Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Fresno Building Healthy Communities v. City of Fresno CA5

Filed 10/8/26 Fresno Building Healthy Communities v. City of Fresno CA5
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/8/26 Fresno Building Healthy Communities v. City of Fresno CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

FRESNO BUILDING HEALTHY
COMMUNITIES, F090084

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 19CECG00432)

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant;

HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS
ASSOCIATION,

Intervener and Respondent.
CITY OF FRESNO,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. F090085

FRESNO BUILDING HEALTHY (Super. Ct. No. 19CECG00422)
COMMUNITIES,

Defendant and Appellant;

HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS
ASSOCIATION,

Intervener and Respondent.
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Robert M.
Whalen, Jr., Judge.
Olson Remcho, Thomas A. Willis, Margaret R. Prinzing, Lance H. Olson,
Deborah B. Caplan, Benjamin N. Gervercer, Inez Kominski and Emily Uchida for
Plaintiff and Appellant in F090084 and Defendant and Appellant in F090085.
Andrew Janz, City Attorney, Tina Griffin and Travis Ray Stokes, Assistant City
Attorneys; Aleshire & Wynder, Anthony R. Taylor and Michael C. Huston, for
Defendant and Appellant in F090084 and Plaintiff and Appellant in F090085.
No appearance for Intervener and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
This is the third time this dispute over Measure P, a citizen-initiated special tax
approved by Fresno voters in 2018, has come before this court. Measure P received a
majority of the vote—52.17 percent—but less than the two-thirds threshold stated in the
measure’s own text. Fresno Building Healthy Communities (FBHC) is the nonprofit
organization that successfully litigated to establish Measure P’s validity, after the City of
Fresno (City) declared the measure had failed. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association
(HJTA) is a taxpayer advocacy organization that intervened to defend the City’s position
that Measure P required a two-thirds vote. The City filed a statement of neutrality and
took no other action in the litigation.
The trial court awarded FBHC attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure1
section 1021.5 and apportioned part of the award between the City and HJTA. The
remainder of the award was imposed against the City alone. FBHC and the City have
both appealed from the order awarding fees. In FBHC’s appeal, we consider whether the
trial court properly apportioned the fee award between the City and HJTA. As to that
issue, we conclude that HJTA was not an “opposing party” under section 1021.5, and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2.
thus the trial court erred in apportioning any part of the fee award to HJTA. In the City’s
appeal, we consider the City’s claim that FBHC should not have been awarded fees on
four separate equitable grounds. We conclude the City’s arguments raised in its appeal
were forfeited for failure to assert them below.
The order appealed from is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and we remand
with directions to enter a new order.
BACKGROUND
In the November 2018 general election, Fresno voters approved Measure P, a
citizen-initiated special sales tax, by 52.17 percent of the vote—a majority, but less than
the two-thirds threshold stated in the measure’s own text. The measure’s text, drafted by
counsel who later represented FBHC in this litigation, stated that passage required a two-
thirds vote of the electorate.
In December 2018, the Fresno City Council declared Measure P had failed
because two-thirds of the electorate had not approved it. (City of Fresno v. Fresno
Building Healthy Communities (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 220, 229 (Fresno I).) In
January 2019, FBHC, through counsel, wrote to the City’s mayor asserting that the
California Constitution required only a majority vote for Measure P to pass and urging
the City to implement Measure P. (City of Fresno v. Fresno Building Healthy
Communities (Dec. 26, 2023, F084662, F084666) [nonpub. opn.], 2023 WL 8888278, at
p. *2 (Fresno II).) When the City did not do so, the City and FBHC filed declaratory
relief actions against each other, seeking a judicial determination of the applicable voter
threshold. (Fresno I, at pp. 229–230.) The City’s complaint alleged that the “Council
declared Measure P failed because of its failure to be approved by a two-thirds votes of
the electorate. The declaration was consistent with the requirement of Section 4 of
Article XIII of the California Constitution that special taxes must be approved by a two-
thirds vote of the electorate.” (Fresno II, at p. *2.) The City’s requested relief in its

