Filed 11/10/26 First Team Real Estate v. Lewandowski CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
FIRST TEAM REAL ESTATE-
ORANGE COUNTY,
G064440
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2017-
v. 00959242)
DEBRA LEWANDOWSKI et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila O. Recio, Judge. Reversed.
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robin Meadow, Hayley
MacMillen, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
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Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, Kevin P. Wagner, Martin
Deniston, Kirsten L. Elstrand, and Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Calvin
E. Davis, and Candice S. Nam, for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
Time limits in civil trials are often utilized by trial courts to focus
litigants and their attorneys on the most important evidence required to
establish their claims and defenses, thereby minimizing the potential for
wasting court time, the parties’ time, and the jurors’ time. And by promoting
judicial economy, time limits also create greater access to justice by making
the courtroom available for other litigants. Time limits, however, must be
reasonable. They must be formulated by the court with substantial input
from the attorneys considering the number of parties and the nature of the
claims to be tried. And for time limits to be fair and effective, courts must be
proactive in monitoring the trial’s progress to ensure the case proceeds
smoothly. Ultimately, it is the court’s responsibility to ensure all parties have
a full and fair opportunity to present their claims and defenses. That did not
occur here.
In this case, the trial court set an unrealistic and rigid time limit,
which forced First Team Real Estate - Orange County (First Team) to rest
before it could present its full case. The court then granted a directed verdict
in favor of Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (Coldwell
Banker), Debra Lewandowski, Farshid Karamzadeh, and Alan Kleindienst
(collectively defendants) without giving First Team the full time it had been
allotted. First Team appealed, arguing it presented substantial evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Alternatively, the lack of
evidence was the result of the court’s prejudicial error in limiting the time of
trial. We conclude the court abused its discretion in setting and enforcing an
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unrealistic time limit for trial, which deprived First Team of its right to a fair
trial. Accordingly, we reverse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Complaints
On December 4, 2017, First Team filed a complaint against
Lewandowski and Karamzadeh, alleging a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against Lewandowski and claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the duty of loyalty, trade
secret misappropriation, tortious interference with contractual relations, and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against both.
The complaint alleges that Lewandowski, the former branch manager of First
Team’s Newport Beach office used First Team’s trade secrets to solicit highly
performing First Team agents and employees to join Coldwell Banker. The
complaint alleged that Lewandowski successfully solicited Karamzadeh, the
former branch manager of First Team’s Huntington Beach office, who in turn,
used First Team’s trade secrets to solicit other First Team agents.
On March 5, 2018, First Team filed a first amended complaint
that did not substantively alter the allegations of the complaint. Before the
parties engaged in any discovery, on March 13, Lewandowski and
Karamzadeh filed a case management statement, in which they estimated
trial on the complaint would take six to eight days. In its case management
statement, First Team estimated 10 to 14 days for trial. At the March 28 case
management conference, the trial court estimated trial would take seven
days.
On September 5, First Team filed a second amended complaint
(SAC), adding Kleindienst as a named defendant. The SAC alleged that
Lewandowski successfully solicited Kleindienst, the former branch manager
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of First Team’s Mission Viejo office to join Coldwell Banker and that he used
First Team’s trade secrets to solicit other First Team employees. It alleged
causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, trade
secret misappropriation, tortious interference with contractual relations and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against
Kleindienst.
On March 13, 2019, First Team filed its third amended complaint
(TAC), the operative complaint in this case. The TAC added Coldwell Banker
as a named defendant and alleged causes of action against Coldwell Banker
for aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty, misappropriation of trade
secrets, inducing breach of contract, and violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200. The TAC alleged that Jamie Duran, then
President of Coldwell Banker’s Orange County and San Diego companies,
Brad Pearson, Regional Vice President of Coldwell Southern California, and
Lewandowski used First Team’s trade secrets to solicit high-performing First
Team agents and employees to join Coldwell Banker. After joining, the agents
would work with their clients to convert their listings from First Team to
Coldwell Banker. Defendants filed answers, generally denying all allegations
and raising numerous affirmative defenses.
B. Reassignment and Summary Judgment Motion
Effective January 2023, the case was reassigned to the current
trial judge.
Subsequently, defendants jointly moved for summary judgment
and/or adjudication. On October 20, the trial court denied the motion.
C. Estimated Trial Times and Proposed Trial Witnesses and Exhibits
On January 8, 2024, First Team submitted what it asserted was
the joint exhibit list, and the parties submitted a joint witness list. The joint
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lists showed thousands of exhibits and 100 witnesses. On January 10, the
parties summited an amended joint witness list, reducing the number of
witnesses to 81.
