F.L. v. Superior Court CA1/2

Filed 8/20/26 F.L. v. Superior Court CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

F.L. et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SONOMA COUNTY,
A176020
Respondent;
SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN (Sonoma County Super. Ct.
SERVICES DEPARTMENT et al., No. 24JD00117)
Real Parties in Interest.

L.L. (mother) and F.L. (father) petition for extraordinary relief to
overturn an order entered at an 18-month review hearing terminating their
reunification services concerning their nine-year-old autistic daughter G.L.
and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1
We will grant both writ petitions. We conclude the juvenile court erred
in concluding that returning G.L. to father’s custody would be substantially
detrimental to G.L. In addition, there is insufficient evidence that the
parents were offered or provided reasonable reunification services during the

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

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18-month review period, including adequate visitation with their significantly
disabled child. Despite the many services they received, there is not
substantial evidence to support a finding by the clear and convincing
standard that they were provided with access to services that were adequate
in the circumstances of this case to assist them in meeting the unique and
highly specialized needs of their daughter.
BACKGROUND
A. Case Initiation
In June 2024, the Sonoma County Department of Human Services (the
Department) filed a dependency petition alleging that seven-year-old G.L.,
her five-year-old sister P.L., and her three-year-old brother L.M. were at risk
due to their parents’ failure to meet their basic needs, including as a result of
mother’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. (§ 300,
subd. (b).) The petition alleged mother “has an unaddressed intellectual
impairment and/or learning disability that appears to be impacting her
ability to meet her children’s needs at this time and contributes to the mother
feeling overwhelmed and unable to follow through with scheduling and
getting the children to their essential appointments.” And it alleged that
father “relies on the mother to manage the children’s medical, physical, and
behavioral needs, despite being aware, and/or reasonably he should have
been aware, that the mother has an unaddressed intellectual impairment
and/or learning disability that impacts her ability to meet the children’s
needs.”
The petition alleged the parents had not consistently ensured the
children had proper hygiene and access to adequate nutrition.
The petition also alleged they had not adequately met G.L.’s medical
needs, “which could result [in] irreversible harm, up to including death.” It

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alleged G.L. had been diagnosed with “Failure to Thrive since approximately
2021” and currently measured at less than 1 percentile in weight and height
for her age. It also alleged G.L. had been diagnosed with “Autism Spectrum
Disorder,” as well as medical conditions that needed medical attention and
follow-up: a rare spinal birth defect; a lung condition from premature birth
that causes breathing problems; an eye disease from premature birth that
causes the growth of abnormal retinal blood vessels; and possibly also a fluid-
filled cyst in her spinal column that could cause pain, weakness, and stiffness
as it grew.
The petition alleged the parents were currently “receiving intensive
case management services through the LifeWorks program2 and previously
participated in a Voluntary Preservation Case with the Department from
approximately October of 2022 through November of 2023,” but the safety
concerns persisted.
According to the detention report, the family had been the subject of
numerous referrals for general neglect in the past seven years, including
reports that the children were dirty and smelly at school and/or on the school
bus (and at least once, one child had dirty feces caked to her bottom); the
children were not being properly fed, clothed or cared for; and the parents
had not followed through on referrals for various services including a
nutritionist and occupational therapist. The most recent past referral had
been a few months earlier, when G.L.’s pediatrician had reported she was
still underweight; it was determined the parents were not buying or
preparing food for the children and were relying exclusively on take-out food.
Then in May 2024, the Department received another referral that the parents

2This was a reference to the LifeWorks program at the North Bay
Regional Center (hereafter the Regional Center).

3
were still chronically neglecting to follow through on services and medical
appointments for G.L., which precipitated this case. The detention report
also noted that “[i]t has been reported that the mother often sends the
children to school with unkept hair, dirty clothes, shoes that are too small,
and soiled diapers. Although successfully becoming toilet trained during her
first week of school, [P.L.] continues to wear diapers at home, to which the
mother states is due to the child not wanting to use the restroom at home.”
As to G.L., the detention report explained that G.L. had been diagnosed
with “failure to thrive” about three years earlier, in 2021, which was a sign of
malnutrition and meant that she was not growing appropriately. Given her
current height and weight (both less than 1 percentile for her age), medical
professionals were concerned her condition could become life-threatening if
her weight loss and her parents’ lack of follow-through persisted.
According to the detention report, “It is reported and confirmed with
various professionals that the mother has a mild intellectual disability” and
“requires a high level of assistance with basic everyday tasks. She becomes
overwhelmed easily, often limits herself to one meeting a day with providers
or stops calling people back because ‘it’s too much.’ ” It said she “relies
entirely on her LifeWorks case manager to assist her in scheduling
appointment[s], reminding her to meet the basic needs of her children, and
for communication with other service professionals.” The Department
reported that it was “worried that the mother’s own intellectual disability
hinders her ability to recognize and provide the necessities for her children.”
As for father, the detention report said he relied “heavily” on mother to
care for the children, did not acknowledge the concerns raised by service
providers regarding mother’s inability to meet the children’s basic needs, was
“not concerned for his children and does not appear to go out of his way to

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make sure they have what they need . . . .” He told the Department he
believed mother was able to adequately care for the children. The detention
report noted he “has done well with direct instructions, although his
engagement is very minimal.”
According to the detention report, the family had recently become
unhoused “due to mismanagement of housing funding” they had been
receiving, was living in a shelter, and had declined additional housing
support. And the parents “continue to overlook concerns . . . regarding the
children’s hygiene and basic needs.” Despite receiving services from various
providers including voluntary case management services from the
Department, the parents had failed to demonstrate an “ability to prioritize
the planning and organization of appointments and services for the children”
and “continue[d] to overlook concerns raised by service providers regarding
the children’s hygiene, basic needs as well as their medical and behavioral
health,” which put the children at continued risk of neglect. 3
The three children were detained, and father was elevated to presumed
father status. Subsequently, at an uncontested jurisdiction/disposition
hearing held on August 7, 2024, the juvenile court sustained the petition and
ordered reunification services.
B. The Family’s Progress After 18 Months
A year and a half later, in its December 10, 2025 report for the 18-
month review hearing, the Department recommended terminating
reunification services for both parents concerning G.L. By contrast, it
recommended reunifying father with P.L. with family maintenance services
and “enhancement services” for mother. The Department recommended that

3 The detention report noted the youngest child, L.M., like G.M., had
been diagnosed with autism too.

5
family maintenance services successfully conclude as to the youngest child
L.M., who by then had been placed in the custody of a second man, J.T., who
had been elevated to “secondary” presumed father status along with father.
The court subsequently adopted these dispositions for the other children by
agreement of the parties following a settlement conference.
By this point, eight-year-old G.L. was in her third placement (an
emergency foster home), and no concurrent placement for her had been
identified.4 She continued to receive an array of developmental, therapeutic
and medical support services, including through school where she was in
third grade and reportedly was doing well, having fewer tantrums and being
more verbal and social. The Department reported she required “24/7 care,”
minimally used words and phrases, and tended to whine, smile, and giggle a
lot. Things like dancing and music put her in a better mood. Noise and
crowds frequently overwhelmed and overstimulated her, and frequently she
had meltdowns or wanted to isolate. She was not yet toilet trained despite
some attempts to help her with this at school and continued to wear diapers.
She had difficulty with social skills and with communication. She
communicated using simple words, one-word sentences or by pointing. She

4 She had been placed initially with a non-relative extended family
member, had been moved to an emergency foster home before the six-month
review hearing, and had been moved to a second emergency foster home
before the 12-month review hearing due to her very high needs and was still
there.
The Department reported that G.L.’s maternal grandmother “could be a
potential option” for concurrent planning, “but further evaluation is needed”
and “was not previously an option due to [P.L.] living in the [maternal
grandmother’s] home.” It reported that “[n]o other relatives have been a
viable option for placement” for G.L., “nor have they expressed interest.” It
wrote that it would “continue assessing and exploring alternative relative
placement options” if G.L. “need[ed] to be moved for any reason.”

6
also had an electronic tablet to help her communicate, although it was
difficult for her to use it consistently at school and at home. Although she
continued to have difficulty gaining weight, G.L.’s pediatrician had lifted her
diagnosis of failure to thrive.
By this point, mother had filed for divorce. She had found stable
housing and was training to get a job as a health care assistant. Father was
working two jobs, and he too had secured housing, although he was worried
about his ability to pay the rent once his financial housing assistance was
exhausted.
Both parents also had undergone a psychological evaluation to
determine whether they could safely parent their children, which had been
discussed in the 12-month status report. As described in the 12-month
report, the psychologist, Dr. Anglada-Figueroa, concluded that father was “ ‘a
reliable, conscientious, and emotionally stable parent.’ ” He found “ ‘no
evidence of mental illness, substance use, or cognitive impairment’ ” and
suggested father “ ‘would benefit from therapeutic support focused on
emotional flexibility and improved interpersonal attunement, especially in
high-stress or ambiguous contexts.’ ”
As described in the 12-month report, the psychologist concluded that
mother also possessed the capacity to parent effectively. He found that
mother’s “ ‘execution’ ” was in the twelfth percentile, “ ‘which reveals a
“Below Average level of Visual Motor Integration Maturity and general
cognitive development” ’ ” and that her “age -equivalent” was that of a 9-year-
old child. But he concluded that mother was “ ‘a psychologically resilient and
emotionally invested mother whose past parenting difficulties are best
explained by a combination of emotional overload, limited prior education,

7
and inadequate parental modeling,[5] rather than any severe mental illness or
intellectual disability.’ ” He explained, “ ‘[c]ognitive testing reveals low
average function with relative strengths in orientation, judgment, and
emotional motivation’ ” and that mother’s “ ‘current functioning supports her
capacity to parent effectively, particularly within a structured and supportive
environment. Continued therapeutic work is encouraged to build on recent
gains, support emotional expression, and maintain consistency in
parenting.’ ”
The full, 22-page report would later be admitted into evidence at the
subsequent contested hearing. Read in full, it flatly contradicted the notion
that mother was suffering from a mental impairment that prevented her
from effectively parenting. It concluded that while she had below-average
cognitive functioning in many areas, she also had “solid judgment and the
ability to make sound decisions in everyday situations” (ranking in the 58th
percentile for that trait) which was “an important strength in the context of
parenting and independent living,” and she exhibited “remarkable”
motivation and effort, “resilience, a sincere commitment to self-betterment,
and a notable degree of psychological insight.” It concluded that her past
parenting challenges “are best understood in the context of prior educational
disadvantages, emotional suppression, and difficulty navigating high-stakes
systems—not due to any major psychopathology or cognitive impairment.” It
described her as a “psychologically resilient and emotionally invested mother
whose past parenting difficulties are best explained by a combination of
emotional overload, limited prior education, and inadequate parenting

5 As a child, mother herself had been the subject of multiple child
welfare investigations into possible physical abuse by her parents, including
one incident involving unexplained broken bones and another that
culminated with mother threatening to kill one of her parents with a knife.

