Filed 7/21/26 Garcia v. SouthNorte Spirits CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JAVIER GARCIA, B345897
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct.
No. 23STCV13143)
v.
SOUTHNORTE SPIRITS LLC,
Defendants and
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
WGLA and Benjamin Gubernick for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Amin Wasserman Gurnani and Cole Kroshus for Defendant
and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Javier Garcia (appellant) appeals
from an order denying his motion for attorney’s fees against
defendant and respondent SouthNorte Spirits LLC (respondent),
pursuant to the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ.
Code, § 1750 et seq.). Appellant contends the order lacked the
findings and determinations under the correct legal framework
required to decide prevailing party status under section 1780,
subdivision (e). We agree and reverse.
BACKGROUND
The incident
In April 2022, appellant purchased a four-pack box of
“Paloma Crafted Cocktail” at a liquor store in Whittier,
California. The packaging and cans were labeled “tequila” and
contained pictures of a tequila bottle. After tasting the product,
appellant was of the opinion it contained no tequila. Appellant
posted a complaint on respondent’s Instagram page. Respondent
allegedly deleted appellant’s post, contacted appellant, admitted
there was a bottling issue with the beverages, and offered a t-
shirt as compensation. Appellant declined the offer.
The lawsuit
In June 2023, appellant filed a lawsuit against respondent.
The complaint asserted four causes of action for violation of the
unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.),
violation of the CLRA, violation of the false advertising law (Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.), and fraud and deceit. The
complaint alleged appellant was misled and deceived by the
product’s packaging. Respondent allegedly made improper
representations as to the product’s ingredients, characteristics,
2
standard, and quality. Appellant alleged respondent failed to
take timely corrective action.
In November 2023, the parties reached a settlement after
appellant accepted respondent’s offer to compromise pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (section 998 offer). Under the
settlement, respondent agreed to pay appellant $2,500 in
exchange for a dismissal of his claims. The settlement indicated
that “[f]ees and costs, if any, will be determined by the court as
allowed by law.”
The motion for attorney’s fees
In June 2024, appellant moved for attorney’s fees pursuant
to Civil Code section 1780. Appellant contended he is the
prevailing party under section 1780, subdivision (e), because
respondent agreed in the settlement to pay appellant $2,500, a
recovery amounting to a multiplier of 250 times his actual
damages. Appellant argued, to determine the prevailing party
under the CLRA, courts must adopt a pragmatic approach based
on which party succeeded on a practical level. Appellant also
asserted his requested amount in attorney’s fees and costs is
reasonable.
In opposition, respondent posited appellant is not entitled
to his attorney’s fees under the CLRA because that statute, like
the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.) and the
Disabled Persons Act (DPA) (Civ. Code, § 54 et seq.), requires a
finding of liability for a fees award. Respondent argued the
section 998 offer does not contain any admission of liability or
statement that appellant suffered damages due to respondent’s
CLRA violation. Moreover, respondent asserted, even if there is a
basis for a fees award, appellant’s requested amount is
unreasonable.
3
In reply, appellant maintained the CLRA does not require a
finding of liability for a fees award like the Unruh Civil Rights
Act or the DPA. Appellant argued the CLRA does not define the
term “prevailing party,” but there is instructive caselaw
addressing the matter. Appellant asserted he should be deemed
the prevailing party on his CLRA claim because he achieved his
litigation objective by obtaining a net monetary recovery. In
addition, appellant addressed respondent’s arguments regarding
the reasonableness of his requested fees.
The trial court heard the motion in November 2024. The
court denied the motion, finding appellant’s acceptance of the
section 998 offer does not necessarily mean he is the prevailing
party. The court indicated the settlement contains no admission
of liability or acknowledgment appellant was truly damaged. The
order stated appellant provided no analysis of why he should be
considered the prevailing party.
