Filed 8/20/26 Fan v. Huang Law Group CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
GUANGZHAO FAN, B350302
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent Super. Ct. No. 25STCV11860)
v.
HUANG LAW GROUP,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Michael B. Wilson, Judge. Reversed.
Michael Chen Law Offices and Michael Chen for Defendant
and Appellant.
Guangzhao Fan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff Guangzhao Fan alleged he worked briefly for
defendants the Huang Law Group (the firm), Xiaosheng Huang,
and Qing Yang. He then filed discrimination cases with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), California
Civil Rights Department (CRD), and Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement (DLSE) (collectively, the agencies). Plaintiff’s civil
complaint included allegations that defendants made false
statements to the agencies that caused him severe emotional
distress. Defendants brought an anti-SLAPP1 motion seeking to
strike the portions of plaintiff’s causes of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED) that arose from communications with the agencies. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court denied the motion.
We reverse. Statements parties make to government
agencies tasked with investigating discrimination during official
proceedings are protected speech. Here, plaintiff alleged claims
for relief arising in part from defendants’ statements to the
agencies. These claims lack minimal merit because the litigation
privilege shields the statements. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) To
the extent that plaintiff’s causes of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation and IIED rely upon protected speech, they
should be stricken. The causes of action will proceed based upon
the unprotected conduct alleged.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint
The following allegations are drawn from the complaint.
1 “SLAPP” refers to “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation.”
2
Plaintiff is a “severely disabled individual with Athetoid
Cerebral Palsy.” Huang was the firm’s president.
During a lunch on June 8, 2024, Huang invited plaintiff to
“work with him and his team” and proposed a meeting to discuss
the employment arrangement. On June 11, 2024, plaintiff
received WeChat messages from the firm’s general manager,
Yang, describing office hours, an in-office work policy, an hourly
pay rate of $20, lunch breaks, and a probationary period. The
same day, he was assigned a laptop and workstation and began
work. Over three days, he organized case files, communicated
with clients, attended a case review meeting, completed
approximately 15 immigration applications or petitions, and was
asked to edit videos for the firm’s YouTube channel.
On June 12, 2024, a malfunctioning elevator trapped
plaintiff on the third floor of the building, and fire department
personnel had to carry him down the stairs. Subsequently, Yang
informed him that his “‘visit’” had concluded and he need not
return.
The firm did not pay plaintiff, so he filed a wage complaint
with the California Labor Commissioner. After mediation, the
firm agreed to pay him $480. He refused to sign the settlement
agreement, however, because the firm unilaterally included a
clause stating that it did not admit liability or the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. Plaintiff alleged that this was
an attempt to mislead him into waiving his legal rights.
Plaintiff also filed discrimination complaints with the
EEOC, CRD, and DLSE. Defendants, in responsive submissions
to the agencies, disparaged him and made false statements about
his status as an employee. As the result of the termination and
3
defendants’ subsequent statements, plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress.
Plaintiff asserted causes of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation, IIED, disability discrimination and retaliation
in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA,
Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.), failure to pay wages, and wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.
B. The Anti-SLAPP Motion
Defendants moved to strike the portions of the complaint
purporting to establish fraud and IIED based upon their
statements to the agencies. They argued their statements to the
agencies were made in furtherance of their petitioning and free
speech rights and were barred by the litigation privilege.
Defendants made clear that their motion was limited. They
acknowledged both causes of action also rested on allegations of
unprotected communications and conduct, such as Yang’s
WeChat messages. They did not seek to strike the causes of
action to the extent that they relied on the unprotected
communications and conduct.2
Plaintiff opposed the motion.3 The exhibits attached to his
declaration included Huang’s December 2024 response to the
discrimination complaint filed with the EEOC. In that response,
2 Defendants did not supply evidence to support an award of
attorney fees and costs, but they reserved their right to seek such an
award if the motion were granted.
3 Plaintiff’s opposition included at least two quotes that do not
exist in the cited cases. We note these citation deficiencies for the
record and warn plaintiff not to misquote cases in any future filings.
Misquoting cases may result in sanctions. (See Sheerer v. Panas (2026)
119 Cal.App.5th 367, 371.)
4
Huang denied the firm hired or terminated plaintiff, and he
described plaintiff’s time in the office as a “visit” to determine if
the parties could work together in a reference-based relationship.
Huang stated he found “fatal” errors in the forms plaintiff
prepared and that plaintiff was unable to verbally express
himself so others could understand him.
Plaintiff did not dispute the agency communications were
protected speech but contended the fraud and IIED causes of
action did not arise from those communications. He contended
the “core wrongful acts” underlying the fraud count were Yang’s
WeChat messages relaying his employment status and
compensation. As for the IIED count, he argued that emotional
harm was caused by the “discriminatory termination” and
“deceptive mediation terms.” The agency communications, he
argued, were merely evidence of defendants’ fraudulent intent,
discriminatory animus, and retaliatory motive, not as the basis of
liability. Defendants did not file a reply brief.