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modeling, rather than any severe mental illness or intellectual disability.
Cognitive tests reveal low average functioning with relative strengths in
orientation, judgment, and emotional motivation. She demonstrates
substantial growth in emotional insight, parenting confidence, and service
engagement.” Overall, it was extremely positive about her capacity and
motivation for further growth and expressed no hesitation about her ability
to do so “particularly within a structured and supportive environment.”
The social worker who authored the 12-month report disagreed with
the psychologist’s conclusions. She wrote that the psychologist’s findings
about some of mother’s below-average traits “call[] for concern in regard to
how safely she would be able to parent [her three children] especially given
that [G.L.] (8) and [L.M.] (4) have special needs. [Mother] has historically
been in special education, has required support in all activities of daily living
(ADL) equivalent to that 24/7 support care, and has slower reactive
responses, creating an increase in concern for the children’s active daily
lives.”
The 18-month report indicated that both parents had fully engaged in
the reunification services that had been offered to them. It reported that
mother “continues to engage and receive parenting support, including
parenting classes and parent coaching from Child Parent Institute and
through the Department” and continued to attend therapy; father continued
to engage with his parent mentor, had recently completed a 12-hour class
called “Armonia y bienestar” at the Child Parent Institute and was working
with another provider on budgeting skills and creating a spending plan; and
both parents had been staying in “constant communication” with the
Department, caregivers, school staff, visitation staff, and all of their service
providers.

9
According to the 18-month report, both parents also had been visiting
regularly with G.L. twice a week for 50 minutes, fully supervised. Two
months earlier, as of October 31, 2025, visitation staff had indicated that
mother was ready to move to “lightly supervised” visits, but the report does
not indicate why that change did not occur. The social worker wrote only
that this “may indicate that mother continues to progress and learn skills
that she is putting into practice” during her visits.
The Department reported that visits with G.L. often had been without
G.L.’s siblings because G.L. would “becomes very over stimulated, begins to
throw herself [on the ground] and have self-harm behaviors and becomes very
dysregulated in visits.” It reported that joint visits with all siblings “tend to
be overwhelming for all siblings, especially [G.L.], as she gets very
overstimulated and dysregulated causing moments of instability and safety
concerns.” But once a month, G.L. would have a 50-minute, fully supervised
joint visit with her parents and siblings, which were reportedly “going well.”
The social worker wrote that “[f]rom secondhand information . . . , the family
visits at CPI [Child and Parent Institute] are going much better, although
transitions are difficult for the children, especially [G.L.]. . . . The
Undersigned has not had the opportunity to observe these visits and might
not be able to as it is understood these visits can be overwhelming and
overstimulating for the children when there are multiple adults present.”
The 18-month report provided minimal information about the parents’
visits with G.L. specifically, did not note any specific concerns with those
visits, and generally reported favorably about visitation. It said that both
parents “have . . . been working on creating a strong structure and routine
during visits, engaging the children, understanding each child’s needs and
managing their behaviors. This continues to be a place of growth as visits

10
with the children have been difficult as each requires a different type and
level of support.” It said it was in the children’s best interests for consistent
visitation with their parents and with each other to continue “as it is
apparent their connection is strong.” It reported that father “brings specific
toys he knows the children will like and asks the children how they are,” and
“is affectionate towards the children” during visits. Regarding mother, it said
that “During visitation with her children [mother] has demonstrated her
ability to bring structure and routine to visits by having plans for visits,
engaging the children and managing their behaviors. On some visits
[mother] is observed to bring different meals for each child based on what
they like to eat. [Mother] structures the visit to have the children wash their
hands before they sit at the table to eat. Other visits are structured around
going to a nearby community park and on these visits [mother] transports the
children in a wagon. [Mother] has previously told the children she will set a
timer on her phone and when the phone rings it’s time to get ready to walk
back to the office.” It also reported that mother’s visits with her other two
children “are going well” though noted a concern that in some visits she “can
become passive and/or confrontational” in that she “remains sitting down
with minimal engagement and redirection,” while at other times, would
“positively redirect[] and validat[e] the children.”
The 18-month report was, on the whole, positive about the parents’
progress and did not identify any specific concerns about their ability to care
for G.L. It said father had “demonstrated better attunement with the
children’s needs” during visits, “engages in appropriate play and safety
guards,” and also had “worked diligently to provide what is needed to meet
the ongoing needs of the children.”

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It said that mother had shown “tremendous improvements.” She
exhibited “noticeable behavioral changes [she] has acknowledged and
reflected on.” Specifically, she “can reflect back on her previous parenting
behaviors and how she has made changes and learned to identify differences
in each of her children’s behavioral cues,” “was able to reflect on how yelling
and screaming at her children was something that she did in the past that
she no longer does now because she understands how it impacts her children
in a negative way,” and “[i]nstead of yelling, [she] will attempt to stay calm
and ask questions to understand what the child’s needs are at that moment.”
She also had bought a fish tank for her children because she knows they love
fish and was able to explain to the social worker how she cares for the fish,
replaces the water and feeds them. In addition, with the benefit of parenting
coaching, she “has improved in her social interactions with others” and
expanded her social connections. She understood the value of the parenting
support she had been receiving, wanted to continue to engage with them, and
also wanted a chance to demonstrate in visits the skills she’d learned and
behavior changes she’d made.
Nevertheless, despite these favorable changes, the Department stated
that “there continues to remain a lack of demonstrating a clear
understanding of age and developmentally appropriate behaviors and
expectations . . . especially around [G.L.’s] and [L.M.’s] diagnosis of autism
and higher levels of care”6 and also, as to mother, “most recently with [P.L.’s]
regression and inconsistency during lightly supervised visits.”7 The first was
the only concern noted as to father.

6 By this point L.M. was four years old and had minimal verbal skills.
7 This was apparently a reference to some difficulties during visits
with P.L. in late August and early September 2025 that the Department
described during closing arguments at the subsequent contested hearing.

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As to mother, it elaborated somewhat. The Department had not
received an update from mother’s therapist. But it said that “Since the onset
of this investigation, it has been observed that [mother] has a possible
cognitive or intellectual delay, which often requires a high level of assistance
from another adult with basic everyday tasks. She becomes overwhelmed
easily, often limiting herself to one to two meetings a day with providers or
visits with the children. The Undersigned has also observed [her] to stay
quiet for a moment after information is given, needing some moments to
process, and often needs prompting regarding questions and next steps. The
Undersigned needs to ask clarifying questions.” It concluded, “At this
moment it is unclear what [her] understanding of each child’s needs are and
if they can be met, especially for [G.L.] who requires 24/7 care.” She “has
acquired many practical skills; however, possible cognitive or intellectual
delays appear to limit her ability to apply these skills reliably in the context
of the children’s elevated behavioral and developmental needs, resulting in
ongoing concerns regarding her ability to provide adequate care.”
The 18-month report included a section entitled “Danger Statement.”
In full it stated: “The Department, medical professionals, and service
providers are worried that the children’s medical and basic needs will
continue to be unmet due to the mother[’s] . . . and father[’s] inability to
prioritize the planning and organization of appointments and services.”
C. The Hearing and Court’s Ruling
A contested review hearing took place about three months later over
two days in March 2026. Several hundred pages of documents were admitted

According to counsel’s argument, the visitation logs reflected three visits in
that period in which P.L. was crying or screaming a great deal and mother
was unable to handle the situation, and in one instance the visitation coach
had to intervene.

