Filed 8/19/26 Estate of Bates CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
Estate of MARY ESTHER BATES,
Deceased.
TYEHIMBA KOKAYI, as
Administrator of the Estate
A174159
Petitioner and Respondent,
v. (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RP21094469)
DUSTAN WRIGHT
Objector and Appellant.
Dustan Wright, who is self-represented, appeals an order entered by
the probate court on June 5, 2025, granting the estate administrator’s
petition to eject him from possession of a single family home located at
845 Athens Avenue in Oakland, California belonging to the deceased, Mary
Bates (hereafter, the Bates residence).
This is Wright’s second appeal in a long-running dispute arising from
Wright’s and others’ occupancy of the Bates residence following her death
that has involved multiple parties and generated multiple lawsuits. We
previously affirmed a judgment of dismissal in a civil action for damages and
foreclosure of a mechanics lien Wright brought against the estate
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administrator and others. (Karewicz v. Wright (Jan. 28, 2025, A170145)
[nonpub. opn.].) In that appeal, we found Wright’s briefing “unfocused and
difficult to understand” (ibid.), and the same is true here.
We will affirm the order granting the administrator’s petition to
recover possession of the Bates residence.1
BACKGROUND
On April 18, 2025, the administrator of Mary Bates’s estate, Tyehimba
Kokayi (hereafter, the administrator), filed a verified petition against Wright
to recover possession of the Bates residence. The petition alleged the
property belongs to the estate, Wright and others had been squatting
unlawfully there for 13 years, and Wright had been “h[olding] the property
hostage” from the estate and Bates’s heirs by filing multiple lawsuits in
propria persona and yet had lost them all, including the prior appeal. It also
alleged Wright had filed a petition in the probate case claiming damages
against the administrator and to remove him as administrator, and his
petition had been denied. It alleged he “now seeks to start the process all
over again by filing another case (25CV112257) against the same parties” and
“is a vexatious litigant.” The petition alleged specifically that on March 3,
2025, Wright had filed “a new complaint in Alameda case number
25CV112[2]57 against Petitioner and other parties, including the same
1 The notice of appeal also specifies an order entered on June 17, 2025,
but the record contains no such order. In addition, Wright states in his brief
that “[t]he subsequent order that is under appeal” is the writ of possession
issued by the clerk on July 14, 2025, but his notice of appeal did not specify
that order and so we lack jurisdiction to review it (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.100(a)(2); see, e.g. DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43),
and in any event his briefing contains no discernible argument concerning
the writ. For these reasons, we address only the probate court’s June 5, 2025
ruling on the ejectment petition.
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parties that he sued” previously. It alleged that, “[a]s of the date of this
Petition, [Wright] has not vacated the Estate Real Property and continues to
obstruct Petitioner from gaining possession” of the property. The petition
sought an order compelling Wright and other occupants to surrender
possession of the Bates residence and related relief.
Wright filed a response opposing the petition on only two grounds: (1)
he argued the petition had not been filed and served properly in violation of
Probate Code section 851; and (2) he asked the court to abate the petition
under Probate Code section 854 until his newly filed civil case
(No. 25CV112257) concluded. Section 854 states: “If a civil action is pending
with respect to the subject matter of a petition filed pursuant to this
chapter this part and jurisdiction has been obtained in the court where the
civil action is pending prior to the filing of the petition, upon request of any
party to the civil action, the court shall abate the petition until the conclusion
of the civil action. This section shall not apply if the court finds that the civil
action was filed for the purpose of delay.” (Italics added.) Wright’s opposition
was supported by no evidence other than a proof of service on the
administrator for the summons and complaint in the newly filed action. His
opposition described that case as one for “quiet title by adverse possession.”
In reply, the administrator argued the petition should not be abated
because Wright’s newly filed civil case was a “sham” that had been filed for
the purpose of delay, to evade prior adverse rulings.
Wright did not attend the hearing.
