Filed 10/7/26 Fraser v. Robertson CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DARREN FRASER, H053096
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 21CP000410)
v.
DEBRA KAY ROBERTSON,
Defendant and Respondent.
Darren Fraser challenges a court order changing the surname of his older son, as
requested by the boy’s mother, Debra Kay Robertson. The challenged order changed the
boy’s surname from Robertson to Fraser-Robertson. Father argues the trial court’s
finding that the surname change was in the child’s best interest is not supported by
substantial evidence. He also argues that the doctrine of implied findings should not
apply because the trial court did not render a statement of decision addressing his
particularized objections. As we will explain, the trial court evaluated father’s arguments
at the hearing, was not obliged to issue a statement of decision, and stated adequate
grounds for finding the name change was in the child’s best interest. We will affirm the
order.
I. BACKGROUND
Mother and father were in an unmarried relationship when their older son was
born. The child was given father’s surname, “Fraser.” After the parties’ relationship
ended, father petitioned to establish parentage and for custody and visitation orders. At
the same time, mother obtained a three-year domestic violence restraining order based on
father threatening “to put a bullet through [her] head” during their relationship.
Father learned years later that mother had given birth to another child a few
months after their relationship ended, and he asserted mother had intentionally concealed
the existence of the second child. Father petitioned for testing to establish parentage (to
which mother consented) and he was determined to be the younger child’s biological
father.
Mother confirmed the second child’s surname was “Robertson,” and father
requested to change that child’s surname to “Fraser” or “Fraser-Robertson.” He also
asked for joint legal and physical custody, visitation, and attorney fees as a sanction for
mother hiding the existence of the younger child (Fam. Code, § 271). Father detailed in
his supporting declaration mother’s efforts to conceal the younger child’s birth and
father’s paternity for over two years, stating that mother continued the concealment even
after father asked her about a “brother” the older son had mentioned. He urged that
concealment of the younger son for over two years had interfered with his parental
relationship. Given that the two boys were “undoubtedly closely bonded,” he sought the
same custody and visitation arrangement for the younger boy as he enjoyed with his older
son, noting that the court had previously determined joint legal and physical custody was
in the older child’s best interest. Mother countered that she did not have an obligation to
voluntarily disclose the existence of the second child and father should have addressed
paternity through alternative means rather than litigation.
The parties ultimately entered into a stipulation for joint legal and physical
custody and a visitation schedule as to both children. The trial court resolved remaining
travel and visitation issues and awarded father attorney fees under Family Code section
271 as a sanction for mother’s concealment of the younger child. As to father’s request to
change the younger boy’s surname, in the findings and order after hearing the court stated
its “tentative ruling is to change [the younger child’s] last name to ‘Fraser-Robertson.’ ”
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At a joint hearing addressing the name change request and renewal of the domestic
violence restraining order (which was denied due to a lack of reasonable apprehension of
future abuse), the court stated it had previously informed the parties that it was
“concerned about the two children having different names, and the impact that that would
have on them in their future.” The court wanted the parents to avoid involving their
children in their dispute and noted “that is best achieved by making their names the same
while they are young so that they do not feel, either one of them, that they are different
from one another. Their attachment to one another as siblings is just as important as their
attachment to their parents.” The court instructed the parties to continue to work on
reaching an agreement in the children’s best interest and asked counsel to file a request or
object if the parties could not agree about changing the older child’s name.
Mother requested to change the older child’s surname from “Fraser” to “Fraser-
Robertson” after the parties met and conferred without resolution. Mother argued that the
older child was still young and the change in his surname would permit him to identify
with both of his parents and his younger brother’s surname once changed. Father argued
that the older child was already six years old and knew the name “Fraser” well. He
asserted there was no evidence the older child was affected by having a different surname
than his mother or brother, and the boys had already had different surnames for three
years. He also noted that both parties had agreed to give the older child his father’s
surname, while mother alone had named the younger child. At the hearing, father pointed
out that mother had another child with a different surname who now lived in the
household, while mother emphasized the court’s tentative finding that it would be in the
brothers’ best interest to share the same surname.