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complaint was that the court “ ‘declare the appropriate voter threshold for passage of a
special tax brought by voter initiative.’ ” (Ibid.)
HJTA moved to intervene in both actions on behalf of its 800-plus members
residing in Fresno, asserting that they would be subject to paying the tax if the measure
were implemented and that their interests, as taxpayers who had voted against Measure P,
were not otherwise represented in the litigation. FBHC consented to HJTA’s intervention
on the condition that FBHC and HJTA agreed they would not seek attorney fees from one
another. (Fresno II, supra, 2023 WL 8888278, at p. *2.) That agreement was confirmed.
(Ibid.)
HJTA moved for judgment on the pleadings in both the City and FBHC’s actions,
arguing the California Constitution required two-thirds voter approval for local tax
measures initiated by citizens, the same as it requires for those initiated by local
governments. (Fresno I, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 230.) FBHC opposed the motion,
and the City submitted a statement of neutrality and did not otherwise participate in the
litigation. (Fresno II, supra, 2023 WL 8888278, at p. *2.)
The trial court granted the motion without leave to amend and entered judgment in
HJTA’s favor, and FBHC appealed. (Fresno II, supra, 2023 WL 8888278, at p. *2.) In
the first appeal, this court resolved the constitutional question, holding that voter-initiated
special tax measures required only a majority vote, and directed entry of judgment
declaring that Measure P had passed. (Fresno I, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) The
trial court on remand entered new judgments for FBHC, declaring Measure P had passed
and directing the City to take steps necessary to implement it. (Fresno II, at p. *3.)
FBHC then moved for attorney fees against the City under section 1021.5.
(Fresno II, supra, 2023 WL 8888278, at p. *3) The trial court denied the motion on
several grounds, including that the City was not an “opposing party” within the meaning
of the statute. (Ibid.) FBHC appealed a second time. We reversed again in Fresno II,
holding that the City was an opposing party responsible for the action giving rise to the

4.
litigation, and that FBHC had satisfied each remaining element of section 1021.5.
(Fresno II, at pp. *4, *12.) We remanded the matter “for a determination of the amount
of reasonable attorney fees payable by the City of Fresno to counsel for FBHC,”
expressly declining to address “the reasonableness of attorney fees, any issues of
apportionment, or what funds are available to satisfy the attorney fees judgment,” which
it left “for the trial court to consider on remand.” (Id. at p. *12, fn. 5.)
On remand, the City moved for contribution from HJTA, or in the alternative for
apportionment of any fee liability between the City and HJTA. As to apportionment, the
City argued that HJTA could be liable for fees because it was an “opposing party” for
section 1021.5 purposes. To that point, the City asserted that HJTA’s “position in the
litigation was adverse to that of FBHC and it ultimately lost the case on the merits.” The
City also asserted that HJTA’s “involvement in this case was not merely ideological, such
that it plausibly could be protected from an award of attorney fees as an amicus curiae
under Connerly [v. State Personnel Board (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169 (Connerly)],” because
HJTA became involved in the case on behalf of its Fresno-based members who would
have to pay the Measure P tax. The City requested that HJTA bear 90% of the fees
awarded to FBHC because “approximately 90% of the attorney fees sought in this case
are attributable to the time after HJTA intervened.”
FBHC opposed the City’s request for contribution or apportionment on the ground
that HJTA was not an “opposing party” to FBHC under section 1021.5. Citing Connerly,
supra, 37 Cal.4th 1169, FBHC argued that HJTA could not be considered an “opposing
party” because it lacked a “direct interest” in the litigation and did nothing that
precipitated the lawsuit. (Id. at p. 1181.) It asserted that HJTA was merely an
“ideological” organization participating in the litigation and was not at all involved in the
City’s refusal to implement Measure P. It added that HJTA also did not stand to gain in
any pecuniary way from the litigation.

