Filed 10/16/26 Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. Cardenas CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
FULLERTON JOINT UNION HIGH
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
G065571
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2025-
v. 01466130)
NICOLAS J. CARDENAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Glenn Mondo, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Affirmed. Motion for sanctions denied. Request to dismiss denied.
Nicolas J. Cardenas, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Anthony P. De Marco,
Jacquelyn Takeda Morenz and Hannah Bushyeager for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Nicolas J. Cardenas appeals from the workplace violence
restraining order imposed on him pursuant to section 527.8 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.1 The trial court ordered restrictions on Cardenas’s contact
with the superintendent and the assistant superintendent of Fullerton Joint
Union High School District (the District), along with members of their
families, after Cardenas engaged in harassment within the meaning of
section 527.8, subdivision (k). We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2025, the District petitioned, pursuant to section 527.8,
for a workplace violence restraining order against Cardenas whose
employment with the District had ended almost two years earlier. The
petition was brought on the ground Cardenas had engaged in “a consistent
course of conduct involving incessant inappropriate communication,
harassment, and verbal threats,” which conduct had “escalated to a point
that the District and [certain employees], fe[lt] afraid for their personal
safety and the safety of their families.”
The petition specifically sought protection for the District’s
superintendent, the District’s assistant superintendent, and members of their
families, as those individuals were particularly targeted in the
communications. The petition was supported by the superintendent’s and the
assistant superintendent’s declarations to which almost 200 pages of exhibits
concerning Cardenas’s communications were attached. The petition
accurately describes many of Cardenas’s voluminous communications as
“consist[ing] of name-calling, [allegedly] false and damaging claims,
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
rhetorical and belittling questions, and pages upon pages of conjecture that
required no District response.”
The trial court granted the District’s request for a temporary
restraining order pending an evidentiary hearing on the petition, which the
court set for March 21, 2025. Cardenas did not appear for the evidentiary
hearing as noticed. The evidentiary hearing did not proceed that day because
the court granted the District’s request to continue the hearing. The
evidentiary hearing was thereafter continued to April 4, 2025.
Although the trial court found Cardenas had been properly
served with notice of the continued date of the evidentiary hearing, he did not
appear on April 4, 2025. The evidentiary hearing proceeded in his absence;
the District called three witnesses to testify and also presented documentary
evidence and argument at the hearing.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the
petition. The court issued a three-year restraining order (the restraining
order) protecting the superintendent, the assistant superintendent, and
certain members of their respective families.
The restraining order prohibits Cardenas from, inter alia,
harassing, committing acts of violence, making threats of violence, following
or stalking the protected persons during work hours or to or from their place
of work, disturbing their peace, contacting the protected persons, entering
their workplace, or taking any action to obtain their addresses or locations.
The order further requires Cardenas to stay at least 100 yards away from the
protected persons, their workplaces, homes, and vehicles but “does not
prohibit [Cardenas] from peacefully and lawfully attending any publicly
noticed meeting or hearing on District owned or operated property.” The
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order also prohibits Cardenas “from using [the District’s] all-employee email
address/system.” Cardenas appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECTION 527.8
Section 527.8 permits an employer to seek a restraining order on
behalf of an employee “who has suffered harassment, unlawful violence, or a
credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be
construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace.”
(§ 527.8, subd. (a).) As pertinent here, “‘[h]arassment’ is a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The
course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress.” (§ 527.8, subd. (b)(4).) After a hearing, if the judge “finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in
harassment . . . an order shall issue prohibiting further harassment.”
(§ 527.8, subd. (k).)
II.
CARDENAS DID NOT SUBMIT A REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT AND IS THEREFORE
BARRED FROM CHALLENGING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his opening brief, Cardenas argues the restraining order is
unsupported by substantial evidence “because key exhibits were legally
insufficient, irrelevant, or unreadable.” (Boldface omitted.) It is an appellant’s
burden to provide an adequate record and the “[f]ailure to provide an
adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the
appellant].” (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000)
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78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.) According to rule 8.120 of the California Rules of
Court, “[i]f an appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration
of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal must
include a record of these oral proceedings in the form of one of the following:
[¶] (1) A reporter’s transcript under rule 8.130; [¶] (2) An agreed statement
under rule 8.134; or [¶] (3) A settled statement under rule 8.137.”
