Filed 8/10/26 Estate of Stephens CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Estate of NORMA J. STEPHENS, Deceased.
MACARIO AGUILAR, F090156
Petitioner and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. VPR052163)
v.
OPINION
ELIZABETH ROSE TYLER,
Objector and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Bret D.
Hillman, Judge.
Elizabeth Rose Tyler, in propria persona, for Objector and Appellant.
Sullivan & Sullivan, a Law Corporation, and Ryan P. Sullivan, for Petitioner and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Meehan, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and Harrell, J.
Macario Aguilar filed in the Tulare County Superior Court, a Probate Code
section 850 petition for transfer of real property. Aguilar noted he had contracted with
his neighbor, Norma Jean Stephens, to buy her property in Goshen, when she moved
from California to Oregon. Aguilar further contended he had complied with all the terms
of sale; however, the escrow company handling the sale shut down before escrow
officially closed and title to the property was never transferred to him. Meanwhile,
Stephens, who had moved to Oregon, had passed away.
Aguilar brought the instant petition to obtain title to the subject property.
Stevens’s granddaughter, Elizabeth Rose Tyler, objected to Aguilar’s petition. The
probate court held a contested hearing in the matter. The court ruled in favor of Aguilar.
The court found that Aguilar had contracted with Stephens to buy her property and had
complied with the contract’s terms. Accordingly, the court ordered that title to the
property be transferred to Aguilar.
Tyler appealed. She argues (1) that the probate court erroneously excluded her
expert witness’s opinion testimony as to the value of the property, and (2) that the court
did not properly apply the statute of frauds in considering the question of the existence of
the contract. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter concerns a claim to a parcel of property—with a trailer home on it—in
Goshen (the property or the Goshen property). Aguilar lived on a neighboring or
adjacent property. The Goshen property had long been owned by Stephens. Stephens
moved to Oregon in October 2016, to live with her sister Donna Dennis. Stephens died
in November 2022 at the age of 84 years.
In August 2023, Aguilar filed a petition for transfer of property under Probate
Code section 850. Aguilar sought a probate court order deeming him owner of the
Goshen property, on grounds that he had purchased the Goshen property from Stephens
2.
pursuant to a written agreement they reached prior to her departure for Oregan, towards
the end of 2016.1
On September 29, 2023, Tyler filed an objection to Aguilar’s petition; Tyler is a
granddaughter of Stephens. Tyler asserted that Stephens remained “legal owner” of the
Goshen property at the time of her death. Among other contentions, Tyler posited that, to
the extent Stephens entered into an agreement with Aguilar, she was cognitively impaired
at the time and did not have the mental capacity to enter into a contract. Tyler also
asserted that Aguilar had not made full payment under the contract. Tyler asked the
probate court to deny Aguilar’s petition.
On February 10, 2025, the probate court held a contested hearing on Aguilar’s
petition. On March 7, 2025, the court issued a written ruling granting the petition.
On May 20, 2025, the probate court entered a “judgment determining claim to
property.” (Capitalization omitted.) The judgment provided that the Goshen property
“shall not be considered an asset in the Estate of Norma J. Stephens.” The judgment
further provided that title to the Goshen property “is hereby ordered to be held by
MACARIO AGUILAR.”
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Testimony of Macario Aguilar at the Contested Hearing
Aguilar testified on his own behalf at the contested hearing on his petition. He
testified that he was Stephens’s neighbor. In May 2016, he asked Stephens if he could
lease part of her property. Stephens told him she planned to move to Oregon and offered
to sell her property to him. Aguilar and Stephens discussed the terms of the sale.
Aguilar testified: “Well, the house needed a lot of work. Needed a lot of work.
The property, it’s pretty much just the lot because the house needs a lot of work. But
[Stephens was] all, ‘I have a lien that needs to be paid beforehand. And if you pay the
1 Aguilar’s initiating petition is not in the record on appeal.
3.
lien, when you get back up, you pay me the rest, and when I’m ready to go to Oregon,
you pay me the rest.’ ” Aguilar clarified the house on Stephens’s property was “a mobile
home, prefab.” He also indicated that the lien in question was on the mobile home, in the
amount of $15,000. Aguilar reiterated that Stephens wanted him to pay off the $15,000
lien, first; thereafter, she would sell him her property for $20,000. Aguilar testified:
“[A]fter I gave her the money to pay the lien, it got handled and she gave me a little bit of
time to give her $10,000. When she was taking off [for] Oregon, I gave her the other
$10,000.”