5.
At an October 16, 2024, hearing, the trial court denied contribution based on the
agreement between FBHC and HJTA not to seek fees from one another but indicated it
was inclined to apportion liability between the City and HJTA. It ordered further
briefing. FBHC then filed its supplemental attorney fees motion, seeking a lodestar2 of
$225,460 for work performed during the Fresno I merits phase, plus a 1.5 multiplier
based on the difficulty of the case and the results achieved, and a lodestar of $303,697 for
work performed during the Fresno II fee-entitlement phase, along with $2,796.17 in
costs. FBHC did not seek a multiplier for the Fresno II phase. FBHC again asserted that
HJTA is not an opposing party and thus the court had no discretion to apportion fees
between HJTA and the City.
At the March 19, 2025, hearing on FBHC’s fees motion, counsel for the City
argued that the City was not truly an opposing party to FBHC, noting that HJTA’s own
2019 ex parte application to intervene had stated that “[t]he City’s interest[s] are in line
with [FBHC’s] interest[s],” and that HJTA intervened because it did not believe the City
would “fight hard enough.” Counsel explained that the City’s posture was a function of
Measure P’s own text. “[W]e didn’t have a choice,” counsel argued, because the measure
“required two thirds of those voting to approve it,” and “[a]ll the City did … is follow
what the citizens put in their measure[.]”
The trial court then turned to one of the factors bearing on whether to apply a
multiplier—“the fact that an award against the [s]tate would ultimately fall upon the tax
payers[.]”3 In response, counsel for the City speculated about “who in fact drafted the

2 Section 1021.5 attorney fees are calculated using the lodestar method.
(Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 552, 589–590 (Grossmont).) The lodestar is the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Id. at p. 590.) The figure
may then be adjusted up or down to fix the fee at the fair market value of the services
provided. (Ibid.)
3 “Once the lodestar is fixed, the court may increase or decrease that amount by
applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take other factors into account. [Citation.]
6.
voter initiative that had the two-thirds vote requirement,” suggesting that if it were “the
client of opposing counsel” who “made the mistake,” FBHC should not “be made
whole[.]” Counsel for the City did not argue, then or at any other point, that FBHC
should recover no fees at all. When the trial court asked directly whether counsel was
suggesting that FBHC itself had written the measure, counsel responded that he did not
know and would “turn that” question to FBHC’s counsel.
Later in the hearing, the trial court returned to the question directly, stating, “We
better get to the issue of who wrote … the measure.” Counsel for FBHC disclosed that
he had personally drafted the initiative, including the two-thirds vote provision. The trial
court then questioned FBHC’s counsel at length regarding the fairness of an award under
these circumstances, but the City did not at any point argue that FBHC should recover no
fees, nor did it invoke the unclean hands doctrine, a breach of the duty of candor, or any
comparable equitable doctrine.
In a written order, the trial court found FBHC’s requested lodestar for both phases
reasonable, except for 2.5 hours of duplicate billing that reduced the Fresno I lodestar by
$1,062.50, and denied FBHC’s request for a multiplier. It awarded FBHC’s fees for the
Fresno II phase against the City in full. As to the Fresno I phase, the court concluded
that HJTA was also an “opposing party” to FBHC under section 1021.5 and apportioned
liability for that phase 10 percent to the City and 90 percent to HJTA.
The trial court stated its reasons for finding that HJTA was an opposing party.
The court first noted HJTA’s litigation filings described its Fresno-based members as
having an interest in the Measure P tax and the right as taxpayers to have their position

These factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved; (2) the skill displayed in presenting them; (3) the extent to which the
nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (4) the contingent
nature of the fee award; and (5) the fact that an award against the state would ultimately
fall upon the taxpayers.” (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
1223, 1240.)

7.
on the measure represented. The trial court then rejected FBHC’s reliance on Connerly,
supra, 37 Cal.4th 1169, for the proposition that HJTA was an intervener with only an
ideological interest in the case. The court found that “HJTA’s interest was not merely
ideological, but direct. They were directly representing the interests of their members
within the City of Fresno.”
The trial court then reproduced verbatim a portion of the City’s opposition to
FBHC’s supplemental brief containing a string of cases purportedly standing for the
proposition that “[i]n the context of mandamus proceedings, real parties in interest in the
litigation who actively participate are considered to be an ‘opposing party’ for purposes
of Section 1021.5.” The court impliedly found, based on the cited authorities, HJTA was
an active participant in the litigation and for that reason can be considered an opposing
party.
The trial court further stated: “Because an intervener can be considered an
opposing party, the court will be apportioning the attorney’s fees between the two
opposing parties; the [City] and HJTA.” The court stated it was granting the City’s
request for the 90/10 apportionment “due to the error of the attorneys representing FBHC
who wrote Measure P. It was the attorneys for FBHC who twice wrote within the
measure it would require a [two-thirds] vote to pass. But for this error on the part of the
attorneys representing FBHC the Fresno City Council would not be compelled to adopt
the position they did, consistent with Measure P, and this litigation, at least in the form it
took, would not have been necessary.” The court cited no authority for its finding that
the City was compelled to declare Measure P failed. Also, the court’s findings were all
made in the context of the fee apportionment issue.
Because HJTA’s agreement with FBHC meant HJTA would not actually pay any
portion of the award, the practical effect of the order was to fix FBHC’s recovery against
the City for the Fresno I phase at $22,439.75—10 percent of the $224,397.50 the court
had found reasonable for that phase. In total, the trial court ordered the City to pay