Cardenas did not submit a reporter’s transcript of the evidentiary
hearing, or an agreed statement or settled statement with respect to that
hearing, as part of the appellate record. Consequently, he cannot challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence in this matter. (Robinson v. Gutierrez (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 278, 283; Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 987
[“where the appellant fails to produce a complete record of oral trial
proceedings, a challenge based on the claim of evidence insufficiency will not
be heard”].) We must therefore presume the evidence supports the issuance of
the restraining order in this case. (Robinson v. Gutierrez, supra, at p. 283.)2
III.
CARDENAS’S CONTENTIONS OF PROCEDURAL ERROR ARE WITHOUT MERIT
Cardenas also challenges the restraining order on the following
procedural grounds: (1) Cardenas was not present at the evidentiary hearing
“and therefore had no meaningful opportunity to be heard”; (2) the April 4,
2 In any event, the respondent’s appendix contains a clear and
legible copy of the single exhibit Cardenas argues was unreadable—the
District’s March 1, 2025 cease and desist letter to Cardenas identified in the
record as exhibit 21. Any additional challenge to the District’s evidence on
relevance grounds was forfeited by Cardenas for failure to raise any
evidentiary objections before the trial court. (See Crouch v. Trinity Christian
Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1020 [“The failure to
object or move to strike evidence at trial forfeits any challenge to the evidence
on appeal”].)
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2025 minute order is defective as “internally contradictory”; (3) the petition
was “improperly verified by an individual who simultaneously claimed to be
the victim and supervised a principal witness”; and (4) “[t]he manner of [the
temporary restraining order’s] issuance and service undermines the District’s
claim of ‘immediate danger.’” (Boldface omitted.) For the reasons we explain,
Cardenas’s contentions lack merit.
A. Cardenas’s Absence Did Not Preclude Issuance of the Restraining Order
Cardenas contends the restraining order must be reversed
because he was not present at the March 21, 2025 hearing, or at the
continued evidentiary hearing on April 4, 2025. Cardenas argues: “A hearing
at which the respondent is absent—combined with a record that does not
demonstrate valid notice—is insufficient to support a three-year order. A
restraining order issued without a meaningful opportunity to be heard cannot
stand.” Without citing supportive legal authority, Cardenas concludes that
because he “was not present and the record does not show that he knowingly
waived his right to participate, reversal is mandatory.”
The record shows Cardenas had been given proper notice of both
hearings. First, the District filed a proof of service showing that on March 14,
2025, Cardenas was personally served with the notice of the evidentiary
hearing on the petition as originally scheduled for March 21, 2025, the
temporary restraining order, the petition, forms instructing Cardenas how to
file a response to the petition, and the trial court’s March 12, 2025 minute
order.3 Although Cardenas was provided with instructions on how to respond
to the petition, Cardenas did not file a response.
3 The temporary restraining order similarly provided instructions
on how Cardenas could respond to the petition if he wished.
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In addition, the temporary restraining order instructed,
“[w]hether or not you file a response, you should attend the hearing” and at
the hearing “[t]ell the judge why you disagree with the orders requested.” The
temporary restraining order expressly advised Cardenas that a restraining
order might be issued in his absence, stating: “If you have been personally
served with this Temporary Restraining Order and form WV-109, Notice of
Court Hearing, but you do not appear at the hearing either in person or by a
lawyer, and a restraining order that is the same as this Temporary
Restraining Order except for the expiration date is issued at the hearing, a
copy of the order will be served on you by mail at the address [listed on the
order].” The notice of hearing also expressly warned Cardenas: “If you do not
attend the hearing, the judge may still grant the restraining order that could
last up to five years.”
