Filed 7/30/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
STEPHEN GLICK et al., B334953
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 20STCV00320)
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from an order and judgment of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Order
granting new trial reversed; judgment reinstated and affirmed.
McNicholas & McNicholas, Matthew S. McNicholas,
Douglas D. Winter, Jason L. Oliver; Esner, Chang, Boyer &
Murphy, Stuart B. Esner and Rowena J. Dizon for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Assistant City Attorney, and
Sara Ugaz, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant.
______________________________
A jury found in favor of Stephen Glick (Glick) and Alfred
Garcia (Garcia) (collectively, plaintiffs) on their claims for gender
discrimination and retaliation against the City of Los Angeles
(City). The jury awarded Glick $8,621,358 in damages and
Garcia $4.5 million, and the trial court entered judgment in that
amount. The court later conditionally granted the City’s new
trial motion unless Glick agreed to a remittitur reducing his
damages to $250,000 and Garcia agreed to reduce his damages to
$125,000. Plaintiffs rejected the reduced awards. Plaintiffs and
the City both appealed.
We reverse the order granting a new trial on damages. The
trial court abused its discretion by capping the amount of
damages a jury can award for so-called “garden-variety emotional
distress.” The court also abused its discretion by erroneously
rejecting as inadmissible Glick’s own testimony about his future
economic damages. Because the jury’s damages awards were not
excessive as a matter of law or unsupported by the evidence, we
reinstate the judgment and affirm it.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
Plaintiffs are Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
officers. On January 26, 2017, Garcia and his partner, Camille
Spitaleri (Spitaleri), arrested Raul C. (Raul)1 for driving under
1
Per California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10), we initially
refer to Raul by his first name and last initial, and thereafter by
his first name. No disrespect is intended.
2
the influence after he struck a child with his car. Glick and his
partner, Amanda Orefice (Orefice), responded to the scene and
transported Raul to the police station.
Plaintiffs and Orefice escorted Raul into the station and
secured him in a holding cell. Glick and Orefice then resumed
their patrol duties. Garcia and Spitaleri remained at the station,
where they worked on their arrest report and conducted periodic
welfare checks on Raul. During one of these checks, Garcia used
his personal cell phone to take a picture of Raul laying on the
floor in his own vomit. At some point it was determined that
Raul needed medical attention. Paramedics took Raul to the
hospital, where he was intubated and treated for acute alcohol
poisoning.
Raul filed a complaint alleging that unknown officers
shaved off his eyebrows, shaved his mustache to look like Adolf
Hitler’s, and drew a penis and wrote the word “puto” on his
abdomen with a marker (the battery).
LAPD’s Internal Affairs department (Internal Affairs)
conducted a “major investigation” into Raul’s allegations.
Internal Affairs obtained a search warrant for the cellular
telephone records of plaintiffs, their partners, and two
paramedics. A second search warrant was obtained to seize
plaintiffs’ cellular telephones but not those belonging to their
partners. Internal Affairs also searched plaintiffs’ lockers and
police and personal vehicles. Internal Affairs later served search
warrants on plaintiffs’ partners to seize their cellular telephones
but did not search their lockers or cars.
Plaintiffs were “benched,” meaning that they were removed
from field duties and assigned to work at the front desk of the
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station. Their partners, Orefice and Spitaleri, remained in the
field.
Because Internal Affairs was unable to identify who
committed the battery on Raul, the commanding officer
recommended that those allegations be adjudicated as “not
resolved.” As for the failure to request medical attention for Raul
in a timely matter, the commanding officer recommended that
Garcia be suspended for three days and that Glick, Spitaleri, and
Orefice receive official reprimands. LAPD’s deputy chief later
recommended increasing Garcia’s suspension to 10 days.
The chief of police, however, rejected the disciplinary
recommendations. Instead, the chief relieved plaintiffs from duty
pending a hearing before the Board of Rights to terminate their
employment. While awaiting the hearing, plaintiffs were
required to stay at their homes unless they received approval to
leave.
The chief of police later canceled the Board of Rights
hearing and adjudicated the battery counts against plaintiffs as
“not resolved.” The chief officially reprimanded plaintiffs for
failing to get Raul medical treatment.
