Filed 10/30/26 Fernandez v. Everytext.com, LLC CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALBERTO JAVIER ELIAS H053725
FERNANDEZ, (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 24CV430325)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
EVERYTEXT.COM, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
In 2023, Alberto Javier Elias Fernandez rented a college textbook from
Everytext.com, LLC (Everytext). Afterwards, Fernandez allegedly became concerned
that the textbook would not be delivered and instructed his credit card company to cancel
payment. After the credit card company charged back the payment, Everytext allegedly
sent Fernandez a series of messages threatening, among other things, to initiate legal
proceedings, to damage his credit rating, and to report a theft, as well as accusing him of
using a stolen credit card. In response, Fernandez sued Everytext and its owner Joypreet
Singh Bhatia claiming violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.) (Rosenthal Act).
Everytext and Bhatia demurred, arguing that the alleged rental was not “on credit”
and therefore not a consumer debt covered by the Rosenthal Act. (Civ. Code, § 1788.2,
subds. (e), (f).) The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.
After Fernandez amended his complaint, Everytext and Bhatia again demurred, and the
trial court again sustained the demurrer, this time without leave to amend.
Fernandez now appeals, arguing that the alleged rental was on credit and that he
stated a valid claim under the Rosenthal Act. For the reasons explained below, we
disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Because we are at the demurrer stage, “we accept the truth of material facts
properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of fact or law.” (See, e.g., Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016)
62 Cal.4th 919, 924.)
A. The Textbook Rental
In January 2023, Fernandez rented a college textbook—apparently entitled
Treating Addiction—from Everytext in exchange for a fee of $34.95. In placing the
order, Fernandez entered into an online “Rental User Agreement,” which Fernandez
attached to his amended complaint. (Underlining omitted.)
The Rental User Agreement stated that Fernandez could rent the textbook for 60,
90, or 120 days or choose his own due date. The agreement also stated that, once the
textbook had been shipped out, Fernandez had 21 days to cancel the order and return it
“for a full refund less shipping charges of $3.99.” The agreement provided as well that
for a “ ‘buyout price’ ” Fernandez could purchase the book “at the end of the rental
period.” Finally, the agreement stated that, if the book were damaged or lost, Everytext
would “charge your credit card for the price of a used copy of that book,” and, if the book
were not returned on time, Everytext would charge either a $25 late fee or the full
purchase price of the book to “the credit card we have on file.”
B. The Chargeback
Fernandez alleges that he did not receive the Treating Addiction textbook, and
after reading online many complaints about Everytext, he decided to purchase a used
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copy from Amazon for $42.96. Fernandez then “initiated a charge-back with his credit
card company” and, thus, refused to pay Everytext.
C. Everytext’s Communications
In response to the chargeback, Everytext sent Fernandez a series of
communications.
The first set of communications came on February 6, 2023. In both an email and a
text to Fernandez’s telephone, Everytext informed Fernandez that it had received a
chargeback from his credit card company. The messages falsely stated that Fernandez
had received the Treating Addiction textbook the day before and instructed Fernandez to
cancel the chargeback immediately so that Everytext could avoid a $35 chargeback fee.
Two days later on February 8, 2023, Everytext sent Fernandez another set of email
and text messages asking him to confirm that he had canceled the chargeback. These
messages also stated that, if the chargeback was not cancelled and the textbook was not
returned, “we will file a Collections Case against you to recover our funds and property
in the amount of $480.00 plus $35.00 in collections fees.”
Another two days later, on February 10, 2023, Everytext sent Fernandez a set of
email and text messages again asking him to confirm that the chargeback had been
canceled and, if not, threatening to send his account to a debt collection agency.
On March 1, 2023, Everytext created an invoice for the Treating Addiction
textbook with a buyout price of $680 (not $480), and on March 14, 2023 Everytext sent
email and text messages to Fernandez stating that $580 (not $680 or $480) was past due
on his account. These messages informed Fernandez that his account “will now be
referred to a legal/collections agency” and that the matter “will have a negative impact on
your credit rating.” The messages also stated that rental items that are not returned are
deemed stolen and that Everytext will “report this to your local District Attorney’s Office
as Theft of Property.”