The trial court found it was in both children’s best interest to change their
surnames to “Fraser-Robertson.” The court noted it had jurisdiction under Family Code
section 3048 to make decisions in the best interest of the child. The court acknowledged
that it does not generally grant name change requests after a disruption in the parental
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relationship to avoid children feeling “whiplashed.” But informed by the contextual
background of the matter, including the domestic violence restraining order, the
revelation of a second child after two and a half years, and the parties’ “clearly
[expressed] … negative feelings for one another,” the trial court felt differently here. The
court stressed that the circumstances under which father came to learn of the existence of
the second child “irrevocably changed the dynamic of this family.” The court described
having “grave concerns” that the parties would treat the two brothers differently based on
the family’s history and determined that the same surname would ensure that the brothers
“are bound together by having the same name” in the future.
The trial court denied father’s oral request for a statement of decision, stating it
was not obligated to provide one given that the hearing was not a trial and a verbatim
record existed of the court’s decision and reasoning. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED FINDINGS
A court must issue a statement of decision upon request of any party appearing at a
“trial of a question of fact” to explain “the factual and legal basis for its decision as to
each of the principal controverted issues at trial.” (Code Civ Proc., § 632, subd. (a).)
Where “the trial [concludes] within one calendar day,” the written or oral request must be
made before the matter is submitted for decision. (Code Civ Proc., § 632, subd. (a).) A
party’s request must specify the controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a
statement of decision. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 982; Code Civ.
Proc., § 632, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(d).) When the trial court does
issue a statement of decision, a party must raise any objection before entry of judgment or
in conjunction with a motion for new trial in order to render the doctrine of implied
findings inapplicable. (Thompson, at pp. 982–983; Code Civ. Proc., § 634; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1590(g).)
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Father argues that the doctrine of implied findings should not apply here because
the court improperly denied his request at the hearing for a statement of decision and his
objections went unaddressed by the trial court. Father acknowledges that a statement of
decision is not required after ruling on a motion, but he points to an exception to that
general rule which would require a statement of decision here. (In re Marriage of Fong
(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 294–295.) Under that exception, a trial court must consider
the importance of the issues at stake and whether appellate review can be effectively
undertaken without express findings. (Id. at p. 295.) Here the trial court considered the
parties’ briefing and arguments and explained at the hearing (which was electronically
recorded and transcribed) why it determined the name change was in the older son’s best
interest. Because we find the record is sufficient for our appellate review, the exception
father relies on did not require the trial court to produce a statement of decision. (Ibid.)
Father further argues the doctrine of implied findings should not apply because his
briefing and argument in the trial court raised contested issues that went unaddressed by
the court. The implied findings doctrine applies in the absence of a statement of decision,
unless a trial court expressly refuses to make a finding. (Reid v. Moskovitz (1989)
208 Cal.App.3d 29, 32.) But here the trial court’s consideration of father’s argument and
its ultimate determination that a name change was in the older child’s best interest was
not a refusal to make necessary findings.
We are not persuaded by father’s arguments on this point, and we turn to our
review of the trial court’s findings. The doctrine of implied findings is a logical corollary
to the appellate presumption of correctness. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc.
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) Applying the implied findings doctrine, we presume that
the trial court made the necessary factual findings in support of its ultimate
determination. (Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 761, 771.)
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B. THE SURNAME CHANGE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED
The sole consideration when a parent seeks or opposes a surname change is the
child’s best interest. (In re Marriage of Schiffman (1980) 28 Cal.3d 640, 647
(Schiffman).) Factors to be considered in determining the best interest of the child
include the length of time the child has used a particular surname; the effect of a name
change on preserving the father-child relationship; the strength of the mother-child
relationship; identification of the child as part of a family unit; and the embarrassment or
discomfort the child might experience from having a surname different from the rest of
the family. (Ibid.)