The renewed motion for attorney’s fees
In March 2025, appellant filed a renewed motion for
attorney’s fees. Appellant contended the CLRA mandates a fees
award when two requirements are satisfied: (1) an action is
brought pursuant to the CLRA, and (2) the plaintiff is the
prevailing party. Appellant asserted he satisfied the first
condition because he filed an action alleging he suffered damages
due to respondent’s CLRA violations and complied with the
statute’s notice requirements. As to the second requirement,
appellant posited he is the prevailing party because his only
litigation objective was to be monetarily compensated and he
achieved this goal under the settlement by recovering $2,500,
which amounts to a multiplier of 250 times the product’s
purchase price. Appellant maintained he would have received no
4
more than a few hundred dollars had he accepted respondent’s
initial settlement offer. Appellant further argued his requested
amount in attorney’s fees and costs is reasonable.
In opposition, respondent contended appellant must
establish liability under the CLRA to obtain attorney’s fees,
which appellant cannot do because the settlement does not show
he suffered any damages due to a CLRA violation. Respondent
maintained the section 998 offer could have been drafted to
include admissions of liability or damages, but such terms were
never included. Respondent asserted the renewed motion was
simply retreading arguments from appellant’s first motion.
Respondent further argued the requested amount in attorney’s
fees is unreasonable.
In reply, appellant stressed that Kim v. Euromotors
West/The Auto Gallery (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 170, 176 (Kim), a
CLRA case involving a settlement with no admissions of liability,
is binding authority on this matter. Moreover, appellant
addressed respondent’s citation of Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P.
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 644 (Meyer), arguing the case does not
suggest a claimant must establish damages resulting from a
CLRA violation to obtain a fees award. Appellant also addressed
respondent’s arguments as to the reasonableness of his requested
amount in fees.
The trial court heard the renewed motion in April 2025.
The court denied the motion, reiterating appellant’s acceptance of
the section 998 offer does not automatically show he is the
prevailing party. The court found the renewed motion had
insufficient caselaw and analysis to find appellant prevailed
under the law.
Appellant timely appealed.
5
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Appellant asserts two main arguments. First, appellant
contends he satisfied the first condition for a fees award by filing
an action alleging a CLRA violation and complying with the
statute’s notice requirements under section 1782. Second,
appellant argues the trial court failed to make the findings and
determinations under the correct legal framework required for
deciding if he is the prevailing party under the CLRA.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review and applicable law
“Generally, the trial court’s determination of the prevailing
party for purposes of awarding attorney fees is an exercise of
discretion, which should not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear showing of abuse of discretion.” (Kim, supra, 149
Cal.App.4th at p. 176.) “But the determination of the legal basis
for an attorney fee award is subject to independent review.”
(Ibid.) “The determination of whether there exists a ‘legal basis
for an award of attorney fees is a question of law which we review
de novo’ where the facts are undisputed.” (Khajavi v. Feather
River Anesthesia Medical Group (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 32, 59.)
“In such a case, the issue involves the application of the law to
undisputed facts.” (Kim, supra, at p. 176.)
II. The trial court did not make mandatory findings and
determinations under the correct legal framework in
6
deciding if appellant is entitled to attorney’s fees
under section 1780
A. Appellant satisfied the requirements for
bringing an action under the CLRA
As an initial matter, appellant maintains he met the first
condition for a fees award by satisfying the statutory
requirements for bringing a CLRA claim. Civil Code section 1780,
subdivision (e), states in relevant part: “The court shall award
court costs and attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in
litigation filed pursuant to this section.” (Italics added.) Thus, the
statute’s plain language shows the first condition for a claimant
to obtain a fees award is to file an action pursuant to the CLRA.
(See Meyer, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 644 [“The attorney fee
provision is to be found in section 1780, subdivision (e), which
states that the court ‘shall award court costs and attorney’s fees
to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed pursuant to this
section.’”].)
We conclude appellant satisfied the requirements for filing
an action under the CLRA. Appellant asserted a cause of action
for violation of the CLRA, alleging respondent violated the
statute by making improper representations as to the product’s
ingredients, characteristics, standard, and quality. Appellant
allegedly suffered damages because he would not have purchased
the product at the price he paid had he known it did not contain
the ingredients listed on the packaging. These allegations show
appellant had standing to sue under the CLRA since he had
allegedly been damaged by an unlawful practice by respondent.
(See Meyer, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 638.)
In addition, appellant satisfied the statute’s notice
requirements under Civil Code section 1782. (See Benson v.