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into evidence in addition to the 18-month review report, and five witnesses
testified: (1) the social worker who was assigned to the case for the first 14
months, from August 2024 to October 29, 2025, Noemi Villagomez (hereafter
initial social worker); (2) the current social worker, Selene Cazares, who took
over the case less than six months after receiving her master’s degree in
social work, authored the 18-month report, and by the time of the hearing
had handled the case for about four months (hereafter current social worker);
(3) mother’s services coordinator from the Regional Center, Amber Gonzales,
who testified about the services mother had been receiving from the center
since her children had been removed from her custody, additional services
mother might be able to access if any of her children were returned to her, as
well as the extent to which the social workers assigned to the case had or had
not engaged with Gonzales about mother’s services and needs; (4) a
supervisor from the Regional Center, Reyna Lopez, who testified in lieu of
G.L.’s service coordinator about the services G.L. was receiving through the
Regional Center; and (5) mother.
We refrain from summarizing the testimony in full and will discuss it
further as necessary below. The second social worker testified that she had
been on the case for approximately nine weeks when she wrote the 18-month
report and did not have a good grasp of the details of the case at that time.
Generally stated, the social workers confirmed that both parents had fully
complied with their case plans and that both had been eager to receive
additional services. They also testified that all reunification services had
been exhausted for both parents and there were no additional services to offer
either parent beyond what had been provided to them. The first social
worker testified she had safety concerns because neither parent had
displayed sufficient understanding of G.L.’s “cues” to understand her needs,

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avoid triggering her into an emotionally dysregulated state where she began
flailing or throwing things, or how to help her when she did become that way.
The second social worker testified that she generally had safety concerns
around mother due to G.L.’s exceptionally high needs, and that it would be
unsafe to return G.L. to father due to the presence of another child in his
home who had exhibited sexualized behaviors in the past. They did not
testify that either parent lacked the understanding or capacity to meet G.L.’s
nutritional needs by this juncture.
As for mother, the initial social worker, who had authored the six and
12-month reports, stood by her disagreement with the psychologist’s
assessment that mother could parent effectively with sufficient support, but
the current social worker agreed with the psychologist’s assessment. She
also testified that mother had developed a way to keep track of appointments
and had never missed an appointment in the time she’d handled the case.
There was a great deal of testimony about what kinds of additional services
from the Regional Center might be available to support mother if G.L. were
returned to her care, but none of those details had been evaluated. The first
social worker never explored that subject with mother’s service coordinator at
the Regional Center because the subject seemed premature; the current
social worker inquired about this, but mother’s service coordinator had lacked
sufficient lead time and information to evaluate what additional services
might be available but stood ready, able, and willing to put the
administrative wheels in motion to assess that question if and when asked to
do so and given a hypothetical return home date. She testified the
assessment hypothetically could have taken place earlier, “but there was no
indication of [G.L.] coming back to the family home.” There was also a great
deal of testimony about why neither parent ever received more than two

15
hours a week of visitation with G.L. in 18 months or, despite numerous
recommendations from visitation monitors to do so, was permitted to move to
lightly supervised rather than fully supervised visitation, a subject we
address below.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled the Department had
met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable
services had been provided, declined to return G.L. to either parent,
terminated reunification services, and set the case for a hearing under
section 366.26. It found that both parents had been “eager” to take
advantage of the services provided to them and had done “a remarkable job of
following through.” But it found that, “unlike with her siblings,” their
“efforts here were not enough” to have [G.L.] returned to them, due to “a
multitude of factors, including the parents’ needs as well as [G.L.’s].”8 The
court also found that the services provided by the Regional Center could have
been “better harmonized” with the Department and that the Department had
not “push[ed] the Regional Center to create some kind of unique protocol or
process to match the circumstances of this family” but that reasonable
reunification services had nonetheless been provided, and that the decision
not to reduce the level of supervision of visitation was reasonable “when
considered against the backdrop of the totality of information before the
court.” The decision “was not arbitrary but a considered choice made by
those in the best position to make them.”

8 The court did not “specify the factual basis for its conclusion that
return [of G.L. to parental custody] would be detrimental” as it was
statutorily required to do (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(2)), an error that neither parent
raises as independent basis for reversal.

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DISCUSSION
I.
Return to Parental Custody.
Both parents assert that the juvenile court erred in finding there would
be a substantial risk of detriment if G.L. were returned to their custody,
because at a minimum any residual concerns for her well-being that
remained by the time of the 18-month hearing could be addressed through an
order for family maintenance services.
A. Legal Principles
Until reunification services are terminated, family preservation is the
dependency scheme’s legislatively mandated goal. (Georgeanne G. v.
Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 870, 267 (Georgeanne G.); In re
C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 839.) “ ‘[U]p until the time the section
366.26 hearing is set, the parent’s interest in reunification is given
precedence over a child’s need for stability and permanency.’ ” (In re
Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 447, quoting In re Marilyn H. (1993)
5 Cal.4th 295, 310 (Marilyn H.).) It is only after reunification services have
been terminated that “the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability.” (Marilyn H., at p. 309; accord, In re Jasmon
O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 420.)
Given the importance of family preservation, only if a parent poses a
“substantial risk of detriment” to a child’s safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being may the state continue to deprive the parent of physical
custody of their child during the reunification period (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1))
and thereby subordinate the constitutionally protected interests in a child’s
care and companionship that parenthood otherwise entails. (See In re
Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 419; Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.)

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Put simply, the parent must pose a “substantial” danger to the child in some
way.
In evaluating this issue, “ ‘the juvenile court must consider the extent
to which the parent participated in reunification services. [Citations.] The
court must also consider the efforts or progress the parent has made toward
eliminating the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.’ ”
(In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.) “The evidence must be viewed
in light of the . . . parent’s response to services and demonstrated ability to
safely care for the child,” despite the dangers the parent initially posed to the
child. (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1417, 1425
(Tracy J.).)
The burden to show substantial danger is on the agency (§ 366.22,
subd. (a)(1)), and it is a high one. (Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at
p. 864.) “[T]he risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a
child to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or
emotional well-being.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400.)
It does not require perfection, including in compliance with services.
(See ibid.; David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789–790
(David B.); Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1343.)
It does not “mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did
not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped,
or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family
member.” (David B., at p. 789.) “[T]here are times when we have to take a
step back and make sure that we are not losing sight of our mandate. We are
looking for passing grades here, not straight A’s.” (Id. at p. 790.)
A trial court does not defer to an agency’s recommendation that it is not
safe to return a child to parental custody (including the opinions of a social

18
worker upon which it may be based). (See David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 796–797.) Rather, an agency has “the express burden of proving to the
court that the conclusions it ha[s] reached [are] correct,” and courts “do not
deprive parents of their children’s custody merely because [the agency] asks
[them] to” do so. (Id. at p. 797.) Courts “do not presume that [the agency’s]
judgments about the propriety or returning children to their parents’ custody
are correct, even if we have previously found them to be correct in other
cases. The final, and actual, judgment on this issue belongs to the court, not
to [the agency]. And that judgment must be exercised independently, and in
accordance with the proper standards of proof.” (Ibid.)
“We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for substantial
evidence by considering whether the evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports the court’s finding.” (L.C. v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1034 (L.C.).) In doing so, “ ‘We resolve all conflicts in
support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold
the findings and may not substitute our deductions for those of the juvenile
court.’ ” (Ibid.) The substantial evidence standard, although deferential, “is
not toothless.” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) It does not mean
“ ‘any’ ” evidence. (L.C., at p. 1034.) “It is well settled that the standard is
not satisfied simply by pointing to ‘ “isolated evidence torn from the context of
the whole record.” ’ ” (In re I.C., at p. 892; accord, People v. Johnson (1980)
26 Cal.3d 557, 577. Rather, substantial evidence “is ‘ “ ‘substantial’ proof of
the essentials which the law requires.” ’ [Citations.] The focus is on the
quality, rather than the quantity, of the evidence. . . . [Citation.] Inferences
may constitute substantial evidence, but they must be the product of logic
and reason.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.)
“Opinion testimony which is conjectural or speculative ‘cannot rise to the

19
dignity of substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] [¶] The ultimate test is whether it
is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the
whole record.” (Roddenberry, at pp. 651–652.)
In the dependency context, “Perceptions of risk, rather than actual
evidence of risk, do not suffice as substantial evidence.” (In re G.Z. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 857, 883.) Nor is the detriment standard satisfied by an
agency’s “vague and nebulous concerns that [are] not supported by evidence.”
(M.G. v. Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 646, 662.) Although social
workers play a vital role in our dependency scheme, not every opinion of a
child welfare worker rises to the level of substantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re
David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941, 953–954 [social worker and agency
assertions that reasonable services were provided and children should be
placed for adoption]; In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 284–285
[social worker opinion that parents had not sufficiently internalized proper
parenting skills was not substantial evidence of detriment]; Blanca P. v.
Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1751 [opinion of social worker
and therapist that mother had not internalized what she learned in
parenting classes insufficient to establish detriment]; In re Heather P. (1988)
203 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1226–1230 (Heather P.)9 [social worker’s report
insufficient to support finding that return of child to mother would create
substantial risk of detriment].)
B. Father
In light of the entire record, we agree with father the Department
failed to meet its burden to prove there was a substantial risk of detriment if
G.L. were returned to him. The Department and the court acknowledged

9 Heather P. was disapproved on unrelated grounds in In re Richard S.

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 866, footnote 5.

