Filed 7/28/26 Guzman v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
SERGIO GUZMAN, B347708
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCP00162)
v.
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR
VEHICLES,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.
Rodney Gould for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant
Attorney General, Gabrielle H. Brumbach and Kaprisha
CresselHosey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and
Respondent.
____________________________
Sergio Guzman appeals from a judgment dismissing his
petition for a writ of mandate. Guzman sought to set aside a
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) order suspending his
driver’s license for refusing to submit to a chemical test of his
blood alcohol level. The trial court found Guzman’s petition was
untimely under Vehicle Code1 section 13559, the statute
governing review of that category of suspension order.
On appeal, Guzman argues his petition challenged not the
suspension order but the hearing procedures that led to it, which
he contends violated his constitutional right to due process. He
asserts section 13559 does not apply to such a claim.
We hold that Guzman’s challenge to the hearing procedures
cannot be separated from a challenge to the suspension order
itself. Therefore section 13559’s time limit applies to Guzman’s
challenge, and his petition is untimely.
Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On June 30, 2024, California Highway Patrol officers
initiated a traffic stop of Guzman’s vehicle. The officers
conducted field sobriety tests. The officers then arrested Guzman
for driving under the influence. The officers also served Guzman
with an order suspending his driver’s license under
sections 13353, subdivision (c) and 23612, subdivision (e), for
refusing to submit to a chemical test of his blood alcohol level.
Guzman challenged the suspension in a hearing before a
DMV driver safety hearing officer on September 24, 2024. At the
outset of the hearing, Guzman’s counsel “enter[ed] a general
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Vehicle Code.
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objection to the hearing process,” citing, inter alia, California
DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 517, which held DMV procedures in which the
hearing officer served both as an advocate for the DMV and as an
adjudicator violated constitutional due process.2 (California DUI
Lawyers Assn., 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 523, 530.) The hearing
officer overruled the objection and the hearing proceeded. On
October 15, 2024, the hearing officer issued a decision finding
Guzman refused or failed to complete a required chemical test,
and upholding the suspension.
On January 17, 2025, Guzman filed a “Verified Petition for
Writ of Mandate” in the trial court. (Boldface omitted.) In the
petition, Guzman alleged his arrest was unlawful and he had not
refused or failed to complete a chemical test. He further alleged
a due process violation because his hearing officer purportedly
acted as both the prosecutor and adjudicator. The petition
requested “a peremptory writ of mandate to set aside the decision
suspending [Guzman’s] driver’s license,” as well as attorney fees
and costs.
The DMV filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
arguing Guzman’s writ petition was untimely. The trial court
granted the motion, finding Guzman filed his writ petition
2 In response to the California DUI Lawyers decision, the
DMV changed its hearing procedures so that “the hearing officer
acts only as a neutral trier of fact, does not represent or advocate
for the department, and is not tasked with preparing the
department’s case.” (Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2026)
119 Cal.App.5th 473, 479.) At Guzman’s hearing, the hearing
officer stated she would “be acting as a neutral factfinder,” and
was “prohibited from and will not act as an advocate for the DMV
or law enforcement.”
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beyond the 30-day deadline under section 13559, subdivision (a).
The court dismissed the writ petition with prejudice.
Guzman timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of a judgment on the pleadings is de novo.
(Sepanossian v. National Ready Mixed Concrete Co. (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 192, 199.)
DISCUSSION
Section 14400 provides, “Nothing in this code shall be
deemed to prevent a review or other action as may be permitted
by the Constitution and laws of this State by a court of competent
jurisdiction of any order of the department refusing, canceling,
suspending, or revoking the privilege of a person to operate a
motor vehicle.” Generally, an action seeking such review “shall
be commenced within 90 days from the date the order is noticed.”
(§ 14401, subd. (a).)
Section 13559, subdivision (a), the subdivision on which the
trial court relied, provides, in relevant part, “Notwithstanding
Section 14400 or 14401, within 30 days of the issuance of the
notice of determination of the department sustaining an order of
suspension or revocation of the person’s privilege to operate a
motor vehicle after the hearing pursuant to Section 13558, the
person may file a petition for review of the order in the court of
competent jurisdiction in the person’s county of residence.”
