum, the trial court properly considered the EIR’s 100 percent housing goal as a
mitigation measure.
b. Occupancy of On-Campus Housing as a Mitigation Measure
On appeal, the university contends that the trial court erred in characterizing the plan
to provide housing for all new students as a mitigation measure.
The trial court, in finding that the housing goal should be treated as a mitigation
measure rather than a component of the project itself, relied on case law distinguishing
between an element of a project that addresses a preexisting problem, and an element that
mitigates an adverse environmental impact of the project. The court determined that in this
case, the “housing goal addresses and mitigates the adverse impacts of the future enrollment
23
and population increase allowed under the LRDP, as opposed to addressing a population
problem that preexisted the LRDP. It therefore meets the test for mitigation . . . .”
“An EIR is required to provide the information needed to alert the public and the
decision makers of the significant problems a project would create and to discuss currently
feasible mitigation measures.” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 523, italics added.)
“Mitigation measures are modifications of the proposed design and implementation of a
project . . . to reduce the project’s adverse environmental effects.” (Butte County, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 627.)
In determining whether a particular aspect is a component of the project, or is instead
a mitigation measure, courts have looked at whether the aspect addresses a preexisting
problem, or whether it instead addresses an impact created by the project. (See, e.g., Save
the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City and County of San Francisco (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 863,
882; Wollmer v. City of Berkeley (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1352.) However, “the
distinction between elements of a project and measures designed to mitigate impacts of the
project may not always be clear.” (Lotus v. Department of Transportation (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 645, 656, fn. 8.) “[S]ome components of [a plan] might be characterized as
mitigation measures rather than as part of the project itself. Any mischaracterization is
significant, however, only if it precludes or obfuscates required disclosure of the project’s
environmental impacts and analysis of potential mitigation measures.” (Mission Bay
Alliance, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 185.)
Here we determine that the trial court erred in separating (a) the construction of new
housing from (b) occupancy, and then treating the university’s plan for full occupancy as a
mitigation measure.
First, the 2021 LRDP contemplated new housing for students, faculty, and staff. The
trial court agreed with the university that “the EIR was required to assume the eventual, full
buildout” of the contemplated housing. In California, building new housing is usually
intertwined with an assumption that it will be occupied given housing shortages. In this
24
case, substantial evidence supports the university’s assumption of full occupancy for the
planned on-campus housing. (See Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512 [explaining that an
agency’s factual conclusions are reviewed for substantial evidence].) The record reflects a
historically tight housing market both on and off campus. For example, on-campus housing
occupancy rates were 96 to 99 percent, or an average of 97 percent occupied, over several
years.14 On-campus housing occupancy dropped during one anomalous time period
immediately prior to the pandemic shutdown. Thereafter, for the most recent time period in
relation to the 2021 LRDP, there was a waiting list for on-campus housing. Regarding off-
campus housing, the EIR indicated that off-campus “housing markets are extremely tight.”
On this record, substantial evidence supports the university’s analysis and conclusion
that housing built on campus would be fully occupied, or as close to fully occupied as was
reasonably possible.15 Further, given the high cost to build housing in California, it is
logical to assume that the university, like any other landlord, would take reasonable steps to
ensure full occupancy once the housing was built. As the university states, “it would be
nonsensical for a campus to price its own students out of on-campus housing.” Indeed the
record reflects that the university consistently maintained high occupancy rates except for
one short period prior to the pandemic shutdown. Although Habitat contends that a lack of
affordable housing on campus in the future will result in a high number of on-campus
vacancies, substantial evidence in the record supports the university’s analysis and
conclusion that this scenario is unlikely given the university’s historically low vacancy and
high occupancy rates. In sum, based on substantial evidence in the record, we determine
that it was reasonable for the university to assume its planned buildout of housing would be
14
Habitat contends that “[h]istorically, there has been an approximately 50%
occupancy rate for on-campus housing.” Habitat’s record citations do not support this
contention. It appears that Habitat has mistakenly confused (1) the percentage of students
housed on campus with (2) the percentage of on-campus beds that are occupied by students.
15
The EIR reported that even a 96 percent occupancy rate “represents effectively full
occupancy.” Presumably the remaining percentage reflects ongoing or normal turnover for
rental housing.
25
fully occupied, rather than treating buildout and occupancy as separate issues with the latter
as a mitigation measure.
Second, as stated above, “[a]ny mischaracterization is significant . . . only if it
precludes or obfuscates required disclosure of the project’s environmental impacts and
analysis of potential mitigation measures.” (Mission Bay Alliance, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at
p. 185.) In this case, the EIR discussed the 2021 LRDP’s significant or potentially
significant impact on housing demand. The EIR acknowledged this impact on housing
demand even after taking into consideration the new student beds and the new employee
residences outlined in the 2021 LRDP. Further, in the section of the EIR discussing
mitigation, the EIR again referred to this new housing outlined in the 2021 LRDP and
acknowledged that there were “no feasible mitigation measures . . . available to reduce the
anticipated impact” on housing demand in the region. The EIR explained that it was only
“with incorporation of cumulative projects on and off campus” that the university would “be
able to provide housing to all students projected under the” 2021 LRDP and thereby reduce
the impact associated with student housing demand to less than significant. The EIR thus
expressly acknowledged (1) the significant impact on student housing demand posed by the
2021 LRDP, and made clear that (2) the planned housing, even if fully utilized, was not
sufficient to reduce the anticipated impact unless other projects on and off campus were
considered. On this record, the university’s reliance on the reasonable assumption that full
buildout would be fully occupied did not preclude or obfuscate the required analysis. (See
id. at p. 185.)
In sum, we determine that the trial court erred in separating occupancy from the
buildout of housing under the 2021 LRDP and characterizing full occupancy as a mitigation
measure.
c. Contribution to the City’s Affordable Housing Trust Fund
On appeal, the university contends that it properly declined to make payments to the
City’s affordable housing trust fund. First, the university argues that a comment by the City
26
during the administrative process regarding its affordable housing trust fund was “not
adequate to exhaust administrative remedies” because the comment did “not state that a
payment should be included as a mitigation measure, nor explain how it would effectively
mitigate the impacts of the LRDP.” Second, the university argues that “the record fails to
support the argument that payment to the City’s [affordable housing trust fund] would
effectively mitigate LRDP impacts.” Specifically, the “record does not demonstrate that
payment into the [fund] would guarantee construction of any housing project, nor that it
would offset housing demand due to LRDP development.”
As background, the City in a comment criticized the draft EIR’s “state[ment] that
proposed and entitled housing development in the City’s pipeline adequately mitigates for
the housing demand created by students, faculty, and staff that choose to live off-campus.”
After explaining in the comment why it disagreed, the City concluded by stating, “[M]ore
affordable housing may not be readily available to meet the needs of student growth just
because new housing development is in the pipeline. This scenario could place further
demand on housing in the City, particularly on the limited supply of affordable housing. An
ongoing contribution to the City’s Affordable Housing Trust Fund should be provided to
offset the increased housing demand from students, faculty, and staff in the City,
particularly to offset the demands for affordable housing stock in the City.” (Italics added.)
The university in its response to this comment did not discuss the proposed contribution to
the City’s affordable housing trust fund and instead stated in part, “This comment does not
address the adequacy of the EIR analysis. No further response is necessary.”
The trial court in its statement of decision determined that, in view of the EIR’s
finding that the increased campus population would have significant impacts on housing,
“the EIR should have considered and adopted feasible mitigation measures that would have
lessened the impact.” The court further determined that the term “offset” is commonly
understood to mean mitigate, and therefore the City’s request for a contribution to “offset”
the increased housing demand was reasonably understood as suggesting a mitigation
27
measure. The court found that the administrative record contained a list of projects that
were funded by the City’s affordable housing trust fund, and a list of potential projects that
could be funded by the fund. The court determined that it was “reasonable to assume that
the University’s contributions to this fund would be effective to offset significant impacts on
housing demand, and that it would be feasible for the University to afford the
contributions.” The court concluded that the EIR violated CEQA by failing “to adequately
respond to the City’s proposed mitigation measure for the significant impacts to the City’s
tight housing market, by an ongoing contribution from the University to the City’s
[affordable housing trust fund]; and failed to demonstrate that this proposed mitigation
measure is facially infeasible.”