When a police union representative complained to a high-
ranking LAPD official about the disparate treatment between
plaintiffs, who are male, and their partners, who are female, he
was told that “ ‘this is something guys would do, not females.’ ”
II. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the City asserting
causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.) for gender discrimination and
retaliation. Plaintiffs stipulated that they were making “no
claim . . . for mental and emotional distress over and above that
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usually associated with the physical injuries claimed” and that
“no expert testimony regarding this usual mental and emotional
distress [would] be presented at trial in support of the claim for
damages.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320, subd. (c)(1) & (2).)
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found in favor of
plaintiffs—and against the City—on both causes of action. The
jury awarded Glick $5 million in past noneconomic damages,
$3 million in future noneconomic damages, and $621,358 in
future economic damages. The jury awarded Garcia $3 million in
past noneconomic damages and $1.5 million in future
noneconomic damages.
Judgment was entered on September 20, 2023.
The City then filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the
noneconomic damages were “plainly excessive.” The City
expressly disavowed any challenge to the jury’s economic
damages award to Glick. In a tentative ruling, the trial court
indicated that it was inclined to grant the new trial motion and
significantly reduce the noneconomic damages awards and to
eliminate Glick’s economic damages. The court permitted the
parties to file supplemental briefs regarding economic damages.
The trial court subsequently granted the City’s new trial
motion, conditionally ordering a new trial on damages unless
Glick consented to reduce his total damages award from
$8,621,358 to $250,000 and Garcia consented to reduce his total
damages award from $4.5 million to $125,000.
The trial court reasoned that plaintiffs had “only sought
and argued for garden-variety emotional distress” and
characterized the evidence supporting the noneconomic damages
as “scant.” The court noted the absence of any testimony from
“psychologists, psychiatrists, or treating physicians.” The court
5
concluded that the jury “clearly should have reached a different
verdict[,]” because the evidence was insufficient to support such
large awards. The court denied “making a hard-and-fast rule as
to the maximum amount that can be awarded for garden-variety
emotional distress” but then stated that “[a] mid- to high-seven
figure award for emotional distress [was] far ‘above and beyond
that usually associated’ with the discrimination and retaliation”
suffered in this case.
The trial court exercised its independent judgment to
reduce Glick’s noneconomic damages to $250,000 ($200,000 for
past and $50,000 for future). The court believed even this
amount was too high, stating: “Given the circumstances of this
case, the [c]ourt would consider an award to . . . Glick of $250,000
in noneconomic damages to be too high. However, had the [j]ury
awarded garden-variety emotional distress damages for . . . Glick
in the amount of $250,000, the [c]ourt would not have issued a
remittitur. Therefore, the [c]ourt issues a conditional order
granting a new trial unless . . . Glick consents to a reduction in
emotional distress damages to $250,000.” The court reduced
Garcia’s noneconomic damages to $125,000 ($100,000 for past
and $25,000 for future).
The trial court admitted the difficulty and imprecision of
this calculation, which it attributed to the lack of an expert “to
ascertain what is the appropriate range of damages[.]” The court
also reasoned that “when a stipulation has been made pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.320[, subdivision (c),]
‘that no claim is being made for mental and emotional distress
over and above that usually associated with the physical injuries
claimed[,]’[] the damages claimed rarely exceed a low five-figure
range.” The court explained that in its own “experience, only the
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most extraordinary claims for garden-variety emotional distress
can reach a very low six-figure range.”
The trial court reduced Glick’s economic damages to $0 on
the ground that, notwithstanding Glick’s own testimony, “there
was no admissible evidence submitted at trial that would support
a finding of any economic damages.” The court characterized
Glick’s testimony “that he planned to retire early” as “completely
speculative and thus inadmissible.” The court also expressed
concern about “the potential for a windfall” and “the potential for
a double recovery” if the economic damages award stood.
Plaintiffs rejected the reduced awards and appealed from
the order granting a new trial. The City filed a protective cross-
appeal from the September 20, 2023, judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiffs’ Appeal
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion by
granting a new trial on damages. We agree.
A. Relevant law and standard of review
A trial court may vacate a jury verdict and order a new
trial based on, as relevant here, “[e]xcessive or inadequate
damages” (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (5)) or “[i]nsufficiency of
the evidence to justify the verdict” (id., subd. (6)). A new trial
may not be granted on these grounds, however, “unless after
weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire
record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court
or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or
decision.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.)