After Aguilar gave Stephens the funds to discharge the lien, and he was ready to
make the first $10,000 payment for the Goshen property, Stephens memorialized their
agreement in writing. The contract stated that Aguilar would make an initial $10,000
payment towards the purchase of the Goshen property, followed by a second $10,000
payment at a later point. Aguilar was asked: “And was this [agreement] written after
you had already paid off the lien on the mobile home to her?” He answered: “Yes.”
Aguilar said the contract was written when he delivered the first $10,000 installment
payment towards the purchase of the property to Stephens.
The signed, written agreement was admitted into evidence. It states: “Price
[$]20,000. Received [$]10,000 from [Aguilar] for [the Goshen property] … for sale as
is[,] leaving a [b]alance of [$]10,000 to be paid by [January] 15[,] 2017[.] Will get the
Deed to the property when paid in full.”2 The agreement further noted, with respect to
the balance that Aguilar “promise[d] to pay [Stephens] [$]10,000 by [January]15th[,]
2017.”
The agreement was drafted by Stephens, and both parties signed it at the same
time. They signed it in the presence of Stephens’s sister, Donna Dennis. Aguilar could
2 The contract refers to Aguilar as “Mike.” Aguilar testified that Stephens referred
to him as “Mike,” rather than Mac.
4.
not recall the exact date they executed the written agreement but noted it was before
Stephens moved to Oregon. He testified: “When she first left [for Oregon], it was at the
end of [2016] [a]nd she came back in January [2017] to finish up the paperwork [related
to the property sale].”
Two versions of the agreement were admitted into evidence. The text of the
two versions is substantively identical; however, one version is written on a larger piece
of paper and the other on a smaller one.3 Aguilar explained that Stephens first drafted the
agreement on “[t]he little sheet[,]” but deemed it “too small.” She then got the “bigger”
sheet and rewrote it in a larger format. Both versions were written on the same occasion.
When Stephens returned to Goshen in January 2017, she and Aguilar went to
Tulare County Escrow. Aguilar testified: “We went to the—I forget what it’s called—
where you do the paperwork. It closed down. Tulare—Tulare County Escrow.… They
closed down afterwards. We went there, met up, signed all the paperwork … at the
escrow [company]. We didn’t finish the paperwork that day because since it’s a mobile
home, I was told that it needs to be [registered at] a separate department .… And that’s
what we didn’t finish. She signed, I signed, and I just had to come back for the other
paperwork and then I didn’t come back.” Aguilar testified that he made the
second payment of $10,000 to Stephens at the escrow company’s office. He took
possession of the property at that time.4
Aguilar explained why he did not timely finish the outstanding paperwork for the
mobile home: “Cold came around and we got busy with work. Had a situation at home.
My brother got cancer. I had to go to Mexico. When I came back, I got to work. Cold
came around, and that’s why I didn’t finish the paperwork.” Aguilar noted that Stephens
3 The language quoted ante is from the larger version.
4 Aguilar testified he periodically rented out the trailer home on the Goshen
property.
5.
had “signed everything over to [him],” but escrow did not close because additional
paperwork was required for the mobile home. Aguilar subsequently received a few calls
from Tulare County Escrow informing him that it was closing down, but Aguilar was in
Mexico. He stated: “When I got back, it was already closed.” Thus, the escrow
company closed down before the process was completed; while a deed had been
prepared, he never got it, nor was it recorded. The Goshen property therefore remained
in Stephens’s name.
Aguilar testified that he remained in touch with Stephens until September 2017.
He was asked, “Did you recognize any cognitive decline in Norma Stephens between,
say, May … 2016 and September … 2017?” He responded: “Nothing. Normal.” He
stated he did not have any concerns regarding her ability or capacity to enter into an
agreement.
Aguilar testified that he had paid property taxes on the Goshen property starting in
2023, and all property taxes were “up to date.” He explained: “I was having a hard time
with the issue [of the property purchase]—with my brother having cancer, and Covid
came around, and I was under the impression that all my taxes came, since all the—the
two properties were together, I thought they would come together.5 I wasn’t really
paying attention. My wife doesn’t speak English. She thought we were paying [for] both
of the properties, until we found out it [sic] wasn’t. The paperwork didn’t get completed,
so that’s when we started moving to put it in my name.”