First, we determine that the City’s comment was sufficient to exhaust its
administrative remedies. The City expressed disagreement with the draft EIR’s conclusion
that housing in the City’s “pipeline adequately mitigates for the housing demand” created by
students and employees living off campus. The City’s concluding statement that an ongoing
contribution should be made to its affordable housing trust fund “to offset the increased
housing demand” is reasonably understood to mean, and could only be understood to mean,
that the ongoing contribution was being proposed to mitigate the increased housing demand,
and “particularly to offset the demands for affordable housing stock in the City.”
Second, we determine that the university violated CEQA by failing to respond to the
City’s suggested mitigation measure. “[A]n adequate EIR must respond to specific
suggestions for mitigating a significant environmental impact unless the suggested
mitigation is facially infeasible. [Citations.] While the response need not be exhaustive, it
should evince good faith and a reasoned analysis. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1030 (Los Angeles
Unified); accord, Residents Against Specific Plan 380 v. County of Riverside (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 941, 970.)
28
In this case, the university does not dispute that the City’s comment pertained to a
“significant environmental impact.” (Los Angeles Unified, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1030.) Indeed the City’s comment pertained to the potential increased demand for off-
campus housing, which the EIR acknowledged was a significant impact that might be
created by the 2021 LRDP. The university did not directly respond to or provide any
analysis of the City’s suggested mitigation of an ongoing contribution to the affordable
housing trust fund. On appeal, the university contends that “the EIR concluded, based on
substantial evidence, that [affordable housing trust fund] payments would not be effective to
mitigate impacts, and this conclusion is entitled to deference.” The university does not
provide a record cite showing that the EIR undertook any such analysis regarding payments
to the fund. To the contrary, the EIR’s response to the City’s comment was that “[t]his
comment does not address the adequacy of the EIR analysis. No further response is
necessary.” On appeal, the university does not contend that the suggested contribution was
facially infeasible. The EIR was therefore inadequate based on its failure to respond to and
analyze the suggested mitigation. (Los Angeles Unified, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030.)
The university contends that there is no evidence that the proposed mitigation
measure “would effectively mitigate LRDP impacts.” However, the university does not
provide legal authority for the proposition that the record must demonstrate that a proposed
mitigation measure will “effectively mitigate” all impacts before the university’s obligation
to even respond to a comment and analyze the mitigation measure is triggered. Further, as
the trial court pointed out, the administrative record contains information about the housing
programs or projects that are or could be supported by the affordable housing trust fund.
The university likewise acknowledges that the record indicates that funds from the
affordable housing trust fund have been used for projects. The university may consider this
and other relevant information in conducting its analysis of whether contributions to the
fund would be feasible mitigation.
29
To the extent the university argues that the housing impact finding in the EIR “was
driven by external uncertainties,” we note that the EIR nevertheless recognized the tight
housing market in the region and the additional, substantial demand for off-campus housing
that may result from the 2021 LRDP, resulting in significant impacts to housing. Further, to
the extent the university contends that no mitigation measure would reduce the impact on
housing to a less-than-significant level, that purported fact would not, by itself, relieve the
university of the obligation to consider feasible mitigation measures. (See Sierra Club,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 524-525 [“Even when a project’s benefits outweigh its unmitigated
effects, agencies are still required to implement all mitigation measures unless those
measures are truly infeasible”; “The inclusion of a mitigation measure that reduces an
environmental impact is permitted even if the measure will not reduce the impact to a level
below the threshold of significance”].)
Lastly, in concluding that the EIR was inadequate in its response to the City’s
proposed mitigation, “[w]e do not mean to imply the [university] must find [ongoing
contributions to the City’s affordable housing trust fund] are feasible mitigation measures.
This is not our call. Our role is merely to determine whether the EIR provides the
[university] sufficient information on which to base its judgment whether to approve the
[2021 LRDP]. [Citation.] In the present case, it does not.” (Los Angeles Unified, supra,
58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030, fn. omitted.)
In sum, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the EIR’s analysis
of housing impacts was inadequate because of (1) the assumption that the goal of housing
100 percent of new students on campus will be achieved, and (2) the EIR’s reliance on this
measure for its significance determination. Therefore, the trial court’s findings in this
regard must be stricken. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in determining
that the EIR (a) failed to adequately respond to the City’s proposed mitigation measure of an
ongoing contribution by the university to the City’s affordable housing trust fund and
(b) failed to demonstrate that the proposed mitigation measure was facially infeasible.
30
C. Wildfire Evacuation
The trial court found the EIR’s analysis regarding wildfire evacuation inadequate,
including because the EIR only considered the temporary impact of construction activities.
The court also determined that the EIR’s mitigation measure for impacts to wildfire with
respect to evacuation routes was ineffective. The court further found that the EIR did not
adequately respond to comment 07-25, which addressed wildfire evacuation outside of
construction. On appeal, the university contends (1) the EIR analyzed the impacts on
evacuation at plan buildout, not merely during construction, and substantial evidence
supports the EIR’s conclusions; (2) no mitigation was required except during construction;
and (3) the EIR’s response to the comment was adequate.
1. Background
The EIR explained that the “2021 LRDP would accommodate an additional 12,830
individuals on the campus above the existing daily campus population and would allow
construction and operation of an additional 5,628,824 assignable square feet of building
space[16] to accommodate this additional population.” The new development would be in
the north campus, which is in an area largely designated as a high fire hazard severity zone
by the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, and in the central and lower campus,
which is surrounded by a moderate fire hazard severity zone on the west, south, and east.
The EIR acknowledged that “the wildfire risk associated with placing new development in
close proximity to [a high fire hazard severity zone] and proposed changes in land use under
the 2021 LRDP would be significant.” (Boldface omitted.) With mitigation involving a
campus-wide vegetation management plan, the EIR determined that the impact would be
less than significant.
In addition to considering the increased wildfire risk, the EIR indicated that its
“impact analysis” also “evaluates the effects of implementing the 2021 LRDP on emergency
16
This square footage included residential space for student and employee housing
and academic and support space.
31
planning and evacuation in the event of a wildfire, and any conflicts with existing
emergency plans and policies.” The EIR indicated that “emergency ingress and egress, and
other emergency planning features that reduce risk are presented and discussed . . . .”
The EIR explained that in 2016, the university adopted an emergency operations plan
(EOP), which must meet state and federal requirements, including specific emergency
planning considerations. The university’s EOP incorporated an emergency management
organizational structure used by other governmental entities to coordinate responses to
incidents. The university’s EOP “comprises the entirety of emergency planning activities
that govern emergency response and evacuation on the main residential campus . . . .” “The
EOP primarily details responsibilities and coordination among responsible parties in the
event of various types of emergencies on campus, including wildfire.” The EOP “outlines
evacuation procedures for building emergencies and campus-wide emergencies.” “The
procedures and actions that students, faculty, and staff should take during an evacuation are
communicated” through various means, including from staff, from public address
announcements from public safety vehicles, and from “CruzAlert,” the university’s
emergency notification system. New development under the 2021 LRDP “would be subject
to the EOP.”
The EIR concluded that “there are no elements in the 2021 LRDP that would
interfere with the emergency response and evacuation procedures set forth in the EOP.”
The EIR stated that “proposed roadway extensions and new streets would provide improved
network connections that could improve emergency vehicle access throughout the LRDP
area.” The EIR acknowledged that “implementation of the 2021 LRDP could interfere with
the UC Santa Cruz EOP through construction-related road closures.” The “impact would be
limited to the construction period and would affect only limited streets or intersections,”
such as by slowing down evacuations or emergency access. The EIR determined that such
impacts would be significant but would only occur during the construction period. The
32
mitigation measure for this impact involved a construction traffic management plan, which
would reduce the impact to less-than-significant.