When a new trial limited to damages is granted based on
excessive damages, the trial court has the discretion to “issue a
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conditional order granting the new trial unless the party in
whose favor the verdict has been rendered consents to the
reduction of so much thereof as the court in its independent
judgment determines from the evidence to be fair and
reasonable.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 662.5, subd. (a)(2).)
In reviewing an order granting a new trial based on
insufficiency of the evidence or excessive damages, the appellate
court “conclusively presume[s] that [the] order . . . was made only
for the reasons specified” therein. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.)
“[W]hen a trial court grants a new trial on the issue of excessive
damages, whether or not the order is conditioned by a demand for
reduction, ‘the presumption of correctness normally accorded on
appeal to the jury’s verdict is replaced by a presumption in favor
of the order.’ [Citations.] [¶] We review the trial court’s use of
its power of remittitur to reduce excessive damages for abuse of
discretion. [Citations.]” (Pearl v. City of Los Angeles (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 475, 486.)
“An appellate court may reverse a trial court decision for
abuse of discretion where the exercise of that discretion is not
based upon the applicable law. ‘Action that transgresses the
confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of
discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion.’
[Citation.]” (Toshiba America Electronic Components v. Superior
Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 762, 768 (Toshiba); see also People
v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 399 [“ ‘A court abuses its
discretion if it acts “in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner” ’ [citation] or ‘when its ruling “falls outside the
bounds of reason” ’ [citation]”].)
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B. Plaintiffs’ noneconomic damages
“Noneconomic damages compensate an injured plaintiff for
nonpecuniary injuries, including pain and suffering. Pain and
suffering is a unitary concept that encompasses physical pain and
various forms of mental anguish and emotional distress.
[Citation.] Such injuries are subjective, and the determination of
the amount of damages by the trier of fact is equally subjective.
[Citation.] There is no fixed standard to determine the amount of
noneconomic damages. Instead, the determination is committed
to the discretion of the trier of fact. [Citations.]” (Corenbaum v.
Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1332, fn. omitted
(Corenbaum).)
The trial court found insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s noneconomic damages awards, labeling the evidence
presented by plaintiffs as “scant.” This characterization,
however, was belied by the court’s own summary of the evidence.
As the trial court recounted, regarding past noneconomic
damages, “Glick testified: (1) that he was upset during the
investigation into the battery and the enforcement actions taken
against him, including being upset and crying when he was
notified of the Board of Rights hearing against him; (2) that these
stresses were ongoing, to the point where he had a hard time
rolling out of bed; (3) that he was stressed out at this time
because he had just become a first-time father and did not know
how he was going to financially support his family; (4) that he
was upset because he was concerned that he would not be able to
transfer into the Metro Division and continue his upward career
trajectory with the LAPD; and (5) that the events stemming from
the investigation and enforcement actions contributed to a
recurrence of his drinking alcohol, which at one point (several
9
years later) led to him calling an LAPD helpline.” Regarding
future noneconomic damages, “[a]mong other things, [Glick]
testified: (1) that he has an ongoing problem with alcoholism,
which was made worse by what has occurred; (2) that he does not
trust the LAPD the way he used to; (3) that he does not enjoy his
job the way he used to; and (4) that he feels that this tore his
family apart.”
According to the trial court, as to past and future
noneconomic damages, “Garcia testified: (1) that he felt
embarrassed by being benched for eight or nine months,
particularly since this was the only time he had ever been
benched; (2) that he was shocked when he received notice of the
Board of Rights hearing; (3) that he did not allow himself to be
down on himself for too long, as he had to take care of his family
financially; (4) that within a week of being sent home, he was
working an off-duty security job; (5) that this was the lowest
point in his entire career; (6) that he felt hurt by the LAPD’s
actions toward him, particularly because he had been loyal to the
LAPD and given them his life (including being in witness
protection as a gang expert); (7) that his wife was deeply upset by
the situation, and that her emotions in turn affected him; (8) that
he never told his daughters about what occurred because he
wanted to remain a role model to them; and (9) that he was able
to stop his transfer to another station because he wanted to keep
working at the station he was at.”