The probate court granted the petition, in an order entered June 5,
2025, rejecting Wright’s only two arguments. It ruled that “all notices
required by law have been given” and “there is no evidence Petitioner
violated Probate Code section 851” regarding proper service. It also found
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that Wright’s previously filed action (No. 25CV112257) “was filed for the
purpose of delay, therefore abatement pursuant to Probate Code section 854
does not apply.” It “f[ound] and confirm[ed] that . . . [Wright] has no rights of
ownership and/or possession to” the Bates residence; ordered Wright and all
other occupants to vacate and surrender possession of the Bates residence to
the administrator within 15 days; ordered the issuance of a writ of possession
commanding the sheriff to eject Wright from the premises; and issued related
ancillary relief and monetary relief.
Wright subsequently filed a motion to vacate the June 5, 2025 order
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, supported by a declaration under
oath and a voluminous request for judicial notice. But he then filed his notice
of appeal before the motion to vacate was heard, and subsequently the trial
court denied his motion without reaching the merits on the ground that the
filing of his appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider vacating
the order.
DISCUSSION
We repeat what we said in Wright’s prior appeal about what an
appellant must do in order to present a proper argument for us to consider.
We presume that the trial court’s ruling is correct, and it is an
appellant’s burden to persuade us of an error. (See Grappo v. McMills (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006 [calling such framework “[t]he most fundamental
principle of appellate review”].) To do this, “ ‘an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146 (United Grand Corp.).) “Mere suggestions of
error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract
principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review.”
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(Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) We are not required to
develop an appellant’s argument for him and thus disregard conclusory
arguments that either lack citation to any relevant legal authority or fail to
spell out the appellant’s reasoning (or both). (United Grand Corp., at p. 153.)
In short, when an appellant fails to “convince us, by developing his
arguments, stating the law, and calling out relevant portions of the record,
that the trial court committed reversible error,” the appellant’s argument is
insufficient to demonstrate error. (See Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910.) Furthermore, the only issues we are required to
consider are those clearly identified in an argument heading. If there are
other arguments for reversal buried somewhere in the appellant’s opening
brief they are forfeited because we aren’t required to ferret them out (even if,
without any appropriately informative headings, we could). (See United
Grand Corp., at p. 153; Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of
Sacramento (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 280, 310.)2
Here, as in the prior appeal, Wright has not affirmatively shown any
error.
To the extent we understand his arguments, most appear to concern
issues he did not raise in opposition to the petition which, as noted, he
opposed on only two grounds. We agree with the administrator that all such
We also do not consider any new arguments contained in an
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appellant’s reply brief (and here, there are several). (See United Grand
Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 157-158.) “ ‘Fairness militates against
allowing an appellant to raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief
because consideration of the issue deprives the respondent of the opportunity
to counter the appellant by raising opposing arguments about the new
issue.’ ” (Id. at p. 158.)
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other issues (which defy precise identification) are forfeited. Generally, “ ‘the
failure to preserve a point below constitutes a [forfeiture] of the point.
[Citation.] This rule is rooted in the fundamental nature of our adversarial
system: The parties must call the court’s attention to issues they deem
relevant.’ ” (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
657, 698.) “ ‘ “An argument or theory will . . . not be considered if it is raised
for the first time on appeal.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 699; accord, Avalos v. Perez (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 773, 776-777.) Furthermore, an appellant must
affirmatively demonstrate that it preserved an argument in the trial court—
including by citing to the record showing exactly where the objection was
made, or else explain why the issue can be raised for the first time on appeal.
When an appellant does neither, we may deem the issue forfeited. (See Dietz
v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 798-802 (Dietz).)