In a master response to comments raising wildfire concerns, the EIR stated in part,
“The Wildland Fire Response Procedures and the Campuswide Evacuation procedures
provide the actions that students and employees should take during a campuswide
evacuation. UC Santa Cruz is currently updating these procedures and working with the
City of Santa Cruz and Caltrans to discuss congestion concerns, including a mutual aid
agreement with the Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District for the provision of additional
transit during an evacuation. The updated campuswide evacuation procedures, which will
be released this winter, are being prepared in accordance with the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) standards . . . . The current evacuation procedures also meet NFPA
standards. These campuswide evacuation procedures will be evaluated annually by the
Office of Emergency Services and the Campus Fire Marshall to determine if any
modifications are needed.”
The trial court found that the EIR conducted “an adequate analysis” of the wildfire
risk for the 2021 LRDP’s development and land use plans. However, the court determined
that the EIR’s analysis of those plans in relation to evacuation during a wildfire was
“deficient.”
On this latter point, the trial court interpreted the EIR as “implying that the EOP is a
sufficient evacuation plan for the LRDP’s new development and land use plan. However,
the EIR makes no analysis of whether the evacuation procedures in the 2016 EOP would be
sufficient for evacuating an additional 10,000 people spread out over the expanded area of
development under the LRDP’s new land use plans. Instead, the EIR restricts the analysis
of impacts to campus evacuation during a wildfire to the construction of the project itself,
concluding that construction activities could temporarily affect campus evacuation by
closing certain streets.” Further, “[t]he fact that other agencies may use the same types of
procedures does not demonstrate that the EOP is adequate for the evacuation of new
33
development in a high to moderate fire risk zone, or that the evacuation routes outlined in
the EOP are adequate for the evacuation of an additional 10,000 persons from the campus.
Nor does the past review of EOP procedures by the [UC Santa Cruz Office of Emergency
Services] and [the campus] Fire Marshal[] demonstrate that the EOP is adequate for the
future evacuation of an increased population and expanded development.”
The trial court was also not persuaded by the EIR’s reliance on the EOP’s campus
evacuation procedures in August 2020 for the CZU Lightning Complex fire which included
using a road called Empire Grade. The EIR acknowledged that “a fully occupied campus
would require longer to evacuate fully . . . .” The court reasoned that “an evacuation during
COVID when the campus population was likely significantly lower than normal, and
certainly lower than what the LRDP proposed, is hardly a sufficient test of the EOP’s
adequacy. No evaluation was made as to whether the early warning procedures and
notifications are sufficient to reach an additional 10,000 people over the expanded
development, or whether their evacuation from the campus by way of Empire Grade will
create gridlock, slowing or halting the evacuation. Moreover, the EIR does not explain why
only the temporary impacts from construction activities are being considered.” The court
thus concluded that “the EIR’s analysis of the LRDP’s impacts on evacuation associated
with wildfire risk is inadequate.”
The trial court also found the “EIR’s mitigation of evacuation routes is ineffective,
because it relies solely on traffic management plans for construction activities, and only
during the construction period. [Citation.] While this is an effective mitigation measure for
that specific impact, it is not an effective mitigation measure for the impacts of the LRDP,
as a whole, on evacuation routes for the expanded development and added campus
population.” The court further determined that there was not substantial evidence that three
new roads contemplated by the 2021 LRDP would be “effective in remedying the impacts of
the new development and the increase in campus population on evacuation.”
34
2. Legal principles
“ ‘ “To facilitate CEQA’s informational role, the EIR must contain facts and analysis,
not just the agency’s bare conclusions or opinions.” ’ [Citation.] In short, ‘there must be a
disclosure of the “analytic route the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action.” ’
[Citation.]” (County of Lake, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230.) “An agency’s inadequate
or conclusory discussion of a potentially substantial adverse change in the environment
deprives the public of information necessary for informed self-government and constitutes a
prejudicial abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1231.)
“On review, we defer to the agency’s factual finding, including which methodologies
best identify and analyze significant environmental impacts. [Citation.] But we
independently review ‘whether the EIR includes enough detail “to enable those who did not
participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by
the proposed project.” ’ [Citation.]” (County of Lake, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231.)
“[I]in reviewing an EIR’s discussion, we do not require technical perfection or scientific
certainty: ‘ “ ‘[T]he courts have looked not for an exhaustive analysis but for adequacy,
completeness and a good-faith effort at full disclosure.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Sierra Club,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515.)
An EIR must “analyze any significant environmental effects the project might cause
or risk exacerbating by bringing development and people into the area affected. For
example the EIR should evaluate any potentially significant direct, indirect, or cumulative
environmental impacts of locating development in areas susceptible to hazardous conditions
(e.g., floodplains, coastlines, wildfire risk areas) . . . .” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.2,
subd. (a); see California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management
Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 378 (California Building Industry); League to Save Lake Tahoe
v. County of Placer (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63, 136 (Save Lake Tahoe).) “[W]hen a
proposed project risks exacerbating those environmental hazards or conditions that already
exist, an agency must analyze the potential impact of such hazards on future residents or
35
users. In those specific instances, it is the project’s impact on the environment—and not
the environment’s impact on the project—that compels an evaluation of how future
residents or users could be affected by exacerbated conditions. (California Building
Industry, supra, at pp. 377-378, italics omitted & added.) For development in wildfire risk
areas, this includes the effect on emergency personnel’s ability to protect and on residents’
ability to evacuate. (Save Lake Tahoe, supra, at p. 136.)
In this case, to determine the significance of any effect on wildfire emergency
response and evacuation, the EIR relied on a checklist from appendix G to the CEQA
Guidelines.17 One question in the checklist asks whether a project that is “located in or
near . . . very high fire hazard severity zones” would “[s]ubstantially impair an adopted
emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan.” (CEQA Guidelines, appen. G;
see Save Lake Tahoe, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 133 [explaining that former appendix G
provided that the “project’s impact would be significant if the project would ‘impair
implementation or physically interfere with an adopted emergency response plan or
emergency evacuation plan’ ”].) As one appellate court has explained, “[d]eveloping homes
and stores in a very high fire hazard area risks exacerbating the hazard by putting more
people and property in harm’s way and increasing the chance of a wildfire starting. The
development increases the number of people who may need to be rescued, rendered aid, and
evacuated and the amount of property that may need to be protected. Thus, when we review
for whether a project may interfere with implementation of an emergency response and
evacuation plan, we are primarily concerned that the public and decision makers
17
“Appendix G is an ‘ “Environmental Checklist Form” that may be used in
determining whether a project could have a significant effect on the environment and
whether it is necessary to prepare a negative declaration or an EIR.’ [Citations.] The
appendix is not, and does not purport to be, a comprehensive listing of possible significant
impacts. To the contrary, appendix G expressly informs users that it is ‘a sample form that
may be tailored to . . . project circumstances,’ and that ‘potential impacts that are not listed
on this form must also be considered.’ [Citation.]” (Yerba Buena Neighborhood
Consortium, LLC v. Regents of University of California (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 779, 803.)
36
understand the impact the project will have on the new residents’ ability to evacuate and on
emergency personnel’s ability to protect and service the residents and their property
consistent with the adopted plan.” (Save Lake Tahoe, supra, at p. 136, italics added.)
3. Analysis
a. Adequacy of EIR’s Wildfire Evacuation Analysis
The university contends that the EIR’s analysis was not limited to whether the
2021 LRDP would substantially impair an adopted emergency response or evacuation plan
during construction, but “also addressed plan buildout and implementation.” The university
also argues that substantial evidence supports the EIR’s analysis, and that the attack on the
wildfire analysis was based on speculation and inadequate lay opinion.