7
Southern California Auto Sales, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th
1198, 1212 (Benson) [“Attorney fees are not recoverable in actions
for damages under the CLRA unless the response to the notice
letter is not an appropriate one or no response is forthcoming
within the statutory time period.”].) Under Civil Code section
1782, subdivision (a), the plaintiff must notify the defendant of
the particular CLRA violation and demand correction at least 30
days prior to filing an action. “[N]o action for damages may be
maintained under Section 1780 if an appropriate correction,
repair, replacement, or other remedy is given, or agreed to be
given within a reasonable time, to the consumer within 30 days
after receipt of the notice.” (Civ. Code., § 1782, subd. (b).)
Appellant presented evidence that his counsel sent a letter
regarding appellant’s CLRA claim to respondent. While the
parties discussed issues regarding the claim, respondent did not
provide a timely correction offer. Respondent does not dispute
appellant satisfied this notice requirement for bringing a CLRA
lawsuit.
Respondent contends, however, appellant could not have
brought an action pursuant to the CLRA because the plain
language of Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (a), requires the
claimant to have suffered damages. Section 1780, subdivision (a),
states in relevant part: “Any consumer who suffers any damage
as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method,
act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 may
bring an action against that person ….” Respondent argues it is
insufficient for a plaintiff to allege he or she suffered damages to
bring an action pursuant to the CLRA because the statute would
have expressly stated consumers who allege they suffered
damages may bring a lawsuit.
8
“‘It is settled that “‘[w]e are required to give effect to
statutes “according to the usual, ordinary import of the language
employed in framing them.”’”’” (City of Sanger v. Superior Court
(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 444, 448.) But “[c]ourts decline to follow the
plain meaning of a statute only when to do so would inevitably
frustrate the manifest purposes of the legislation as a whole or
lead to absurd results.” (Ibid.) Respondent’s interpretation here
lacks merit. The plain language of Civil Code section 1780,
subdivision (a), clearly refers to the standing requirement for a
lawsuit under the CLRA. “‘“Standing” is a party’s right to make a
legal claim and is a threshold issue to be resolved before reaching
the merits of an action.’” (Dent v. Wolf (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 230,
233–234.) A plaintiff’s allegations of damages suffered as a result
of a CLRA violation help to show the plaintiff has standing to sue
under the statute. (See Meyer, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 638 [“We
conclude that a plaintiff has no standing to sue under the CLRA
without some allegation that he or she has been damaged by an
alleged unlawful practice, an allegation plaintiffs do not
sufficiently make here.”].) Respondent’s suggestion that appellant
had to somehow make an early showing of merits to bring a
CLRA claim lacks any support and is antithetical to the basic
concept of standing. Respondent provides no other example of a
statute containing the type of language respondent insists the
CLRA should have to support appellant’s interpretation.
Further, respondent claims the decision in Benson, supra,
239 Cal.App.4th 1198 supports its interpretation of the statute.
We find no language in Benson supporting respondent’s
argument. Benson involves the CLRA’s notice requirement, with
the Court of Appeal concluding “that if a suit for damages cannot
be maintained under the CLRA because a merchant offered an
9
appropriate correction in response to a consumer’s notice, then a
plaintiff cannot collect attorney fees for such a suit.” (Benson,
supra, at p. 1212.) Respondent seizes on particular language in
Benson stating, “If the plaintiff sues without fulfilling [the notice]
requirement, the lawsuits are fatally defective from the
beginning.” (Ibid.) Respondent maintains the same principle can
be applied here to conclude a lawsuit under the CLRA is “fatally
defective from the beginning” when a settlement contains no
admission of liability. But nothing in Benson suggests applying
such language to another disparate matter is appropriate. Benson
only involves the Civil Code section 1782 notice requirement, not
allegations needed for standing to bring an action pursuant to the
CLRA. (See Benson, supra, at pp. 1203, 1206–1207, 1212.) The
language from Benson that respondent asserts is taken out of
context and entirely inapposite for a determination of the issues
here.
B. A settlement lacking admission of liability does
not preclude appellant from being the
prevailing party
The other requirement for obtaining attorney’s fees and
costs under the CLRA is the claimant must be the prevailing
party. (See Kim, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 176, 178–179.)