8.
FBHC $328,932.92. This was comprised of $22,439.75 for the Fresno I phase, $303,697
for the Fresno II phase, and $2,796.17 in costs.
Both FBHC and the City separately appealed from the order awarding fees.
DISCUSSION
FBHC, in its appeal, challenges the trial court’s apportionment of the Fresno I
award between the City and HJTA, arguing that HJTA is not an “opposing party” under
section 1021.5 and that the City alone is therefore liable for those fees. The City, in its
appeal, raises four claims all directed at seeking a determination that FBHC should have
received no fees at all. These four claims are: that “special circumstances” render any
fee award unjust, that FBHC’s counsel breached his duty of candor, that Civil Code
section 3517 bars recovery, and that the doctrine of unclean hands independently
precludes an award. The City asks that this court reverse the order awarding fees with
directions to the trial court to either deny fees to FBHC entirely or “to authorize the Trial
Court to further reduce the award of fees to FBHC.”
I. Overview of Section 1021.5
“Section 1021.5 codifies California’s version of the private attorney general
doctrine, which is an exception to the usual rule that each party bears its own attorney
fees.” (Vosburg v. County of Fresno (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 439, 449.)
Section 1021.5 provides in relevant part:
“Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful
party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted
in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if:
(a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been
conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one
public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award
appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid
out of the recovery, if any.”
“ ‘Although the statute is phrased in permissive terms, a court’s discretion to deny
attorney’s fees to a party that meets the statutory requirements of section 1021.5 is

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limited. [Citation.] Unless special circumstances would render an award of
[section] 1021.5 fees unjust, fees must be awarded under the statute where the statutory
criteria are met.’ ” (Burgess v. Coronado Unified School District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th
1, 7, original italics.)
Generally, an order granting or denying attorney fees under section 1021.5 is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Grossmont, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.)
However, we apply de novo review “ ‘ “where the determination of whether the criteria
for an award of attorney fees … [has] been satisfied amounts to statutory construction
and a question of law.” ’ ” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213.)
II. FBHC’s Claim – Apportionment
FBHC argues the trial court erred in apportioning the Fresno I fee award between
the City and HJTA because HJTA is not an “opposing party” for section 1021.5 purposes.
We agree. Section 1021.5 authorizes fee awards against “opposing parties,” a term that
requires more than adversity to the prevailing party in a general sense. As discussed
below, a real party in interest may be considered an opposing party only if it also held a
direct interest in the litigation, distinct from an ideological or policy interest shared with
like-minded members of the general public. HJTA does not meet this standard here.
We look to the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Connerly for the legal
framework. There, plaintiff Connerly successfully sued six state agencies to invalidate
five statutory affirmative action programs. (Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1172–
1173.) “A group of organizations and associations” appeared as amici curiae to defend
the programs. (Id. at p. 1173.) The state agencies largely declined to defend the
challenged programs, and “[i]t fell to [the] various amici curiae advocacy groups that
were in favor of affirmative action to defend the state programs and statutes on the
merits.” (Id. at p. 1172.)
After Connerly prevailed in significant part, the trial court awarded him attorney
fees under section 1021.5, which it apportioned one-sixth each among the five state

