Filed 10/5/26 Estate of Wigg CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Estate of HAROLD T. WIGG, Jr., D086240
Deceased.
_____________________________________
IMPERIAL COUNTY PUBLIC (Super. Ct. No. EPR03314)
ADMINISTRATOR, as Administrator,
etc.,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
MICHELLE M. DUTRO,
Claimant and Appellant,
HARROLD T. WIGG III, as
Beneficiary,
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, L.
Brooks Anderholt, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Law Offices of Peter C. Giffin and Peter C. Giffin for Claimant and
Appellant.
Andrew Briseno, Imperial County Deputy County Counsel for
Petitioner and Respondent.
Astuno & Associates, James J. Astuno, Jr., Samuel McNeal and Shawn
Lyons for Respondent.
Appellant Michelle M. Dutro appeals a January 2025 probate court
order directing the distribution of real property previously held by Wigg &
Sons, Inc., a suspended corporation, to respondent Harrold Trueman Wigg III
pursuant to a will of decedent Harold T. Wigg, Jr.1 Dutro contends the
probate court’s order is contrary to California law that prohibits suspended
corporations from transferring property, and thus the order is void as a
matter of law. Respondents Imperial County Public Administrator
(Administrator) and Wigg respond that Dutro, who was paid on her creditor’s
claim against the estate prior to entry of the appealed-from order, lacks
standing and/or is not an aggrieved party, requiring that her appeal be
dismissed. We agree with that contention, and therefore must dismiss
Dutro’s appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The decedent died in January 2014, leaving a will. The will
bequeathed to Wigg, among other things, “Wigg & Son Inc. stocks,” specified
property on Leon Lane in Julian, California (the Julian property), as well as
1 We refer to Harold T. Wigg, Jr. as the decedent and respondent Harrold
Trueman Wigg III as Wigg.
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“everything related to Wigg & Son Inc.”2 The court eventually appointed
Wigg as the estate’s personal representative and the will’s executor. As of
the end of 2018, Wigg had not yet petitioned to discharge the estate, so in
February 2019, the court replaced him with Administrator.
In February 2021, Dutro filed a creditor’s claim in the probate
proceeding in the amount of $27,798.76 for payment of taxes on the Julian
property.
In January 2025, Administrator filed a final accounting, report, and
petition for final distribution of the estate (final accounting and petition).
The final accounting indicates that Administrator received Dutro’s creditor’s
claim and paid it in full in June 2023. Days later, the court entered an order
approving the final accounting and petition. The order authorizes
Administrator to distribute the estate’s remaining funds and real property to
2 Corporate records that Dutro has asked this court to judicially notice
(see footnote 3, infra) suggest the corporation’s name is Wigg & Sons, Inc.
The discrepancy is immaterial to this appeal.
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Wigg pursuant to the decedent’s will. In April 2025, Administrator signed a
quitclaim deed transferring the Julian property to Wigg.3
Following Administrator’s execution of the quitclaim deed, Dutro filed
an appeal of the court’s order approving the final accounting and petition.
Two days later, on April 21, 2025, the quitclaim deed was recorded.
DISCUSSION
Pointing out that a suspended corporation lacks legal capacity to
exercise corporate powers including the transfer of real property, Dutro
contends the probate court erred by ordering the Julian property’s transfer to
Wigg. Specifically, she argues this court in Casiopea Bovet, LLC v. Chiang
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 656 held that “judicial action cannot override corporate
suspension,” that conveyances made during a corporation’s suspension are
voidable at the instance of any party other than the suspended entity, and
3 We elect to take judicial notice of the quitclaim deed signed and
recorded in April 2025 (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459; Linda Vista Village
San Diego Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Tecolote Investors, LLC (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 166, 185) as Wigg does not object and relies on that document in
his own respondent’s brief. Dutro has asked that this court take judicial
notice of various other documents pertaining to Wigg & Sons, Inc.’s corporate
status and the Julian property, including a California Secretary of State
certificate of status pertaining to Wigg & Sons, Inc., as well as what appear
to be pages from website searches for information related to Wigg & Sons,
Inc. Dutro admits that none of these items were before the probate court
below. She has not described exceptional circumstances that would permit us
to take judicial notice of these items in this event. (See Haworth v. Superior
Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 379, fn. 2 [absent exceptional circumstances,
appellate court will not take judicial notice of matters not before the trial
court].) Additionally, because we resolve this matter on grounds of standing
as well as the absence of record evidence to support Dutro’s claim of any
interest in the Julian property, we deny the request as unnecessary to our
resolution of this appeal. (Accord, Leahy v. Peterson (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
239, 244; County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
580, 613, fn. 29.)