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On March 14, 2023 Everytext also sent a second set of email and text messages.
In these messages, Everytext stated that it had “determined that this order was placed
using a stolen credit card” and would “now file a police report with the Saratoga police
and the Salinas police to bring you to justice.” Everytext’s claim that Fernandez used a
stolen credit card is false.
D. The Proceedings Below
1. The Original Complaint
In February 2024, Fernandez sued Everytext and Bhatia on behalf of class of
textbook purchasers. Fernandez alleged a single cause of action: that defendants violated
the Rosenthal Act by seeking to collect a consumer debt by threatening to harm his
reputation, falsely accusing him of a crime, falsely threatening to refer his debt to a
consumer reporting agency, and falsely representing that legal proceedings would be
brought against him. Fernandez sought actual damages, statutory damages not to exceed
$500,000 or one percent of defendants’ net worth, and attorney’s fees.
2. The First Demurrer and the Motion to Arbitrate
Everytext and Bhatia filed a motion to arbitrate Fernandez’s claim and a demurrer.
The trial court denied the motion to arbitrate on the ground that defendants had failed to
prove that the user agreement to which Fernandez agreed contained an agreement to
arbitrate. However, the court sustained the demurrer.
The trial court reasoned that, to state a valid claim under the Rosenthal Act based
on defendants’ collection efforts, Fernandez had to show that defendants were seeking to
collect a debt arising out of a consumer credit transaction, which the Act defines as a
transaction “ ‘in which property, services, or money is acquired on credit.’ ” (Quoting
Civ. Code, § 1788.2, subd. (e).) The court further reasoned that the phrase “on credit”
has been interpreted to mean obtaining something without immediate payment on the
promise of a payment in the future. However, Fernandez failed to allege that he acquired
the Treating Addiction textbook on credit because he did not allege that he obtained it
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without immediate payment on the promise of future payment. To the contrary, as the
alleged request for a chargeback to recover his money showed, Fernandez had to pay for
the textbook at the time of the rental transaction to complete that transaction.
Accordingly, the trial court sustained the demurrer but granted leave to amend.
3. The Amended Complaint
Fernandez subsequently amended his complaint. The amended complaint added
allegations that Fernandez entered into a “Rental User Agreement” with Everytext when
he rented the Treating Addiction textbook, and it attached a copy of that agreement.
(Underlining omitted.) The amended complaint also added allegations that the Rental
User Agreement allowed Fernandez to keep the textbook by paying a buyout price, which
the agreement also required him to pay if the textbook were lost, stolen, or not returned to
Everytext. The amended complaint added as well an allegation that an invoice for the
buyout price was created. Otherwise, Fernandez’s pleading remained largely the same.
4. The Second Demurrer
Everytext and Bhatia demurred to the amended complaint on largely the same
grounds that they had demurred to the original complaint. Defendants also moved to
strike the amended complaint based on Fernandez’s failure to timely file it. The trial
court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and denied the motion to strike as
moot.
The trial court once again reasoned that Fernandez failed to state a valid claim
under the Rosenthal Act because he did not allege that he obtained anything without
immediate payment based on the promise of future payment and therefore failed to show
that he acquired the textbook “on credit” in a consumer credit transaction subject to the
Act. In so doing, the court noted that Fernandez characterized the buyout price in the
Rental User Agreement as the alleged debt, but concluded that this allegation “cannot
overcome his allegation that he paid $34.95 in exchange for rental of the textbook.”
The trial court entered judgment, and Fernandez filed a timely notice of appeal.
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II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Fernandez argues that the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer
against the first amended complaint because he rented his textbook on credit by using a
credit card on which he could—and did—seek a chargeback, and because he
conditionally purchased the textbook based on prepayment of a portion of its purchase
price. We review orders sustaining demurrers de novo, assuming all properly pleaded
facts to be true. (See, e.g., T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145,
162; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) As explained below, we reject both of
Fernandez’s arguments.
A. The Rosenthal Act
We begin by briefly reviewing the Rosenthal Act.