At the January 11 pretrial conference, the trial court and the
parties discussed the estimated time for trial and number of witnesses. First
Team estimated 20 to 25 days, but indicated that time “could be cut down
considerably” if there were stipulations to admissibility of exhibits. Coldwell
Banker estimated 15 days, but suggested that rather than trial days, each
side would have a certain number of trial hours. Lewandowski, Karamzadeh
and Kleindienst (the individual defendants) estimated 20 days.
After ruling on numerous motions in limine filed by the parties,
the trial court ordered that the parties file no further motions, including
motions in limine, during trial without prior court permission. The court also
ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the trial exhibits. Finally, it
ordered the parties to meet and confer to pare down the list of witnesses,
stating “75 people is still way too [many witnesses] for this trial.”
In response, the parties submitted a second amended joint
witness list and a joint stipulation re exhibits. The second amended witness
list listed 63 witnesses, with estimated times for direct examination and
cross-examination. For example, it was estimated Cameron Merage, the
founder and owner of First Team, would require 8 hours of direct
examination and 4.5 hours of cross-examination. The parties estimated the
individual defendants would take a total of 24 hours; Duran and Pearson,
Coldwell Banker’s employees, 15 hours; and Mark Clews, First Team’s
forensic computer expert, 3 hours. First Team also expected to call 10 former
or current agents, most of whom would take less than 1 hour of trial time
each.
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In the joint trial exhibits, the parties stipulated to the
admissibility of the vast majority of exhibits. However, they disagreed on
whether documents would be admissible absent use with a witness.
Defendants argued documents should be admitted only when used with a
witness, whereas First Team argued the documents should be admitted en
masse to streamline proceedings and shorten the length of trial.
At the pretrial conference, January 16, the parties agreed that
exhibits would be admitted when used with a witness. The parties and the
court then went over the witness list and expected testimony. The court noted
the trial “was first scheduled as a seven-day trial,” but the parties stated
“much higher amounts.” It also noted the witness list had been pared down to
63 witnesses, but that number was “still too many witnesses for this trial.”
During the ensuing discussion, counsel for Coldwell Banker argued calling
former First Team agents to testify about why they left First Team was
“critical testimony that goes to the heart of the case.” After discussing various
witnesses and their expected testimony, the court set a trial time of 10 to 12
court days, including jury selection, but excluding jury deliberations and
punitive damages phase, if any. The court ordered the parties to keep track of
the time used each day. “The time will be allotted equally to both sides.” Each
trial day would start at 9:00 a.m., and end at 4:15 p.m., with two 15-minute
breaks and a lunch break. However, “sidebars and discussions and late
witnesses, anything like that or simply breaks that take much longer, that
will eat into that [time].” After further discussion with the parties, the court
noted that it would revisit the time estimate during the trial as needed.
On January 17, before jury selection started, First Team asked
the court to reconsider the 10 to 12 day trial time limit. Counsel argued that
when the prior judge gave the seven-day estimate, Coldwell Banker had not
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been added as a defendant, 40 depositions had not been taken and 100,000
documents had not been exchanged. Thus, “the idea of being able to get all of
that in 10 to 12 days, including jury selection and opening, it’s a
monumental, if not impossible task for the plaintiff[] because we do have the
burden . . . and defendants . . . deny everything.” The court stated its belief
trial could be done in 10 to 12 days, but reiterated that it would revisit the
issue if needed.
D. Jury Selection and Opening Statements
The trial court estimated jury selection would take one day.
However, jury selection took almost two days, ending in the late afternoon of
the second day (January 18). Outside of the presence of the jury, the court
advised the parties it would not count the second day toward its estimate
because “that’s simply not fair.” The court then gave some preliminary
instructions to the jury before dismissing it for the day.
The next trial day, opening statements from the three parties
took all of the morning and some of the afternoon session.
E. Testimony of Cameron Merage
Merage, First Team’s founder and owner, began testifying at
2:16 p.m. on the third day of trial, before court was adjourned at 4:14 p.m.,
with a 25-minute break in the middle of his testimony. Merage resumed
testimony at 11:03 a.m. the following day. He also was the sole witness on the
fifth and sixth day of trial, and testified along with Mark Clews, First Team’s
forensic expert, on the seventh day. In total, Merage testified for 16 hours, 58
minutes, consisting of: 6 hours, 43 minutes on direct examination; 7 hours, 20
7
minutes on cross-examination; 2 hours, 53 minutes on redirect examination;
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and 2 minutes on re-cross-examination.
