Filed 9/4/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
RAUL VELAZQUEZ GUZMAN, C105049
Petitioner,
(Super. Ct. No. 34-2022-
v. 00319455-CU-PA-GDS)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO
COUNTY,
Respondent;
NATHAN SCOTT WIGLE,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate or prohibition. Petition denied.
Steven M. Gevercer, Judge.
Gavrilov & Brooks, Michael Coleman, Ognian Gavrilov, Eliezer Cohen and
Priscilla M. Parker for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Raymond K. Wilson, Jr., and Corinne C.
Bertsche for Real Party in Interest.
1
Code of Civil Procedure 1 section 995.240 permits courts, in their discretion, to
waive a bond provision “if the court determines that the principal is unable to give the
bond because the principal is indigent and is unable to obtain sufficient sureties.” This
appeal hinges on the word indigent, for which “there is no rigid standard.” (Alshafie v.
Lallande (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 421, 434 (Alshafie).)
Real party in interest and defendant Nathan Scott Wigle filed a petition for relief
under section 995.240 for a bond required to stay, pending appeal, a $20 million personal
injury judgment that a jury awarded petitioner and plaintiff Raul Velazquez Guzman.
Wigle declared in his motion for relief that though he has about $1.75 million of assets,
he was unable to obtain the necessary bond exceeding $30 million. The trial court
granted relief and lowered the bond to $1.25 million. Guzman filed a petition for writ of
mandate or prohibition challenging this order, arguing Wigle is not indigent as required
by section 995.240.
We deny the petition, concluding “indigent” means any person who is unable to
obtain sufficient sureties, not just a person who is destitute. (Family Violence Appellate
Project v. Superior Court (Aug. 10, 2026, S288176) Cal.5th [p. 29], fn. 3 (Family
Violence) [“the right to proceed in forma pauperis extends to any litigant who cannot
reasonably afford the costs necessary to access the judicial process”].) We also reject
several legal challenges Guzman makes to the evidence required under section 995.240.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
A jury found Wigle negligent and awarded Guzman $18,512,253.94 in total
damages. The trial court also awarded Guzman recoverable costs and interest for a total
1 Further undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 The parties each filed a request for judicial notice and we deny both. Guzman
seeks judicial notice of a California Law Revision Commission report, which is authority
2
judgment against Wigle of over $20 million. Wigle filed a motion under section 995.240
to waive the bond required by section 917.1 to stay enforcement of a judgment pending
appeal. In support of this motion, Wigle attached a declaration identifying the net value
of his major assets: $408,666 for a primary residence; $560,000 total for two rental
condos; $121,000 for checking and savings accounts; $525,000 for a brokerage account;
a $24,000 treasury bill; a $107,000 certificate of deposit; and $3,700 for a car. Wigle
stated that even if he liquidated all of his assets it would not be sufficient to post the
required $31 million bond with a surety company or post a $41 million bond without a
surety company. Wigle requested the trial court waive the bond or lower it to his
insurance policy’s limit of $1.25 million.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion and noted there was no declaration
establishing costs for various bond levels. The court questioned defense counsel on
whether Wigle “would still be indigent if it was a [$]2.5 million[ bond],” and defense
counsel said “[p]robably not.” The court also noted it found persuasive the argument
indigency within the statute is tied to a lack of an ability to obtain sufficient sureties. The
court then ordered the parties to submit additional declarations.
Wigle submitted a supplemental declaration with a letter from a bond broker,
working with 12 sureties, that provided estimates for the annual premiums and collateral
necessary to obtain appellate bonds at three levels. For a $1.25 million bond the annual
premium would be between $9,375 and $12,500 but would require Wigle’s insurance to
guarantee payment of $1.25 million. For a $2.5 million bond the annual premium would
not requiring judicial notice for our review. (See Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 400, 410, fn. 7 [“ ‘A request for judicial notice of published
materials is unnecessary. Citation to the materials is sufficient’ ”].) Wigle seeks judicial
notice of an article written by Guzman’s counsel, which is not relevant to the issues on
appeal. (See City and County of San Francisco v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 66, 72, fn. 3 [denying requests for judicial notice for irrelevant
documents].)