The Rosenthal Act, which was passed in 1977, is modeled on the federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) (FDCPA). (See Hagey v. Solar
Services Experts, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1303, 1308; Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 568, 576.) Much like the FDCPA (see 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)),
the stated purpose of the Rosenthal Act is “to prohibit debt collectors from engaging in
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the collection of consumer debts.” (Civ. Code, §
1788.1, subd. (b).) However, the Rosenthal Act has a different scope than the FDCPA.
For example, unlike the FDCPA, the Rosenthal Act covers creditors seeking to collect
their own debts. (Best, at p. 576.) Even more pertinent, the Rosenthal Act is focused on
the “banking and credit system” (Civ. Code, § 1788.1, subd. (a)(1)) and covers efforts to
collect consumer debt due or owing because of a “consumer credit transaction” (id.,
§ 1788.2, subd. (f)).
The Rosenthal Act bars various debt collection conduct and practices. For
example, the Act prohibits threats to use physical force or “to cause harm to …
reputation.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.10, subd. (a).) The Act also prohibits threatening, if a
debt is not paid, to make a false “accusation that the debtor has committed a crime.” (Id.,
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§ 1788.10, subd. (b).) It likewise prohibits false representations that an unpaid debt will
be referred to a consumer reporting agency or that a legal proceeding brought. (Id.,
§ 1788.13, subds. (f), (j).) Finally, the Rosenthal Act requires debt collectors to comply
with portions of the FDCPA. (Id., § 1788.17.)
In keeping with its focus on the banking and credit system, the Rosenthal Act’s
prohibitions apply to attempts to collect debts for property or services acquired by
consumers “on credit.” (Civ. Code, § 1788.2, subd. (b).) The Act bars various unfair and
coercive practices when used to collect a “consumer debt” or a “covered debt,” which is
defined to include both “consumer debt” and “covered commercial debt.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1788.2, subd. (l); see also id., § 1788.10 [“No debt collector shall collect or attempt to
collect a covered debt by means of the following conduct ….”]; id., § 1788.13 [“No debt
collector shall collect or attempt to collect a covered debt by means of the following
practices ….”]; id., § 1788.17 [requiring “every debt collector collecting or attempting to
collect a consumer debt” to comply with portions of the FDCPA].) In turn, “consumer
debt” is defined to mean transactions in which money or property is owed “by reason of a
consumer credit transaction.” (Id., § 1788.2, subd. (f).) Finally, a “consumer credit
transaction” is defined to mean “a transaction between a natural person and another
person in which property, services, or money is acquired on credit by that natural person
from the other person primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” (Id.,
§ 1788.2, subd. (e), italics added.)
In short, the Rosenthal Act bars use of unfair and coercive practices to collect
debts for property or services that consumers “acquired on credit.”
B. The Textbook Rental
The trial court held that Fernandez failed to state a valid claim under the Rosenthal
Act because he failed to allege that he acquired the Treating Addiction textbook “on
credit.” We agree.
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Fernandez alleged that defendants violated the Rosenthal Act by threatening to
harm his reputation (Civ. Code, § 1788.10, subd. (a)), falsely threatening to accuse him of
a crime (id., § 1788.10, subd. (b)), falsely threatening to refer him to a consumer credit
reporting agency (id., § 1788.13, subd. (f)), falsely threatening to bring legal proceedings
if payment was not made (id., § 1788.13, subd. (j)), and violating the FDCPA (id.,
§ 1788.17). Each of the Rosenthal Act provisions allegedly violated by defendants
prohibits collection of either a “consumer debt” in violation of the FDCPA (id.,
§ 1788.17) or a “covered debt” by means of other specified conduct or practice (id.,
§§ 1788.10, 1788.13). Although “covered debt” is defined to mean either a “consumer
debt” or a “covered commercial debt” (id., § 1788.2, subd. (l)), Fernandez alleges that he
incurred a consumer debt rather than a commercial debt. As a consequence, all of
Fernandez’s claims involve consumer debt. The Rosenthal Act defines consumer debt to
mean money, property or their equivalent owed because of a “consumer credit
transaction” (id., § 1788.2, subd. (f)), and “consumer credit transaction” in turn is defined
to mean a transaction in which property, services, or money are acquired “on credit” for
personal, family, or household purposes. (Id., § 1788.2, subd. (e).) Thus, each of the
Rosenthal Act violations alleged by Fernandez requires an acquisition “on credit.”