Appellant argues the trial court failed to make mandatory
findings and determinations under the correct legal framework in
deciding if he is the prevailing party under Civil Code section
1780, subdivision (e). Appellant maintains he presented evidence
that he is the prevailing party, which the court did not properly
consider. We agree.
“[A]n award of attorney fees to ‘a prevailing plaintiff’ in an
action brought pursuant to the CLRA is mandatory, even where
10
the litigation is resolved by a pretrial settlement agreement,
absent an enforceable agreement to the contrary.” (Kim, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 178–179.)
“The CLRA does not define ‘prevailing plaintiff.’” (Kim,
supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 179.) However, in Graciano v.
Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 150
(Graciano), the Court of Appeal held, “in deciding prevailing
party status under [the CLRA], the court should adopt a
pragmatic approach, determining prevailing party status based
on which party succeeded on a practical level. [Citations.] Under
that approach, the court exercises its discretion to determine ‘the
prevailing party by analyzing which party realized its litigation
objectives.’” “‘In assessing litigation success, … “[c]ourts should
respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be
guided by ‘equitable considerations.’ For example, a party who is
denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a
prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise
achieved its main litigation objective.”’” (Id. at p. 151.) Factors
favoring a finding the plaintiff prevailed may include the plaintiff
obtaining a net monetary recovery or otherwise “‘get[ting] most or
all of what he wanted by filing the action.’” (Kim, supra, at p. 180;
see id. at pp. 179–180, 181 [“[W]hile [the defendant] obtained a
dismissal in the settlement agreement, [the plaintiff] obtained
many of his litigation objectives including return of the car,
cancellation of the lease and a monetary recovery.”].)
Here, the findings and determinations under the correct
legal framework were not made in deciding whether appellant is
entitled to his attorney’s fees and costs under Civil Code section
1780. The November 12, 2024 order denying the motion for
attorney’s fees contains no discussion regarding which party
11
achieved its litigation objectives. The order states the settlement
“does not contain any admission of liability nor any admission
that plaintiff was truly damaged.” The trial court concluded
appellant is not necessarily the prevailing party as a result of
accepting the section 998 offer. Likewise, the April 7, 2025 order
denying the renewed motion contains no discussion as to the
parties’ litigation success and only indicated appellant’s
acceptance of the section 998 offer does not automatically show
he is the prevailing party. Such an approach in determining the
prevailing party status for a fees award under the CLRA is
prohibited under Kim and Graciano.
As discussed above, courts must assess the parties’
litigation success, not the form of a settlement. (See Kim, supra,
149 Cal.App.4th at p. 181; Graciano, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at
p. 150.) This can be seen in Kim, where the lack of an admission
of liability in the settlement did not preclude a finding the
plaintiff was the prevailing party. (See Kim, supra, 149
Cal.App.4th at pp. 174, 181.) “Because [the plaintiff’s] right to
attorney fees arises not from contract, but under section 1780[,
now subdivision (e)], [the plaintiff] is not precluded from
obtaining an award of attorney fees even though the litigation
was resolved by a settlement agreement.” (Id. at p. 181.) Hence,
absent express language in the section 998 offer excluding a fees
award (see Engle v. Copenbarger & Copenbarger, LLP (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 165, 168 [“[The plaintiff] argues she is entitled to
fees because they were not expressly excluded in the offer to
compromise. She is right.”]), a determination of prevailing party
status cannot be based merely on the terms or form of the
settlement agreement. The section 998 offer here does not
12
exclude attorney’s fees and costs as it states, “Fees and costs, if
any, will be determined by the court as allowed by law.”
In addition, the November 12, 2024 order indicates
appellant provided no “analysis as to why he should be
considered prevailing.” The April 7, 2025 order denying the
renewed motion similarly states, “Insufficient analysis/argument
provided to this Court to find plaintiff ‘prevailing’ under the law.”