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be between $16,875 and $37,500 and require the insurance company to guarantee $1.25
million and Wigle to provide additional collateral of $1.25 million. For a bond covering
the entire statutorily required amount of roughly $31 million, the annual premium would
be between $156,388 and $390,971 and require Wigle to provide over $30 million in
collateral. Wigle stated he could not afford the $2.5 million bond or the $31 million bond
as either bond “would render [Wigle] incapable of paying [his] mortgages, providing for
[him]self and [his] family, and would significantly reduce the assets available to pay for
the judgment against [him] should [his] appeal fail.”
The trial court issued a written order granting Wigle relief under section 995.240,
stating: “In light of the amount of judgment entered in this matter, [Wigle] qualifies for
discretionary relief under … section 995.240. Accordingly, [Wigle] is ordered to post
bond, by December 1, 2025, in the amount of $1,250,000, in order to stay enforcement of
the judgment.”
Guzman filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition and we issued an order
to show cause.
DISCUSSION
Guzman argues the “trial court erred as a matter of law” by granting Wigle relief
under section 995.240. Guzman’s central contention is the trial court misinterpreted the
statute because it requires the petitioner to be both indigent and unable to obtain
sufficient sureties, and Wigle is not indigent “as a matter of law.” Guzman also asserts
Wigle did not supply legally sufficient evidence to support the petition. We conclude the
trial court did not make any legal error.
I
Legal Standards
A judgment or order for the payment of money is not stayed by the perfecting of
an appeal unless an undertaking is given. (§ 917.1, subd. (a).) “The undertaking shall be
for double the amount of the judgment or order unless given by an admitted surety
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insurer in which event it shall be for one and one-half times the amount of the judgment
or order.” (§ 917.1, subd. (b).) “The court may, in its discretion, waive a provision for a
bond … if the court determines that the principal is unable to give the bond because the
principal is indigent and is unable to obtain sufficient sureties.” (§ 995.240.) The trial
court “shall take into consideration all factors it deems relevant, including but not limited
to the character of the action or proceeding, the nature of the beneficiary, whether public
or private, and the potential harm to the beneficiary if the … bond is waived.” (Ibid.)
We review the trial court’s order under section 995.240 for abuse of discretion.
(Alshafie, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.) “An exercise of discretion will be disturbed
on appeal only if the court exercised it in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
manner resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan
(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1434.) The deference the abuse of discretion standard
“calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712, fns.
omitted.)
II
Section 995.240 Does Not Limit Relief To The Destitute
We first address the interpretation of section 995.240. Guzman’s central
disagreement with the trial court’s interpretation is on the definition and application of
the word “indigent.” Guzman contends indigency means “extreme poverty.” Thus, he
contends, the trial court erred by finding indigency is tied to ability to obtain sufficient
sureties and finding Wigle indigent because he has “substantial liquid assets” so “he
cannot possibly be deemed ‘indigent’ as that term is generally understood.” We conclude
the trial court correctly applied the statute.
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“ ‘ “ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task …
is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.]
We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense
meaning.” ’ ” [Citation.] “[W]e consider the language of the entire scheme and related
statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.” ’ [Citations.] If the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction and our task is
at an end. If the language is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, however,
we may examine extrinsic aids such as the apparent purpose of the statute, the legislative
history, the canons of statutory construction, and public policy.” (Earnest v. Commission
on Teacher Credentialing (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 62, 74.)
There is an ambiguity here. Indigent is not defined in the statute and traditionally
“there is no rigid standard for the requisite showing of indigency.” (Alshafie, supra,
171 Cal.App.4th at p. 434.) We must therefore look beyond the plain language to better
understand the meaning and application of indigent within section 995.240.
We start with the common law because “section 995.240 codifies the common law
authority of the courts to exempt an indigent from an undertaking requirement.”