In In re Marriage of McManamy & Templeton, the court established that a trial
court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence (In re Marriage of
McManamy & Templeton (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 607, 610), including any reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1,
57 (Brooks).) Substantial evidence review requires that we uphold the trial court’s
findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence, even if it could have
reached different conclusions had it relied on other evidence in the record. (In re Caden
C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640 (Caden C.).) The best interest determination is necessarily
forward looking. (In re L.M. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 898, 911.) In the context of the
beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights, the Supreme Court
explained that a trial court must make certain factual findings which are reviewed for
substantial evidence and “also engage in a delicate balancing of … determinations as part
of assessing the likely course of a future situation that’s inherently uncertain. … [T]he
ultimate decision … is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
(Caden C., at p. 640.) We therefore review the ultimate best interest determination under
that deferential abuse of discretion standard. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)
13 Cal.4th 25, 32.)
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Father argues that the trial court did not properly apply the best interest standard in
reaching its conclusion because it referenced Family Code section 3048 during the
hearing and analyzed the name change as a custody issue. But the trial court referenced
Family Code section 3048 to explain that it had jurisdiction to make decisions in the best
interest of the children in the case. Both mother and father referenced the best interest
standard articulated in Schiffman in their briefing, and the trial specifically found the
name change was in the best interest of the older child after considering relevant factors
such as the child’s age and evaluating his relationship with his parents and brother.
We discern no error in the trial court’s decision that the name change would be in
the older child’s best interest. (Schiffman, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 647.) Although that
child had carried his father’s surname since birth and was six years old at the time of the
hearing, adding his mother’s surname to his father’s would reflect the child’s relationship
with both parents, who shared joint custody. A hyphenated surname “meets and satisfies
the concerns of both parents in establishing an identity with both parents and their
respective family units.” (In re Marriage of Douglass (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1046,
1055.) Although father argues there is no evidence that mother’s relationship with the
older son would be impaired by retaining the original surname, the uncontested evidence
demonstrates that the relationship between mother and father was strained to the point
that she concealed the existence of the couple’s younger son for years. It was not
unreasonable for the trial court to infer that adding her surname could help support the
mother-child relationship in the context of what the court observed was a contentious
relationship between the parties. (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 57; Schiffman, at p. 647.)
We will not disturb the trial court’s decision merely because it could have ruled the other
way based on the older child’s age and familiarity with the name “Fraser.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
Father argues that the trial court granted the name change based on speculation.
According to father, no facts were alleged or studies or testimony provided showing harm
7
from the brothers having different surnames during the time they had lived together, and
no expert opined on such an effect. But mother was not required to provide evidence of
actual negative impact for the trial court to consider whether having a different surname
might cause a child embarrassment or discomfort in the future. (Schiffman, supra,
28 Cal.3d at p. 647.) Mother wrote in her request that the change in the older child’s
surname would allow him to identify with both of his parents and his brother once the
younger boy’s surname was changed. It was reasonable for the court to infer that sharing
a common surname would ensure the brothers remain connected going forward
regardless of their parents’ difficult relationship. (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 57.)
Father relies on Donald J. v. Evna M. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 929 to argue that a
change in a child’s surname is permissible only when required by the child’s substantial
welfare if an original surname was used for a long time without objection. (Id. at p. 937.)
Father does not explain how that test is fundamentally different from the best interest
standard articulated in Schiffman two years after Donald J. v. Evna M. was decided.
Father complains that the trial court sua sponte introduced the issue of the older child’s
name change, but he does not explain how that would be improper given that mother
requested to change the older child’s surname after the parties could not reach an
informal resolution. We conclude that the trial court’s decision was supported by the
record and not an abuse of discretion.
III. DISPOSITION
The February 27, 2025 order granting mother’s request to change the parties’ older
child’s surname is affirmed. Mother shall recover costs on appeal by operation of
California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).
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____________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________
Chung, J.*
H053096
Fraser v. Robertson
__________________
*Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.