The trial court denied defendants’ motion. The court
construed the agency communications as evidence to “bolster”
plaintiff’s “central” allegations of wrongdoing—
misrepresentations regarding his employment status and
compensation and a discriminatory termination. It found
defendants failed to show the fraud and IIED causes of action
arose from protected activity and denied the motion without
reaching the second step. The firm appealed.
5
DISCUSSION4
A. Governing Law – the Anti-SLAPP Statute
The Legislature enacted section 425.16 to prevent and
deter “lawsuits [referred to as SLAPPs] brought primarily to chill
the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech
and petition for the redress of grievances.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16, subd. (a).) “A cause of action against a person arising
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or
the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall
be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) An act in furtherance of a
person’s right of petition or free speech includes any statement or
writing “made before . . . [an] official proceeding authorized by
law” or “in connection with an issue under consideration or
review” by such a proceeding. (Id., subd. (e)(1), (2).) Such
statements include those made in administrative proceedings or
investigations. (See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &
Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [statements in
connection with issues under consideration by federal agency];
Dible v. Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th
843, 846 [statements to Employment Development Department].)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step
process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e]
4 Plaintiff filed a motion in this court to strike parts of defendant’s
reply brief on the basis the reply raised new matters. The motion is
denied. New matters raised have not been considered.
6
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.”
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) “If the defendant carries its burden, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal
merit.’” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s order de novo and in
so doing, conduct the same two-step analysis. (Newport Harbor
Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42.)
B. Analysis
The firm contends that the trial court misapplied the
anti-SLAPP framework for “mixed” causes of action—i.e., those
alleging both protected and unprotected activity. It argues the
court incorrectly focused on the gravamen or overall thrust of the
dispute rather than determining whether the fraudulent
misrepresentation and IIED counts sought to impose liability
based on their statements to the agencies. We agree.
1. Step One – Legal Standards
“The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the activity
each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity
is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson).) “Although at
one time courts were applying a gravamen test in the first step of
an anti-SLAPP analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear it is
not the proper inquiry.” (Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 616, 628 (Sandoval), citing Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009–1011 (Bonni).)
“Instead, we must first identify each claim for relief pled in the
complaint, without being constrained by the way the complaint
7
structures each cause of action.” (Sandoval, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Once we identify each act or set of acts
supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a
single pleaded cause of action, we must determine whether each
act or set of acts is protected. (Ibid.) If cause of action is “mixed,”
meaning it rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which
constitute protected activity and some of which do not, we
disregard the unprotected acts and reach the second step of the
anti-SLAPP analysis as to the protected acts. (Ibid., citing Baral
v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.)
“Identifying the act or set of acts which supply a basis for
relief, meaning the acts from which a claim arises, involves
looking to the legally required elements of a cause of action.”
(Sandoval, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) “Allegations which
are merely incidental, collateral, or provide context, as opposed to
supplying an element of a claim, may not be used as a basis for
triggering anti-SLAPP protection.” (Ibid.) “[I]f protected speech
activity supplies an element of the claim, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on
the merits.” (Musero v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 802, 819.)
2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation – Step One
In their anti-SLAPP motion, defendants correctly stated
that a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation requires a
misrepresentation of material fact. Plaintiff’s complaint
identified false statements defendants allegedly made before he
began work: that he was being hired as a legal assistant, would
be paid for his work, and was a member of the firm’s active team.
Defendants conceded the hiring-related communications were
8
unprotected speech. They argued the complaint also included
statements made months later to the agencies reviewing his
discrimination complaints. These statements were the target of
the anti-SLAPP motion.
In deciding the motion, the trial court did not separately
analyze the hiring-related communications from those made to
the agencies as it should have. (Sandoval, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Instead, it considered the gravamen of
plaintiff’s causes of action.5 (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 1011 [rejecting argument that courts “should consider whether
the gravamen of the entire cause of action was based on protected
or unprotected activity”].) The court found that the hiring-
related statements and a disability-related termination were the
“primary allegations of [d]efendants’ wrongful conduct.” It
concluded the communications to agencies were incidental to the
“central claims for relief.”
The trial court should have focused on whether defendants’
communications to the regulatory agencies supplied elements of
the cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation. (Sandoval,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Plaintiff alleged that
defendants “filed position statements [with the EEOC and CRD]
that falsely described Plaintiff as a mere ‘observer’ or ‘visitor,’
denied the existence of any work performed, and attacked
Plaintiff’s motives and abilities.” He also alleged that defendants
5 The trial court relied on pre-Bonni decisions that stated that a
cause of action’s principal thrust or gravamen determines whether the
anti-SLAPP statute applies. (Nam v. Regents of University of
California (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1191, disapproved in part by
Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 892; McConnell v. Innovative Artists
Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 177.)
