Filed 7/14/26 Estate of Bagha CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
Estate of VICTOR BAGHA, B332514
Deceased. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 17STPB11167)
MARILYN HARTON-ROSS,
Petitioner and
Respondent,
v.
RAIDA ALIMARDANI,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jessica A. Uzcategui, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Zarmi Law and David Zarmi for Objector and Appellant.
RMO and Sean D. Muntz for Petitioner and Respondent.
******
Objector and appellant Raida Alimardani (appellant)
appeals from the order for punitive damages following a bench
trial in favor of petitioner and respondent Marilyn Harton-Ross
(respondent). Appellant contends the punitive damages award
was improper because there was no evidence regarding her
financial condition and ability to pay. We agree and reverse.
BACKGROUND
The parties and the disputed property
Decedent Victor Bagha (decedent) owned property on La
Brea Avenue in Los Angeles (La Brea property) when he died on
October 11, 2017. The principal dispute in this case involved the
ownership of this property.
Decedent had a total of three marriages and four children.
His first marriage to respondent, with whom he had two children,
lasted nine years until they divorced in 1978. Decedent had two
other children in his second marriage to a woman named Susan.
Decedent married appellant in October 2006. The couple
separated in January 2015. Appellant filed for divorce, which
was ongoing at the time of decedent’s death.
In March 2017, decedent executed a holographic will
(March 2017 will) giving whatever he owned to his four children,
each to receive an equal 25 percent share. In the March 2017
will, decedent named respondent as the person responsible for
taking care of his belongings.
The petitions
In December 2017, respondent filed a petition for probate of
will seeking admission of the March 2017 will. In June 2018,
appellant filed a will contest and grounds for opposition to
probate of purported will. Appellant alleged the March 2017 will
was revoked and a product of respondent’s undue influence on
decedent. In December 2019, respondent filed a petition under
Probate Code section 850, which sought to determine title to the
La Brea property and asserted a claim for financial elder abuse.
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Respondent alleged that the grant deed decedent
purportedly executed on July 28, 2011 (July 2011 deed) to
transfer the La Brea property to appellant is a forgery.
Respondent alleged the property should be an asset of decedent’s
estate since he owned it when he died.
Decedent did not sign the July 2011 deed; it was signed by
appellant as his attorney-in-fact. Appellant claimed she had the
right as decedent’s power of attorney to transfer the La Brea
property to herself via the July 2011 deed. Appellant maintained
decedent executed the power of attorney on July 13, 2010, while
he was in jail. The July 2011 deed was recorded on
September 29, 2017.
Moreover, appellant alleged the March 2017 will was
revoked by a September 29, 2017 letter (September 2017 letter)
confirming decedent’s prior September 11, 2011 will, which
named appellant as executor and sole beneficiary. Appellant also
claimed another grant deed, dated August 15, 2012, transferred
the La Brea property from decedent to appellant (August 2012
deed). This grant deed was recorded on May 22, 2019, after the
litigation commenced and more than 18 months after decedent’s
death.
The trial
In March 2023, the matters came for trial. The trial court
heard testimony from the parties, Joseph Kennedy (a notary) and
Michael Wakshull (an expert in forensic document examination).
The court found the March 2017 will valid. Wakshull
testified decedent’s signature on the September 2017 letter was
lifted from another document. The court found Wakshull’s
testimony persuasive.
Further, the court found appellant could not transfer the
La Brea property to herself via the July 2011 deed because the
power of attorney did not authorize her to gift the property to
herself. The court also questioned the validity of the July 2011
deed due to Kennedy’s refusal to acknowledge he notarized the
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document and that appellant signed it in front of him on July 28,
2011. The court concluded decedent owned the property when he
died as it was never validly transferred to appellant.
As to the financial elder abuse claim, the court found the
evidence regarding the July 2011 deed recording showed
appellant took an elder adult’s real property with an intent to
defraud, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30.
Accordingly, respondent’s petition for probate was granted
and appellant’s will contest was denied.1 The court awarded
$250,000 in punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code section
3294. This award was based on the finding there was clear and
convincing evidence appellant misrepresented the execution of
the July 2011 deed and the August 2012 deed with the intent to
deprive decedent of the La Brea property. The evidence
supporting the finding included appellant’s testimony regarding
the July 2011 deed, Kennedy’s refusal to acknowledge the
circumstances surrounding the execution thereof, and appellant’s
inconsistent deposition testimony concerning her contacts with
Kennedy.