(Burkes v. Robertson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 334, 346.) Conover v. Hall (1974)
11 Cal.3d 842 is often cited as a case exemplifying the common law codified in
section 995.240. (Recommendation Relating to Statutory Bonds and Undertakings
(Nov. 1981) 16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1982) p. 518; Smith v. Adventist Health
System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 740, fn. 9 [“[§ 995.240] codified the common
law authority of the courts recognized in Conover”].) In that case, our Supreme Court
found, in part, the trial court had discretion to waive an undertaking for a preliminary
injunction because the “plaintiffs obviously could not afford to post the significant
undertaking that would be necessary to cover the substantial costs resulting from the
application of the preliminary injunction over the entire statewide welfare program.”
(Conover, at pp. 852-853.) Our Supreme Court did not grant relief based on a clear level
6
of poverty and whether the parties were above or below that level. The court instead
looked at the parties’ ability to pay the obligation necessary to post the undertaking.
Our Supreme Court confirmed this understanding of Conover in Family Violence,
supra, Cal.5th . 3 There, our Supreme Court found courts have a ministerial duty
under “the in forma pauperis doctrine to provide indigent litigants, upon request, with
meaningful access in all cases to an official verbatim record of proceedings, including by
means of electronic recording if an official reporter or official reporter pro tempore is
unavailable.” (Id. at pp. [pp. 34-35].) The primary concern was access to justice. In a
prior case, Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 605, the court observed courts “have
the inherent discretion to facilitate an indigent civil litigant’s equal access to the judicial
process even when the relevant statutory provisions that impose fees or other expenses do
not themselves contain an exception for needy litigants.” (Italics added.) In Family
Violence, the court affirmed this principle, concluding: “The continued failure of the
superior courts to provide indigent litigants with a means of obtaining an official
verbatim record deprives them of ‘meaningful access to the judicial process’ ([Jameson,]
at p. 606), triggering the courts’ inherent power to take steps to ensure that ‘indigent
litigants are not, as a practical matter, denied their day in court’ ([Jameson,] at p. 605).”
(Family Violence, at p. [p. 29].)
Our Supreme Court in Family Violence also confirmed there is no generally
applicable definition of indigency. The court stated: “Although our discussion primarily
refers to indigent litigants, we do not suggest some absolute standard of indigency.
Instead, the right to proceed in forma pauperis extends to any litigant who cannot
3 Family Violence was filed after briefing concluded in this case but prior to oral
argument. Through a focus letter, we requested the parties discuss this case during oral
argument, which they did. Consequently, we did not request supplemental briefing on
the issue.
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reasonably afford the costs necessary to access the judicial process. In this case, the
litigants at issue include all litigants who cannot afford to hire a private court reporter to
provide an official verbatim record of their proceeding. Because the costs involved in
hiring a private court reporter can be significant, the population of litigants who cannot
afford to hire a private court reporter, but who can afford to pay routine court fees and
costs, may be large. Courts should be flexible in assessing a litigant’s ability to pay. We
have previously rejected the contention that ‘a formal in forma pauperis application is
required before relief can be granted.’ (Conover, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 852.)” (Family
Violence, supra, Cal.5th at p. [p. 29], fn. 3.)
This analysis establishes indigency is dependent on access to courts which may
vary depending on the burden imposed. Indigency is often applied to those with the most
meager of resources because even being required to pay basic court fees could deny them
the “necessities of life.” (Earls v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 109, 117.) But “a
litigant need not render himself,[ herself, or themselves] absolutely destitute before being
entitled to the protections of the common law or statutory procedures.” (Markley v.
Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 738, 749; see Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. (1948) 335 U.S. 331, 339 [“We cannot agree with the court below that one must be
absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the statute”].) Instead, indigency is dependent
on the obligation imposed. For example, someone who can pay court costs may not be
indigent in that circumstance, but may be indigent for purposes of affording an attorney.
(See Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 842, col. 2 [“indigent defendant” is “[a] person
who is too poor to hire a lawyer”].) Or, as our Supreme Court concluded in Family
Violence, litigants may be indigent if unable to pay for a court reporter, which could
include a “large” population. (Family Violence, supra, Cal.5th at p. [p. 29], fn. 3.)