Merage testified about his founding of First Team and history
with the company, its structure and size over the years, its confidential
training materials and trade secrets, including how it splits commissions
with its agents, and its loss in profitability after losing 200 top-producing
agents to Coldwell Banker. He also provided context for numerous
documents, such as explaining whether certain employees would have
permission or reason to access confidential information, and whether certain
Coldwell Banker training documents were copies of First Team’s training
documents except with First Team’s name being replaced by Coldwell
Banker.
Merage also testified about the individual defendants and his
history with them, including when he first learned they had recruited other
agents to join them at Coldwell Banker. On redirect examination, he testified
about their employment contracts and nondisclosure and nonsolicitation
agreements with First Team.
At no time during the direct examination or redirect examination
did the trial court advise First Team it was wasting time. Defendants did
make a narrative objection one time, but the court found Merage had not
provided a narrative. The court also did not advise or admonish defendants
about wasting time cross-examining Merage.
1
We calculated the time based on the minute orders, excluding
any sidebar and technical interruptions.
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F. Testimony of Mark Clews
Clews, First Team’s forensic expert, testified for 5 hours, 54
minutes over three trial days, consisting of: 3 hours, 40 minutes on direct
examination; 1 hour, 54 minutes on cross-examination; and 20 minutes on
redirect examination.
Clews testified numerous documents on the individual
defendants’ laptops were deleted before the laptops were returned to First
Team. He also testified external hard drives belonging to Lewandowski and
Karamzadeh showed high levels of activity of certain dates, indicating
copying of numerous files, and they contained First Team documents.
G. Conference on Trial Time Limit
During a break in Clews’ direct examination on the eighth day of
trial, Coldwell Banker raised the issue of the timing of how trial was
proceeding. This was the first time anyone raised the issue since the
discussion held at the end of voir dire. The court noted it was “a bit
concerned,” but stated the 10 to12 day estimate remained a “good estimate,
even based on what I’m hearing, in terms of what the issues are.” Asked
about its plan for the remaining time, First Team replied that critical
witnesses remained, including Karamzadeh and Kleindienst, Coldwell
Banker’s Duran and Pearson, and some relatively small collateral witnesses.
Coldwell Banker argued First Team had used more than an additional day of
trial time , and expressed concern that First Team was monopolizing the trial
time. First Team responded that the parties had used the same amount of
trial hours, excluding Clews’s time because defendants had not yet cross-
examined him.
The trial court noted it had stated trial time would be allotted
equally. It stated, “I think we did not need as much time as we used for Mr.
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Merage,” and “[e]ven for Mr. Clews, there was a bit of repetition, at least in
the beginning.” Nevertheless, the court “still expect[ed] this trial to be
presented to the jury, at least phase 1, within 10 to 12 court days.”
H. Testimony of Debra Lewandowski
Lewandowski began testifying on the ninth and 10th days of
trial. She testified a total of 10 hours, 26 minutes, consisting of: 5 hours, 59
minutes on direct examination; 4 hours, 7 minutes on cross-examination; 19
minutes of redirect examination; and 1 minute on re-cross examination.
She testified about her employment history with Coldwell Banker
and First Team, her duties and obligations to First Team, and her
recruitment by Coldwell Banker. She also was questioned about whether she
solicited First Team agents and employees to leave with her and go to
Coldwell Banker, and whether she downloaded First Team documents on her
laptop to a personal hard drive to take with her before leaving First Team.
I. Second Conference on Trial Timing
During a break in Lewandowski’s direct examination on the
tenth day of trial, Coldwell Banker again raised the issue of timing of trial,
noting it only had about two hours of trial time this week. At the subsequent
conference on this issue after the jury was excused that same day, Coldwell
Banker sought to limit First Team to two hours for the last week of trial to
equalize trial time. First Team responded it was impossible because they had
two additional witnesses, plus the two named defendants. The trial court
stated the “problem here is that we spent . . . four or five days on Mr. Merage
alone, and I just don’t see why that occurred given the 10 to 12 day time
estimate.” Additionally, the court also did not see why Clews took “multiple
days.” The court asked First Team when it planned to rest, and First Team
responded by noting the remaining witnesses it intended to call but stated it
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had not yet “plotted” out when it would rest. The court criticized First Team,
stating, “If you had plotted it out, perhaps you wouldn’t have taken four to
five days on the first witness alone.” The court advised it may have to cut off
First Team’s time to “make sure it’s fair to the other side.” The court stated:
“So I told you what the time estimate was before. That’s what it was. I don’t
think that it needed to be changed. I think it could have and should have
been tried within this time period.”
J. First Team’s Motion for Reconsideration of Trial Time Limits
On the morning of the 11th day of trial, before Lewandowski
completed her testimony, the parties and the court again discussed timing
issues. Coldwell Banker noted that based on its calculation, First Team only
had 10 minutes left and had not yet produced a damages expert. It indicated
it would file for nonsuit. First Team responded by reiterating its consistent
position that the trial time limit was unrealistic.