The trial court did not conclude that any of this testimony
was inherently improbable or otherwise lacked credibility.
Rather, the court deemed it insufficient because it showed
“garden-variety emotional harms” and was uncorroborated by
testimony from “any psychologists, psychiatrists, or treating
10
physicians.” But expert testimony is not required where, as here,
“[t]he emotional distress to which [a plaintiff] testifie[s] is not
beyond the common experience of the jurors.” (Knutson v. Foster
(2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1097; see also Campbell v. General
Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 124 [“ ‘the decisive
consideration in determining the [necessity] of expert opinion
evidence is whether the subject of inquiry is one of such common
knowledge that [persons] of ordinary education could reach a
conclusion as intelligently as the witness or whether, on the other
hand, the matter is sufficiently beyond common experience that
the opinion of an expert [is required]’ ”].)
The trial court also erred by intimating that a discovery
stipulation under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.320 serves
as a limit on the amount a plaintiff can recover for emotional
distress and arbitrarily capping damages in cases where such a
stipulation has been made as “rarely exceed[ing] a low five-figure
range.”2
Finally, notwithstanding its claim to the contrary, the trial
court erroneously placed a limit on the amount of damages a jury
can award for emotional distress damages. The trial court noted
2
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.320, a trial
court may “not order a mental examination of a person for whose
personal injuries a recovery is being sought except on a showing
of exceptional circumstances” if the person stipulates “that no
claim is being made for mental and emotional distress over and
above that usually associated with the physical injuries claimed”
and “that no expert testimony regarding this usual mental and
emotional distress will be presented at trial in support of the
claim for damages.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.320, subds. (b) &
(c)(1)-(2).)
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that “only the most extraordinary claims for garden-variety
emotional distress can reach a very low six-figure range” (italics
added), which effectively caps damages and means that no
plaintiff could receive a mid-to-high six-figure amount or any
seven-figure amount or higher for “garden-variety emotional
distress.” The court’s reasoning is incompatible with case law’s
rejection of a “fixed standard to determine the amount of
noneconomic damages.” (Corenbaum, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1332.)
Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its
discretion by granting the motion for new trial on damages based
on insufficiency of the evidence, unless plaintiffs accepted an
extreme and arbitrary reduction of their noneconomic damages.
C. Glick’s economic damages
Assuming without deciding that the trial court had the
statutory authority to grant a new trial as to Glick’s economic
damages, we conclude that doing so was an abuse of discretion.3
The jury was instructed that Glick claimed “future lost
earnings” as economic damages and that, to recover such
damages, Glick was required to “prove the amount of income,
earnings, salary, and wages that he w[ould] be reasonably certain
to lose in the future as a result of the injury.” (See also Civ.
Code, § 3283 [“Damages may be awarded, in a judicial
proceeding, for detriment resulting after the commencement
thereof, or certain to result in the future”].)
The trial court’s stated reason for reducing the jury’s
economic damages award from $621,358 to $0 was that no
3
We need not address the parties’ arguments concerning the
trial court’s compliance with Code of Civil Procedure
section 659a.
12
supporting “admissible evidence” had been presented at trial.
The court was mistaken.
Glick testified that the City’s actions “cut [his] career
short[.]” Instead of his original plan to retire at 55 years old, he
now planned to retire at age 50, which was the earliest that he
could collect his pension to provide for his family. The court
characterized this testimony as “completely speculative and thus
inadmissible” because “without any supporting evidence of a
diminished future capacity to work because of what happened in
this case, it is pure speculation whether someone who is 43 years
old and says that they will retire in seven years . . . will actually
do what they say.”
The trial court confused the admissibility of evidence with
its credibility. (See Yates v. Smith (1871) 40 Cal. 662, 669 [“The
question of the admissibility of evidence is quite different from
the question of its value, weight or effect”].) Glick was competent
to testify about his past retirement plans and how the City’s
actions affected those plans. (See People v. Valencia (2021)
11 Cal.5th 818, 837 [“any witness, whether lay or expert, may
testify to facts within their personal knowledge, so long as those
facts are relevant”].) That Glick could change his mind about
when to retire and possibly receive “a windfall” or “double
recovery” did not render his testimony inadmissible.
The jury clearly believed Glick’s (admissible) testimony.