20
that he had fully complied with his case plan and fully engaged in all services
offered to him, and as described above, the 18-month report reported
favorably about his progress and his visits. It reported he had “demonstrated
better attunement with the children’s needs” during visits, “engages in
appropriate play and safety guards,” and had “worked diligently to provide
what is needed to meet the ongoing needs of the children.” The visitation logs
reflect uniformly positive interactions between father and his children and
show that G.L. routinely allowed father to feed her and play with her,
frequently allowed him to change her diaper, and frequently displayed
physical closeness and affection toward him, allowing him to hug her, hold
her hand, and even carry her.10 He had progressed sufficiently to regain
custody of his other child, P.L. And the Department no longer expressed any
concern for his ability to appreciate G.L.’s nutritional needs or keep her
clean; the concerns for her malnutrition and poor hygiene that precipitated
this case appear to have been resolved. The report did not identify any
specific detrimental effects that would result from returning G.L. to father
and failed to satisfy the basic mandate of section 366.21, that a status report
not recommending the return of the child to the parent “specify why the
return of the child would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (c),
italics added.)11

10 The social worker who wrote the 18-month report hadn’t read the
most recent visitation notes from January 2026, was last in contact with
visitation staff in December 2025 (which was several months before the
hearing), and didn’t know if the parents’ visits with G.L. had since
progressed.
11 It mentioned, in connection with P.L.’s return, that father continued
to work “two different jobs,” expressing concern as to who would be able to
care for P.L. on the nights father works, other than her maternal
grandmother. That concern did not lead to a recommendation that P.L. not
be returned to father. The report also noted that P.L. did not require as high

21
In addition, neither social worker articulated any specific criticism of
father’s parenting capabilities or identified any concrete safety issue he
presented to G.L.
The initial social worker, who had not been involved in the case for
almost six months by the time of the contested hearing, identified no such
concerns. She testified, “There are times that dad is a bit aloof and appears
to not also be engaged into what is being said in regards to, like, [G.L.’s]
medical needs. [¶] And I’m unsure if dad really comprehends what’s
happening or if this might be like a cultural thing, where a lot of the times
the female partner is the one that takes care of all the household and child
duties and the male is like a breadwinner of that dynamic. [¶] He would
either awkwardly smile or laugh, and so I don’t know if that was some type of
like anxiety of him in those certain circumstances or if he didn’t know what
else to do and that was kind of his response.”
Speculation about possible “cultural” dynamics or other explanations
for father’s affect is not substantial evidence that G.L. would be at risk of
detriment in father’s care. Our courts have held that social workers’
“subjective beliefs,” “fuzzy” and “nebulous ideas” are insufficient to support a
detriment finding. (In re Jasmine G., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 289–291
[“subjective beliefs”]; Blanca P. v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1751–1752 [“fuzzy” and “nebulous ideas”].) Instead, the focus of the court,
and therefore of the agency, must be on “the efforts or progress, or both,
demonstrated by the parent or guardian and the extent to which he or she

a level of care as G.L. But it did not conclude that father would be unable to
arrange appropriate care for either child or describe any effort on the
agency’s part to address that issue with father.

22
cooperated and availed himself or herself of services provided.” (Heather P.,
supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1229–1230.)
There was testimony by the social workers about visits. The earlier
social worker testified G.L. had engaged in self-harming behavior during
visits with her parents when she became over-stimulated such as by hitting
herself in the face with books and shoes or throwing things. But she
acknowledged that G.L. was able to be controlled “a lot more” by father than
mother, and that although “it was just difficult anytime mom would attempt
to step in at moments,” those behaviors with mother had decreased over time.
She also testified that the only reasons father’s visits were not increased
beyond two hours a week were G.L.’s caregiver’s availability and “capacity,”
not any conduct of father.
The only specific safety concern the current social worker articulated
about father was that previously, when she was in foster care, P.L. had
reportedly exhibited some “sexualized behaviors” toward the foster family’s
seven- and 10-year-old daughters, such as kissing their bottoms and looking
under their towels. Now that P.L. was back with father, the social worker
expressed concern that P.L.’s behaviors would pose a risk to G.L. if she was
returned to father’s custody because of G.L.’s limited ability to communicate.
But, as father points out, these behaviors had occurred in October 2024 when
P.L. was six years old. Her maternal grandmother had agreed to talk with
P.L. about inappropriate touching and body parts, and no new incidents or
concerns had been observed by the time of the 18-month hearing, more than a
year and a half later. There is no evidence such behaviors had ever occurred
while P.L. was in father’s custody, that P.L. had ever directed such behaviors
toward G.L., or that father was likely to be unresponsive if P.L. ever began
exhibiting such behaviors again toward G.L. or anyone else. In short, the

23
social worker’s concern, although well-intentioned, was vague and
speculative.
The only other comment the current social worker made about father
was in the 18-month review report, when she had only recently begun
working on the case. She wrote that “there continues to remain a lack of
demonstrating a clear understanding of age and developmentally appropriate
behaviors and expectations . . . around G.L.[’s] . . . diagnosis of autism and
higher level[] of care.” No explanation or examples were provided. Such
“vague and nebulous concerns” are not substantial evidence of danger. (M.G.
v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 662.) This is especially true
given the specific descriptions of father’s engagement in the services offered
and interactions with the children during visits, including G.L., and
improvements in managing the children during visits, all of which we have
described. Further, the comment reflects a misunderstanding of the burden
of proof, which is on the social worker when she recommends removal, and
requires her to “ ‘demonstrate with specificity how the minor has been or will
be harmed’ ” if returned to parent’s care. (Heather P., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1229.) Where, as here, the evidence shows the parent has fully engaged
in the elements of the reunification plan and demonstrated substantial
progress, “more [is required] than the mere conclusion[s]” and vague concerns
on the part of the social worker that there may be risk of some unspecified
detriment. (Id. at p. 1228.)
Finally, there were at least two potential sources of in-home services
that could be made available to father if G.L. were returned to his custody:
(i) Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) therapy—a resource we discuss below
that the social workers testified is intended to provide G.L.’s caregivers with
behavioral support services in the home; and (ii) additional services for G.L.

24
provided through the Regional Center if needed, such as respite services for
her caregiver “so that the parents don’t get caregiver fatigue”; and
transportation to medical appointments. The evidence shows these services
could be used to assist father in caring for the needs of both of his young
daughters if it turned out that he needed such help. (See, e.g., David B.,
supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 797 [evidence insufficient to demonstrate that
agency’s safety concerns “could not have been addressed through less drastic
means” than declining to return child to parental custody].)
Nor is it clear why an order for family maintenance could not have
filled any such gaps, such as by providing father with continued parent
coaching, additional parenting classes specific to autism, referrals to any
resources the Department felt would be helpful for him to become educated
about preventing a recurrence of P.L.’s past sexualized behaviors, and/or
other more general forms of support. (See Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 285, 316 [juvenile court has discretion to return child to
parental custody, retain jurisdiction, and order family maintenance services];
see, e.g., Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 868–869.) The
Department does not explain why any concerns it still harbored about him
could not be addressed through less drastic measures such as these. It only
says family maintenance services “would not be appropriate,” which is not
the law. Father argues that “[t]he court has the authority to return G.L. to
[father’s] custody and order family maintenance services. Such an order
would achieve the legislative goal of family preservation, while also allowing
for additional safeguards to be in place to ensure G.L.’s care in the home.”
We agree.12

12The question of whether father can safely care for G.L. under
continued juvenile court supervision, with or without an order for family

25
We are not persuaded by any of the Department’s other arguments
either. In addition to the concerns we have already discussed, the
Department stresses that father posed a danger to G.L. because of the
reasons that precipitated its intervention; but this generalized claim ignores
the progress that the Department itself reported father having made over the
ensuing 18 months. The Department also asserts, again generally and
without any record citation, that neither parent’s visitation had ever
progressed from fully supervised, that G.L. sometimes engaged in self-harm
behavior and tantrums, and that she “often refused to allow them to change
her diapers.” We will address the subject of supervised visitation below, but
for present purposes it is enough to say that there is no evidence the
Department’s failure to permit father’s visits with G.L. to progress from
supervised to unsupervised reflects any risks he presented to G.L. during
visitation or otherwise. As for the remaining points, as explained above, the
first social worker testified the concerns about G.L.’s self-harm or outbursts
during visits largely concerned mother, and in any event, had improved over
time. And while G.L. occasionally wouldn’t allow her parents to change her
diaper during their short visits with her, that is not evidence of substantial
danger. G.L. frequently did allow father to change her. To infer that when
she didn’t, it was because she was uncomfortable with father is speculative
and, indeed, unreasonable in light of the other evidence we have discussed,
including evidence of his bond with her by the time of the 18-month review
hearing and the physical affection she routinely exhibited towards him.

maintenance, is distinct from the question of whether the court should have
returned G.L. to father’s custody and terminated its jurisdiction over G.L. No
party asserts the latter disposition was warranted on the record before us,
and the question is premature.

26
Again, the standard is not perfection. G.L. had exceptionally high
needs, to be sure. And the Department was reasonably concerned that her
caregiver be able to read her cues, help her regulate, and protect her from
tantrums and self-harm. But father had demonstrated during the
interactions he was permitted to have with G.L. over 18 months that he could
largely read her cues. Nobody who cared for her could guarantee she would
not experience behavioral issues from time to time, which presumably is one
reason G.L. continued to receive supportive services. The second social
worker acknowledged that G.L. exhibited quite a few behavioral problems in
the resource parents’ home too,13 and she had sometimes encountered
tantrums while visiting G.L. in the caregiver’s home “and sometimes [G.L.]
would hurt herself.” And as noted, G.L. had moved placements several times,
and no concurrent planning option yet existed for her due to her high needs.
Expecting father to prevent G.L.’s behavioral issues from ever recurring held
him to an unexplained standard of perfection for which there was no
evidentiary support.14 And as already noted, the Department does not
address why in-home services and family maintenance would be insufficient
to address any of its remaining safety concerns regarding father’s parenting
capabilities.
In short, there was no substantial evidence for the juvenile court’s
finding that father poses a substantial danger to G.L. The court should have

13 During three separate visits, mother also observed G.L. with “tiny
bruises” during a diaper change, a long scratch on one of her legs, and a
bump on her forehead.
14 For example, no medical professional or expert with specialty in
autism testified that G.L. could reasonably be expected never to throw
another tantrum, sometimes refuse a diaper change, or attempt to hit herself
ever again if she lived with an appropriate caregiver who was attentive and
knowledgeable about her needs and cues.