With regard to the sale price for the Goshen property proposed by Stephens,
Aguilar testified that the mobile home needed a lot of work and that the purchase price
was commensurate with the prices of “three lots down the road.” He testified that
Stephens had factored in the prices of those nearby lots.
5 Aguilar had bought his own home from one of Stephens’s sisters, Katherine
Sunderland, and her husband, in 2006. Stephens’s property (the Goshen property) was
next door.
6.
Deposition Testimony of Donna Dennis, Stephens’s Sister (Admitted by Stipulation)
Counsel for both parties deposed Stephens’s sister, Donna Dennis, on April 18,
2024, during the course of the discovery process in this matter. The deposition was
admitted into evidence at the contested hearing, by stipulation of the parties.
Dennis has lived outside Klamath Falls in Oregon since 2001. At the end of
October 2016, Stephens moved to Oregon to live with Dennis. Prior to moving to
Oregon, Stephens lived in Goshen for 45 years, at the Goshen property. Dennis and
Stephens were “very close,” and Dennis would regularly visit Stephens in Goshen. They
would also speak on the phone once a week, when Stephens lived in Goshen.
Dennis testified: “[Stephens] told me a long time ago … that she wanted [Aguilar]
to have her house, to buy her house, because he had bought my other sister’s house next
door to her.[6] And he was a truck driver, and he needed the land for all of his trucks.”7
Dennis stated that she had not noticed any cognitive decline in Stephens before Stephens
moved to Oregon.
Dennis recalled that Stephens sold her property to Aguilar in September 2016.
Dennis was asked: “And how do you know that?” Dennis replied: “Because I was down
there with her, and she told [Aguilar] that she had a lien on her property for [$]15,000
plus some change and if he would pay the lien off then she would sell it to him for
$20,000. So he agreed.” Dennis was shown the written agreement signed by Aguilar and
Stephens. Dennis confirmed the agreement was written in Stephens’s handwriting and
the signature on it was Stephens’s signature. Dennis also noted that she and her husband
were both present at Stephens’s house when Stephens drafted the agreement. Dennis
6 Dennis testified that Aguilar bought his own home from Dennis’s other sister,
Katherine Sunderland, for $94,000. Dennis explained that Sunderland’s property was
“worth more” than Stephens’s property because “it’s got a lot more property on it” and
“it’s in nicer shape.” Dennis added that Stephens “couldn’t keep her place up.”
7 Dennis also referred to Aguilar as “Mike.”
7.
added: “She received $10,000 from [Aguilar] for the property and the balance of
[$]10,000 [was] to be paid by January 15[, 2017].”
Dennis was asked, “And to your knowledge did [Aguilar] pay the $10,000 to
[Stephens] by January 15[,] of 2017 as agreed?” Dennis answered: “Yes. I was there
when he paid both [installments]. He owed her $20,000, and I was there both times.”
Dennis was asked, “To your knowledge [Stephens] never transferred the deed?”
Dennis responded: “I think that’s what the problem [was]. Yeah, she signed a lot of
papers, and we thought then that the property would be in his name. But evidently it
wasn’t in his name, it was [still] in [Stephens’s] name.” Dennis added: “We ran into
different places and signed a lot of papers, her and [Aguilar] did. And I went with them.
But the normal papers I guess was nothing that had to do with the deed.”
Dennis was further asked: “How do you know there was no deed?” She
answered: “It’s just that [Aguilar] asked me, because he took a long time finding me,
[after the problem came to light], and when he did find me he asked if I had gotten
anything in the mail about a deed or anything. I said, no, I haven’t received anything. He
said, well, he hadn’t received anything either.”
In addition, Dennis was asked, “[D]o you know how the price of $20,000 came
about?” Dennis replied: “Well, [Aguilar] was asking [Stephens] how much she wanted
for it, and she says, well, I have a lien against it. That’s when she said if he would pay
off the lien that she would let him have it for $20,000. Because she knew the property
wasn’t worth that much anyway. The trailer was getting really bad. It was in really bad
shape.” Dennis added: “The only thing that [Aguilar] was interested in was the [land].”
Dennis said that Stephens was pleased with the transaction.
Dennis was asked, “When you were present and heard discussion between
[Stephens] and [Aguilar] about the price for her property, who proposed the sale price?”