Cardenas did not appear on March 21, 2025 for the scheduled
evidentiary hearing. The trial court found the District’s proof of service on
Cardenas proper and continued the hearing for April 4, 2025. The record
contains the District’s subsequent proof of service showing that on March 21,
2025, Cardenas was personally served with, among other documents, the
court’s order granting the request to continue the evidentiary hearing to
April 4, 2025, along with a copy of the court’s March 21, 2025 minute order.
Nevertheless, Cardenas did not appear for the evidentiary hearing on April 4,
2025. The court stated in its minute order of that date that it found “proof of
service [wa]s proper.”
The record thus establishes Cardenas was duly served with
notice of the evidentiary hearing on April 4, 2025, but failed to appear. He
also was instructed on how to file a response to the petition, but he did not
submit any such response. He does not explain how service was defective and
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does not argue he was unaware of the proceedings. Any suggestion
Cardenas’s failure to respond to the petition or to appear and participate at
the evidentiary hearing automatically barred the issuance of a restraining
order against him is without support in the law. (See § 527.8, subd. (o) [“A
notice of hearing under this section shall notify the respondent that, if they
do not attend the hearing, the court may make orders against them that
could last up to three years”].) We find no error.
B. The April 4, 2025 Minute Order Is Not Internally Inconsistent
Cardenas argues: “The minute order for April 4[, 2025,] states
both that the court granted the [restraining order] ‘after all parties were
heard’ and that [Cardenas] ‘is not present.’ [Citation.] Both propositions
cannot be true. [¶] This contradiction shows that the trial court made a
finding that is facially inaccurate and relied on it as the procedural predicate
for issuing a multi-year restraining order.”
As discussed earlier in this opinion, the trial court’s April 4, 2025
minute order accurately states Cardenas did not appear at the evidentiary
hearing continued for that date. After reporting the examination of witnesses,
the proffer of documentary evidence, and argument presented by the District
at that hearing, the court stated in its minute order: “The Court having fully
considered the arguments of all parties, both written and oral, as well as the
evidence presented, now rules as follows: [¶] Restraining order as requested
against Nicolas Cardenas is granted.” The court’s statement does not indicate
that Cardenas had presented argument and evidence at the hearing, but that
the court fully considered the arguments and evidence that had been
presented in the matter. We find no error.
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C. Cardenas Has Forfeited His Challenge to the Verification of the Petition
Cardenas argues the petition is somehow rendered infirm
because it was signed by the superintendent on behalf of the District. In his
opening brief, Cardenas argues: “[The superintendent] signed the petition,
identified himself as the victim, and supervised [the assistant
superintendent], a key witness supporting the petition. [Citation.] This dual
role raises inherent credibility concerns and risks conflating supervisory
authority with victim status. [¶] Section 527.8 requires trustworthy,
competent evidence demonstrating that an employee has been subjected to
unlawful violence or a credible threat. When the petitioner-victim is also the
supervisor of persons whose statements form the evidentiary basis of the
request, the reliability of the petition is diminished and requires close judicial
scrutiny. [¶] Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court addressed
this conflict. This omission is significant given the absence of cross-
examination caused by [Cardenas’s] non-participation in the hearings.”
Cardenas’s argument on this point is forfeited for two reasons.
First, Cardenas failed to raise this issue in the trial court. “It is axiomatic
that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.” (Kern
County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1028, 1038.) Second, Cardenas has not cited any legal authority supporting
his argument. “When legal argument is not supported by citation to legal
authority on a particular point, ‘we may treat the point as forfeited and pass
it without consideration.’” (Pinter-Brown v. Regents of University of
California (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55, 95.) We therefore do not consider this
argument further.
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D. Service of the Notice of Temporary Restraining Order
Finally, Cardenas argues: “The declaration re: notice temporary
restraining order states that notice should be provided ‘directly through law
enforcement’ because giving [Cardenas] notice could ‘incite an aggressive
reaction.’ [Citation.] Yet the District selected a private process server to
deliver the order. [Citation.] [¶] This discrepancy undermines the
foundational claim that extraordinary [temporary restraining order] relief
was necessary. If law enforcement involvement was truly required for safety,
private service would not have been appropriate. Conversely, if private
service was safe, the [temporary restraining order]’s justification for
extraordinary relief is called into question. [¶] These contradictions further
weaken the evidentiary basis for issuing a three-year [workplace violence
restraining order].” (Capitalization omitted.)