27
returned G.L. to his custody, including with an order for family maintenance
services if the court, in its discretion, concluded such an order was
appropriate.
C. Mother.
Mother presents a closer question. Mother made substantial and
commendable progress over the course of the case, and we applaud her for
her hard work, obvious personal growth, and dedication. Even if, on this
record, the juvenile court could have made a finding in her favor on the
detriment issue, it did not, and on appeal we are not permitted to re-weigh
the evidence or substitute our judgment for the juvenile court’s judgment.
(L.C., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034.) Although not overwhelming, there is
substantial evidence that mother continued to pose a safety risk to G.L.
Mother offers a relatively one-sided argument, supported by few
specifics, as to why the court’s danger finding as to her did not have sufficient
evidentiary support. Such as it is, her argument largely ignores the evidence
that was unfavorable to her, such as the initial social worker’s testimony that
the self-harming behaviors during visits tended to occur with mother rather
than father and the current social worker’s testimony that some of mother’s
visits with G.L. went well but others did not. And, visits aside, the initial
social worker testified that “a lot of the times” when mother went to medical
appointments “there was a lack of understanding of what was really
occurring for [G.L.’s] medical needs; and that was super concerning.”15

15 There was also a conflict in the opinion evidence as to whether
mother could ever safely parent within a structured, supportive environment:
the psychologist who examined her concluded that she could, and the current
social worker agreed with that assessment, but the initial social worker
disagreed.

28
In addition, the most recent visitation logs (from roughly December
2025 until the end of January 2026) reflect many positive moments between
mother and G.L. (including many diaper changes, feeding, and frequent hair
brushing) but also reflect that G.L. was less physically comfortable with and
responsive to mother than she was to father, that mother was less
consistently engaged with G.L. than father was, and that mother sometimes
acted detached, disassociated or even intemperate.16
Every case is unique and decisions such as these can be difficult, but
we cannot say the court erred in assessing the risk of returning G.L. to
mother. Any number of injuries or harms could befall G.L. if mother failed to
attend to her needs or failed to appreciate her medical needs. (Cf. Tracy J.,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425 [affirming finding that it would be unsafe

16 For example, during the December 20, 2025 visit, mother yelled at

G.L. when she tossed a toy and told her, “ ‘Don’t do that!’ ” and then put on
her backpack and said she was ready to go despite 10 minutes remaining; it
took two reminders from the monitor about the time remaining before mother
sat back down, whereupon she “called out for [G.L.] repeatedly” without
success, scorned P.L., complained to father about P.L., “stared into space,”
did not react when her son bumped his head and fell, scorned him for trying
to get back on his tricycle, and ended up “grabbing” him and taking him to
the restroom for a diaper change where she stayed for the rest of the visit.
Another time, on January 3, 2026, mother came to the visit not feeling well,
lay on the floor while father interacted with the children, fell asleep, and
didn’t wake up even after one of the other children threw himself on her. At
another visit with G.L., on January 22, 2026, mother remained seated
“look[ing] straight at the wall in front of her” for much of the time and “would
occasionally turn her sight to see the child and then return her sight to the
wall in front of her,” while G.L. ate or played with father. This bewildering
behavior, which was at odds with the way she had comported herself during
previous visits, was unexplained. The juvenile court could reasonably
conclude that if mother were to detach this way during one of G.L.’s many
medical appointments or while G.L. was at home in her care, it could
jeopardize G.L.’s physical or mental health.

29
to return asthmatic child to custody of physically disabled mother and
developmentally impaired father despite their “demonstrated ability to
provide basic care to [him], the positive nature of their interactions with him
[in visits] and available [regional service center] services to assist them”
where, inter alia, they were not trained to treat his asthma and regional
center was not providing 24-hour services; “[u]nder these circumstances, it is
reasonable to infer [child] might suffer serious harm if he had an asthma
attack while in the sole care of his parents”].)
As for whether such concerns could be ameliorated by the provision of
family maintenance services, mother also stands in a different posture than
father. The first social worker opined that mother would need 24/7 support
with G.L., and although she testified the Regional Center said they could
provide services to support mother, “I don’t think that there would be any
type of care out there that can do 24/7 care that would help support [G.L.]
being in the care of mom.” Mother does not address that testimony or
develop an argument supported by citations to the record showing it does not
constitute substantial evidence in light of the entire record.
Mother clearly loves G.L., has taken impressive steps to improve her
understanding of G.L.’s needs and cues, and has made commendable progress
in becoming a responsive, dedicated parent. But she came into this case
presenting with more serious parenting challenges than father, and as the
primary caretaking parent, she was more directly responsible for the neglect
G.L. suffered. She has not demonstrated the court’s danger finding at the 18-
month review hearing is unsupported by substantial evidence.

30
II.
Reunification Services
Both parents also assert there is no clear and convincing evidence they
were provided reasonable reunification services and, as a result, ask that we
order additional reunification services for them. However, because we have
determined G.L. should have been returned to father’s custody, the question
whether he should have received further reunification services would appear
to be moot—a question no party has addressed. (See generally In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 [addressing mootness in dependency context]; see also
Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 671 [court in writ proceeding must
consider “facts that arise after pleading which render the dispute moot or
make the remedy useless”].) In addition, we note that the maximum
statutory time limits for providing reunification services has now passed,
raising a question as to whether any effective relief could now be granted to
either father or mother.17 Nonetheless, it is possible the adequacy of

17 Reunification services can be extended “up to a maximum time
period not to exceed 24 months after the date the child was originally
removed from physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian” if
reasonable services have not been provided. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A); see
also 366.22, subd. (b)(2)(B) [mandatory six-month extension of reunification
services at 18-month review hearing where reasonable services have not been
provided unless “court finds by clear and convincing evidence based on
competent evidence from a mental health professional that extending the
time period for reunification services would be detrimental to the child”]; In
re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1060 (A.O.) [“In 2024, the Legislature
clarified that reunification services can even be extended to 24 months if,
among other findings, the court finds ‘reasonable services have not been
provided to the parent’ ”].)
G.L. was ordered detained on June 27, 2024, and so the juvenile court’s
authority to extend reunification services up to the 24-month statutory
maximum expired on June 27, 2026. (See, e.g., In re Damian L. (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 357, 369 [expiration of 24-month statutory maximum period for

31
reunification services could become relevant for either parent if G.L. were
removed from father’s custody again on a supplemental petition, and/or,
regardless whether she is removed a second time, if mother were to ask the
juvenile court for discretionary relief to extend her services.18 Therefore, we
will address this issue.
A. Legal Principles
At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court may not set a
hearing under section 366.26 unless the social services agency proves by clear
and convincing evidence that reasonable services were provided. (§ 366.22,
subds. (a)(3), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(c)(iii).) The agency must prove that it made “a
good faith effort to provide reasonable services responsive to the unique
needs of each family, and the plan must be ‘ “ ‘specifically tailored to fit the
circumstances of each family’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘designed to eliminate those conditions
which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.’ ” ’ [Citation.]
Specifically, the record must show the agency identified the problems leading
to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems,
maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the duration of the
service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents when

reunification services rendered appeal moot because juvenile court “is no
longer capable of ordering reunification services” but appellate court
exercised discretion to reach the merits].)
18 When the statutory maximum period of services has expired, the
juvenile court retains discretion to order additional reunification services in
exceptional circumstances. (See generally Michael G. v. Superior Court
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632–635; § 352.) “If reasonable services have not been
provided, a court may use that finding when considering whether to exercise
its discretionary authority to grant a parent’s request under section 352 for
further reunification services. Therefore, an erroneous reasonable services
finding could impede the court’s ability to fully and accurately evaluate that
parent’s request.” (A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060.)

32
compliance was difficult. [Citation.] The adequacy of the plan and the
agency’s efforts are judged according to the specific circumstances of each
case.” ’ ” (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, 420
(Patricia W.).)
“ ‘ “[T]he effort must be made to provide reasonable reunification
services in spite of difficulties in doing so or the prospects of success.” ’ ”
(Patricia W., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) At the same time, however,
courts must be careful not to judge an agency’s efforts too harshly. “ ‘In
almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided
more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard
is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in
an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstances.’ ” (A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1063.)
“ ‘Visitation is a critical component, probably the most critical
component, of a reunification plan.’ (In re Lauren Z. [(2008)]158 Cal.App.4th
[1102,] 1113–1114.) ‘Without visitation of some sort, it is virtually impossible
for a parent to achieve reunification.’ (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
1481, 1491–1492.) ‘The absence of visitation will not only prejudice a
parent’s interests at a section 366.26 hearing but may “virtually assure[] the
erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship” between [parent]
and child.’ (In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 307.) [¶] To promote
reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the
well-being of the child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Visitation requirements
exist ‘[i]n order to maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to
provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the
custody of his or her parent.’ (Id., subd. (a).)” (Serena M. v. Superior Court
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 673 (Serena M.).)

33
We review the adequacy of reunification services, including visitation,
under the substantial evidence standard, bearing in mind the clear and
convincing evidence that the juvenile court must apply in determining
whether reunification services were adequate. (Serena M., supra,
52 Cal.App.5th at p. 674; accord, A.O., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.)
“ ‘Under this burden of proof, “evidence must be so clear as to leave no
substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the
unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” ’ ” (Serena M., at p. 674;
In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245.) While less rigorous a standard
than beyond a reasonable doubt, “[t]his intermediate standard ‘requires a
finding of high probability’ ” that the asserted fact is true. (Conservatorship
of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998 (O.B.); see In re L.O., at p. 245.) On appeal,
“the question before [this] court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that” adequate services were provided. (O.B., at p. 995.)
B. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, we will consider the adequacy of reunification
services only as it pertains to the final review period, after the 12-month
review hearing which was held on August 21, 2025. We agree with the
Department that the parents forfeited objections to the court’s reasonable
services findings made at the six-month and 12-month review hearings.
Those reasonable services findings were appealable (A.O., supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1058–1061), yet no appeal was taken. “ ‘ “[A]n unappealed
disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be
attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” [Citation.] An appeal
from the most recent order in a dependency matter may not challenge earlier
orders for which the time for filing an appeal has passed.’ ” (In re Isaiah W.