She responded: “Well, [Stephens] called the realtor out there, and [he] didn’t go inside
the house or anything, and he estimated about [$]40[,000] to [$]45,000.” Dennis said this
8.
figure was for the land and the trailer. She noted that she was present when Stephens
called the realtor. Dennis was also present when Stephens proposed to Aguilar the plan
of paying off the lien on the trailer and paying an additional $20,000 for the property.
Dennis was asked, “Did you have any conversation with [Stephens] at any time about
whether that was a good, fair price?” Dennis replied: “Well, I thought it was,
considering the way the trailer looked.” Dennis added: “She didn’t regret … selling the
house.”
Dennis stated that sometime after Stephens moved to Oregon, she was placed in a
conservatorship. Dennis noted that Stephens was fine for a while after she moved to
Oregon. However, around 2018, she was “a little bit … forgetting stuff.” Dennis added:
“I wouldn’t call that dementia. But she was forgetting things a little bit, yeah.”
Eventually, Stephens was moved from Dennis’s house to a facility. Dennis explained:
“She just didn’t seem like she was getting along that well mentally by herself. I think she
should have had more care.”
Dennis testified that all of Stephens’s four children had passed away. She said
Stephens’s grandchildren “never came around at all until they found out money was
involved, and now they’re coming out of the woodwork.” Dennis said that Stephens had
told her that her grandchildren did not visit her and did not like her.
Probate Court’s Written Ruling
Following the contested hearing on Aguilar’s petition, the probate court issued a
detailed, written ruling granting the petition.
Among other findings, the probate court stated: “In this case, the court finds that
the petitioner has [established] that he completed the purchase of the property. He
testified he paid the agreed purchase price for the real property.” The court added:
“Decedent’s sister fully supports his version of events. She confirmed her sister wanted
to sell the property to ‘[Aguilar].’ Dennis additionally testified that [Stephens] set the
price, which price she was willing to agree to after Aguilar paid the mobile home lien.
9.
Dennis testified that after Aguilar paid off the lien, the parties entered the agreement for
the purchase and sale of the property at the price decedent indicated she was willing to
sell for and that Aguilar paid the $20,000.”
The probate court continued: “Dennis’s testimony was consistent with Aguilar’s
that the parties had ‘signed papers,’ but that the property was never transferred to Aguilar
for unknown reasons. Dennis also confirmed that cognitive decline and undue influence
did not impact the sale.”
The probate court further stated: “[T]he [c]ourt does not give great weight to the
2018 conservatorship” as “it tells the [c]ourt nothing about [Stephens’s] mental state in
2016.” The court added: “Decedent hand-wrote two versions of the sales contract and
neither exhibited any confusion as to their terms. The [c]ourt is more persuaded by the
testimony of decedent’s sister in that she was present when the transaction was negotiated
and completed and no evidence was presented that would cast doubt on her credibility on
the matters about which she testified.”
The probate court concluded: “The Probate Code [section] 850 petition is granted.
[The Goshen property] shall not be considered an asset in the estate of Norma Stephens.”
The probate court subsequently entered judgment to the effect that title to the
Goshen property would be held by Aguilar.
DISCUSSION
I. Probate Court’s Exclusion of Opinion Testimony of Tyler’s Expert Witness
Tyler argues the probate court improperly struck the opinion testimony of her
expert witness. We conclude Tyler has not shown reversible error.
A. Standard of Review
We “review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion.” (In re Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 540,
fn. 5.)
10.
B. Background
Tyler called Diane Witz as a witness in the contested hearing on Aguilar’s
petition. Witz is a “broker associate and manager of the [E]state [P]roperties office in
Beverly Hills.” She has been with that office since 1995 and became manager in 1999.
She works on “all aspects of real estate, as far as sales go.”
Witz explained she conducts market research to help clients who are selling
properties decide on listing prices. She testified: “We pull public record data and
multiple listing data or in commercial applications, CoStar, which is similar to Multiple
Listing Service for commercial property. And from that information, we’re able to
discern what the valuation is for comparative market analysis purposes.”
Witz was asked to form an opinion about the fair market value of the Goshen
property as of October 2016. She explained how she went about doing that. She
testified: “Well, the first thing I do when I’m working on a property that is outside of my
immediate geographic area is contact a local agent who is familiar with the local territory
and nuances, because I can pull public record information, but I can’t get the feel for …
the street, a local [perspective].” Witz followed this practice in this instance as well.