Wright argues that he didn’t forfeit any issues because he later filed a
motion to vacate the court’s June 5, 2025 ruling. But he has made no
attempt to show that his subsequent motion raised any of these new issues,
as is his burden. (See Dietz, supra, 177 Cal. App.4th at p. 800 [appellant who
“fail[ed] to provide a single record citation demonstrating that it raised in the
trial court any of the numerous contentions” in opening brief held to have
forfeited them all; “[t]his court has no obligation to cull the lengthy record
[and] ascertain the procedural context in which [appellant] may have raised
these claims in the trial court”].) Furthermore, even if he had shown this,
Wright cites no authority that his subsequent motion was sufficient to
preserve those new issues in connection with the probate court’s earlier
June 5, 2025 ruling on the petition. At most, any new issues he raised in his
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motion to vacate that order would be reviewable on appeal from the court’s
August 13, 2025 ruling denying his motion, but no such appeal is before us.3
Turning then to the two issues Wright raised below, we perceive no
intelligible argument challenging the probate court’s ruling that there was no
violation of Probate Code section 851’s notice and service requirements.
As for whether the petition should have been abated under Probate
Code section 854 in favor of the already pending civil case, Wright does argue
the probate court erred. But here again, we discern no intelligible argument
that it erred in finding that Wright’s previously filed civil action “was filed for
the purpose of delay, [and] therefore abatement pursuant to Probate Code
section 854 does not apply.” At most, Wright attacks on several grounds
what he characterizes as “testimony” by the administrator’s counsel at the
hearing; but counsel did not testify at the hearing—he presented oral
argument. Wright does not address the legal standard under section 854 for
determining whether a previously filed civil action “was filed for the purpose
of delay,” the parties’ respective evidentiary burdens on this issue or the
applicable standard of review. He thus fails to demonstrate that the
uncontested allegations of the verified petition (which he did not dispute or in
any way contest) were not legally sufficient to sustain a ruling that
abatement in favor of the civil action was not mandatory.
Finally, we have discretion to address an issue for the first time on
appeal for pure questions of law (see Avalos v. Perez, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th
3 “An order denying a motion to vacate an appealable judgment is
generally not appealable if such appeal raises only matters that could be
reviewed on appeal from the judgment itself,” but such a ruling is appealable
when the motion “raise[d] issues which are not disclosed or could not be
disposed of on appeal from the judgment itself.” (Rooney v. Vermont
Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 358, 359.)
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at p. 777), and we exercise that discretion here to comment briefly on one
matter. Wright asserts that the probate court awarded damages in an
amount well in excess of the statutory maximum under Civil Code
section 3334, which generally limits damages for wrongful occupation of real
property to “the value of the use of the property for the time of that wrongful
occupation, not exceeding five years next preceding the commencement of the
action or proceeding to enforce the right to damages, the reasonable cost of
repair or restoration of the property to its original condition, and the costs, if
any, of recovering the possession.” (Italics added.) He asserts the probate
court erroneously awarded damages for the reasonable rental value of the
Bates residence ($83.33 per day) calculated from June 1, 2012 (or,
approximately $400,000), rather than from five years before the petition was
filed (or, approximately $152,077).
The court’s order is ambiguous. Paragraph 8 orders Wright “to pay
Petitioner $83.33 per day as fair market rent from June 1, 2012, to the date
possession of [the Bates residence] is surrendered to Petitioner.” But
Paragraph 9 states in relevant part, “The Court finds pursuant to Civil Code
section 3334, the detriment caused by [Wright’s] wrongful occupation of [the
Bates residence] is deemed to include the value of the use of the property for
the time of that wrongful occupation, not exceeding five years next preceding
the commencement of the action or proceeding to enforce the right to damages,”
thereby incorporating the statutory limitation. (Italics added.) Nothing in
this opinion is intended to preclude Wright from utilizing whatever
procedural vehicles may be appropriate on remand to seek clarification
concerning the probate court’s intentions regarding the date that fair rental
damages begin to accrue.
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DISPOSITION
The June 5, 2025 order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs.
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STEWART, P. J.
We concur.
RICHMAN, J.
MILLER, J.
Estate of Bates (A174159)
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