10.
agencies with programs that had been challenged and the remaining one-sixth portion to
one of the amici curiae, the California Business Council. (Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
pp. 1173–1174.)
The California Business Council appealed. (Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 1174.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, “holding that real parties in interest that actively
participate in litigation may be assessed attorney fees, even though they were not
responsible for initiating or enforcing the policies that were the subject of the underlying
litigation. The Court of Appeal focused on the trial court’s finding that the California
Business Council groups ‘participated in the litigation as full-fledge parties,’
distinguishing themselves from the typical amicus curiae.” (Id. at p. 1175.) To that
point, the California Business Council had “actively participated in the litigation” by
seeking to remove the case to federal court and moving (successfully) to peremptorily
challenge the trial judge. (Id. at pp. 1173.)
Our Supreme Court reversed, holding the California Business Council could not
be assessed attorney fees because it was not an “opposing party” under section 1021.5.
(Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1177.) This determination presented a question of law
reviewed de novo. (Id. at pp. 1175–1176.)
The Court identified two factors, either of which could make an organization an
“opposing party” under section 1021.5. The first was whether the organization “has been
the defendant person or agency sued, which is responsible for initiating and maintaining
actions or policies that are deemed harmful to the public interest and that gave rise to the
litigation.” (Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1176–1177.) Under this standard, “the
California Business Council clearly [was] not an ‘opposing party’ because it was
responsible neither for enacting nor enforcing the statutes that were judged to be
unconstitutional in the underlying litigation.” (Id. at p. 1177.)
Second, the Court considered whether the California Business Council, who
participated in the case as an amicus curiae, was a “real party in interest.” (Connerly,

11.
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1178.) “[A]mici curiae traditionally have not been considered
parties liable for attorney fees.” (Id. at p. 1177.) Connerly recognized that point but
argued that California Business Council was a real party in interest in the case. (Id. at
p. 1178.) Meanwhile, the California Business Council did not dispute that real parties in
interest could be held liable for attorney fees but maintained it was not an authentic real
party. (Id. at p. 1178.)
The Court observed a “real party in interest” has been defined to mean “ ‘ “any
person or entity whose interest will be directly affected by the proceeding[.]” ’ ”
(Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1178, quoting Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone ’86
v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 167, 173 (Sonoma County).) This would
include “ ‘ “the person or entity in whose favor the acts complained of [operate]” or
“anyone having a direct interest in the result” [citation], or “the real adverse party … in
whose favor the act complained of has been done.” ’ ” (Connerly, at p. 1178, quoting
Sonoma County, at p. 173.) A “direct interest” is “ ‘a special interest to be served or
some particular right to be protected over and above the interest held in common with the
public at large[.]’ ” (Connerly, at p. 1179.) While California Business Council had “a
particular ideological or policy focus that motivate[d] them to participate in [the]
litigation,” their policy interest “in maintaining some affirmative action programs [was]
no different in kind from that of the typical amicus curiae and no different in substance
from like-minded members of the general public.” (Id. at p. 1179.) The Court stressed
that active participation in the litigation alone, without a direct interest in the litigation, is
insufficient to declare an entity an “opposing party” under section 1021.5. (Id. at
p. 1181.)
The trial court here held, and the City maintains on appeal, that HJTA’s interest in
this litigation “was not merely ideological, but direct. They were directly representing
the interests of their members within the City of Fresno.” The court noted that HJTA’s
motion to intervene stated that HJTA has “over 800 members who reside in the City of

12.
Fresno, all or most of whom are registered voters [who] would be subject to paying the
Measure P sales tax increase if it were implemented.” But Connerly instructs that this
does not establish a direct interest. That HJTA has members living in Fresno who would
have to pay the Measure P sales tax establishes a “policy interest” that is “no different in
substance from like-minded members of the general public.” (Connerly, supra, 37
Cal.4th at p. 1179.)
The trial court also cites four cases, which it took from the City’s opposition to
FBHC’s supplemental fee motion, in which section 1021.5 attorney fees were assessed
against real parties in interest under section 1021.5. In our view, none of these cases
support the City and trial court’s position.
The first case is City of Los Angeles v. Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 290 (Metropolitan Water). The City cites this case for
the broad proposition that interveners “may” be liable for attorney fees, and the trial court
cited it for the proposition that “an opposing party is a party whose position in the
litigation is adverse to that of the prevailing party and who has lost on the merits.” The
case does not support the finding that HJTA was an opposing party.
In Metropolitan Water, a city water department sued a regional water wholesaler
to block disclosure of customer records to a newspaper under the California Public
Records Act. (Metropolitan Water, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 294.) Three water
districts, each a co-custodian of the records under their own contracts with the
wholesaler, intervened to also oppose disclosure. (Id. at pp. 294, 305.) The newspaper
prevailed and was awarded attorney fees under section 1021.5 against the city department
and the three districts. (Id. at p. 294.) The districts argued on appeal they were not
“opposing parties” under the statute since they merely advocated for the privacy rights of
their customers and had no control of the records the newspaper sought. (Id. at p. 304.)
They analogized themselves to amici curiae. (Ibid.)