Noting the trial court’s standing order not to file motions without
preapproval, First Team asked the court’s permission to file a nine-page
2
motion for reconsideration of the court’s trial time limit. The court denied
permission to file the motion, but noted First Team was essentially arguing
an oral motion for reconsideration. The court stated it originally thought “it
was going to be a seven-to-eight-day jury trial. I gave it 10 to 12 in light of
everything I heard, I still think that it was a fair estimate. The fact we took
longer on some things doesn’t mean that that was not an appropriate time
2
In the motion, which was lodged with the trial court but not
filed, First Team requested the court “add an additional five court days to the
presentation of evidence.” We note this would take the trial time limit to 15
to 17 court days, which would be within the time estimate originally proposed
by the defendants. The requested number shows First Team was cognizant of
not wasting trial time.
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estimate.” It noted that it had originally given First Team until 2:00 p.m., but
would give First Team the rest of the day. “And at that time I expect to see
the plaintiff rest.”
K. Testimony of Robert Magnotta
Robert Magnotta, a First Team broker associate who left for
Coldwell Banker before returning, testified for 1 hour, 17 minutes, consisting
of: 43 minutes on direct examination; and 34 minutes on cross-examination.
His testimony was interrupted by technical issues.
Magnotta testified that Coldwell Banker’s Duran recruited him
in August 2015. During the recruitment, she told him what his commission
split would be. He also testified that while still employed by First Team,
Lewandowski told [him] he “should absolutely make the move [to Coldwell
Banker]. [Lewandowski] said everyone was going to be gone when it was all
over, and it wouldn’t be good for [Magnotta’s] career to stay.”
L. Testimony of Jamie Troxel
Jamie Troxel, First Team’s financial analyst, testified for a total
of 54 minutes on direct examination, on the 11th and 12th day of trial. First
Team attempted to get exhibit 6157, which showed production figures for
First Team’s agents who had left the company, admitted through Troxel’s
testimony, but the trial court eventually sustained defendants’ objections
based on hearsay and relevance, and excluded the exhibit.
M. Close of First Team’s Cases-in-Chief
On the 12th day of trial, after Troxel’s testimony concluded, at
11:36 a.m., the trial court ordered First Team to disclose its remaining
witnesses and offers of proof before involuntarily resting its case. The court
gave First Team “five minutes.” First Team disclosed several witnesses and
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offers of proof, and at 11:56 p.m., the court declared First Team’s case-in-chief
closed.
N. Defendants’ Motions for Nonsuit and Directed Verdict
The afternoon of the 12th day of trial, defendants moved for
nonsuit on the grounds of lack of damages and the statute of limitations, as
well as lack of evidence as to Karamzadeh and Kleindienst. After First Team
opposed and sought to reopen the case, defendants withdrew their nonsuit
motion to prevent reopening, rested and moved for directed verdict based on
the same grounds.
Before addressing the motion for directed verdict, the trial court
stated that it did not believe First Team was entitled to reopen the case
based on the trial time limit. The court stated that the addition of Coldwell
Banker did not convert the case into a complex case. The court found “days
and days were days passed and we were still on the first witness, whose
testimony amounted to lengthy and repetitive narratives that dragged on
way too long without aiding the jury much. It went beyond the original time
estimate that even the plaintiff provided in the last amended joint list of
witnesses. Then, thereafter, again, days and days were spent on the second
witness, Mr. Clews, and again similarly the same thing.” “And, of course,
there is an obligation to ensure that questions are rapid, distinct, and
effective, and I don’t think that often occurred. I should state that often I
think it did not occur.” The court also noted that it had given First Team
“more time and more time and some more time” to address any prejudice to
First Team.
The trial court then granted directed verdict “as to all of the
causes of action for much of the reasons stated by the defendants.” It stated:
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“I don’t think there is substantial evidence supporting the claims,” noting
that “a large part of it has to do with damages and causation.”
On May 24, 2024, judgment was entered on the TAC against
First Team.
First Team timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
First Team contends the judgment should be reversed because:
(1) it presented sufficient evidence for a jury to consider its claims, and (2)
the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the parties to complete their
cases in just 10 to 12 days (or 53 to 63 hours based on the court’s proposed
daily pace). We address the second argument first, as it would be dispositive
of this appeal.
I.
RELEVANT LAW ON TRIAL TIME LIMITS
A trial court has inherent and statutory authority to set and
enforce time limits on the presentation of evidence as long as the limits are
“reasonable” and the court remains “mindful that each party is entitled to a
full and fair opportunity to present its case.” (California Crane School, Inc. v.