Witz contacted Jennifer Oliphant of the Anderson Realty Group. Witz said: “She
is a native Visalian, and she’s been in the business for [10] years.” Oliphant provided
Witz with new information and “also supplemented some of the information that [Witz]
already had.” Witz was asked, “And what information did she provide you?” Witz
responded: “The fact that [focusing on] west Goshen is critical to ascertaining true
comps. It’s a very limited geographic area, but pulling information from a greater radius
will not really deliver comparable information because the data sets are quite different.”
Witz added: “Both of us separately searched the greater Visalia area, Tulare County,
Goshen, and west Goshen, all separately and combined.”
Witz was also asked: “Did you encounter any difficulties in coming up with a fair
market value in this case?” Witz answered: “Yes, one of the challenges that we ran into
11.
is the lack of comps. There’s a very low turnover in west Goshen. And in order to find
comparable properties, we were able to go back to 2014 and extend [from there] out to
2017, but when we tried to tighten [the] timeline [for more precise comparables], there
was nothing available.”
Witz focused on information about prior sales on the street on which the Goshen
property is located. She settled on two prior properties on that street. One was Aguilar’s
own property, which he had purchased from Stephens’s sister in 2006 for $90,000. The
other property was a “brick and mortar” house, not a mobile home, and was
“substantially larger”; this property had sold for $165,000 in 2014.
Witz was asked: “Based on what you did find, in all the work you did, including
talking with the local agent, did you come up with a figure that you felt was the fair
market value for the subject property in October 2016?” Witz replied: “My opinion is
the property was worth, conservatively, $100,000.… Adjustments have been made for
the fact that the structure was a different type of structure. And that’s how I got to
[$]100,000. And I conferred with the local agent on that valuation and she is in
agreement with me.”
At that point, Aguilar’s counsel objected on hearsay grounds and moved to strike
the opinion; the probate court sustained the objection. The court stated: “I’m going to
strike the whole thing. I don’t think she has any basis to make that testimony that’s
compatible with the Sanchez case,[8] counsel. She’s clearly relied on case-specific
hearsay to form 100 percent of her opinion. And, I mean, I assume you would have listed
the information if you had any connection to the local market: [s]he had been [here], she
had listed properties here, sold property here, she had knowledge that wasn’t related to
hearsay that had helped her form that opinion.” (Italics added.)
8 People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665.
12.
In its subsequent written ruling, the probate court explained its exclusion of Witz’s
opinion as follows: “Here the expert was not consulting a general database for
background information. If she had used the county assessor’s website to look up the
assessor’s parcel number, that would have been appropriate. She was consulting real
estate databases that offered value opinions and then confirming her conclusions with a
separate hearsay consultation with a local realtor. This is the very definition of case
specific facts prohibited by Sanchez.”
C. Analysis
Here, even assuming the probate court erred in excluding Witz’s opinion
testimony, Tyler has not shown the error was prejudicial. “The burden is on the appellant
in every case to show that the claimed error is prejudicial, i.e., that it has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.” (Cucinella v. Weston Biscuit Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 71, 82.)
Prejudice is not presumed and must appear affirmatively upon an examination of the
entire record. “[T]he appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the
error caused a miscarriage of justice.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 68, 106; see also Santina v. General Petroleum Corp. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d
74, 76.)
The record indicates the probate court was not inclined to give much weight to
Witz’s opinion, regardless of its admissibility. First, at one point in Witz’s testimony, the
court had observed: “I’ll let [Witz] express her opinion, but it’s unlikely I’m going to
give it much, if any, weight based on her testimony as to how she acquired it.”
Next, the probate court noted in its written ruling: “The [c]ourt agrees that this
was a civil bench trial, and the [c]ourt has more discretion to consider or disregard
opinions it finds inaccurate. Ultimately, the court doesn’t find the valuation testimony
relevant. The court has not been presented with any evidence that indicates the decedent
was incapable of setting a sales price for her property, that she was defrauded or subject
to undue influence. The two witnesses who testified on this issue[, namely Aguilar and
13.
Dennis,] said she set the sales price based on the location of the real property and the
condition of the personal property.”
Elsewhere in its written ruling, the probate court commented: “Decedent asked
for the price she wanted and was fully aware of the property’s defects.”
Tyler contends the “purpose of [Witz’s] opinion was to establish that the sale price
asserted by Aguilar was grossly below fair market value.” However, Tyler’s argument as
to prejudice arising from the exclusion of Witz’s opinion is only one sentence long. On
the issue of prejudice, Tyler merely states: “Striking Witz’s testimony and thus
preventing use of Witz’s valuation in the case was highly prejudicial to Tyler.”