13.
The Metropolitan Water court rejected the districts’ argument, holding that they
“were not merely interested bystanders who filed briefs hoping to ultimately persuade the
court to reach a certain decision; they were intervening plaintiffs who actively blocked
[the newspaper’s] attempts to obtain their records.” (Metropolitan Water, supra,
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 305.) The districts also “actively intervened” in the case in the sense
that they repeatedly requested that the trial court’s temporary restraining order blocking
disclosure be broadened to cover their own customers. (Id. at pp. 304–305.) The court
also rejected the argument that the districts had no “pecuniary or institutional interest in
the litigation and so are not subject to attorney fees.” (Id. at p. 305.) Instead, the court
found the districts had a direct interest in the litigation because they were themselves co-
custodians of the records sought. (Ibid.) The court contrasted the districts’ role in the
litigation to that of the advocacy groups in Connerly, who had no direct interest in the
litigation there. (Ibid.)
Unlike the water districts, HJTA held no comparable direct interest in this
litigation. The water districts’ interests were individualized as they were custodians of
the specific records the litigation sought to disclose. To the contrary, HJTA’s asserted
interest in protecting its 800 members from having to pay a city-wide sales tax is
precisely the kind of interest Connerly holds is “no different in substance from like-
minded members of the general public.” Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1179.)
Metropolitan Water is not applicable.
The City and trial court also cite three CEQA4 cases for the proposition that real
parties in interest who “actively participate” in the litigation are, by that fact alone,
opposing parties under section 1021.5. In Mejia v. City of Los Angeles (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 151 (Mejia), San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Inc. v. County of

4 CEQA refers to the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code,
§ 21000 et seq.) and the regulations implementing it (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et
seq.).

14.
San Bernardino (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 738 (Audubon Society), and Save the Agoura
Cornell Knell v. City of Agoura Hills (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 665 (Agoura Hills), the real
party in interest held liable for fees was the project applicant or property owner whose
own development approval was the subject of the litigation, not a third party defending a
position it merely favored. In Mejia, the real party was the developer whose project
entitlements were invalidated. (Mejia, at pp. 155–156.) In Audubon Society, the real
party was a cemetery operator seeking its own site approval. (Audubon Society, at
p. 745.) And in Agoura Hills, the real parties were the property owner and named
applicant for the challenged development. (Agoura Hills, at pp. 670–671.) In each case,
the litigation existed because of that party’s own application or land entitlement; the real
party did not merely share the government’s position.
Mejia held: “[A] real party in interest in a mandamus proceeding that has a direct
interest in the litigation, more than merely an ideological or policy interest, and actively
participates in the litigation is an opposing party within the meaning of … section 1021.5
and can be liable for attorney fees under the statute.” (Mejia, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at
p. 161; Agoura Hills, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 712 [quoting same].)
These CEQA cases, like Metropolitan Water, confirm what Connerly holds;
mainly, that active participation in litigation, standing alone, does not establish opposing-
party status. (Connerly, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) The real party must also have a
direct interest in the litigation. (Ibid.) Unlike the intervening districts in Metropolitan
Water and the developers and applicants in Mejia, Audubon Society, and Agoura Hills,
HJTA held no comparable individualized stake in Measure P. Its asserted interest is the
same generalized economic interest shared by every Fresno voter who opposed the
measure. 5 (Connerly, at pp. 1179–1180.)