There is no “absolute standard of indigency.” (Ibid.; see Alshafie, supra,
171 Cal.App.4th at p. 434 [“there is no rigid standard for the requisite showing of
8
indigency”].) There is instead a relative benchmark based on the costs inhibiting access
to courts.
Section 995.240 permitting waiver of appellate bonds furthers the goal of equal
access to the judicial process. As another court found: “The trial court’s authority to
waive an appeal bond required by section 917.1 for an indigent party under
section 995.240 is consistent with principles ‘afford[ing] indigent civil litigants the ability
to obtain meaningful access to the judicial process in a great variety of contexts.’ ”
(Sarkany v. West (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 801, 809.) Though an appeal may be filed
without a bond, considerations of immediate judgment enforcement will necessarily
impact a litigant’s strategy in seeking and executing an appeal. And those litigants who
can afford a bond will be in a better position to assert their rights than those who cannot.
(Cf. Family Violence, supra, Cal.5th at p. [p. 29] [“Wealthier litigants can be
assured that an official verbatim record of their proceedings will be available, whereas
indigent litigants cannot. Wealthier litigants can be assured they will not be forced to
accept a continuance based on official reporter unavailability, whereas indigent litigants
cannot”].)
Defining indigency based on access is also consistent with the discretion both
section 995.240 and the common law give courts. The section states “[t]he court may, in
its discretion” and “[i]n exercising its discretion the court shall take into consideration all
factors it deems relevant.” (§ 995.240, italics added.) And traditionally “California
courts … have the inherent discretion to facilitate an indigent civil litigant’s equal access
to the judicial process.” (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 605, italics added.)
Limiting indigency to a narrow subset of destitute petitioners would necessarily limit the
trial court’s discretion to grant relief when considering access to courts. And this
limitation on discretion would be ill-defined because there is no definition of indigent in
the statute and no rigid definition at common law. Thus, there is no support in the text or
9
in the interpretive aids at our disposal for an interpretation drawing a clear line for
eligibility under section 995.240 based on a specific level of wealth.
This problem underlies Guzman’s arguments. Guzman contends this
interpretation is against “the legislative purpose of the statute,” which “was not designed
to absolve a millionaire defendant of his obligation to satisfy a judgment against him or
post a bond pending appeal, particularly where his victim is indigent in-fact.” But these
assertions are not based on a clear countervailing definition of indigent. Guzman argues
indigent is not someone who has “substantial means” but is someone in “extreme
poverty” without defining these ambiguous phrases in a way that draws a clear distinction
between the two in every circumstance. Moreover, Wigle is not absolved of his
obligation to eventually satisfy the judgment should he lose on appeal, he is not absolved
of his obligation to post a bond, and the trial court did not ignore the impact on Guzman.
Instead, the trial court found Wigle qualified for discretionary relief given the judgment
amount and it ordered a bond to a level it determined Wigle could obtain after it took
“into consideration all factors it deem[ed] relevant, including … the potential harm to the
beneficiary if the provision for the bond is waived.” (§ 995.240.)
Guzman’s argument also clashes with the core concern of access to the courts by
assuming this right is inapplicable above certain net worths, regardless of the burden.
But an inability to post a bond can inhibit access for many levels of wealth. One litigant
who cannot afford to post a large bond exceeding their high net worth may, under certain
circumstances, lack access to the courts similarly to another litigant who cannot afford to
do so at a lower level exceeding their more meager resources. (See Family Violence,
supra, Cal.5th at p. [p. 29].) Access is impeded in both cases. And the statute
protects against abuse by permitting the trial court to impose a lower bond, which the
opposing party can challenge as an abuse of discretion. Thus, neither the statute nor the
common law automatically disallows relief where a bond exceeding $30 million could
render a petitioner unable to obtain sufficient sureties to effectively prosecute their appeal
10
without the threat of immediate judgment enforcement, even if that petitioner is not in
extreme poverty.