National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
12, 21 (Crane); accord, People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. (2017) 17
Cal.App.5th 51, 150 (ConAgra).) In Crane, the appellate court proposed a set
of procedures a trial court should follow when setting trial time limits. “For
those cases in which the trial judge believes time limits should be set, the
court should first elicit estimates from the parties,” and then “independently
evaluate” those estimates “based on the arguments of the parties, the state of
the pleadings, the legal and factual issues presented, the number of
witnesses likely to testify, the court’s trial schedule and hours, and the
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court’s experience in trying similar cases.” (Crane, at p. 20; accord, ConAgra,
at p. 149.) Although time limits may set in court days or court hours, the
appellate court recommended using court hours because “the length of time
that a court is in session on any given day may vary depending on
unanticipated interruptions or delays (e.g., juror tardiness, matters taken up
outside the presence of the jury, other court business that interrupts the
trial, etc.).” (Crane, at p. 20.) “Regardless of whether court-imposed time
limits are expressed in days or hours, any time limit order should be
reasonable, mindful that each party is entitled to a full and fair opportunity
to present its case. Trials are a dynamic process without the benefit of a dress
rehearsal, which makes forecasting the length of a trial less than precise.”
(Id. at p. 21.)
“Trial time management is an ongoing responsibility of the trial
judge, regardless of the case’s complexity, the number of witnesses called or
whether specific time limits have been imposed.” (Crane, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at p. 30.) “Judges need to be proactive from the start in both
assessing what a reasonable trial time estimate is and in monitoring the
trial’s progress so that the case proceeds smoothly without delay.” (Id. at p.
20.) We review the time limits a court imposes and enforces for an abuse of
discretion. (McMillin v. Eare (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 893, 922 (McMillin).) A
court abuses its discretion among other ways by making a decision that
exceeds the bounds of reasons, all of the circumstances considered. (Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566; Cook v. University of Southern
California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, 329.)
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AND ENFORCED AN
UNREASONABLE TRIAL TIME LIMIT
Here, the trial court set a 10 to 12 day trial time limit, which was
lower than any party’s time estimate. (Cf. ConAgra, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at
p. 147 [“Plaintiff’s time estimate was within the court’s 30-hour allotment”].)
Coldwell Banker had estimated 15 days, the individual defendants 20 days,
and First Team 20 to 25 days. Although the court was not bound by those
estimates, it failed to provide a rational basis for selecting a figure lower than
any suggested by a party. Its rationale for the lower figure was that given the
original trial judge’s seven-day trial estimate, the addition of Coldwell
Banker and the new causes of action did not make the case complex,
warranting more than 3 to 5 days of trial time. The original trial estimate
was based on a party’s 6 to 8 day estimate, suggesting the reasonableness of
that party’s time estimate. That party (now part of the individual defendants)
suggested a 20 day trial time limit, significantly more days than the court
set. The court did not explain why it rejected the time estimate of a party
3
whose prior estimate was considered reasonable.
Additionally, it is unclear why the new defendants and causes of
action would only warrant an additional three to five days. For example, the
trial court did not explain that the additional time was based on the court’s
3
We acknowledge counsel for individual defendants, but not
counsel for Coldwell Banker, later stated “we” were agreeable with the 10 to
12 day trial limit. This statement, however, came after the trial court set the
trial time limit. Thus, it may be influenced by considerations such as whether
First Team would be more harmed by the time limit than the individual
defendants would be harmed by the same time limit, and not purely by how
much time it would reasonably take to present or defend a case.
16
experience with similar cases or claims. Indeed, this case showed the court
itself was inaccurate about trial time estimates. It had estimated one court
day for jury selection, but jury selection took two court days.
Finally, in light of the fact that First Team was entitled to only
half of the trial time, it is unreasonable to expect First Team to prove its case
against four defendants on 15 causes of action in five to six days, which
included jury selection, opening statement and sidebar discussions, even if
there are common facts and some derivative claims. As an example, calling
First Team agents who left for Coldwell Banker to explain the circumstances
of their decisions to show causation and/or damages, a fact that Coldwell
Banker opined went to the heart of this case, would consume more than one
court day, even if only one hour was spent on each witness.4 When the time
required to examine Merage, the individual defendants, and Coldwell
Banker’s Duran and Pearson is included, even if maximally efficient, it is
improbable that First Team could finish their cases-in-chief in that short of a
time period. In sum, the trial court set an unreasonable trial time limit.