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review and applicable law
“Generally, punitive damages awards are reviewed under
the substantial evidence standard of review ‘in which all
presumptions favor the trial court’s findings and we view the
record in the light most favorable to the judgment.’” (Behr v.
1 While not detailed in the trial court’s ruling, appellant
testified at trial she spent over half a million dollars in repairs
and renovations to the La Brea property. Appellant also attested
she paid over $30,000 in delinquent property taxes on the
property. Appellant was later questioned whether she owns a
certain house in Woodland Hills addressed to decedent, that she
confirmed she owns.
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Redmond (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 517, 535.) “‘An award of
punitive damages hinges on three factors: the reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct; the reasonableness of the relationship
between the award and the plaintiff's harm; and, in view of the
defendant’s financial condition, the amount necessary to punish
him or her and discourage future wrongful conduct. [Citations.]’”
(Baxter v. Peterson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 673, 679 (Baxter).)
II. Punitive damages could not be awarded because
there was no evidence of appellant’s financial
condition
A. Evidence concerning appellant’s ability to pay
the punitive damages award was never
presented at trial
Appellant contends punitive damages were improperly
awarded against her because no evidence of her financial
condition and ability to pay was ever presented. We agree.
“A reviewing court cannot make a fully informed
determination of whether an award of punitive damages is
excessive unless the record contains evidence of the defendant’s
financial condition.” (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105,
110 (Adams).) “[A] plaintiff who seeks to recover punitive
damages must bear the burden of establishing the defendant’s
financial condition.” (Id. at p. 123.) “[T]he purpose of punitive
damages is not served by financially destroying a defendant. The
purpose is to deter, not to destroy.” (Id. at p. 112.) “Accordingly,
‘an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal
unless the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the
defendant’s financial condition.’” (Baxter, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th
at p. 680.) “‘Without such evidence, a reviewing court can only
speculate as to whether the award is appropriate or excessive.’”
(Ibid.)
To establish a defendant’s financial condition, “there should
be some evidence of the defendant’s actual wealth.” (Baxter,
supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 680.) “Net worth is the most
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common measure, but not the exclusive measure.” (Ibid.) “In
most cases, evidence of earnings or profit alone are not sufficient
‘without examining the liabilities side of the balance sheet.’”
(Ibid.) “Normally, evidence of liabilities should accompany
evidence of assets, and evidence of expenses should accompany
evidence of income.” (Ibid.) “What is required is evidence of the
defendant’s ability to pay the damage award.” (Robert L. Cloud
& Associates, Inc. v. Mikesell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1152.)
We conclude punitive damages cannot be awarded against
appellant because the trial record has no evidence demonstrating
her financial condition and ability to pay the damage award.
Appellant was never questioned as to her income, assets, or
liabilities. Appellant’s finances or ability to pay punitive
damages were not issues raised in the trial briefs. Without
meaningful evidence on such matters, it cannot be determined if
imposing punitive damages against appellant is appropriate or
excessive. As discussed above, punitive damages can only deter,
not financially destroy, a defendant. (See Adams, supra, 54
Cal.3d at p. 112.) No evidence was presented showing appellant
has the financial ability to pay $250,000 in punitive damages.
Thus, the punitive damages award against appellant cannot be
sustained.
The only trial testimony involving appellant’s assets was a
brief statement appellant gave indicating she owns a house in
Woodland Hills. But this statement alone cannot establish
appellant’s financial condition for the purpose of deciding
punitive damages. Appellant was not questioned as to whether
any encumbrances are attached to the Woodland Hills house.
There is no evidence that the mere fact appellant owns this house
somehow demonstrates her overall financial state or ability to
pay punitive damages. Without further evidence as to appellant’s
other assets and liabilities, her financial ability to pay the
punitive damages award cannot be determined.
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Finally, appellant indicates she testified to spending a
substantial amount in renovations, delinquent property taxes,
and repairs for the La Brea property. Appellant maintains this
evidence tends to show her financial inability to pay the punitive
damages award. Indeed, the testimony may show appellant’s
inability to pay the damage award if she spent most of her
resources on the property. But more significantly, this evidence
shows we can only speculate as to appellant’s ability to pay given
a lack of evidence of her overall finances. We note respondent
indicates she has reviewed the evidence and does not oppose
striking the order for punitive damages. Accordingly, this matter
should be remanded to vacate the punitive damages award
against appellant.
DISPOSITION
The August 7, 2023 order for punitive damages is reversed.
On remand, the trial court shall vacate the order for punitive
damages and enter a new order denying respondent’s request for
punitive damages. Appellant is awarded her costs on appeal.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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