Filed 11/13/26 Green v. Nnodim CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
KYLE GREEN, B346213
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23SMRO00251)
ELIZABETH NNODIM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David W. Swift, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth Nnodim, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Elizabeth Nnodim appeals from an order denying her
motion to set aside a default or a default judgment under Code of
Civil Procedure section 473.5. Because as the appellant Nnodim
has the burden to supply an adequate record to facilitate
appellate review, and because Nnodim has not provided an
adequate record in this case, we must presume the trial court’s
order is correct. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The record in this case is sparse. It appears that on
June 30, 2023 Kyle Green filed a request for a domestic violence
restraining order seeking to enjoin Nnodim. Nnodim filed a
response approximately two weeks later. On July 28, 2023 the
court granted Green’s request in part and issued a restraining
order.
In April 2024 and July 2024 Green filed requests to renew
the restraining order. The trial court issued temporary
restraining orders in July and August 2024. On September 9,
2024 the trial court renewed the restraining order protecting
Green.
On December 12, 2024 Nnodim filed several documents,
which the superior court case summary lists as “Declaration Lack
of Notice,” “Exhibit List A,” and “Exhibit List B.” A minute order
dated February 3, 2025 states the “Request for Order to Set Aside
filed on 12-12-2024 is Denied.” Nnodim timely appealed from the
February 3, 2025 order.
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DISCUSSION
Nnodim summarizes her argument this way: “Appellant
seeks to set aside this order [of February 3, 2025] on the grounds
of lack of proper notice, fraud, misrepresentation, and
misconduct, asserting that the underlying default judgment was
entered based on defective service and misrepresentations by”
Green. Nnodim also cites Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5,
which (as she suggests) allows the court to set aside a party’s
default or a default judgment and to allow the party to defend the
action if the service of summons did not provide that party actual
notice of the action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473.5, subds. (a), (c).)
“An order granting or denying a statutory motion to vacate
or set aside a default and default judgment is appealable under
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) as an order made after final
judgment.” (Shapell SoCal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico’s
FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198, 207, fn. 2.) We review the
trial court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 for abuse of
discretion. (Shapell SoCal Rental Properties, at p. 212; Rios v.
Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 885.)
We cannot consider the merits of Nnodim’s argument on
appeal because she has not provided an adequate record of the
proceedings. We presume the trial court’s judgment or order is
correct, and the appellant has the burden to demonstrate error.
(Family Violence Appellate Project v. Superior Court (2026)
20 Cal.5th 564, 575; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608-609; Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 569, 588.) The appellant has the burden to
provide an adequate record to support his or her arguments, and
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failure to do so requires us to resolve the issue against the
appellant. (Blue Mountain Enterprises, LLC v. Owen (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 537, 557.)
We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding
of the rules on appeal is likely more limited than an experienced
appellate attorney’s, and whenever possible we will not strictly
apply technical rules of procedure in a manner that deprives a
litigant of a hearing. Nevertheless, we must apply the procedural
and substantive principles and rules of appellate review to a self-
represented litigant’s arguments on appeal, just as we would to
litigants represented by attorneys. (See In re Marriage of Furie
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 816, 824; Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413.)
Because the record does not include Nnodim’s motion to set
aside the default or default judgment or any of the evidence she
submitted to the trial court to support her motion, we cannot
evaluate whether the court abused its discretion in denying the
motion. And based on the record we have, it is not clear whether
the trial court entered a default or default judgment against
Nnodim.1 Therefore, Nnodim has failed to show any prejudicial
error, and we presume the trial court’s order is correct.
1 An “agreed statement” submitted to this court states
Nnodim and Green would like the trial court to dismiss the
underlying action. (They do not ask us to dismiss the appeal.)
We cannot dismiss the action, but the parties may submit such a
request to the trial court after this court issues its remittitur.
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DISPOSITION
The February 3, 2025 order is affirmed. Nnodim is to bear
her costs on appeal.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
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