34
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10; see also, e.g., Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995)
35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811–812.)
Mother makes numerous arguments, all captioned under the vague
heading that the Department failed to offer her “fruitful” reunification
services. Many concern her own intellectual or cognitive limitations; others
concern G.L.’s specialized needs. To the extent she challenges the adequacy
of services offered and provided to her to overcome the parenting challenges
posed by her own intellectual or cognitive limitations, we do not agree, and
extended discussion is unnecessary.19

19 The record discloses mother was offered and timely received a broad
array of supportive services specifically tailored to address her intellectual
limitations, and both social workers testified they had exhausted every
resource that was available. (See, e.g., B.D. v. Superior Court (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1153–1154 [parent with developmental delays
provided reasonable services where agency “appropriately recognized [her]
need for Regional Center services” and assisted her in seeking them out;
“Regional centers are specifically designed to provide services to persons with
developmental disabilities”]; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
1229, 1241 [rejecting challenge to adequacy of case plan for developmentally
disabled mother that provided for counseling, parenting support, in-home
support services, anger management services, individual therapy, and
referral to regional center programming].)
In particular, her contention that the Department failed to incorporate
the results of her psychological examination into the case plan is forfeited for
the reasons we have already discussed, and it also is unsupported by the
record. In arguing otherwise, she cites only to the first social worker’s
testimony that the social worker didn’t agree with the psychologist’s
evaluation that mother could appropriately parent within a structured
environment. Both social workers testified that mother was provided with all
the services the psychologist recommended and mother points to none that
she was not. At most, our review of the record suggests there might have
been one: a “level 5 Triple P” parenting class. On top of all the other
parenting classes mother had completed, the initial social worker was unsure
whether mother had taken this one.

35
This brings us to the other two issues that both parents raise. They
assert the Department failed to provide them with reasonable services
designed to educate them on how to appropriately care for G.L. given her
specialized needs and unreasonably limited them to supervised visitation two
hours a week. Here, we agree.
Both parents received a great number of services. Without being
exhaustive, they included many parenting classes, access to G.L.’s medical
appointments, regular case meetings with the social worker, information
about G.L.’s needs through the resource parents with whom they had a good
relationship, and individualized parenting coaching with real-time feedback
during visits with G.L.20 Mother also received individualized therapy and
continued to receive independent living services and other assistance from
the Regional Center to support her.
In addition, the parents received some services specifically intended to
educate them about G.L.’s autism and the behavioral issues it presented.
They both took a parenting class called “Understanding Autism: respect,
support and empowerment.” Mother also took a parenting class called
“Matrix Parenting Network,” which provided support for families of children
with disabilities more generally in which she gained some basic tools for
addressing G.L.’s tantrums.21 She also took a “level 4 Triple P” parenting

20 We have been directed to no evidence indicating their parent coach
was trained in children with high needs generally, much less autism
specifically, and the current social worker testified the parents received no
“professional support” during visits.
21 In closing argument, the Department relied on an entry in the
delivered services log describing it this way: “Matrix Parent Network
provides training and support to families of children and young adults with
disabilities. Our trainings provide information and expertise to parents
involved in our regimen. Thank you for Participating in a Matrix training

36
class called “Stepping Stones” that the psychologist recommended because it
was designed for children with autism and other developmental/intellectual
disabilities.
But quantity is not necessarily quality, and we are concerned by two
aspects of their case plans that raise at least some doubt, if not “substantial”
doubt (Serena M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 674), as to whether they were
afforded services that were reasonable under the circumstances of this case.
That is because, despite the many services they were offered, their case plans
required them to access two resources specifically relating to autism and/or
G.L.’s special needs that the record does not show were made available to
them.
One was ABA therapy, which we have already briefly touched upon.
Their case plans required them to “work[] with the ABA therapist and other
service providers to help [them understand G.L.’s] needs and how to best
support her development.” Although the precise details of ABA therapy are
unclear, there is evidence it is a form of behavioral services funded by private

event. This is to certify that [mother] has completed the Matrix Parent
Network’s . . . training on Transition to Preschool.”
Mother testified that the class taught her G.L. would throw herself on
the ground during tantrums because G.L. “felt protected by doing that” and it
was G.L.’s “way of calming down”; that she would have to stay calm when
G.L. did this, give G.L. space and learn how to better communicate with G.L.;
and that the teacher told her she would have to take more classes to learn
how to manage G.L.’s tantrums. She also testified that another parent of an
autistic child told her, apparently at the class, she would have to take classes
“specifically about my daughter’s needs because they . . . couldn’t offer a
whole lot of classes specifically for autism-disability needs.” Mother testified
that from the Matrix classes, “I’ve learned how to calm her down, hugging
her whenever she gets angry. I’ve noticed she likes that a lot” and that
“when she hits herself, I try as a mother to explain that what she’s doing
is . . . not right, it’s not good.”

37
insurance. The current social worker described an ABA therapist’s role as
“work[ing] with the parents and the child . . . in supporting the child’s
needs . . . at that specific moment in terms of their behaviors and . . . what is
coming up during . . . their time together.” The initial social worker testified
similarly, describing their role as “go[ing] into the caregiver’s home and . . .
observ[ing] what the child is doing and help[ing] support the caregiver.”
Neither parent was given access to this resource, in part it seems due to
vaguely described logistical issues.22 In addition, though, the current social
worker testified—contrary to the clear directive of the parents’ case plans,
and contrary to her testimony that some effort had been made to provide this
resource to them during visits—that ABA therapy is an “additional” support
service made available only to in-home caregivers and not to parents whose
children have been removed from their custody. So, she testified, the parents
could never fulfill that aspect of their case plan.

22 The first social worker testified that there was “a lot of difficulty”
lining up an ABA therapist due to the multiple changes of placement G.L.
experienced, and that by the time she left the case, there was still no ABA
therapist in place. The current social worker testified that G.L.’s school and
team of providers had tried unsuccessfully to get an ABA therapist at school,
and the social worker even talked with mother about volunteering at school
in order to be able work with the ABA therapist, “but it sounded like it could
not happen” at school. By the time of the hearing, ABA therapy was still not
in place, and the Department was still trying to evaluate other options and
settings for that to happen.
In addition, the social worker testified that one possibility they
considered was having an ABA therapist attend visits. She also testified that
it was her understanding from some notes by the previous social worker that
an ABA therapist had attended some visits in September, October, or
November of 2025 but was not certain as to the exact date or whether that
was accurate. Other than that possible exception, she testified neither
mother nor father had any opportunity to work with an ABA therapist.

38
Asked whether the parents could learn how to effectively meet G.L.’s
behavioral needs without the assistance of an ABA therapist, the current
social worker answered equivocally: “Yes and no.” She explained that
although they had access to other service providers such as the Regional
Center, Matrix class and parenting classes, “ABA therapy would also be an
additional support . . . that they would benefit from.”
It is troubling that there is a specialized professional resource that
provides individualized, hands-on support and education about attending to
the specific behavioral needs and cues of a particular autistic child—the very
thing the Department identified as its primary source of concern about
mother and father—and yet neither parent was able to access it. All the
more troubling, because the Department specifically identified this resource
as part of both parents’ case plans, implying both that it could be provided to
them and that it was important. There is no evidence or explanation in the
record as to why ABA therapy was not, or could not have been, made
available to either parent while G.L. was not in their custody; the
Department essentially just took the position that it’s not done that way.
Such murky explanations do not meet the test of “substantial evidence,”
taking into account the “ ‘high probability’ ” threshold that the clear and
convincing evidence burden of proof requires the agency to meet. (O.B.,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 997–998.)
Furthermore, to suggest that services were nonetheless reasonable
because the parents were provided with other, more generalized resources is
not particularly satisfactory. Had the Department not specifically included
ABA therapy in the case plans, we might take a different view. But it did
require this and apparently for good reason. ABA therapy appears to be
highly specialized and targeted to the very safety issues that lay at the heart

39
of this case: understanding and being responsive to G.L.’s specific needs and
managing the behavioral challenges posed by her autism. It is clear the
Department was trying to arrange for this resource to be provided to G.L.’s
foster family, but it made little or no effort to arrange for the parents to
benefit from it, too. And, as noted, the social worker could not rule out the
possibility that the parents would be unable to progress sufficiently without
it.
A second concern, as father notes, is that the parents’ case plans
required them to “communicat[e] with [G.L.’s Regional Center] coordinator
Elizabeth Mendoza” and “[a]dvocat[e] for appropriate services and
participat[e] when appropriate.” This didn’t happen in the final review
period either; indeed, it appears to have happened only once during the entire
case.23 The Department does not explain why. Given that concerns about the
parents’ ability to care for G.L.’s highly specialized needs were at the crux of
this case, it is again difficult to conclude that it was reasonable for the
Department to make apparently no effort during the final review period to
assist them in communicating with one of the professionals tasked with
coordinating G.L.’s services.24

23Meetings with G.L.’s service coordinator took place only once a year,
and the most recent one took place about a year before the 18-month review
hearing. And G.L.’s coordinator never attended any of the monthly team
meetings with the Department and the family, even though mother’s
Regional Center coordinator, who did attend the meetings, urged the
Department to make that happen.
24 There was testimony that Mendoza had been out on medical leave
for an unspecified amount of time. There is no evidence any effort was made
to assist the parents in communicating either with the service coordinator
who handled G.L.’s case during her absence and/or with Mendoza’s
supervisor, Reyna Lopez.