Defendants fault First Team for having no plan for complying
with the trial court’s 10 to 12 day estimate, noting First Team was aware of
the time used on Merage and Clews because it had been ordered to keep
track of trial time and it admitted having no plan on when to stop its case-in-
chief when asked. Attorneys certainly have an obligation to try their case
diligently. (Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 21.) However, we are not
4
Defendants suggest these witnesses would only take a “few
minutes” each. In the second amended joint list of witnesses, however, the
parties estimated between 45 minutes to 1.5 hours for each. This time
estimate is supported by the actual trial testimony of Magnotta, a broker
associate who left for Coldwell Banker, which took 1 hour, 17 minutes.
17
convinced there is any feasible plan to comply with unrealistic time limits,
other than to present an abbreviated case devoid of evidence necessary to
prove all the elements of the claims at issue. Stated differently, it would be
unfair to require First Team to comply with unrealistic time limits. (See Civ.
Code, § 3351 [“The law never requires impossibilities”]; cf. National Shooting
Sports Foundation, Inc. v. State of California (2018) 5 Cal.5th 428, 433
[“Impossibility can occasionally excuse noncompliance with a statute”].)
Besides setting an unrealistic trial time limit, the trial court also
rigidly enforced that time limit despite changing circumstances and First
Team’s repeated requests for reconsideration. The court stated it would
revisit the trial time limits as needed. After jury selection took two days, it
informed the parties it would not count the second day toward the time limit.
However, the trial ended before the end of the 12th court day when
accounting for the two days of jury selection, which was within the original
time limit. The parties lost a court day because the time limit effectively went
from 10 to 12 days to 10 to 11 days.
The trial court also stated it had given First Team additional
time, but even with that additional time, First Team was forced to rest at
noon on the 12th day of the trial, which is within the original 10 to 12 day
limit. More importantly, when the 10 to 12 day trial time limit is converted
into court hours, First Team spent only 21 hours, 31 minutes on direct
examination and redirect examination, less than half of the 53-to-63-hour
trial time limit. (Cf. McMillin, supra,70 Cal.App.5th at p. 922 [“The trial
court proceeded more than fairly, as it provided [appellant] an hour and half
more time than what [they] had estimated to the court”].)
At oral argument, defendants argued the trial court acted within
its discretion because it provided First Team ongoing warnings about trial
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timing before forcing First Team to rest. (See Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th
at p. 20 [“Judges need to be proactive from the start in both assessing what a
reasonable trial time estimate is and in monitoring the trial’s progress so
that the case proceeds smoothly without delay”].) Defendants argued the
court warned First Team about the trial time limit, citing two instances in
the record. We disagree the court’s comments can be construed as warning
First Team it was wasting time. In the first instance, during Merage’s
redirect examination on the seventh day of trial, the court asked for a time
estimate for remaining redirect examination. First Team’s counsel responded
it would take less than 15 minutes. After redirect examination took 37
minutes, counsel apologized for the time spent. The court’s comment did not
inform First Team it was wasting time, and counsel’s apology did not concede
time was wasted. Rather, it was a concession that the time spent exceeded
the original 15-minute estimate.
The second instance occurred during the first conference on trial
time limit on the eighth day of trial, which was precipitated by Coldwell
Banker’s counsel, as noted above. During this conference, the court expressed
a “bit” of concern about the trial timing, but concluded that the 10 to 12 day
time limit remained a “good estimate” even with the time First Team had
spent on Merage and was spending on Clews.
It was only at the second conference on trial timing, held in the
late afternoon on the 10th day of trial, when the trial court for the first time
began criticizing First Team for spending “four or five days on Mr. Merage
alone” and “multiple days” on Clews in light of the trial time limit. However,
when the court made its comments, First Team had almost no trial time left,
as the court had initially planned to cut First Time off at 2:00 p.m. the
following day (the 11th trial day) before granting First Team additional time.
19
Even with that additional time, First Team spent less than 2 hours on three
witnesses (cross-examining Lewandowski and examining Magnotta and
Troxel) before being forced to rest. Thus, the record shows that by the time
the court warned First Team, it was too late for First Team to salvage its
case, if it was even possible to do so.
Although the trial court criticized First Team for spending too
much time on Merage and Clews during the second conference on trial
timing, it never made any findings on how First Team was wasting time until
after First Team was forced to rest. For example, it found that Merage had
engaged in lengthy narrative in response to questioning, but at the time
Merage was examined, the court rejected the only narrative objection. It also
stated that many of First Team’s questions were not “rapid, distinct, and
effective,” but it provided no example. Additionally, it never admonished
First Team on the form of its inquiry during the direct or redirect
examinations of Merage and Clews.