We determine that the EIR contains conclusions regarding whether full
implementation, not just during construction, of the 2021 LRDP would cause impacts. For
example, the EIR states, “Implementation of the 2021 LRDP would not interfere with an
adopted emergency response or evacuation plan, but construction activities for projects
under the 2021 LRDP could result in short-term, temporary impacts on street traffic because
of roadway improvements and potential extension of construction activities into the right-of-
way. This could result in a reduction in the number of lanes or temporary closure of certain
street segments. Any such impacts would be limited to the construction period and would
affect only adjacent streets or intersection.” (Italics added.) Similarly, the EIR states,
“[T]here are no elements in the 2021 LRDP that would interfere with the emergency
response and evacuation procedures set forth in the EOP. However, implementation of the
2021 LRDP could interfere with the UC Santa Cruz EOP through construction-related road
closures.” (Italics added.) These statements in the EIR reflect the conclusion that the 2021
LRDP would have only temporary impacts during construction, and that no impact would
occur for full implementation in relation to an adopted emergency response or evacuation
plan.
37
However, we further determine that, although the EIR concluded that implementation
of the 2021 LRDP would not interfere with the EOP or other adopted evacuation plan, the
EIR did not contain an adequate analysis to reach this conclusion.
The EIR disclosed the “significant” wildfire risk that the 2021 LRDP’s contemplated
development and land use changes would pose due to the close proximity to a high fire
hazard severity zone. (Boldface omitted.) The EIR indicated that its “impact analysis”
would “evaluate[] the effects of implementing the 2021 LRDP on emergency planning and
evacuation in the event of a wildfire, and any conflicts with existing emergency plans and
policies.” The EIR indicated that “emergency ingress and egress, and other emergency
planning features that reduce risk are presented and discussed . . . .” The EIR ultimately
concluded that “there are no elements in the 2021 LRDP that would interfere with the
emergency response and evacuation procedures set forth in the EOP.”
Absent from the EIR was an adequate discussion of how this conclusion was reached.
The EIR (1) generally referred to the EOP’s plan for a coordinated response to emergencies
and (2) described the communication channels for providing information to the on-campus
population during emergencies. However, the EIR did not provide any analysis regarding
emergency “evacuation procedures” for a wildfire upon full implementation of the
2021 LRDP.
The university contends that “[t]he EIR detailed responsibilities and coordination
among parties on [c]ampus in the event of various types of emergencies and outlined
evacuation procedures for specific types of emergencies.” (Italics added.) The portions of
the EIR cited by the university in support of this argument simply state that “the UC Santa
Cruz EOP outlines evacuation procedures for building emergencies and campus-wide
emergencies,” and “the UC Santa Cruz EOP outlines evacuation procedures for building
emergencies (Stage 1) and campus-wide emergencies (Stage 2).” These sentences in the
EIR do not reflect an evaluation of the 2021 LRDP’s impact on evacuation in the event of a
wildfire. (See Save Lake Tahoe, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 136.)
38
The apparent reason for this omission is disclosed in the EIR’s master response to
comments regarding wildfire risk. According to the response, UC Santa Cruz’s “Wildland
Fire Response Procedures and the Campuswide Evacuation procedures,” which “provide the
actions that students and employees should take during a campuswide evacuation,” were in
the process of being “updat[ed],” including to address “congestion concerns.” The response
indicated only that the “current evacuation procedures” met certain standards, and that the
procedures would be evaluated annually going forward.
Further, we are not persuaded by the university’s contention that certain statements in
the EIR reflect (1) an analysis of the effects of implementing the 2021 LRDP on wildfire
evacuation, and/or (2) support the conclusion that the 2021 LRDP would not interfere with
evacuation procedures.
For example, a commenter expressed concern about an active wildfire and one of the
three new road segments contemplated by the 2021 LRDP.18 In response, the EIR states
that “UC Santa Cruz will . . . consider the need to restrict access along the proposed
connection during emergency evacuation procedures, as prescribed in the EOP for the main
residential campus.” (Italics added.) The “will . . . consider” language is consistent with the
fact that evacuation procedures were still being updated and the analysis was not yet
complete. Further, the possible need to “restrict access” on at least one of the proposed new
roadways during a wildfire evacuation appears to be inconsistent with the conclusion that
the 2021 LRDP would not interfere with a wildfire evacuation.
Other pages in the EIR cited by the university refer to emergency vehicle access
throughout the LRDP area, not evacuation of the campus during a wildfire.
18
It appears the commenter was referring to a proposed new road segment that would
connect the developed campus area to a new northern entrance. To the extent people would
be evacuated northward and/or northwestward on campus, people would be moving closer
to the high fire hazard severity zone and/or closer to the vicinity of historic fires, including
the 2020 CZU Lightning Complex fire.
39
The university also refers to pages in the EIR that mention the evacuation of campus
in August 2020, during the CZU Lightning Complex fire. The university acknowledges,
however, that the EIR “did not rely on this example as the basis for the conclusion that
evacuation impacts would be less than significant.”
The university cites to one page in the 2021 LRDP itself, which states that the three
new proposed roadways “will help enhance existing vehicular networks and offer additional
opportunities for egress, depending on the challenges being faced.” (Italics added.) This
statement does not reflect an analysis of the impact specifically in relation to wildfire
evacuation.
Lastly, the university cites e-mails and meeting agenda in the administrative record
showing, according to the university, UC Santa Cruz’s consultation with a deputy fire
marshal about “wildfire risks and evacuation issues.” However, whatever substantive
analysis was conducted on these issues is not contained in the cited pages, let alone in the
EIR. (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 442 [determining that a county “failed to proceed in the manner
provided by CEQA” to the extent the county “relied on information not actually
incorporated or described and referenced” in the EIR]; County of Lake, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1230, 1231 [explaining that the EIR must disclose “ ‘the “analytic route
the . . . agency traveled from evidence to action,” ’ ” including “ ‘enough detail “to enable
those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully
the issues raised by the proposed project” ’ ”].)
In sum, the EIR did not provide an adequate analysis of the impact that full
implementation of the 2021 LRDP would have on an adopted plan for emergency wildfire
evacuation. (See Save Lake Tahoe, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 136; see also CEQA
Guidelines, § 15126.2, subd. (a); California Building Industry, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 377-
378.) Instead, the EIR offered only the bare conclusion that “no elements in the 2021
LRDP . . . would interfere with the . . . evacuation procedures set forth in the EOP.”
40
However, the EIR was required to include “ ‘enough detail “to enable those who did not
participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by
the proposed project.” ’ [Citation.]” (County of Lake, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231.)
Here, the university’s “ ‘ “bare conclusion[]” ’ ” in the EIR without an adequate discussion
“deprive[d] the public of information necessary for informed self-government and
constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 1230, 1231.)
b. Mitigation
The university contends that the trial court should not have analyzed whether the
additional road segments proposed under the 2021 LRDP was ineffective mitigation. The
university argues that the court, by addressing this issue, misunderstood the EIR’s analysis.
According to the university, the EIR determined that “evacuation impacts would not be
significant” and therefore mitigation was not required (except during construction). Further,
the university contends that the new roads were “part of the plan itself, not mitigation.”
In view of our conclusion that the EIR did not adequately analyze the 2021 LRDP’s
impact on an adopted plan for wildfire evacuation, we cannot determine whether the
2021 LRDP’s proposed new roads constituted mitigation or were effective mitigation.
Nevertheless, the trial court’s finding of ineffective mitigation was not limited to its
consideration of the proposed new road segments. The trial court also found the “EIR’s
mitigation of evacuation routes is ineffective, because it relies solely on traffic management
plans for construction activities, and only during the construction period. [Citation.] While
this is an effective mitigation measure for that specific impact, it is not an effective
mitigation measure for the impacts of the LRDP, as a whole, on evacuation routes for the
expanded development and added campus population.” We agree with the trial court. The
EIR’s master response to comments regarding wildfire risk indicated that there were already
“congestion concerns” with respect to campus evacuation. As the trial court stated, a
mitigation measure limited to the construction time period would not be “an effective
41
mitigation measure for the impacts of the LRDP, as a whole, on evacuation routes for the
expanded development and added campus population.”
c. Response to Comment 07-25
The university contends that the trial court erred in determining that the EIR’s
response to comment 07-25 was insufficient. Comment 07-25 raised the issue of the
2021 LRDP’s impacts on wildfire evacuation outside of the construction period. The
university argues that the EIR “evaluate[d] operational impacts,” not just impacts during
construction as asserted in the comment, and therefore the response, which made this point,
was sufficient.