Property is acquired “on credit,” when payment is deferred, and the property is
acquired without immediate payment and with the promise of future payment. Although
the Rosenthal Act does not define “on credit,” that term is generally understood to mean
“without receiving or making immediate payment.” (Oxford English Dict. Online (2026)
<http://oed.com/credit_n?tab=meaning_and_use#248351210> [as of Oct. 30, 2026],
archived at < https://perma.cc/C226-LGPP>.); see also American Heritage Dict. Online
(2026) [defining “credit” to mean, among other things, “[a]n arrangement for deferred
payment of a loan or purchase”] <https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=credit>
[as of Oct. 30, 2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/3F4W-H857>.) Accordingly, courts
have interpreted “on credit” to mean acquiring something “ ‘ “without immediate
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payment and with the promise to pay in the future.” ’ ” (Paredes v. Credit Consulting
Services, Inc. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 410, 436, quoting Davidson v. Seterus, Inc. (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 283, 296-297; see also Gouskos v. Aptos Village Garage, Inc. (2001) 94
Cal.App.4th 754, 759 [“there is a consumer credit transaction when the consumer
acquires something without paying for it”].).
The amended complaint did not allege that Fernandez acquired the Treating
Addiction textbook without immediate payment or that he made a promise to pay for it in
the future. The amended complaint alleges only that Fernandez entered into a “Rental
User Agreement under which EVERYTEXT agreed to loan a college textbook to Plaintiff
in exchange for a fee in the amount of $34.95.” (Underlining omitted.) There is no
allegation that Everytext shipped (or purported to ship) the textbook without payment.
Nor is there any allegation that Fernandez promised to pay Everytext $34.95 at any point
in the future. To the contrary, the amended complaint alleges that Fernandez “initiated a
charge-back with his credit card company,” which suggests that a credit charge was made
beforehand. Thus, Fernandez did not allege in the amended complaint that Fernandez
promised to make a deferred payment or otherwise acquired his textbook “on credit.”
The Rental User Agreement attached to the amended complaint does not suggest
an acquisition on credit either. The agreement refers to shipping charges and fees, late
fees, collection fees, and the purchase price of the textbook rented. However, there is no
mention of the rental price, much less a suggestion that Fernandez acquired his textbook
without immediate payment and with a promise to pay in the future. Indeed, the rental
agreement refers several times to the customer’s “credit card … on file,” which suggests
that Everytext requires a credit card payment before rental. In short, neither the amended
complaint nor the attached Rental User Agreement suggests that Fernandez acquired
anything “on credit” under the Rosenthal Act.
Fernandez argues that, unlike payment in cash or “other irrevocable
consideration,” payment using his credit card was “conditional, at minimum for the
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period until the time limit for filing a chargeback had expired.” (Underlining omitted.)
That may be true. However, Fernandez fails to explain how such a conditional or
revocable payment is “on credit” under the Rosenthal Act. Under the Act, a payment is
“on credit” if it is “ ‘ “without immediate payment and with the promise to pay in the
future.” ’ ” (Paredes, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) Fernandez does not explain why
a payment that may be revoked or withdrawn is not immediate. Nor does he explain how
a revocable payment includes in any meaningful sense a promise to pay in the future.
Thus, there is no reason to consider an acquisition “on credit” simply because the
payment for it later may be withdrawn or revoked.
While we are not aware of any decisions considering whether a credit card
payment that may be withdrawn or revoked is “on credit” under the Rosenthal Act, the
federal courts have considered a similar situation. In Abels v. JBC Legal Group, P.C.
(2005) 428 F.Supp.2d 1023, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the
Rosenthal Act in seeking to collect on dishonored checks. (Id. at p. 1024.) Much like
Fernandez, the plaintiff in Abels argued that payment using a check is “on credit” under
the Rosenthal Act because payment is not actually made until the check was paid or
certified. (Id. at p. 1026.) The Northern District of California rejected this argument and
held that payment made with a dishonored check is not “on credit” under the Rosenthal
Act. (Id. at pp. 1026-1027; see also Edwards v. Crosscheck, Inc. (N.D. Cal. July 12,
2011) 2011 WL 2836759, at p. *3 [following Abels].) At oral argument, Fernandez tried
to distinguish credit card chargebacks from dishonored checks on the ground that
chargebacks are permitted by federal law. However, he failed to offer any reason why a
vendor would anticipate chargebacks as a matter of routine or otherwise to explain why
the possibility of chargebacks makes any difference for purposes of the Rosenthal Act.