Again, Cardenas has forfeited this argument as he neither raised
it in the trial court, nor supports it with citations to any legal authority. In
any event, this is an appeal from the restraining order. The District’s use of a
private process server to serve Cardenas with the notice of the temporary
restraining order, as opposed to requesting law enforcement to serve him,
does not have any impact on whether the court erred in issuing the
restraining order. We find no error.
IV.
WE DENY THE DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
During the pendency of this appeal, the District filed a motion for
sanctions brought on the grounds the appeal is frivolous and Cardenas has
failed to follow the California Rules of Court in his briefing. An appellate
court may impose monetary sanctions when “the appeal was frivolous or
taken solely for delay.” (§ 907; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1).)
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In evaluating whether an appeal is frivolous, we use a subjective and
objective standard. (Malek Media Group, LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 817, 834.) “‘The subjective standard looks to the motives of
the appealing party and his or her attorney, while the objective standard
looks at the merits of the appeal from a reasonable person’s perspective.’”
(Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 192.) “A finding of
frivolousness may be based on either standard by itself, but the two tests are
ordinarily used together, with one sometimes providing evidence relevant to
the other.” (Malek Media Group, at p. 834.)
Generally, a self-represented litigant must abide by “the same
restrictive rules and procedures as an attorney.” (Kabbe v. Miller (1990) 226
Cal.App.3d 93, 98.) But courts are hesitant to impose sanctions on self-
represented appellants for filing frivolous appeals. (Ibid.) “We do not believe
it is appropriate to hold a propria persona appellant to the standard of what a
‘reasonable attorney’ should know is frivolous unless and until that appellant
becomes a persistent litigant.” (Ibid.)
We conclude the record on appeal does not show Cardenas, a self-
represented appellant, had a vexatious motive in filing his appeal. Rather, it
shows he was frustrated with the outcome of this case, appealed from an
appealable order, and, without the benefit of counsel, presented dubious
arguments on appeal in a good faith effort to prevail. While the District is
correct Cardenas did not comply with the relevant California Rules of Court,
we conclude his failure in this regard did not rise to the level of being
sanctionable. We therefore deny the motion for sanctions.
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V.
WE DENY BOTH CARDENAS’S ELEVENTH-HOUR REQUEST TO DISMISS THIS
APPEAL AND THE DISTRICT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Four days before the scheduled date for oral argument in this
case, and over five months after briefing was complete, this court received
Cardenas’s form request for dismissal of this appeal. We invited the District
to respond to Cardenas’s request. In response, the District filed an amended
motion for sanctions, seeking an additional $8,793.75 in attorney fees and
costs from those sought in its original motion for sanctions. The District
requested that the court impose sanctions against Cardenas and dismiss the
appeal.
On receipt of a request to voluntarily dismiss an appeal, this
court has discretion whether to grant the request. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.244(c)(2) [“court may dismiss the appeal”], italics added.) Appellate courts
have denied requests to dismiss an appeal filed during the latter stages of an
appeal. (See Greb v. Diamond Internat. Corp. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 243, 247, fn. 3
[appellate court properly rejected stipulation to dismiss appeal filed after the
issues were fully briefed and warranted an opinion]; Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 300, fn. 4 [parties’ stipulation to
dismiss appeal rejected by appellate court because it was not submitted until
after the court “expended considerable time and effort reviewing the record,
researching the issues presented and preparing the case for calendar”].)
Because Cardenas waited until the eve of oral argument to
request dismissal of his appeal, and because the issues presented warrant an
opinion in this matter, we deny the request to dismiss the appeal.
For the same reasons we deny the District’s original motion for
sanctions as discussed above, we deny its amended motion for sanctions.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SCOTT, J.
SERVINO, J.
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