Comment 07-25 expressed concern that the draft EIR only considered wildfire
evacuation during construction and that evacuation should also be considered outside of
construction. Specifically, the comment raised the scenario of a fire propelled by offshore
winds during fire season in the fall, and the need to evacuate the campus. The comment
observed that many of the nearly 10,000 proposed additional people on campus would have
to evacuate on Empire Grade, that all Bonny Doon residents would also have to evacuate on
that road in certain scenarios, and that this would create gridlock and a “death trap” in the
west campus area. In response, the EIR stated, “Contrary to statements made in this
comment, the Draft EIR properly evaluated potential impacts associated with 2021 LRDP
implementation, including the risks associated with new development (construction and
operation) and issues related to emergency response and evacuation plans in Impacts 3.18-1
and 3.18-2, and determines that impacts would be less than significant with mitigation.
Refer to Master Response 4.” The court found this response, and the sections of the EIR
that it referred to, did not explain why the impacts from only construction activities were
addressed. The court concluded that the response was therefore insufficient.
When an agency receives a comment regarding the draft EIR, “[t]he written response
shall describe the disposition of significant environmental issues raised . . . . There must be
good faith, reasoned analysis in response. Conclusory statements unsupported by factual
42
information will not suffice.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15088, subd. (c).) “Furthermore,
‘[s]atisfactory responses to comments “ ‘may be provided by reference to the EIR itself.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (Preservation, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.)
In this case, the comment raised the issue of wildfire evacuation and the increased
campus population under the 2021 LRDP, and expressed concern that only impacts during
construction were analyzed. The EIR’s response to this comment indicated that the EIR
evaluated evacuation plans in relation to construction and implementation of the 2021
LRDP and cited portions of the EIR. As we have explained, the EIR did not provide an
adequate analysis to support its conclusion that implementation of the 2021 LRDP would
not interfere with an adopted evacuation plan outside of construction. As the response at
issue simply referred to other portions of the EIR that did not contain an adequate analysis,
the response to the comment likewise lacked “reasoned analysis” regarding the 2021
LRDP’s impact on wildfire evacuation outside of construction. (CEQA Guidelines,
§ 15088, subd. (c).)
In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the EIR’s analysis
was inadequate regarding the 2021 LRDP’s impacts on wildfire with respect to evacuation,
and that the EIR did not adequately respond to comment 07-25.
D. Consistency with Land Use Policies
The university contends that the trial court erred in determining that the EIR did not
adequately analyze whether the 2021 LRDP was consistent with land use policies. The
university argues that the court’s conclusion was based on factual and legal determinations
that have since been rejected by this court in a separate case. The university contends that
its land use consistency analysis was otherwise sufficient.
An EIR “shall discuss any inconsistencies between the proposed project and
applicable general plans, specific plans and regional plans.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15125,
subd. (d).) “The purpose of this requirement is to give the public and decision makers the
most accurate and understandable picture practically possible of the project’s likely near-
43
term and long-term impacts.” (Id., subd. (a).) “The failure to provide enough information
to permit informed decisionmaking is fatal. ‘When the informational requirements of
CEQA are not complied with, an agency has failed to proceed in “a manner required by
law” and has therefore abused its discretion. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Napa Citizens for
Honest Government v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342, 361.)
“The Constitution . . . establishes the University of California, vesting the Regents
with ‘full powers of organization and government’ (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (a)),
including ‘the legal title and the management and disposition of the property of the
university and of property held for its benefit’ (id., subd. (f)), and ‘all the powers necessary
or convenient for the effective administration of [the University of California]’ (ibid.).”
(City and County of San Francisco v. Regents of University of California (2019)
7 Cal.5th 536, 545.) “As a ‘constitutionally created arm of the state,’ the Regents have
‘virtual autonomy in self-governance,’ and their power ‘ “ ‘to operate, control, and
administer the University is virtually exclusive.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Given this unique status, the
Regents have ‘immunity from local regulation unless the state, through statute or provision
of the California Constitution, has [expressly] consented to waive such immunity.’
[Citations.]” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
852, 858; see id. at pp. 855-856 [holding that construction project by the Regents was
exempt from local building and zoning regulations].)
In this case, the EIR indicated that the university previously contracted with the City
for adequate water service for the entire campus. However, a portion of the campus,
including some areas proposed to be developed by the 2021 LRDP, were located outside the
city limit. According to the EIR, the university believed that under the contracts, the City
was obligated to provide water to the entire campus, while the City believed it was only
required to provide water to areas of the campus within the City’s service boundary. At the
time the EIR was issued, a civil action was pending to resolve the issue. In the EIR, the
university indicated that it did “not believe that further compliance with state or local laws,
44
including approval by the Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO), is required for
the campus to receive increased service for the development of those portions of the campus
that lie in unincorporated Santa Cruz County.”
In the trial court, Habitat contended that because the 2021 LRDP included areas
outside the City’s water service area, the City’s general plan required LAFCO approval of
any extension of the water service area. Consequently, the EIR had to address the impacts
on water supply to meet the informational needs of LAFCO.
The trial court determined that the university’s “ ‘belief’ ” about not needing LAFCO
approval did “not constitute substantial evidence.” The court stated that the City was bound
by its general plan and LAFCO regulations, both of which required LAFCO approval before
the City could provide water outside its water service area. The court concluded that the
university “violated CEQA by failing to discuss the inconsistencies between the proposed
project and applicable and local and regional plans, and in failing to support their conclusion
regarding LAFCO approval with substantial evidence.”
After the trial court issued its statement of decision and judgment in this case, this
court in an appeal in a separate case between the Regents and the City determined:
(1) based on written contracts between the Regents and the City, the City “is obligated to
provide water service to the boundaries of the University of California campus through the
City’s existing water lines, which may then be used for distribution to any part of the
University of California, Santa Cruz campus, including new campus development and those
parts of the campus outside the City’s jurisdiction”; and (2) “LAFCO approval is not
required before the City can provide water service for the entire UC Santa Cruz campus.”
(The Regents of the University of California v. City of Santa Cruz (Nov. 21, 2024, H050528)
[nonpub. opn.] (Regents), pp. 39, 31.)19 In view of this court’s conclusions in Regents, the
19
The University has requested judicial notice of this court’s opinion in The Regents
of the University of California v. City of Santa Cruz (Nov. 21, 2024, H050528) [nonpub.
opn.] (Regents). In response, the City states that it does not oppose judicial notice of the
45
trial court’s earlier determinations to the contrary cannot support a finding that the EIR was
deficient in its discussion of inconsistencies with applicable local and regional plans, and its
discussion of whether LAFCO approval was required.
The City contends that the trial court nevertheless correctly determined that the EIR’s
analysis was inadequate because the EIR did not discuss the project’s inconsistencies with
regional land use plans. Specifically, the City argues that its general plan allows the
extension of the City’s water service area only if an application is approved by the city
council and/or LAFCO. The City contends that the EIR simply identifies the existence of
this policy but does not provide sufficient analysis. However, as the university observes,
UC Santa Cruz as a constitutionally created entity is not subject to the City’s general plan.
Further, the provision of water pursuant to the existing contracts was presumably approved
by the city council when it previously entered into the contracts with the Regents.