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the probate court’s order attempting to effectuate such a transfer was “legally
incapable of producing valid title.” According to Dutro, Administrator’s
quitclaim deed is not lawful, but an attempted judicial workaround of
statutory suspension. She argues the order prejudiced her interests as
creditor, taxpayer, and adverse possessor.
Administrator in response suggests Dutro, whose creditor’s claim was
paid in full, is not aggrieved by the probate court’s order, in part relying on
Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194. It further argues that Dutro
has not suffered prejudice as an alleged adverse possessor because she still
has the same rights and ability to obtain her desired result for title to the
property. Wigg similarly argues that because Dutro is not aggrieved by the
court’s order but rather prevailed on it by obtaining payment on her creditor’s
claim, she lacks standing to bring this appeal. He points out Dutro has no
interest in the Julian property including by any claim of adverse possession,
which lacks any basis in the appellate record. Wigg argues that Dutro’s
adverse possession claim is unaffected by the title transfer in any event
because that claim is not dependent on who holds title. He maintains any
interest she has is so attenuated and remote that she still cannot be
aggrieved by the order.
The respondents’ contentions have merit, and thus we limit our
analysis to the question of Dutro’s standing to appeal the court’s order.
I. Principles of Appellate and Probate Court Standing
“Not every party has standing to appeal every appealable order.
Although standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts are resolved in
its favor, only a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal. [Citations.] An
aggrieved person, for this purpose, is one whose rights or interests are
injuriously affected by the decision in an immediate and substantial way, and
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not as a nominal or remote consequence of the decision.” (In re K.C. (2011) 52
Cal.4th 231, 236; Code Civ. Proc., § 902; Young v. Hartford (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 730, 739; Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
62, 67.) Standing rules are jurisdictional and cannot be waived.
(Conservatorship of Gregory D., at p. 67.)
In the context of a probate proceeding, “ ‘standing . . . is a fluid concept
dependent on the nature of the proceeding before the trial court and the
parties’ relationship to the proceeding, as well as to the trust (or estate).’
[Citation.] In general, ‘ “[t]o have standing, a party must be beneficially
interested in the controversy, and have ‘some special interest to be served or
some particular right to be preserved or protected.’ [Citation.] This interest
must be concrete and actual, and must not be conjectural or hypothetical.” ’
[Citation.] . . . The Probate Code defines ‘ “interested person” ’ broadly as
including an ‘[a]n heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any
other person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the
estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding’ ([Prob. Code,]
§ 48, subd. (a)), and its meaning ‘may vary from time to time and shall be
determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in,
any proceeding’ (id., subd. (b)). In turn, an ‘heir’ includes ‘any person . . . who
is entitled to take property of the decedent by intestate succession under this
code.’ ([Prob. Code,] § 44.) Consequently, the probate court ‘has flexibility in
determining whether to permit a party to participate as an interested party’
and may give standing to ‘ “anyone having an interest in an estate which may
be affected by a probate proceeding.” ’ ” (Hamlin v. Jendayi (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 1064, 1074; accord, In re Plaut’s Estate (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424,
425-426 [an interested person under the Probate Code “is one who has ‘such
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an interest as may be impaired or defeated by the probate of the will, or
benefited by setting it aside’ ”].)
II. Analysis
Here, Dutro lacks standing under either principle summarized above.
The record shows, and she does not dispute, that the estate satisfied her
claimed debt, paying it in full. Dutro does not claim to be a beneficiary of the
decedent’s will, and the will does not bequest anything to her, much less any
interest in the Julian property. With respect to appellate standing,
Administrator’s order directing transfer of the Julian property to Wigg does
not impact any right or interest Dutro may possess. (Estate of King (1953)
121 Cal.App.2d 765, 770 [appellant who was not a devisee under the
decedent’s will was not interested in his estate, and was not entitled to
appeal from probate court orders]; compare, Conservatorship of Hart (1991)
228 Cal.App.3d 1244, 1251, fn. 1 [potential diminution of expected
inheritance of named beneficiary in a will, by gifts to others, was sufficient to
confer appellate standing]; Estate of Bartsch (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 885, 890-
891 [potential heir had appellate standing to challenge interim attorney fee
award where the award might diminish the estate, despite the fact that heir’s
right to inherit had yet to be established].) Thus, we agree she is not
aggrieved for purposes of appellate standing.