Section 13558 governs hearings on suspensions pursuant to,
inter alia, section 13353, which imposes a one-year suspension for
failure to submit to a blood alcohol chemical test. (See § 13353,
subd. (a)(1).)
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The 30-day limitations period under section 13559
“supersedes the more general provisions of sections 14400 and
14401.” (Johanson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995)
36 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1214–1215.) This is clear on the face of
section 13559, which expressly states it applies
“[n]otwithstanding Section 14400 or 14401.” (§ 13559, subd. (a).)
Thus, the 90-day deadline under section 14401 does not apply to
suspension and revocation orders issued after a section 13558
hearing, which are instead subject to the shorter 30-day
limitations period set forth in section 13559.
The trial court found Guzman’s writ petition sought review
of an order suspending his license following a section 13558
hearing. The court concluded the petition therefore was subject
to the 30-day limitations period under section 13559. Because
the hearing officer issued the order on October 15, 2024, and
Guzman did not file his petition until January 17, 2025, the court
found he did not meet section 13559’s deadline.
Guzman argues his writ petition is a constitutional due
process challenge not to the suspension order itself, but to the
procedures employed at the hearing, specifically the hearing
officer allegedly serving as both prosecutor and adjudicator. This
constitutional attack on the hearing procedures, he contends, is
not subject to the time limits under section 13559, or even under
section 14401, but rather is governed by section 14400’s
admonition that “[n]othing in [the Vehicle Code] shall be deemed
to prevent a review . . . as may be permitted by the Constitution
and laws of this State . . . .” Guzman asserts, “While Section
13[5]59 may limit the ability to seek administrative review of an
order of suspension or revocation, by its own terms it does not
limit a traditional mandamus action to review the procedure
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employed by [the] DMV during a hearing.” He further states,
“[T]his action does not seek review of the order of suspension.
Indeed, the entire mandamus action arguably could be resolved
without reference to the written decision at all. Rather, the
petition seeks to enforce [the DMV’s] duty to provide a hearing
that both complies with [the California DUI Lawyers decision]
and affords due process of law.”
We reject Guzman’s attempt to distinguish his challenge to
the hearing procedures from a challenge to the suspension order
itself. The suspension order clearly was the impetus for
Guzman’s petition. This is evident from the fact that the only
relief requested, apart from fees and costs, is that the trial court
“set aside the decision suspending [Guzman’s] driver’s license.”
Indeed, as Guzman concedes, he has standing to challenge the
purportedly unconstitutional process only because it led to
suspension of his license — he alleges no other injury. (See
Salazar v. Majestic Realty Co. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 813, 832
[to have standing to challenge a law, a plaintiff “must show . . .
‘ “ ‘ “that he is injuriously affected thereby” ’ ” ’ ”].)
Also, it was the hearing officer that ruled below on
Guzman’s due process objection, and that ruling arose in the
hearing itself. The ruling on the due process objection therefore
is part and parcel of the hearing officer’s suspension decision.
In sum, without the suspension order Guzman has no due
process claim. His petition therefore is necessarily “a petition for
review of” “an order of suspension or revocation of the person’s
privilege to operate a motor vehicle after the hearing pursuant to
Section 13558.” (§ 13559, subd. (a).)
For this reason we decline to address the parties’
arguments as to whether Guzman’s challenge is one of traditional
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mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 or
administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5. Whatever the procedural vehicle for Guzman’s challenge,
it is a petition for review of a suspension order following a
section 13558 hearing, and thus falls within the language of
section 13559, subdivision (a).
We further conclude the Legislature intended section 13559
to address constitutional due process challenges to suspension
decisions. The statute provides, “If the court finds that the
department exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority,
made an erroneous interpretation of the law, acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination which
is not supported by the evidence in the record, the court may
order the department to rescind the order of suspension or
revocation and return, or reissue a new license to, the person.”
(§ 13559, subd. (a).) This scope of review encompasses the
hearing officer’s overruling Guzman’s due process objection,
which implicated the hearing officer’s “constitutional . . .
authority” and “interpretation of the law.” (Ibid.)
We therefore conclude Guzman’s petition is subject to
section 13559’s 30-day time limit, and the trial court correctly
dismissed the petition as untimely.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The Department of
Motor Vehicles is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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