Habitat contends that regardless of whether the City’s delivery of water for the 2021
LRDP’s planned growth is subject to LAFCO review, CEQA still requires a discussion of
any inconsistencies between the proposed project and applicable land use plans. According
to Habitat, the “EIR did not actually discuss potential inconsistencies between the LRDP
and applicable plans.” Habitat argues, for example, that the EIR must discuss the 2021
LRDP’s “water supply impacts on the City, and its possible inconsistencies with the City’s
existence of the opinion, or of the legal conclusions reached in the opinion. The City only
opposes the request to the extent the University seeks judicial notice of “conclusions of law
not reached” in the opinion. We grant the University’s request for judicial notice of the
opinion and of the conclusions reached therein. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459;
Guarantee Forklift, Inc. v. Capacity of Texas, Inc. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1075-1076
[explaining that judicial notice of court records is proper to determine whether relitigation of
an issue is precluded on collateral estoppel grounds]; Western Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1485 [holding that judicial notice of an unpublished opinion
was proper for purposes of preventing the parties from relitigating an issue]; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1) [unpublished opinion may be cited if it “is relevant under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel”] (all further rule references
are to the California Rules of Court).)
46
General Plan policies discouraging the extension of water service where it might exacerbate
the City’s water supply shortfall.”
However, the EIR contains a land use and planning section in which the EIR
“evaluates the potential environmental impacts that could result from conflicts with land use
plans and policies from buildout of the 2021 LRDP.” Regarding water in particular, the EIR
elsewhere discloses the City’s general plan policies regarding water, and includes an
analysis of, among other matters, water supply, campus water demand under the project,
impacts on water supply, and potential alternative water supplies and the associated
environmental impacts if used. Habitat fails to persuasively articulate how or why the
analysis in the EIR is inadequate.
In sum, we determine that the EIR’s discussion of local and regional plans or policies
has not been shown to be inadequate. Therefore the trial court’s finding that the EIR failed
to discuss the LRD’s consistency or inconsistency with applicable local and regional plans
or policies must be stricken.
E. Education Code Section 67504
Education Code section 67504(b)(1) sets forth, among other matters, a legislative
“intent,” “[c]onsistent with the requirements of CEQA,” that “the University of California
sufficiently mitigate significant off-campus impacts related to campus growth and
development.” The City and County each alleged a cause of action for violation of this
subdivision based on the university’s alleged failure to analyze and mitigate off-campus
impacts of increased enrollment.
On appeal, the university contends that the City and County waived their claim by
failing to make more than “passing references” to Education Code section 67504 in their
opening briefs in the trial court. Second, the university argues that the City and County
cannot state a claim because there is no private right of action, the section “does not give
rise to any mandatory duty that creates an actionable claim,” and the City and County do not
47
have standing to allege a violation. Third, the university argues that, in any event, it has
complied with Education Code section 67504.
In response, the City contends that it did not waive its claim. The City also argues
that Education Code section 67504 creates a private right of action and imposes a mandatory
duty on the university to mitigate significant off-campus impacts. The City further contends
that the university violated the section by failing to sufficiently analyze mitigation with
respect to housing and wildfires. The County does not address its Education Code
section 67504 claim in its respondent’s brief on appeal.
The trial court determined that the City and County did not forfeit their Education
Code claim because the City addressed the claim in its opening brief and the County joined
in the briefing. The court also found that the City and County had a private right of action
and standing to sue. The court determined that Education Code section 67504 required the
university to mitigate off-campus impacts in compliance with CEQA. The court ultimately
determined that the university’s CEQA violations also constituted violations of Education
Code section 67504.
We determine that the City and the County did not forfeit their Education Code
claim. Although the City made only a few references to Education Code section 67504 in
its opening trial brief, it is apparent that its Education Code claim was based on its claim
that the university violated CEQA. For example, the City argued in its opening trial brief
that the university’s failure to adequately mitigate the impact of the campus population
increase on housing violated both CEQA and Education Code section 67504(b)(1). The
County in its opening trial brief joined in the City’s argument. Forfeiture has not been
shown.
We conclude, however, that Education Code section 67504(b)(1) does not give rise to
a private right of action for the failure to sufficiently mitigate off-campus impacts.
Education Code section 67504 “was part of a comprehensive amendment to the Education
Code intended to ‘refine higher education reporting requirements to provide for more
48
effective, manageable, and transparent reporting by the higher education segments.’
[Citation.]” (City of San Diego, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 963.) As the Legislative Counsel’s
Digest explained regarding the proposed amendment, “Existing law contains various
reporting requirements of the University of California, the California State University, and
the California Community Colleges both in statute and in Supplemental Report language to
the annual Budget Act. [¶] The bill would codify these requirements by requesting the
University of California, and requiring the California State University and the California
Community Colleges, to report to the Legislature on institutional financial aid, campus
enrollment and facilities, academic and research programs, and the capital outlay planning
process, as specified. . . . The bill would additionally revise the deadlines for the submittal
of reports by the University of California, the California State University, and the California
Community Colleges.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1182 (2009–2010 Reg.
Sess.); Stats. 2009, ch. 386.) The bill also deleted several reporting requirements. (Ibid.)
In the uncodified first section of the legislation, the Legislature expressed its
“intent . . . that the need for recurring reports from the University of California, the
California State University, and the California Community Colleges be met through clear
reporting requirements established in statute. Accordingly, it is the intent of the Legislature
that noncodified requests for reports from the higher education segments adopted prior to
[this legislation], including those taking the form of provisional or supplemental language in
Budget Acts adopted prior to 2009 . . . have by this act been subsumed, as needed, into the
appropriate code sections.” (Stats. 2009, ch. 386, § 1, subd. (a).)
Among the several sections that were added to the Education Code as part of the
refinement of higher education reporting requirements was the statute at issue here,
Education Code section 67504. This section contains four separate reporting requirements
in four separate subdivisions. Subdivisions (a) and (b) pertain to the University of
California, and subdivisions (c) and (d) pertain to California State University. (Ed. Code,
§ 67504.) Paragraph (1) of each subdivision contains findings and declarations by the
49
Legislature, as well as a statement of legislative intent in two of the subdivisions, relating to
the particular reporting requirement. (Id., subds. (a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1) & (d)(1).)
Paragraph (2) of each subdivision contains the specific reporting requirement. (Id.,
subds. (a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(2) & (d)(2).)
Regarding the University of California, Education Code section 67504 states:
“(a)(1) The Legislature finds and declares that based on academic goals and projected
enrollment levels, each University of California campus and medical center periodically
develops a Long Range Development Plan (LRDP) that guides its physical development,
including land use designations, the location of buildings, and infrastructure systems, for an
established time horizon.
“(2) In order to ensure greater legislative oversight over the process used by the
University of California to prepare and implement each plan, including the accompanying
Environmental Impact Report (EIR), at the time draft LRDPs and draft LRDP EIRs are
submitted for public review, the university is requested to provide the Legislature with
summaries of the draft LRDPs and LRDP EIRs to the Joint Legislative Budget
Committee. . . .
“(b)(1) The Legislature further finds and declares that the expansion of campus
enrollment and facilities may negatively affect the surrounding environment. Consistent
with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), it is the intent
of the Legislature that the University of California sufficiently mitigate significant off-
campus impacts related to campus growth and development.