However, in the initial motion, appellant argued he is the
prevailing party because his recovery of $2,500 under the
settlement amounts to a multiplier of 250 times his actual
damages. Appellant asserted respondent was originally only
willing to offer a T-shirt, a refund, or another box of the product
before appellant filed suit. At the hearing, appellant contended
he should be considered the prevailing party because he filed his
case seeking monetary recovery and achieved this objective by
recovering substantially more than respondent’s final offer before
the lawsuit was filed.
Moreover, in the renewed motion, appellant reiterated he
was the prevailing party because his only litigation objective was
to be monetarily compensated, and he achieved this by recovering
$2,500 through the settlement. Appellant posited he would have
received no more than a few hundred dollars had he accepted
respondent’s initial settlement offer. At the hearing, appellant
asserted respondent cannot identify any litigation objective
appellant did not achieve. Appellant reiterated he only sought
monetary compensation and ultimately achieved a recovery
amounting to a multiplier of 250 times the product’s purchase
price.
The foregoing facts are all relevant to deciding which party
prevailed because they relate to appellant’s litigation success.
13
The orders denying the attorney’s fees motions fail to show any of
these facts were considered in determining whether appellant
achieved his litigation objective. Respondent argues it made a
$5,000 offer plus a full refund to appellant, which he rejected.
Respondent posits appellant subsequently accumulated more
legal fees to litigate the matter before ultimately accepting an
amount that is only half of respondent’s prior offer. Such
opposing facts, however, relate to respondent’s litigation success
and should have also been considered in a proper analysis
predicated on the parties’ litigation objectives and achievements.
Since nothing shows the facts pertinent to the parties’ litigation
success were ever considered, we cannot conclude the findings
and determinations required in deciding the prevailing party
under Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (e), were made.
Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for the trial court to
make such findings and determinations under the correct legal
framework discussed herein.
Finally, respondent contends appellant is not entitled to a
fees award because the CLRA requires a finding of the
defendant’s liability, like the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the
DPA. To support this argument, respondent cites Doran v. North
State Grocery, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 484 (Doran) and
Linton v. County of Contra Costa (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 628
(Linton).
Respondent’s reliance on Doran and Linton is misplaced.
These cases only involve the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the DPA
and do not even mention the CLRA. (See Linton, supra, 31
Cal.App.5th at pp. 632–638; Doran, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 488–492.) Nothing in these cases establishes that it is proper
to analogize the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the DPA to the
14
CLRA. (Ibid.) Indeed, the language in the Unruh Civil Rights Act
and the DPA is materially different from the CLRA’s text. As to
the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 52, subdivision (a),
states in relevant part: “Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial,
or makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51,
51.5, or 51.6, is liable for each and every offense for the actual
damages … and any attorney’s fees that may be determined by
the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the
rights provided in Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6.” Similar to the Unruh
Civil Rights Act, the DPA states in relevant part: “Any person or
persons, firm or corporation who denies or interferes with
admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities as specified in
Sections 54 and 54.1 or otherwise interferes with the rights of an
individual with a disability under Sections 54, 54.1 and 54.2 is
liable for each offense for the actual damages … and attorney’s
fees as may be determined by the court in addition thereto,
suffered by any person denied any of the rights provided in
Sections 54, 54.1, and 54.2.” (Civ. Code, § 54.3, subd. (a).) Thus,
unlike the CLRA, the attorney’s fees discussed in the Unruh Civil
Rights Act and the DPA are strictly a function of the defendant’s
liability.
We note Kim and Graciano both involve the CLRA and are
directly on point with the issues in this matter. There is no
support for applying legal authorities, such as Doran and Linton,
that concern entirely different statutes than those at issue here.
“A decision is not authority merely for what it says, but for the
points actually involved and actually decided.” (Huscher v. Wells
Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956, 962.) Hence, Doran and
Linton, which only decided issues as to the Unruh Civil Rights
15
Act and the DPA, are inapposite to the matters here regarding
the CLRA.
DISPOSITION
The April 7, 2025 order denying the motion for attorney’s
fees is reversed. On remand, the trial court shall determine if
appellant is the prevailing party within the meaning of Civil
Code section 1780, subdivision (e), under the correct legal
framework as discussed herein. If appellant is determined to be
the prevailing party, the court shall decide the amount in
attorney’s fees and costs appellant should recover.
Appellant is awarded his costs on appeal.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
16