Garcia v. Santa Clara Co. Dept. of Child Support Services




Filed 5/20/11 Garcia v. Santa Clara Co. Dept. of Child Support Services CA5




NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MARTIN GARCIA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Defendant and Respondent.

H036136 (Santa Clara County Super.Ct.No. CV181974)

I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Martin Garcia, a self-represented litigant, filed an action against respondent Santa Clara County Department of Child Support Services (County) in which he alleged that the County was liable for its negligence in attempting to collect child support from him. He also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause re preliminary injunction, which he sought to enjoin the County’s collection efforts. The trial court denied the ex parte application.
On appeal, Garcia contends that the trial court should have granted his ex parte application for injunctive relief because the County did not file written opposition and his income from supplemental social security is exempt from collection. After briefing was complete, the County advised this court that the underlying action had been dismissed and argued in a supplemental briefing letter that the appeal was therefore moot. For the reasons stated below, we agree and therefore we will dismiss the appeal as moot.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Verified Complaint
Garcia filed a verified complaint on September 9, 2010, in which he stated that “he is an older gentleman in need of accommodations by the American’s with Disabilities Act [sic].” The minimal factual allegations also included Garcia’s statements that “this case arises from the [County’s] claims [that Garcia] owes support of his minor children,” “there was never an order for support,” “the mother was prosecuted for welfare fraud,” and Garcia “has been dragged into court, required to travel disabled from Madera, California, at least eight times for the unlawful enforcement of support, in bad faith.” Additionally, Garcia alleged that the “County’s computer system had been rehauled [sic] four (4) times since the year 2000, and that many of the entries in the computer system are incorrect and/or incomplete.” Finally, although the allegation is unclear, it appears that Garcia alleged that the County was attempting to collect child support from him in the amount of $131,940.98.
Based on these allegations, Garcia asserted a cause of action for negligence, claiming that the County had garnished his “social security in violation of 42 [U.S.C] § 407^[[1]] and [Code of Civil Procedure] § 704.130,”[2] and maliciously “begun all out war” by initiating an action against him without notice, a court order for support, or personal service.
B. The Ex Parte Application for Injunctive Relief
On September 13, 2010, Garcia filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause re preliminary injunction. The application stated that Garcia sought to enjoin the County from (1) “Further enforcement of Judgment for support pending outcome of case number 187DA637647^[[3]]”; (2) “Accruing additional support pending the outcome of case number 187 DA637647”; and (3) “Suspending the driving privileges of [Garcia].”
In his memorandum of points and authorities, Garcia argued that injunctive relief was necessary to avoid “a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.” In his supporting declaration, Garcia asserted that the County’s efforts to collect child support from him were unlawful and that injunctive relief was necessary because the County was threatening to incarcerate him, garnish his social security benefits, and suspend his driver’s license.
The County did not file written opposition to Garcia’s ex parte application for injunctive relief and the record does not reflect that the County appeared in opposition to the application.
On September 13, 2010, the trial court issued its handwritten order denying the ex parte application for injunctive relief as follows: “Denied. No good cause for [temporary restraining order] or ex parte relief.”
Garcia filed a timely notice of appeal from the September 13, 2010 order denying his application for a temporary restraining order on October 12, 2010. After briefing on the appeal was completed, we received a letter from the County, dated April 21, 2011, stating that the action underlying action had been dismissed and suggesting that the appeal was now moot.
The County then submitted a filed copy of the April 22, 2011 order dismissing the underlying action (Garcia v. County of Santa Clara (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, 2011, No. CV181974) in its entirety due to Garcia’s failure to appear in trial court proceedings. We take judicial notice of the April 22, 2011 order of dismissal. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
After receiving the order of dismissal, we requested that the parties submit supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the order had rendered the appeal moot. We received a supplemental briefing letter dated May 6, 2011, from the County and no response from Garcia. The County argues in its supplemental briefing letter that the appeal is moot and must be dismissed because “where there is no underlying case remaining in the trial court, the issue of granting interim relief is moot. [Citation.]” For the reasons stated below, we agree.
III. DISCUSSION
The general rule is that “[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief. [Citations.]” (Cucamongans United For Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 (Cucamongans); see also MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.)
With regard to an order granting or denying an application for injunctive relief, it is well established that “ ‘[a] preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits. [Citation.] It is not, in itself, a cause of action. Thus, a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted. [Citation.]’ ” (Korean Legal Advocacy Foundation (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 376, 398-399.) Accordingly, where judgment has been entered into the underlying action, and no cause of action remains to support a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, “the question of the right to interim relief is moot.” (Agnew v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 51 Cal.2d 1, 2; see also MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.)
After the right to interim relief is rendered moot by the entry of judgment in the underlying action, an appeal of an order denying injunctive relief must be dismissed as moot. (Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 2.) We believe that the same rule applies where, as here, the underlying action has been dismissed in its entirety, since after dismissal no cause of action remains to support injunctive relief and the right to injunctive relief is therefore rendered moot.
However, the appellate court has the inherent power to retain a moot appeal under three discretionary exceptions: (1) the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur; (2) the parties’ controversy may recur; and (3) “a material question remains for the court’s determination. [Citations.]” (Cucamongans, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 479-480.)
In the present case, the underlying action has been dismissed in its entirety. Consequently, no cause of action remains to support Garcia’s ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause re preliminary injunction and the issue of whether he is entitled to injunctive relief is moot. Garcia’s appeal of the order denying his application for injunctive relief is therefore also moot. (Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 2.) In addition, having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record in this matter, we determine that no discretionary exception applies that would allow this court to retain the moot appeal. For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.
IV. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.



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Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P.J.





WE CONCUR:




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MIHARA, J.








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duffy, J.

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