“(2) On or before March 1 of each year from 2010 to 2012, inclusive, the University
of California is requested to report for each campus on the status of implementation,
including the implementation dates where applicable, of mitigation measures for significant
off-campus impacts identified consistent with the requirements of CEQA, including those
that require fair share payments to local agencies. The report shall identify the status of fair
share mitigation agreements with and payments to local agencies for mitigation of off-
50
campus impacts that are required in certified EIRs. The report should also list any monetary
or equivalent in-kind payments to local agencies made by the campuses for the mitigation of
off-campus impacts that do not involve fair share language in CEQA documents and that
have been implemented under other arrangements. For those significant off-campus impacts
that have been triggered but have not been sufficiently mitigated, the university shall report
on the additional steps that are being taken to reach a resolution.” (Italics added.)20
As explained by the California Supreme Court, “[a] violation of a state statute does
not necessarily give rise to a private cause of action. [Citation.] Instead, whether a party
has a right to sue depends on whether the Legislature has ‘manifested an intent to create
such a private cause of action’ under the statute. [Citations.] Such legislative intent, if any,
20
The remaining subdivisions (c) and (d), which pertain to California State
University, state, “(c)(1) The Legislature finds and declares that each California State
University campus periodically develops a physical master plan to guide the future
development of their facilities, based on academic goals and projected student enrollment
levels, for an established time horizon. [¶] (2) In order to ensure greater legislative
oversight over the process used by the California State University to prepare and implement
each plan, including the accompanying Environmental Impact Report (EIR), at the time a
draft physical master plan and the accompanying draft EIR are submitted for public review,
the university shall provide summaries of these documents to the Joint Legislative Budget
Committee. The summaries shall also be available on the university Internet Web site. [¶]
(d)(1) The Legislature further finds and declares that the expansion of campus enrollment
and facilities may negatively affect the surrounding environment. In view of the case City of
Marina v. the Board of Trustees of the California State University (2006) [39] Cal.4th 341,
it is the intent of the Legislature that the California State University take steps to reach
agreements with local public agencies regarding the mitigation of off-campus impacts
related to campus growth and development. [¶] (2) On or before March 1 of each year from
2010 to 2012, inclusive, the California State University shall report by campus on the status
of any negotiations with local agencies for mitigation measures for significant off-campus
impacts identified consistent with the requirements of CEQA, including implementation
dates where applicable. For each impact, this report shall identify whether an agreement has
been reached with local agencies. The report shall also list any monetary and nonmonetary
in-kind payments made by the campus for the mitigation of off-campus impacts identified as
unavoidable in the certified EIRs. For those impacts for which there is no agreement, the
university shall explain what steps were taken and if any additional steps will be taken to
reach an agreement.” (Ed. Code, § 67504.)
51
is revealed through the language of the statute and its legislative history. [Citation.]” (Lu v.
Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 596 (Lu).)
“A statute may contain ‘ “clear, understandable, unmistakable terms,” ’ which
strongly and directly indicate that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of
action. [Citation.] For instance, the statute may expressly state that a person has or is liable
for a cause of action for a particular violation. [Citations.] Or, more commonly, a statute
may refer to a remedy or means of enforcing its substantive provisions, i.e., by way of an
action. [Citations.] If, however, a statute does not contain such obvious language, resort to
its legislative history is next in order. [Citations.]” (Lu, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 597,
fn. omitted.)
In this case, the City’s and County’s cause of action was based on an alleged
violation of Education Code section 67504(b)(1). The statutory language of Education
Code section 67504 “does not ‘ “unmistakabl[y]” ’ reveal a legislative intent to provide . . .
a private right to sue” with respect to subdivision (b)(1). (Lu, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 598.)
For example, this section “does not expressly state that there is a cause of action” (Lu,
supra, at p. 598) for a violation of subdivision (b)(1), nor does it refer to a person’s right to
bring an action for the university’s failure to mitigate. Instead, subdivision (b)(1) simply
reflects the Legislature’s intent that “the expansion of campus enrollment and facilities” be
analyzed for their effect on “the surrounding environment,” and that those effects be
mitigated “[c]onsistent with”—meaning in accordance with the preexisting statutory scheme
of—CEQA. (Ed. Code, § 67504.) Nothing in Education Code section 67504 indicates that
subdivision (b)(1) creates a new obligation or new liability on the part of the university in
addition to preexisting duties and liability under CEQA. Indeed, the California Supreme
Court has stated that Education Code section 67504 “does not amend CEQA.” (City of San
Diego, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 963.)
In contrast, subdivision (b)(2) of Education Code section 67504 contains an express
“request[]” for reporting by the university to the Legislature. The other subdivisions follow
52
a similar structure with the Legislature’s findings, declarations, and/or intent in paragraph 1
and a reporting requirement in paragraph 2. (Ed. Code, § 67504, subds. (a), (c) & (d).) It
thus appears that subdivision (b)(1) was included to demonstrate the context, significance,
and need for the corresponding reporting requirement of subdivision (b)(2). (Ed. Code,
§ 67504.)
There is also “no clear indication” (Lu, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 600) in the legislative
history of Education Code section 67504 that the Legislature intended to create a private
right action under subdivision (b)(1). Indeed, no party has provided this court, nor have we
located, any legislative history suggesting that the Legislature intended to create a private
right of action in this context. Instead, the uncodified portion of the legislation that included
Education Code section 67504, as well as the Legislative Counsel’s summary of the
legislation, focus exclusively on the need for “refin[ing] higher education reporting
requirements,” not changing or adding to the university’s liability in relation to its
mitigation duties under CEQA. (Stats. 2009, ch. 386, § 2; see id., § 1; Legis. Counsel’s
Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1182 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.).)
We are not persuaded by the City’s argument that a private right of action must be
implied in this case to achieve the statute’s policy goals. In making this argument, the City
acknowledges that the purpose of Education Code section 67504 is to “ ‘refine higher
education reporting requirements to provide for more effective, manageable, and transparent
reporting by the higher education segments.’ ” However, this case does not concern the
university’s reporting requirements. Moreover, regarding the reference in Education Code
section 67504(b)(1) to the university’s obligation to mitigate off-campus impacts, the City
acknowledges that “Education Code section 67504 is coextensive with CEQA’s mitigation
requirements . . . .” Consequently, our determination that Education Code section 67504
does not provide a private right of action for a violation of subdivision (b)(1) does not
foreclose the availability of remedies under CEQA for the university’s failure to sufficiently
mitigate off-campus impacts. (See Lu, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 601-604 [declining to imply
53
a private cause of action for a violation of Lab. Code, § 351, and observing that other
remedies, such as a common law action, may be available].)
In sum, we conclude that there is no private right of action under Education Code
section 67504 for a purported violation of subdivision (b)(1). Therefore, the trial court’s
finding of a violation of Education Code section 67504 as a basis for relief must be stricken.
To the extent the university has failed to “sufficiently mitigate significant off-campus
impacts related to campus growth and development” (ibid.), the City and the County may
seek (and has already sought) relief through CEQA.
F. County’s Failure to Timely Request a Hearing
The university contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the
County relief from dismissal of its CEQA action after the County failed to request a hearing
on its mandate petition within the statutorily specified timeframe. (See § 21167.4, subd. (a)
[hearing must be requested within 90 days of the filing of a petition or be subject to
dismissal].) The university argues that the County was not entitled to discretionary relief
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (Code of Civil Procedure
section 473(b)) because the evidence reflects that counsel forgot to file the request for a
hearing, which does not constitute excusable neglect. The County contends that the trial
court did not err in finding excusable neglect.
On February 23, 2022, the County filed its petition for writ of mandate and complaint
alleging CEQA violations. The County did not file a request for a hearing within 90 days
thereafter.
In September 2022, approximately seven months after filing its CEQA action, the
County was informed of its error by the university during a meet and confer. The next day,
on September 21, 2022, the County filed its request for a hearing.
One day later, the university filed a motion to dismiss the County’s CEQA related
claims on the ground that the County’s request for a hearing was untimely and should have
been filed by May 24, 2022.
54
The County filed (1) opposition to the motion to dismiss, (2) a motion for relief under
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, and (3) a motion to consolidate the County’s and the
City’s CEQA actions. (The City and Habitat had previously filed a timely request for a
hearing in their own CEQA actions.)
In the motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), the County
argued that its counsel’s error in failing to file the request for a hearing was excusable, that
the County otherwise diligently pursued its case, and that no prejudice would result to the
university if relief was granted to the County. In support of its motion for relief, the County
filed a declaration from its former assistant county counsel who was responsible for the case
until leaving the County’s employ in mid-July 2022. Former counsel stated that he knew
that a request for a hearing had to be filed within 90 days of the filing of the CEQA action.