40
Whether or not, standing alone, one or both of these omissions would
lead us to conclude the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing
evidence that services provided were adequate, for as we have said, services
need not be perfect (see In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 973 [“the
mere fact that more services could have been provided does not render the
Department’s efforts unreasonable”]), they diminish our confidence that a
reasonable factfinder could find it “ ‘highly probable’ ” (as opposed to merely
“ ‘probable’ ”—or even just “ ‘ “possible” ’ ”) the parents received adequate
services. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 998 [distinguishing between clear
and convincing and preponderance of the evidence standards].)
This brings us to the issue of visitation, which further diminishes our
confidence. “Visitation is an essential component of a reunification plan.”
(Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.) “To promote reunification,
visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of
the child.” (Ibid.) “When the Agency limits visitation in the absence of
evidence showing the parents’ behavior has jeopardized or will jeopardize the
child’s safety, it unreasonably forecloses family reunification on the basis of
the parents’ labeled diagnoses, and [this] does not constitute reasonable
services.” (Id. at p. 1427; accord, Patricia W., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at
p. 428, fn. 19.) A parent’s lack of sufficient progress in court-ordered services,
while an important consideration, cannot be the deciding factor in restricting
visitation where there is no evidence that expanding visitation “would be
detrimental to the child and where there are no prospects for reunification
without it.” (Serena M., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.)
So, for example, the appellate court in Tracy J. addressed a more
liberal visitation schedule than was permitted here and held it was not
enough. It held that restricting visitation for a physically disabled mother

41
and a developmentally disabled father to only four hours a week of
supervised visitation with their child, rather than advance them to
unsupervised visitation, was “clearly unreasonable,” even though the child
had special medical needs neither parent was trained to treat or recognize
(asthma). (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1425, 1427.) As in this
case, there were favorable reports about the parents’ conduct, attitude, and
ability to care for the child during visits. (Id. at p. 1426; see also id. at
pp. 1422–1423.) But two social workers expressed safety concerns about
moving to unsupervised visitation. One of them cited as an example a very
recent visit to a mall after which the foster parent reported concerns; she
asserted (contrary to the account of another witness) that the mother had not
known how to react to the child’s tantrum; the father had told the child to
“stay” on a changing table and walked away to throw away a diaper; he also
had briefly left the child in a stroller in the middle of the mall to get a nearby
high chair; and neither parent had checked the child for injuries after the
tantrum. (Id. at p. 1421.) In addition, the second social worker said she
would not feel “comfortable” leaving the child alone with them, but the only
potentially dangerous situation she had observed in more than a year was the
child falling and bumping his head once in a visit while learning to walk. (Id.
at pp. 1422, 1426.) The appellate court noted that, in that instance, “[t]he
record shows [father] picked his son up, wiped away his tears and followed
[the social worker’s] advice to put ice on a small lump on [the child’s] head.”
(Id. at p. 1426.)
Although the appellate court upheld the juvenile court’s decision not to
return the child to the parents’ custody (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1425 [concluding “the evidence barely sustains the detriment finding”]),
restricting their visitation in these circumstances was held to be

42
unreasonable. It reasoned the parents had “fully cooperated with the Agency,
made substantial progress with their court-ordered case plans and had
demonstrated their abilities to feed, soothe, protect and care for” their child
during visits. (Id. at p. 1427.) Further, it noted, one of the providers of
father’s independent living skills services said father parented “fairly
independently,” and both the coordinator of his regional center services and
another provider of his independent living skills services “emphasized the
parents’ ability to work as a team and the complementary nature of their
skills.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 1422.) The appellate court explained that the
agency should have taken other measures to address its safety concerns
rather than unduly limit the parents’ visitation in this manner. “The
Agency’s concerns about unsupervised visitation,” it said, “could have been
alleviated by scheduling services from [the regional center] and the public
health nurse and implementing in-home parenting skills training during a
portion of the unsupervised visits, and providing initial drop-in checks by the
social worker.” (Id. at p. 1427.) “Under the circumstances,” it concluded, “the
visitation services provided to reunify this family were clearly unreasonable.”
(Ibid.) It issued a writ that, among other relief, ordered the agency to
“expand the parent’s visitation . . . including unsupervised visitation as
appropriate.” (Id. at p. 1428.)
We reach a similar conclusion here. In this case, the level of
supervision of the parents’ visits with G.L. was never reduced from fully
supervised in the period following the August 21, 2025 12-month review
hearing nor increased beyond two hours a week for either parent.25 Yet, as

25 As we have noted, some visits with G.L. were alone and some were
with her siblings together. None of the parties have quantified precisely how
many were with her alone versus jointly with her siblings, nor have they
separately identified and analyzed the quality of the parents’ visits with G.L.

43
we have discussed, the parents’ inability to demonstrate to the Department’s
satisfaction that they could understand G.L.’s cues and needs was the chief
reason the Department recommended terminating services and setting the
case for a permanency hearing. The parents were never even allowed to visit
with G.L. on a “lightly” supervised basis which, according to the current
social worker, would entail the visitation monitor entering the visitation
room periodically to check in rather than remain in the room for the entire
visit.
As in Tracy J., the Department points to no instances during any visits
with G.L.—neither in their visits alone with her nor in their visits with G.L.
and her siblings together—in which either parent jeopardized G.L.’s safety,
and no instances in which a monitor had to intervene or correct either parent
to avoid a dangerous situation. (See Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1421.) In addition, the visitation logs in evidence, which span the last four
months of the review period (from October 2025 through the end of January
2026), reflect no indication during visits that G.L. was ever remotely in
danger. Father’s conduct appears to have been uniformly appropriate, and
mother also displayed appropriate parenting skills at most junctures. With
the exception of her behaviors we have already noted (see fn. 16, ante), both
parents were consistently attentive to G.L.; they frequently fed her, played
with her, and changed her diaper; and they were able to manage her
behaviors safely and appropriately, even at times when G.L. displayed
frustration. Further, the Department praised both parents in its 18-month
report prepared at the end of December 2025: father, for having

alone as compared to visits that her siblings also attended. Thus, our
discussion of visits that follows encompasses both situations, without
distinction.

44
“demonstrated better attunement with the children’s needs, during visits he
comes prepared with food items, toys, diapers, and engages in appropriate
play and safety guards,” and mother, for having “demonstrated her ability to
bring structure and routine to visits . . . , engaging the children and
managing their behaviors.” Such comments are not consistent with limiting
them to two hours of fully supervised visitation a week.
Also striking to us is that the people most directly charged with
monitoring visitation saw progress too. There were long stretches of time
during multiple junctures in this final review period since August 21, 2025,
that the visitation logs reflected entries recommending that the level of
supervision be reduced to lightly supervised. In addition, a CPI staff member
named Daisy Bravo26 affirmatively reached out to the Department to
recommend this on October 7, 2025, in an e-mail that was extremely
complimentary, and particularly so of mother;27 and Bravo did so again in
another e-mail three weeks later (on October 31). Several months later, on

26 The record is unclear as to Bravo’s exact role. There was testimony
she is was the CPI “coach,” and it appears from some of the testimony and
delivered service logs that she was the social workers’ primary point of
contact with CPI about visitation. Other individuals created most of the
entries in the visitation logs, presumably the visitation monitors.
27 She wrote that the parents “are using tools and strategies more
effectively, allowing [G.L.] to approach them on her own terms, offering
appropriate praises and communicating in ways that align more closely with
her needs and comfort level. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] We’ve noticed a stronger bond
forming between mom and [G.L.], with mom showing a better understanding
of [G.L.]’s nonverbal cues and emotional needs. Mom is also giving [G.L.]
space when needed, which has helped foster more genuine and relaxed
interactions during play, such as with the dollhouses and kitchenette. Mom
has been engaging in a way that supports connection while respecting
[G.L.’s] . . . lead. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] It’s also lovely to see that [G.L.] appears
genuinely excited to see both mom and dad during visits, which speaks to the
growing trust and emotional connection.”

45
December 23, Bravo backed off the recommendation for lightly supervised
visitation but only partially: she e-mailed the social worker to say that
“Although the family ha[s] previously been ready for lightly supervised visits,
based on the past two months, I cannot confidently recommend lightly
supervised visits at this time.” But she nevertheless suggested trying it on a
trial basis “to assess how things progress” and suggested “reviewing the
reports on Apricot to make the best judgment.” Yet throughout the entire
review period it was never even tried once. As said, all that lightly
supervised visitation would have required would have been some periods of
unsupervised visitation combined with periodic “check ins” from a visitation
monitor throughout the visit.
The first social worker attributed the Department’s non-action in the
October timeframe only to the fact that she was transitioning off the case.
After she left, the current social worker consulted with her supervisor, was in
favor of stepping down the level of supervision to lightly supervised at least
on a trial basis but testified that “it was concluded that was not appropriate.”
At the time of the contested 18-month review hearing months later, she was
still in favor of conducting a trial run of lightly supervised visitation. She
also testified that G.L. is uncomfortable with strangers and at times even
with people she knows, and that G.L.’s lack of opportunity to visit more
frequently with her parents may have contributed to some of the outbursts
and tantrums she had during visits with them.
On this record, the Department’s failure to allow father to have more
liberalized visitation was just as “clearly unreasonable” as in Tracy J.
Indeed, the initial social worker testified that father’s conduct never played
any role in the decision not to expand his visitation. The only reasons she
gave for not allowing him more liberal opportunities to visit with G.L. was