Fernandez also argues that this case is analogous to Paredes, supra, 82
Cal.App.5th 410 because in both cases “an intermediary that ostensibly would have paid
the consumer’s bill with the vendor eventually did not.” (Italics omitted.) It is true that
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Paredes involved an intermediary: In that case, the plaintiff and her family received
dental treatment on the understanding that a dental plan (Delta Dental) would pay for the
services when claims were made. (Paredes, at p. 418.) However, Paredes did not hold
that the plaintiff acquired dental services “on credit” because an intermediary was
supposed to pay for the services. Paredes held that services were acquired on credit
because the dentist agreed that the dental plan would be paid in the future after claims
were filed with the intermediary, and, thus, the services were acquired without immediate
payment and with the promise to pay in the future. (Id. at p. 436 [“In accordance with
their agreed-upon financial arrangement, such future payment would be made by Delta
Dental upon the filing of the claims”].) Thus, the fact that Paredes involved an
intermediary was not material to its determination that the services in that case were
acquired “on credit.”
Finally, Fernandez argues that the Rosenthal Act is a remedial statute enacted to
protect consumer debtors such as Fernandez and “ ‘should be interpreted broadly in order
to effectuate its purpose.’ ” (Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 324, 340.) Fernandez argues as well that, if the Act is not interpreted to
apply here, other rental transactions may not be covered by the Act either. While that is
true, as noted above, the Rosenthal Act is not intended to cover all consumer debts.
Instead, it is focused on the banking and credit system (Civ. Code, § 1788.1, subd. (a)(1)),
and therefore it applies only to consumer debts owed because of “consumer credit
transaction[s]” involving property, services, or money acquired “on credit” (id., § 1788.2,
subds. (e), (f)). In construing the Rosenthal Act broadly, we cannot ignore the limitations
that the Legislatures imposed on its application.
C. The Conditional Purchase Theory
In his reply brief, Fernandez argues that he conditionally purchased the Treating
Addiction textbook on credit because he prepaid to have the book for a certain period of
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time and after that time period, he was obligated either to return the textbook or to pay
the buyout price for it. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the argument cannot be reconciled with the actual agreement between
Everytext and Fernandez. Fernandez did not enter into an agreement to conditionally
purchase the Treating Addiction textbook; he entered into a “Rental User Agreement.”
(Italics added & underlining omitted.) Indeed, that agreement referred more than 20
times to the “rental books,” “rental orders,” the “rental price,” the “rental period,” and the
“rental due date,” and it required users to return “rental books” when they become due.
The agreement did allow Fernandez to “choose to buy the book,” but only “at the end of
the rental period,” and it instructed him to email the company for a price quote. Thus, far
from creating an agreement, conditional or otherwise, to purchase the textbook, the
Rental User Agreement gave Fernandez an option to do so.
Second, Fernandez fails to explain how this option allowed him to acquire the
Treating Addiction textbook “on credit.” Nothing in the Rental User Agreement’s
provisions granting Fernandez the option of purchasing the textbook suggests that he
could acquire ownership of the textbook without immediate payment. Nor is there any
promise, if the option is exercised, of future payment. To the contrary, as just noted, the
agreement simply states that Fernandez may “choose” to buy the textbook and instructs
Fernandez to contact Everytext for a price quote. Here again, nothing in the agreement
suggests that Fernandez could acquire ownership of the textbook without payment and
with the promise of future payment, and it therefore does not suggest that he acquired the
textbook “on credit.”
Accordingly, we conclude that Fernandez failed to allege that he acquired the
Treating Addiction textbook “on credit,” and therefore the Rosenthal Act does not cover
his debt relating to the textbook. In light of this conclusion, we do not reach defendants’
arguments that the amended complaint should have been struck because it was not timely
filed.
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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to reasonable costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
LIE, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
WILSON, J.
Fernandez v. Everytext.com, LLC., et al.
H053725