He “believe[d] that [he] started to prepare” a request for a hearing and “believed that” the
request “had been timely completed.” However, he later learned that the university sought
to move for dismissal based on the County’s failure to file the request. Former counsel
stated that the “failure to complete, serve, and/or file” the request for a hearing was because
he “overlooked timely completing and readying that document.” He took “responsibility for
that error,” which was “an honest mistake consisting of an oversight,” and asked the trial
court to “alleviate the hardship that dismissal of the County’s [petition] would cause to the
County and the public at large on this matter of significant public import.” Former counsel
further stated that he thought the County’s CEQA action would be consolidated with the
City’s and Habitat’s separate CEQA actions. Former counsel stated that his “omission in
not timely serving and filing the [r]equest for [h]earing was due in part to [his] mistaken
belief that this consolidation would take place.” He indicated that the County promptly filed
and served the request for a hearing upon learning from the university that no such request
had been filed. Former counsel indicated that no hearing could have taken place in the
meantime because the administrative record was still being prepared by the university. In
that regard, former counsel explained that the parties had agreed to extensions of time
55
regarding preparation of the administrative record, which the university was compiling and
assembling.21
The university filed opposition to the motion for relief. The university contended
that the County failed to demonstrate excusable neglect under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473(b). The university argued that it was only after the County learned the
university would be filing a motion to dismiss that the County realized its mistake and filed
the request for a hearing. The university also opposed the County’s motion to consolidate
the action with the City’s CEQA action.
After a hearing on the matter, the trial court (1) granted the university’s motion to
dismiss the County’s CEQA claims based on the County’s failure to timely request a
hearing, (2) granted the County’s motion for discretionary relief from the dismissal, and
(3) granted in part the County’s motion for consolidation by consolidating the County’s and
City’s actions for purposes of trial only. Regarding the dismissal of the County’s CEQA
action, the court explained that dismissal was mandatory for failing to request a hearing
within the statutory time period.
Regarding discretionary relief for excusable neglect, the trial court referred to former
counsel’s “belief that the Request for Hearing that he had begun preparing had actually been
filed, and his belief that this case would be consolidated with two related cases in which the
Request for Hearing had been timely filed.” The court found that the County had diligently
prosecuted the case, including by filing the hearing request as soon as it became aware of
the oversight and, at the same time, the administrative record had not yet been lodged and
the matter was not yet ready for hearing. The court ultimately concluded that the County
21
The County has requested judicial notice of five documents that were filed in the
trial court. The five documents reflect the County’s former counsel’s prosecution of the
case and include stipulations by the parties regarding extensions of time for preparation of
the administrative record. No opposition has been filed to the County’s request. We will
treat County’s request for judicial notice as a motion to augment, and we grant the motion.
(See rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) [record may be augmented with a “document filed or lodged in the
case in superior court”].)
56
had shown excusable neglect and that the circumstances of the case warranted granting the
County discretionary relief from the dismissal for failing to request a hearing by the
statutory deadline.
“ ‘[D]ismissal of a CEQA claim under Public Resources Code section 21167.4[22] is
mandatory when a petitioner has failed to request a hearing on the writ within 90 days and a
party or the court, sua sponte, moves to dismiss.’ [Citation.]” (Nacimiento Regional Water
Management Advisory Com. v. Monterey County Water Resources Agency (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 961, 966 (Nacimiento).) As courts have explained, “ ‘[t]he statutory
scheme, which is designed to promote prompt resolution of CEQA matters, can only be
served if a request for a hearing or trial on the ultimate merits of the petition for writ of
mandate is made within 90 days of filing of the petition.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
A party who fails to timely request a hearing under section 21167.4 and whose
CEQA action is dismissed may seek discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure
section 473(b) “but only when such failure constituted excusable error.” (Comunidad en
Accion v. Los Angeles City Council (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1132 (Comunidad);
Nacimiento, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 966.) Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b)
provides for discretionary relief as follows: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just,
relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.”23 “ ‘[T]he provisions of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
to be liberally construed and sound policy favors the determination of actions on their
22
Section 21167.4, subdivision (a), states, “In any action or proceeding alleging
noncompliance with [CEQA], the petitioner shall request a hearing within 90 days from the
date of filing the petition or shall be subject to dismissal on the court’s own motion or on the
motion of any party interested in the action or proceeding.”
23
A different version of Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) was in effect at the
time the trial court granted the County’s motion for relief. (See Stats. 1996, ch. 60, § 1.)
The amendment thereafter made nonsubstantive changes, and therefore we cite the current
version.
57
merits.’ [Citation.]” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249,
255-256 (Zamora ).)
“ ‘A party who seeks relief under section 473 on the basis of mistake or inadvertence
of counsel must demonstrate that such mistake, inadvertence, or general neglect was
excusable . . . .’ [Citation.] In determining whether the attorney’s mistake or inadvertence
was excusable, ‘the court inquires whether “a reasonably prudent person under the same or
similar circumstances” might have made the same error.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, the
discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error ‘fairly
imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made.’ [Citation.] ‘Conduct
falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly
advance an argument, is not therefore excusable. To hold otherwise would be to eliminate
the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of
attorney malpractice.’ [Citation.]” (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 258.)
“ ‘ “A motion seeking such relief lies within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and the trial court’s decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
[Citations.] However, the trial court’s discretion is not unlimited and must be ‘ “exercised
in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or
defeat the ends of substantial justice.” ’ [Citations.] [¶] [Code of Civil Procedure
section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek
relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted.
[Citations.] In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in
setting aside the default.’ [Citations.] [¶] Moreover, because the law strongly favors trial
and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying [Code of Civil Procedure] section 473
must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [Citations]. Therefore, a
trial court order denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on
the merits. [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.]” (Miller v. City of Hermosa Beach (1993)
13 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1136; see Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 257 [stating that a “ ‘ruling
58
on a motion for discretionary relief under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 473 shall not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse’ ”].) “ ‘Unless inexcusable neglect is
clear, the policy favoring trial on the merits prevails. [Citation.]’ ” (Comunidad, supra,
219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.) Moreover, “[i]t is the province of the trial court to determine
the credibility of the declarant[] and to weigh the evidence.” (Falahati v. Kondo (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 823, 828, fn. omitted.)
In this case, we determine that the trial court’s discretionary grant of relief under
Code of Civil Procedure section 437(b) should “ ‘not be disturbed on appeal’ ” because
there is no “ ‘clear showing of abuse.’ ” (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 257.) The trial
court found excusable neglect based on the declaration by the County’s former counsel.
Counsel’s declaration indicated that he mistakenly believed the request for a hearing “had
been timely completed in this case.” The court found that the County had otherwise
diligently prosecuted the case, including by filing the hearing request as soon as it became
aware of the oversight. As the trial court observed, former counsel’s mistake in this action
is “akin” to failing to calendar a deadline, which may constitute excusable neglect. (See
Comunidad, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1131, 1135.) Further, it appears to have been an
“isolated mistake” and “any doubt is to be resolved in favor of granting relief [citation].”
(Id. at p. 1135.)
The university observes that the County’s former counsel also stated in his
declaration that the oversight “was due in part to [his] mistaken belief that . . . consolidation
would take place” with the City’s and Habitat’s CEQA actions in which requests for hearing
had been timely filed. The university contends that this mistaken belief could not constitute
excusable neglect. However, the trial court could reasonably infer from counsel’s statement
that he did not immediately file the request for a hearing because there were discussions, as
reflected in counsel’s declaration, about consolidation. The court could further reasonably
infer that, as time wore on, however, counsel mistakenly believed that he had timely
completed the task of requesting a hearing.
59
In sum, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief to the
County for its failure to timely file a request for a hearing.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is hereby modified to strike the following findings in the trial court’s
August 26, 2024 statement of decision:
(1) the entirety of the trial court’s first and third findings regarding housing and
regional land use policies on page 58,
(2) the finding that the City of Santa Cruz and the County of Santa Cruz have a
private right of action under Education Code section 67504, subdivision (b)(1) on pages 25
to 26, and
(3) the finding that a violation of Education Code section 67504 is a basis for relief in
this case on page 58.
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.
60
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Danner, J.
______________________________________
Wilson, J.
H052804 Habitat and Watershed Caretakers et al v. Regents of UC