9
“falsely denied the employment relationship to regulatory
authorities” and “[s]uch conduct constitutes fraudulent
misrepresentation under California law.” Plaintiff further
alleged that Huang “submitted false statements to regulatory
agencies, including the [CRD, EEOC, and DLSE], in violation of
his duty under Civil Code §§1709–1710,[6] which prohibits
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.” These alleged misrepresentations of
material facts supplied an element of plaintiff’s fraudulent
misrepresentation cause of action. (See Cooper v. Equity Gen.
Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.) As such, they were
more than mere evidence. (See Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038 [protected statements supplied element
of misrepresentation/false promise].)7
Accordingly, we conclude plaintiff asserted a claim that
arose in part from defendants’ protected statements to the
agencies, and as to these statements, defendants carried their
step one burden.
6 Civil Code section 1709 provides: “One who willfully deceives
another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or
risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” Section 1710
defines “deceit” to include, e.g., “[t]he suggestion, as a fact, of that
which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true” and “[t]he
assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no
reasonable ground for believing it to be true . . . .” (Id., subds. (1), (2).)
7 Plaintiff attempts to limit the statements’ purpose to evidence of
pre-employment misrepresentations. He points to an allegation that
he “retained [a] copy” of these submissions to “serve as evidence of
their false representations.” This allegation confirms that plaintiff
believed the submissions contained “false representations,” and he
kept a copy of them for use as evidence in the future.
10
3. IIED – Step One
In their anti-SLAPP motion, defendants identified the
elements of a cause of action for IIED as including “extreme and
outrageous conduct,” “severe emotional distress,” and “proximate
causation.” In his complaint, plaintiff alleged he suffered
emotional anguish because he was “misled” and “placed in danger
due to his disability.” This alleged misconduct by defendants was
not protected. Plaintiff also alleged, however, that he suffered
anguish because he was “publicly discredited.” He further
alleged, “[a]s a result of Defendants’ subsequent submissions to
government regulatory agencies—many of which included false
statements disparaging Plaintiff’s character and professional
competence—Plaintiff’s depressive condition worsened,” leading
to insomnia, suicidal ideation, and other symptoms.
In assessing plaintiff’s IIED cause of action, the trial court
again employed a gravamen analysis, rather than considering
whether defendants’ communications to the regulatory agencies
supplied requisite elements of the cause of action. (Sandoval,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) “Public[] discredit[ing]”
appears to refer to defendants’ agency communications about
plaintiff. This and the “subsequent submissions to government
regulatory agencies” supplied the element of extreme and
outrageous conduct that caused severe emotional distress. (See
Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
1145, 1164 [elements of IIED].) Thus, the IIED cause of action
relies in part on protected statements.
Plaintiff argues he alleged only a “worsen[ing]” of the
emotional distress he had already suffered. Aggravation of an
existing injury, he argues, could bear on the progression of harm
but does not necessarily provide a basis for a claim arising from
11
protected communications. Plaintiff cites no authority to support
this argument, and it is unpersuasive. Tortfeasors may be liable
for a plaintiff’s damages when their wrongdoing aggravates a
preexisting condition. (Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical
Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 146, 168.) By alleging
that defendants’ false statements to the agencies aggravated his
depression, plaintiff sought to impose liability on them for
making those statements.
We conclude plaintiff alleged an IIED claim for relief
arising in part from the protected agency communications, and
defendants carried their step one burden as to these
communications.
4. Step Two – Minimal Merit
In the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court
determines whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient
claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.) Only claims with minimal merit may
proceed. (Ibid.)
The firm argues that the litigation privilege (Civ. Code,
§ 47, subd. (b)) bars both the fraudulent misrepresentation and
IIED causes of action to the extent they rely on the statements
made in the agency proceedings. Plaintiff cannot carry his step
two burden if the litigation privilege precludes liability for the
challenged claims. (Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
648, 661.)
The litigation privilege exists to protect citizens from the
threat of litigation for communications to government agencies
whose function it is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing.
12
(People ex rel. Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber Co. (2008) 158
Cal.App.4th 950, 958 (Gallegos).) The privilege applies to
communications made in an “official proceeding” or in the “course
of any other proceeding authorized by law.” (Civ. Code, § 47,
subd. (b).) This includes false statements made to an agency
during administrative proceedings. (Gallegos, supra, 158
Cal.App.4th at pp. 958–959 [“whether fraudulent or not,”
statements in California Environmental Quality Act proceedings
fell within litigation privilege].) When it applies, the privilege
bars all tort causes of action except malicious prosecution.
(Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1031.)
Following augmentation of the record, we permitted
plaintiff to file a supplemental brief addressing step two of the
anti-SLAPP analysis. His brief did not dispute application of the
litigation privilege to defendants’ statements to the agencies. We
conclude his fraudulent misrepresentation and IIED causes of
action are barred by the privilege to the extent they arise from
these communications. Plaintiff did not carry his step two
burden of demonstrating minimal merit.
13
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is reversed. On remand, the
allegations concerning defendants’ communications in the agency
proceedings in support of the first cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation and second cause of action for IIED shall be
stricken from the complaint, as indicated in this opinion. The
causes of action will proceed based upon the unprotected conduct
alleged. The firm shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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