5 This case is also distinguishable from Raptors Are the Solution v. CropLife
America (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 237, a case the City mentioned for the first time at oral
argument. Raptors affirmed a section 1021.5 award against trade-association intervenors.
(Id. at p. 242.) It applied Connerly’s direct-interest test and found it met because the
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We therefore conclude that HJTA was not an “opposing party” within the meaning
of section 1021.5, and that the trial court erred in apportioning any part of the Fresno I
fee award to HJTA. Because the City on appeal does not challenge the trial court’s
lodestar calculation, the City is liable for the fees the trial court found reasonable for the
Fresno I phase of the litigation unless it can prevail on one of the claims raised in its
appeal.6 We turn to those claims next.
III. The City’s Claims
The City’s appeal raises four claims, each requesting the same relief: a
determination that FBHC should not have been awarded attorney fees at all. Each of
these claims is asserted for the first time on appeal and separate from the apportionment
argument the City raised below and maintains on appeal.
First, the City argues there are “special circumstances” that render the award of
any fees unjust. The two asserted special circumstances are related: (1) that FBHC’s
own counsel drafted the two-thirds vote provision that appeared in Measure P’s text, and
(2) that under Hass v. City Council of City of Palm Springs (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 73
and its progeny, the City was legally compelled to apply that provision and declare
Measure P failed. Second, the City argues that FBHC’s counsel breached his duty of
candor to the trial court and to this court by failing to disclose at any point in the life of
this case, until oral argument on March 19, 2025, that he had personally drafted the two-
thirds threshold he later challenged as unconstitutional. Third, the City invokes the
equitable maxim, codified at Civil Code section 3517, that no one may take advantage of

intervenors, by their own account, represented manufacturers and distributors whose
products’ registrations were at stake and described their interest as “pecuniary” and
“direct.” (Id. at pp. 254, 256–258.) As in Metropolitan Water and the CEQA cases, the
intervenors there held an individualized stake in the subject of the litigation. HJTA held
no comparable interest here.
6 In the trial court, the City disputed the reasonableness of the fees requested by
FBHC, asserting that the hours spent by counsel were unreasonable and that the hourly
rates charged were unreasonable.

16.
their own wrong, arguing that FBHC’s counsel should not be permitted to profit from
correcting an error of his own making. Fourth, the City argues that the doctrine of
unclean hands independently bars any award of fees to FBHC because of FBHC’s
counsel’s failure to disclose sooner that he drafted Measure P’s two-thirds vote provision.
A. The Claims are Forfeited
We hold that the City’s claims are forfeited for failing to raise them below.
Generally, “ ‘ “a party must raise an issue in the trial court if they would like appellate
review.” ’ ” (Kazelka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1239,
1254.) In line with this rule, a party cannot assert a new theory on appeal for or against
recovery of attorney fees. (Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 565, 569.) An exception to this general rule is that “a new theory raising
a pure question of law on undisputed facts can be raised for the first time on appeal.”
(Myers v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 470, 485.)
None of the City’s arguments first asserted on appeal as to why FBHC should not
have been awarded any fees raises a pure question of law. Instead, each of the City’s
theories involves consideration of the equities of the case and an exercise of the trial
court’s discretion. Our function as an appellate court is to review the trial court’s
decisions on those theories for abuse of discretion, not to pass on the theories ourselves in
the first instance. (Robin v. Crowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 727, 738 [exercises of a trial
court’s equitable powers are reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Lin v. Jeng (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1025 [decision whether to apportion attorney fees based upon
equitable considerations reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Uriarte v. United States Pipe
& Foundry Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 780, 791 [“ ‘unlike trial, the purpose of an appeal
is not to determine the case on its merits, but to review for trial court error’ ”].)
Since the City did not raise any of its theories as to why FBHC should be awarded
no fees, the trial court did not pass on those theories, and there is no error to review. The
record confirms this. At the March 19, 2025, hearing, the City’s arguments regarding