We therefore conclude it not an abuse of discretion as a matter of law to provide
relief to a petitioner under section 995.240 who may not be destitute. Instead, trial courts
retain discretion to evaluate each request for relief under the statute and against the
traditional understanding of indigency that is tied to equal access to justice. Permitting
this discretion does not automatically require waiver of a bond for large judgments. A
court instead must consider all factors it deems relevant, including “potential harm to the
beneficiary,” to determine the appropriate relief, if any, given the bond amount required
and the petitioner’s relative indigency. (§ 995.240; see Family Violence,
supra, Cal.5th at p. [p. 29], fn. 3 [“Courts should be flexible in assessing a litigant’s
ability to pay”].) The trial court did not err by making this legal determination.
III
Guzman Does Not Establish Evidentiary Error
In addition to arguing for a narrow reading of indigent, Guzman challenges the
evidence Wigle submitted. Guzman first contends Wigle’s statements in his declaration
about the costs to obtain the bond “are double hearsay for which there is no exception”
and Wigle needed to submit a declaration “from the broker himself.” Guzman also
complains Wigle “failed to provide any information of his monthly or annual income or
of his monthly and annual expenses, data he claims to have ‘carefully’ analyzed in
preparing his declaration.” Finally, Guzman asserts, “There is absolutely no evidence to
suggest Wigle made any effort to obtain a bond or surety.” (Underscoring omitted.) We
conclude there was no error here either.
Initially, the plain language of section 995.240 does not include this evidence as
requirements. Nowhere in the statute is a requirement for a declaration from a bond
broker, a requirement the petitioner made an effort to obtain a bond, or a requirement that
declaratory evidence may not contain hearsay. The latter would also be an exemption
11
from section 2009 that generally permits declaratory evidence to support motions
notwithstanding hearsay. (North Beverly Park Homeowners Assn. v. Bisno (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 762, 778 [“under section 2009, affidavits and declarations may be used
in support of a motion, even though they are hearsay”]; McDonald v. Superior Court
(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 364, 370 [“[The petitioner’s] personal declaration under penalty of
perjury as to her financial condition and its impact on her ability to proceed with the
litigation was competent evidence”].)
This case is also substantially different than the case Guzman cites, Cardinal Care
Management, LLC v. Afable (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1011, where the petitioners “provided
no details of their financial situation” and simply “averred that they lacked financial
ability to post the undertaking.” (Id. at p. 1019.) Here, Wigle did aver to a lack of
financial ability, but supported this with a list of his financial assets and how these
compared to the financial requirements of obtaining bonds at different levels. This was
unlike Cardinal Care.
Finally, in asserting “[t]here is absolutely no evidence to suggest Wigle made any
effort to obtain a bond or surety” (underscoring omitted), Guzman misinterprets a case
that stated: “Absent a showing of an unsuccessful effort to obtain a bond or surety,”
petitioners have “failed to meet the preliminary prerequisite for relief under … section
995.240.” (Williams v. Freedomcard, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 609, 615.) But
immediately preceding this statement the court said petitioners either made “no showing
of any unsuccessful attempt to obtain a bond or undertaking” or “never showed even any
attempt to contact a bonding or surety company.” (Ibid.) The trial court here initially
articulated a similar concern, telling Wigle there was no information on the costs of the
various bond levels. But Wigle later contacted a bond company and submitted the
requested information, which the trial court found sufficient to grant relief. This was
enough to satisfy the legal requirements of the statute.
12
Beyond arguing absence of this evidence was legal error, Guzman does not
contend granting Wigle relief on the information considered here was an abuse of
discretion. For example, Guzman does not contend it was arbitrary and capricious to
grant Wigle relief and order a $1.25 million bond based on Wigle’s financial status and
the associated expenses of the bonds. Having rejected these legal challenges, we
therefore necessarily conclude Guzman has not established the trial court abused its
discretion by granting Wigle relief under section 995.240.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate or prohibition is denied. Real party in interest
shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).)
/s/
ROBIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
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