46
the “availability” and “capacity” of G.L.’s foster parent. At least in the
absence of some showing the Department tried to address those obstacles,
that was unreasonable. (See, e.g., In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 972–974 [reasonable services not provided where caregiver’s schedule and
other constraints interfered with access to visitation and there was “no
evidence with regard to any follow-up by the Department . . . or to assist the
overwhelmed [caregiver] in any respect”].) Although father’s petition is not
entirely clear, we understand him to contend that his visitation should have
been increased in duration, he should have been allowed to visit G.L.
separately from mother, and/or the level of supervision should have been
reduced to unsupervised. It is enough to say that had the Department
allowed him to have unsupervised visitation in a timely fashion, he likely also
would have received more than two hours of visitation over time and/or
potentially progressed to overnight visits to show he could safely care for G.L.
Doing so potentially could have changed the outcome for him at the 18-month
review hearing in the juvenile court’s estimation, rendering his petition (and
our reversal of the court’s detriment finding) unnecessary.
As with the custody issue, mother’s circumstances are not precisely the
same as father’s. Her conduct in visitation was not as uniformly consistent or
protective toward G.L. as father’s and that of the parents in Tracy J., and we
have noted some erratic conduct she displayed in January 2026.
Nevertheless, these differences do not detract from our conclusion she was
not afforded reasonable visitation, either. Although we are affirming the
detriment finding as to mother, assessing whether G.L. would be safe in her
custody 24 hours a day given the concerns that were noted about mother and
the behaviors mother displayed during visits presents a different question
than whether mother displayed enough judgment, responsiveness, and

47
concerns for G.L.’s needs and welfare during visits to warrant an opportunity
for her to step up modestly from visits that were completely supervised 100
percent of the time. (Indeed, as noted, Tracy J. affirmed a detriment finding
yet concluded visitation had been unreasonably curtailed.) Unlike father,
and unlike in Tracy J., mother makes a very limited argument concerning
visitation. She does not argue she progressed enough to proceed to visitation
on a completely unsupervised basis (which was the issue in Tracy J.). She
argues only that her visits should have been stepped up to lightly supervised.
We perceive no basis in this record to conclude she should not have been
given that opportunity during the final review period.
We are not persuaded by the Department’s arguments to the contrary
concerning either parent’s visitation.
In defending the limited visitation that was afforded both parents, the
Department stresses testimony from the initial social worker that it was
important for the parents to be able to read G.L.’s cues and that mother in
particular was not always able to do so. That concern is certainly well-
intentioned and valid. But even if either parent did not perfectly read every
one of G.L.’s cues every time, that was precisely why maximum opportunities
for visitation could have been beneficial to them and to G.L. Lack of “cue”
reading is not automatically synonymous with danger. The only specific
example the Department cites of misreading cues during this latest review
period is one visit in January 2026 during which G.L. initially would not
allow mother to brush her hair but then did so. By contrast, there are many
instances in the visitation logs from this review period where the parents did
read G.L.’s cues effectively and backed off to give her space when she

48
appeared to need it.28 In addition, the second social worker also testified that
they frequently did so (“for the most part”). And the visitation logs also
reflect that when G.L. occasionally vented frustration physically, they were
appropriately protective of her.29

28 For example, at a visit on November 6, 2025, G.L. “started yelling
and throwing toys” when asked if she wanted a diaper change, and so mother
“asked [her] to look at her eyes and got closer” and “asked what was wrong,”
and when G.L. said “no,” “mom said okay and backed off.” G.L. continued to
say “ ‘no, no, no, no, no, no,’ ” and so “[b]oth parents sat back and watched
[her] play.”
29 For example, during a visit on October 9, 2025, mother and father
fed G.L. and watched her play, mother brushed her hair, and father changed
her diaper. At one point, G.L. “threw herself on the floor” and kicked a toy
but mother told her, “ ‘Be nice’ ” and she stopped. At another point, she
began kicking a chair but calmed down when father gave her some gummies.
There was no intervention and no hint of possible injury or danger during
this visit. Any possible risk of self-harm was completely averted.
Likewise, in a visit on November 5, 2025, mother brushed her hair but
stopped when G.L. “tugged her head away” and then resumed when G.L. was
ready. At the end of the visit, G.L. started kicking and grunting, and “[t]hey
gave her space and watched that she didn’t hurt herself.”
In a visit on December 3, 2025, G.L. “threw herself to the ground and
dad went over to make sure she was ok,” and later mother “asked that they
end early because [G.L.] seemed tired.”
Another time, on December 11, 2025, G.L. started slamming the door of
some toy furniture, they “told the child to be careful” and she stopped; later
during the same visit when mother asked if she wanted to eat, she “reacted
by hitting herself on the head,” but mother told her, “We don’t do that. That’s
a big no, no,” father told her, “[G.L.], be gentle,” and she stopped.
During one of the most recent visits, on January 22, 2026, G.L. briefly
kicked the wall in frustration at one point and, at another juncture, became
upset and started to hit her head with her hands and kick toys. But each
time, the parents effectively defused her behavior without incident or injury,
the monitor again did not step in to intervene, and the visit ended with G.L.
taking father’s hand and allowing him to carry her out of the room while
mother packed their things and cleaned up after the visit.

49
We do not minimize the importance of being able to judge the non-
verbal cues of a child who has limited verbal skills and is prone to
dysregulation, sometimes to the point of self-harming behaviors such as
hitting herself. But absent evidence that missed cue-reading during visits or
brief moments of emotional dysregulation caused or risked injury to G.L.
during visits (or emotional distress beyond that which G.L. might experience
in the ordinary course with caretakers she trusts and with whom she is
comfortable), such concerns should not take precedence over affording the
parents maximum opportunities for visitation with the child to learn, and
demonstrate they are able, to attend to her needs.
The Department also points out that entries in the visitation logs
fluctuated in their recommendations as to whether the level of supervision
should be reduced, and that the logs recommended that visits remain fully
supervised in four visits during October 2025, and in 21 visits from November
5, 2025, to January 31, 2026. But it is substance not form that matters, and
a mere entry in a visitation log stating “continue visits at the same level” is
not in and of itself a reliable indicator of either parent’s conduct. For
example, in October 2025, despite entries in the visitation logs by monitors
that consistently recommended “continue visits at the same level,” CPI staff
member Bravo was, as we have said, extremely complimentary of both
parents and recommended moving the visits to lightly supervised (in an e-
mail on October 23).
The Agency was required to exercise its own judgment on this issue in
light of all of the information available to it which, as said, was on the whole
relatively positive about the parents’ progress and their conduct during
visitation, even at times when G.L. became momentarily frustrated and

50
began to kick or throw a toy.30 The current social worker, who was handling
the case by this juncture, could not recall any details about the behaviors
that prompted the visitation monitors to change their recommendations back
to fully supervised visits in this period. She just testified that after she
consulted with her supervisor, a decision was made not to try lightly
supervised visions for unspecified reasons. It is illogical for the Department
to justify its determination about visitation on the basis of a visitation
monitor’s recommendation only when the monitor recommends against
reducing the level of supervision. For these reasons, the lack of consistent
recommendations from the visitation monitors to reduce the level of
supervision is not proof by clear and convincing evidence that it was
reasonable in the circumstances for the Department to allow no more than
two hours of fully supervised visitation.
Like the parents in Tracy J., both parents here were unreasonably
denied adequate visitation with G.L. Combined with the Department’s
failure to prove it was reasonable not to provide either parent access to ABA
therapy or assistance in communicating with G.L.’s Regional Center
coordinator as called for in their case plans, we conclude the Department did
not prove by clear and convincing evidence it provided the parents with
reasonable services during the 18-month review period.
We do not doubt the Department’s dedication and good faith efforts in
this case to reunify a family that faced very complicated challenges. In
addition, we appreciate the complexity of assessing the available services and
coordinating the many service providers involved in this case, complexities

30 The initial social worker seemed to recognize this. She testified that
she considers factors other than just the visitation recommendation in
considering whether to reduce the level of visitation, which she described as
“the totality of what visitation looks like.”

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compounded by the fact that multiple children were involved and also by the
fact that G.L.’s high needs no doubt required a particularly high degree of
attention to and coordination with her caregivers.31 We suspect that this
case might tax the abilities of even the most experienced child welfare
professional. But a reasonable fact finder could not find by clear and
convincing evidence that either parent was provided with reasonable
reunification services during the 18-month review period. The court erred
when it found to the contrary.
DISPOSITION
The petitions for writ of mandate are granted. Let a peremptory writ of
mandate issue directing the juvenile court to: (1) vacate its order setting a
hearing for G.L. under section 366.26; (2) vacate its finding reasonable
services were offered or provided to the parents; and (3) set a continued 18-
month permanency review hearing at the earliest date consistent with the
rights of the parties to prepare their case. At the new hearing, in addition to
the evidence previously presented, the court shall consider any evidence of
developments since March 20, 2026, that are relevant to the question of
G.L.’s safe return to father. If at the continued 18-month review hearing
there are no new developments that would warrant otherwise, G.L. should be
returned to father’s custody, including, if the juvenile court in its discretion
deems it appropriate, with an order for family maintenance services. If the
court does find that new developments warrant a different conclusion, the

31 Not only did G.L. change placements several times as we have noted,
but the delivered service logs indicate that in late November and early
December 2025, G.L.’s current caregiver began pressing the Department to
find G.L. another placement “immediately” and resisting entreaties to
become a concurrent planning option.

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court can make whatever orders are appropriate in light of that finding and
then address any other issues raised by the parties.
In the interest of justice, this decision shall become final as to this court
five days from the date it is filed. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
The temporary stay previously granted is hereby vacated.

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STEWART, P. J.

We concur:

RICHMAN, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

F.L. et al. v. Sonoma County Superior Court; Sonoma County Human Services
Department et al., RPI (A176020)

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