Without resorting to speculation, the jury could find that Glick
was reasonably certain to retire at age 50, and award him
$621,358 based on the expert testimony of a forensic economist,
who opined that Glick’s future loss of earnings would be $621,358
if he retired at 50 instead of 55.
13
In basing its decision on the purported lack of admissible
evidence, the trial court “ ‘transgresse[d] the confines of the
applicable principles of law’ ” and, thus, abused its discretion.
(Toshiba, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 768.)
II. The City’s Appeal
The City contends that, if we reverse the trial court’s order
granting a new trial on damages, we should nevertheless
significantly reduce plaintiffs’ noneconomic damages and
eliminate Glick’s economic damages. We disagree.
A. Plaintiffs’ noneconomic damages
“Determining the amount of money a plaintiff is to be
awarded as compensation for noneconomic injuries is ‘[o]ne of the
most difficult tasks imposed on a fact finder’ ” and “is ‘ “a matter
on which there legitimately may be a wide difference of
opinion.” ’ ” (Burchell v. Faculty Physicians & Surgeons etc.
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 515, 527 (Burchell).)
“Appellate review of the jury’s determination of
noneconomic damages is ‘ “very narrow.” ’ [Citations.]” (Phipps
v. Copeland Corp. LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 319, 343.) “We
typically defer to the jury’s discretion ‘in the absence of some
other factor in the record, such as inflammatory evidence,
misleading instructions or improper argument by counsel, that
would suggest the jury relied upon improper considerations.’
[Citation.]” (Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 165, 199 (Soto).) “The jury ‘is entrusted with
vast discretion in determining the amount of damages to be
awarded,’ and a reviewing court will reverse or reduce the award
only ‘ “ ‘where the recovery is so grossly disproportionate as to
raise a presumption that it is the result of passion or
prejudice . . . .’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Bender v. County of
14
Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 985; see also Seffert v.
Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 507–508.)
The City points to no “ ‘inflammatory evidence, misleading
instructions or improper argument by counsel’ ” (Soto, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th at p. 199) that may have influenced the jury’s
verdict. Rather, the City argues that the noneconomic damages
were so large that they shock the conscience and create an
inference of “the existence of passion and prejudice.”
We are unconvinced that the noneconomic damages
awarded here shock the conscience and require reduction.
Glick testified that the City’s discrimination and retaliation
“was probably the single-most difficult thing [he] ha[d] ever gone
through in [his] entire life.” When “[a]ll [his] dreams [were]
coming true[,]” “it crushed [his] career goals” and “tore [his]
family apart.” He relapsed into alcoholism. Glick testified that
“[i]t was very, very difficult . . . for years after.” Garcia testified
that he “tried to maintain some kind of toughness and tried to
maintain [his] emotions.” Garcia’s wife, however, “took it pretty
hard[,]” which in turn affected him. Garcia “never told [his]
daughters[,]” as he “wanted to maintain that role model of being
a police officer with them and didn’t want them to feel like [he]
was in any kind of trouble.”
“[E]ntrusted with vast discretion in determining the
amount of damages to be awarded” (Bertero v. National General
Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 64), the jury was entitled to believe
plaintiffs’ testimony, make reasonable inferences from it, and
award Glick $8 million and Garcia $4.5 million in noneconomic
damages. We will not find the jury’s award “ ‘excessive as a
matter of law simply because it exceeds the amount awarded in
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other cases.’ [Citation.]” (Burchell, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
p. 528.)
B. Glick’s economic damages
The City urges us to uphold the trial court’s elimination of
Glick’s economic damages on the ground that “[s]ince no
admissible evidence—let alone substantial evidence—shows that
Glick was reasonably certain to suffer any future economic loss,
the trial court could have found such damages are nonrecoverable
as a matter of law and granted a [judgment notwithstanding the
verdict] motion on the issue.”
We reject this argument. As we have already discussed,
Glick’s testimony that he had changed his retirement plans
because of the City’s actions was admissible. This evidence,
coupled with the expert testimony of the forensic economist on
Glick’s future loss of earnings, constitutes substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s award of $621,358 for future economic
damages.
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DISPOSITION
The order granting the City’s motion for new trial is
reversed. The underlying September 20, 2023, judgment is
reinstated and affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs on
appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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