In her opening brief, Dutro makes several factual assertions “to explain
her interest in the matter.” However, she admits these facts “are not
presently contained in the clerk’s transcript or the exhibits attached to [her]
motion for judicial notice.” (Some capitalization omitted.) They include the
fact that Dutro assertedly owns property adjacent to the Julian property, that
she, with Administrator’s knowledge and without its objection, “continued to
pay property taxes on the [Julian property], defended it against adverse
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possessors, and invested significant resources to protect and improve the
property.”4 She asserts that she did not seek reimbursement of these
expenses because she believed she would obtain title as an adverse possessor.
Absent record support for these factual assertions or any indication she
raised them in the probate court, we disregard them. (See In re S.C. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“To demonstrate error, appellant must present
meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to
facts in the record that support the claim of error”]; also Neptune
Management Corp. v. Cemetery & Funeral Bureau (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1007, 1012, fn. 2 [declining to address argument for the first time “because
the parties did not address it below and consequently neither the
administrative law judge nor the superior court ruled on this issue”].)
Dutro also states that Administrator’s quit claim deed “prompted the
purported beneficiary to file a quiet title action against [her]” and that being
forced into litigation is a “substantial and immediate injury.” But again,
Dutro cites no part of the record showing such an action was filed. And the
case she cites for the proposition, In re Estate of Colton (1912) 164 Cal. 1,
does not stand for the proposition she advances. Colton involved individuals
who entered into a written contract conditioning an estate’s distribution to
them on payment of the decedent’s debts and necessary costs of
4 According to Dutro, her “efforts included major structural repairs to the
residence, which had begun rotting due to rain damage and other
environmental deterioration, requiring considerable expense and labor” as
well as “substantial fire-prevention measures and extensive vegetation
management to safeguard the property and maintain its condition, all
directed toward preserving and enhancing the value of the estate’s assets.”
Dutro reserved the right to present such evidence in a supplemental request
for judicial notice in connection with her reply brief. We see none, but even if
she had done so, there is no indication she made any such request to the
probate court or presented such facts to it.
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administration. (Id. at p. 2.) Over those parties’ objections, the court decreed
partial distribution of the estate prematurely, while unresolved claims were
in pending litigation. (Id. at pp. 2, 4.) Under those circumstances, the
appellant, who had the right under the contract to distribution of one-half the
estate and thus possessed an interest in it, was injuriously affected by the
decree. (Id. at pp. 2, 4-5 [the appellant “not only possessed rights under the
contract which were injuriously affected by the decree, but she possessed an
interest in the estate which, for the reasons indicated, were liable to suffer
detriment because of the decree”; “any person having an interest recognized
by law in the subject matter of the judgment, which interest is injuriously
affected by the judgment, is a party aggrieved and entitled to be heard upon
appeal”].) In Colton, the appellant did not argue she was injured by being
subjected to litigation, and the appellate court made no such statement.
Further, Dutro has no corresponding interest in the estate as did the
appellant in Colton. The case does not assist Dutro.
As for Probate Code section 48 standing, while Dutro was previously a
creditor of the estate, she is no longer, as Administrator satisfied her debt.
And because Dutro has not otherwise demonstrated facts revealing some
interest or rights related to the Julian property, her claim of interest is
entirely conjectural. For the same reasons stated above, we disregard as
unsupported by the record her bare assertions concerning additional actions
or payments she made for the Julian property. Dutro has not shown she is a
“person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the
estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding” within the
meaning of Probate Code section 48, subdivision (a). (Italics added.)
Though as stated, “standing to appeal is construed liberally, and
doubts are resolved in its favor” (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 236), we
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are satisfied that Dutro has not shown she is aggrieved by the probate court
order that the Julian property be transferred to Wigg. Accordingly, we must
dismiss the appeal on grounds she lacks standing to challenge the order. (In
re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 709; Comerica Bank v. Runyon
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 473, 479; In re Holly B. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1261,
1263.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Respondents shall recover their costs on
appeal.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
KELETY, J.
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