The trial court faulted First Team for spending “days and days
and days” and exceeding original time estimates on the first two witnesses,
without acknowledging that defendants spent almost half of that time and
also exceeded their original time estimates. As a panel of this court has
noted, “adherence to a rigid get-it-over-within-your-original-time-estimate
approach” can “encourage stalling at trial by any party who believes it can
obtain an advantage by crowding the time available to its opponent.” (Abbott
v. Mandiola (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 676, 680-681, fn. 5.)
Finally, the trial court stated it had granted First Team
additional time, but rather than considering the additional five court days
First Team requested, it granted First Team one additional court day, which,
as noted above, amounted to less than 2 hours of witness examination. (Cf.
20
ConAgra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148 [the court increased original time
limit by 10 hours for each side and agreed to an additional hour for the
defense near the end of the defense case].) On this record, we conclude the
court abused its discretion in setting and enforcing an unreasonable and
inflexible trial time limit which denied First Team its right to a full and fair
opportunity to present its case against defendants.
The trial court’s error constituted reversible error, without any
need to show prejudice. (See Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 22-23
[“Denying a party the right to testify or offer evidence deprives him of a fair
trial and constitutes reversible error”]; In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 281, 291 [“‘Denying a party the right to testify or to offer
evidence is reversible per se’”].)
Defendants contend the trial court’s error in setting or enforcing
an unreasonable time limit is not structural error, but cites no legal authority
for this contention. Defendants cite Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 370 for the proposition that “an abuse of discretion results in
reversible error only if it is prejudicial,” but that quoted language comes from
York v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1190, which noted
that “an abuse of discretion results in reversible error only when it results in
the denial of a fair hearing or otherwise prejudices a party.” (Ibid.) Thus, the
setting of a time limit that provides the litigant with a fair opportunity to
present its case is subject to review for an abuse of discretion, and would
require an appellant to demonstrate prejudice. The setting and enforcing of
21
the unrealistic trial time limit here, however, denied First Team its right to a
5
fair trial. Thus, the trial court’s error is reversible per se.
Because we find reversible error, we need not address First
Team’s alternative argument for reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. First Team is entitled to its costs on
appeal.
DELANEY, J.
I CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
5
The dissent cites Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 12, for the
proposition that the party aggrieved by a time limit must show prejudice.
Crane discusses prejudice after finding “the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in holding appellants to the trial schedule.” (Id. at p. 24.) As noted,
Crane holds that “the court must permit a party to have his day in court.
Denying a party the right to testify or offer evidence deprives him of a fair
trial and constitutes reversible error.” (Id. at pp. 22-23.)
22
Scott, J., dissenting.
I second the court’s recognition that keeping trials on schedule “create[s]
greater access to justice by making the courtroom available for other litigants.” (Maj.
opn. ante, at p. 2.) Civil litigation contributes to the common good by providing an
effective forum for dispute resolution. For the courts to be effective, courtrooms must be
available. And for courtrooms to be available, cases cannot always linger as long as
lawyers might like.
Judges must be able to make difficult and potentially unpopular decisions
as stewards of a limited public resource. “The trial judge has the responsibility to manage
the trial proceedings” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 2.20(a)) and “dispose of all judicial
matters fairly, promptly, and efficiently” (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3B(8)). “A judge
should monitor and supervise cases so as to reduce or eliminate dilatory practices,
avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs.” (Adv. Comm. Com. to Canon 3B(8).) They
“should employ” techniques including “reasonable time limits.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 2.20(b)(2).)
As the trial court noted, it “has an obligation to protect not just the court’s
time and resources, but as well as the interest of the jurors, the witnesses, and all of the
litigants who are waiting for this trial to be over so I can get on to the next one, as well as
other matters too.”
The majority opinion reasonably observes the trial court could have done
things differently. While the trial court gave the parties 10 to 12 days to try this case, it
could have given them 15 trial days. (See maj. opn. ante, at p. 12, fn. 2.) After deciding
the overall number of trial days, the court could have allocated five hours per trial day,
divided that time between the parties, and then kept a running tally of how much time
each side had used. It could have reminded the parties of their time consumption and
remaining time at the end of every day. There is value in doing this.
1
But I’m hesitant to elevate best practices to bare minimums. There can be a
range of reasonable choices from which a court may exercise its discretion in keeping a
trial on track. (See California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of
Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 12, 22–23 (Crane) [reviewing time limit for
abuse of discretion].) We should empower trial judges to select any reasonable option
without obligating them to do what in hindsight may appear optimal. Parties are “entitled
to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 556.)
Because we should not reverse absent “a miscarriage of justice” (Crane,
supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 23), it’s worth recounting the ways in which the trial court
complied with the Crane procedure.
First, the trial court appropriately “elicit[ed] estimates from the parties.”
(Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) Early at the January 11 pretrial conference, the
court expressed concern about the 100 people on the witness list and told the parties it
needed “to know realistically who is going to be called or even if their name is going to
be, like, mentioned, and I need more information about those things in order to determine
[the] appropriate time estimate.” It asked the parties for time estimates, and the parties
then requested 15 to 25 days.
Next, the trial court “independently evaluate[d] the estimates.” (Crane,
supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) The court was well-situated to determine the time truly
needed for trial. It had recently done a deep dive into defendants’ summary judgment
motions—the hearing transcript consumed 40 pages; its ruling was 18 single-spaced
pages. The court spent two full days in a pretrial conference, appropriately pressing
counsel about their plans for trial—no party offered a day-by-day schedule. The court
reviewed the witnesses and exhibits with counsel at length. It heard argument on and
decided 18 motions in limine.
The trial court educated itself about the case and understood the parties’
positions. It worked closely with counsel for days to prepare for trial. After all that, if the
2
court was confident counsel could reasonably try the case in 10 to 12 days, I would defer
1
to its informed judgment.
Counsels’ estimates were a factor to consider but not a floor. One court,
when faced with the parties’ two month estimates, reasonably allocated 40 hours per side.
(People v. ConAgra Grocery Co. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 51, 146–147.) Another court,
given a party’s four to six week estimate, reasonably allocated 12 days. (Crane, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 17.)
Finally, while everyone in the courtroom could observe the pace of First
Team’s case, the trial court still actively managed the trial. Let’s look just at the direct
examination of Merage. The court:
• repeatedly interposed its own narrative objections or cut off rambling
answers;
• repeatedly admonished the witness to answer only the question asked;
• appropriately asked the witness to clarify an answer;
• informed First Team’s counsel (outside the presence of the jury) that the
witness did not appear to understand questioning;
• cautioned First Team’s counsel against asking leading questions or
dwelling on a topic; and
• cautioned defense counsel against speaking objections.
It is impossible to tell how much the pace of questioning was slowed by
repeated instructions to “Jason” (tech support?) regarding electronic exhibits or by
reading exhibits out loud into the record. This isn’t improper but it does cost time.
1
Crane affirmed a time limit set in days. (Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 17, 23–24.) Judges and lawyers routinely refer to trial length by number of days. The
mandatory Case Management Statement asks parties to estimate long-cause trials by
number of days. (Judicial Council Forms, form CM-110.)
3
The majority opinion calculates that First Team spent 9.6 hours questioning
Merage on direct and redirect. Having reviewed that testimony, I find the trial court’s
point is well-taken: “I think we did not need as much time as we used for Mr. Merage,”
“whose testimony amounted to lengthy and repetitive narratives that dragged on way too
long without aiding the jury much.” Ground could have been covered more quickly.
Also, rather than excluding trial time spent on “any sidebar and technical
interruptions” (maj. opn. ante, at p. 8, fn. 1), we should instead presume that time was
properly attributed to First Team unless it affirmatively shows otherwise. (See Jogani v.
Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 839 [“We indulge all intendments and presumptions
to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and an appellant
must affirmatively show error”].) I’m not convinced that showing has been made.
Similarly, I’m not convinced First Team has shown it was reasonably likely
to complete its case if given another day or even a couple of days, let alone was
reasonably likely to prevail. (See maj. opn. ante, at pp. 19−20.) Crane requires the party
aggrieved by a time limit to show prejudice: “A judgment will not be reversed due to the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless it appears, upon examining the entire cause,
including the evidence, a miscarriage of justice has resulted. [Citations.] A miscarriage of
justice occurs only when the reviewing court is convinced it is reasonably probable a
result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent the error.” (Crane,
supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 24.) This is not a case “in which the trial judge literally
walked out of the courtroom in midtrial.” (In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 281, 293.) Nor did the court deny First Team “the right to testify or to offer
evidence.” (Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 677–678
[trial court wrongly constrained the plaintiff’s testimony and barred her expert witness].)
First Team tried its case for days. Even if the time limit was too short and/or misapplied,
I would still require First Team to show prejudice.
4
Trying cases demands much of lawyers; it is an enviable skill that is
increasingly difficult to develop. Imposing time limits increases the degree of difficulty.
Yet I find that counsel across the board were well-prepared, well-spoken, and thoughtful.
I have no doubt these polished trial lawyers were fully capable of heeding the trial court’s
order and putting on persuasive cases within the time permitted.
The majority opinion makes many good points; trial courts would do well
to heed it (and Crane) closely. What it sees as reversible per se, though, strikes me as a
diligent trial judge meeting her staggering responsibility by making hard calls to give
these parties a fair opportunity to try their case while striving to remain available to the
thousands of litigants waiting for their day in court.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
SCOTT, J.
5