Tyler’s argument as to prejudice is entirely undeveloped and unsupported.
Accordingly, we conclude Tyler has not affirmatively shown that the exclusion of Witz’s
opinion testimony resulted in a miscarriage of justice in this case.
II. Statute of Frauds
Tyler next contends the probate court did not properly apply the statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds, Civil Code section 1624, provides that contracts for the sale of real
property that are not in writing are invalid. “Since the statute of frauds primarily serves
to prove that a contract exists, the writing need only mention certain ‘essential’ or
‘meaningful’ terms.” (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1108 (citations
omitted); see Phillippe v. Shapell Industries (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1247, 1259 [“The total lack
of meaningful terms and conditions is the problem.”].)
Tyler notes: “The statute of frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624[, subd.,] (a)(3)) requires
agreements for the sale of real property be in writing that [sic] includes all material
terms.” She argues: “The [p]robate [c]ourt’s [r]uling improperly entered [judgment] for
Aguilar despite there being a clear violation of the statute of fraud[s].” Tyler adds: “The
only written document evidencing any aspect of an agreement between Stephens and
Aguilar does not mention any requirement that Aguilar payoff [sic] a $15,000 lien for
Stephens.”
14.
Aguilar, for his part, responds: “Here, the written agreement did not make any
mention that [Aguilar] was required to pay off the $15,000 lien before transfer of title
[could] be effectuated. The written agreement stated that the purchase price for the
[p]roperty was $20,000. [Citation.] [Stephens] acknowledged that she received $10,000
from [Aguilar] and that [Aguilar] would receive the deed to the [p]roperty when the
purchase price was paid in full. [Citation.] [Aguilar] testified that the written agreement
was made and executed after he [had] paid off the $15,000 lien. [Citation.] Thus, the
payoff of the lien was not an essential term of the written agreement between the parties.”
(Italics added.)
We conclude Aguilar has the better argument on the point. Here, the lien was paid
off before the written agreement was executed. Thus, when the agreement was executed,
there was no danger of a dispute regarding paying off the lien in relation to execution of
the contract. The written contract, executed after the lien was paid off, reasonably
specified that the sale price for the Goshen property was $20,000, payable in
two installments of $10,000 each, and that Aguilar would acquire title upon full payment
thereof. In short, the written agreement appears to encompass all essential terms. (See
Sterling v. Taylor (2007) 40 Cal.4th 757, 775 [the statute of frauds’s writing requirement
is intended to “ ‘prevent enforcement through fraud or perjury of contracts never in fact
made’ ”].) Furthermore, Tyler has not provided citations to any legal authorities showing
that, under the circumstances, the lien payoff was required to be included in the written
agreement as an essential contractual term.
15.
We conclude Tyler has not established that the probate court erred under the
statute of frauds.9, 10
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Aguilar is entitled to his costs on appeal.
9 Tyler also argues, in three sentences: “Moreover, the [p]robate [c]ourt also
glossed over the fact that Aguilar did not produce a grant deed. Although Aguilar
claimed the decedent executed a deed to him, he failed to produce a deed, violating the
statute of frauds set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1971. The decedent’s sister
testified she went with the decedent to sign papers and that there was no deed.”
Aguilar responds: “This point is untenable. Sufficient evidence was produced to
substantiate that [Aguilar] performed all conditions and obligations in conformity with
the parties’ agreement. By virtue of the written agreement, title of the [p]roperty should
have vested to [Aguilar].”
Aguilar again has the better argument. Code of Civil Procedure section 1971
states that interests in real property are properly created or granted by “operation of law.”
Furthermore, the probate court determined: “[T]he court finds that the evidence
established a writing consistent with the requirements of the [s]tatute of [f]rauds and that
Aguilar performed his payment obligations in conformity with the parties’ agreement.”
10 On February 17, 2026, Tyler filed a motion to augment the record, attaching
multiple documents that were the subject of her request to augment. On February 18,
2026, this court issued an order denying Tyler’s motion as an augmentation request but
deemed it a motion to take judicial notice of the documents attached thereto, to be
decided in conjunction with the merits of the appeal. The motion to take judicial notice is
hereby denied because Tyler has not sufficiently clarified the relevance of the subject
documents.
16.