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Measure P’s drafting arose in two contexts, neither of which sought a complete denial of
fees. First, the City argued it was not truly adverse to FBHC because it had “no choice”
but to apply the two-thirds threshold stated in the measure’s own text. This argument
was offered in support of apportioning liability for fees to HJTA, not in support of
denying FBHC’s motion outright.
Second, when the trial court raised a multiplier factor concerning who would
ultimately bear the cost of any award, the City asserted that if FBHC had drafted
Measure P’s two-thirds vote provision, FBHC should not “be made whole.” This
language of being made whole was directed at whether the court should apply a
multiplier to the lodestar amount, not denying an award entirely on equitable grounds.
When FBHC’s counsel disclosed shortly thereafter that he had in fact drafted the
provision, the City did not move to strike FBHC’s fee request, did not argue that FBHC
should recover no fees, and did not invoke the duty of candor, Civil Code section 3517,
or the doctrine of unclean hands, despite having the opportunity to do so. As a reviewing
court, we cannot pass on these theories in the first instance. In our view, the four claims
are forfeited for failure to adequately raise them below.
B. The Merits
Even were we to reach the merits, the City’s claims would fail because they
depend on a premise the record does not support. Each claim assumes that the two-thirds
provision in Measure P’s text, rather than the City’s interpretation of the California
Constitution, led the City to declare the measure failed, such that responsibility for this
litigation lies with FBHC’s counsel, who drafted it.
The City did not take that position until late in these proceedings. In its complaint
for declaratory relief, the City alleged that its declaration that Measure P had failed was
consistent with the state Constitution’s two-thirds requirement for special taxes and asked
the court to declare the voter threshold for a special tax brought by initiative. The
complaint did not allege that the City was constrained by the two-thirds provision in the

18.
measure’s text. Then, after the trial court granted judgment in the City’s favor in the
City’s declaratory relief action on the constitutional question alone, the City stipulated
that judgment also be entered in FBHC’s declaratory relief action on that same basis.
The City did not assert that the measure’s text bound it and that its hands were tied
until after the merits phase of this litigation, and it did not raise that point in its written
opposition to FBHC’s supplemental fee motion. The City points to no evidence that the
City acted on the text rather than on its reading of the Constitution. An assertion first
made in March 2025 does not show that the text, rather than the City’s constitutional
interpretation, was the basis of its decision to declare Measure P had failed. Because the
premise fails, who drafted Measure P’s two-thirds vote requirement is of no import. We
therefore reject the premise underlying the City’s four claims.
In sum, the record shows that the City’s position when it acted, and in the merits
proceedings, was that the Constitution required a two-thirds vote. We ultimately held
that position incorrect. (Fresno I, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) As we held in
Fresno II, the City was responsible for the action that gave rise to this litigation, and it
could have changed its position at any point but did not do so. (Fresno II, supra,
2023 WL 8888278, at pp. *5–6.) The City’s claims in this appeal rest on the premise that
the measure’s text, rather than that position, was the basis for its decision. However, the
record does not support it. Without that premise, nothing in those claims undermines our
conclusion in Fresno II that the City was an opposing party properly liable for FBHC’s
fees, and the City has not shown that holding it liable is unjust.
DISPOSITION
The order awarding fees is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The part of the
order awarding FBHC its fees in the Fresno II litigation is affirmed. The part of the order
awarding FBHC its fees in the Fresno I litigation is reversed. The trial court is directed
to enter a new order awarding FBHC fees in the amount of $224,397.50 for the Fresno I
phase of the litigation and $303,697 for the Fresno II litigation, plus $2,796.17 of costs.

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The trial court is also directed to allow FBHC to move for attorney fees in connection
with this appeal if FBHC so chooses. Any fees and costs awarded in connection with this
appeal may be added to the new attorney fee order. We express no opinion on whether
FBHC is entitled to any fees in connection with this appeal or the amount of any fees;
that will be for the trial court to determine in the first instance. FBHC is awarded its
costs on appeal.
The City’s request for judicial notice is denied as unnecessary.7

SNAUFFER, J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

7 The City requests that we take judicial notice of two filings from Jobs &
Housing Coalition v. City of Oakland (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 505: an application and
proposed amicus curiae brief filed in the First District by the law firm representing FBHC
here, and the order granting leave to file it. According to the City, the law firm
representing FBHC argued in that brief that the text of a voter-initiated measure controls
the applicable vote threshold. The City offers these materials in support of its equitable
claims against a fee award. Because we conclude those claims are forfeited for failure to
raise them below, the materials are unnecessary to our decision.

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