Filed 6/26/26 Esparza v. Sharp Healthcare CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
EUNICE ESPARZA, D086499
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024-
00029244-CU-MM-CTL)
SHARP HEALTHCARE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Carolyn M. Caietti, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Office of John Gagnon and John A. Gagnon for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Lotz, Doggett & Rawers, Jeffrey S. Doggett and Sara R. Sabzerou for
Defendants and Respondents.
The trial court sustained without leave to amend Defendants Sharp
Healthcare, Sharp Memorial Hospital, Douglas Darlin, and Brian Jacob
Lichtenstein’s demurrer to Eunice Esparza’s professional negligence and
medical malpractice complaint on the ground the claims were time-barred
under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.
Esparza claims the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer
because the complaint adequately alleges facts establishing that (1) the
relevant statute of limitations was tolled and (2) equitable estoppel precludes
Defendants from asserting the statute of limitations. We conclude the
complaint does not allege facts relevant to tolling or equitable estoppel and
Esparza additionally forfeited her equitable estoppel claim by not adequately
developing it on appeal. The court therefore did not err in sustaining the
demurrer.
Esparza also argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying
leave to amend because she could allege facts relevant to tolling and
equitable estoppel. We discern no abuse of discretion because Esparza failed
to meet her burden to identify facts she could plead to establish tolling or
equitable estoppel.
Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
On an appeal from a demurrer, we state the facts from the properly
pleaded allegations in the operative pleading, its attachments, and any
matters subject to judicial notice. (Jimenez v. Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food
Markets, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 645, 653.) We also recite here and
“consider evidence outside the pleadings [that] the trial court considered
without objection.” (Pomona College v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th
1716, 1721.)
On April 29, 2022, Esparza underwent kidney stone surgery at Sharp
Memorial Hospital. Darlin and Lichtenstein performed the surgery. Esparza
had no mobility issues before the surgery, but since the surgery she has been
“restricted to using a wheelchair and dependent on short periods of using a
walker.”
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On March 23, 2023, Esparza served Defendants with a Code of Civil
Procedure section 364 notice of intent to sue letter.
On June 21, 2024, Esparza sued Defendants, alleging claims for
professional negligence and medical malpractice.
Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground it was time-
barred under section 340.5.
Following briefing, the court issued a tentative ruling sustaining the
demurrer without leave to amend. The court subsequently confirmed the
tentative ruling, which faulted Esparza for failing to “explain how [she] had
enough knowledge of her claim when she served a Notice of Intent to Sue
letter on March 23, 2023, but then did not file the Complaint for over a year
later.” The court noted Esparza “does not explain how any intentional
concealment or conduct by Defendants barred her from filing her Complaint
on time.” “Under these circumstances and on this record,” the court ruled the
complaint time-barred and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
II.
A.
Esparza argues the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer by
“fail[ing] to properly consider the significant allegations of intentional
concealment and the applicability of equitable estoppel.” We conclude the
court correctly sustained the demurrer.
We review de novo an appeal of an order of dismissal following the
sustaining of a demurrer. (The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut
v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 353.)
“We assume the truth of all properly pled factual allegations and matters
that are judicially noticeable” and “liberally construe the complaint’s
allegations.” (Jimenez, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 653.) “We consider evidence
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outside the pleadings which the trial court considered without objection”—
here, that Esparza served Defendants with a notice of intent to sue letter on
March 23, 2023. (Pomona College, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1721.)
“In an action for injury . . . against a health[]care provider based upon
such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement
of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the
plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.)
This statute of limitations can be tolled due to “intentional concealment” by
the healthcare provider. (Ibid.)
Equitable estoppel “addresses the circumstances in which a party will
be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an
admittedly untimely action because [the party’s] conduct has induced another
into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.” (Lantzy v.
Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 383 [cleaned up].)
As an initial matter, the one paragraph Esparza devotes to equitable
estoppel in her opening brief cites no relevant legal authority. We
accordingly deem this inadequately developed argument forfeited. (See In re
Masoner (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1531, 1538-1539.)
More importantly, however, Esparza does not identify, nor have we
located on our own review, any allegations in the complaint relevant to
tolling or equitable estoppel. Instead, the complaint alleges Esparza was last
able to walk immediately before her April 29, 2022 surgery. Since the
surgery, she has required a wheelchair or walker. By these allegations, with
reasonable diligence Esparza should have discovered the injury immediately,
triggering section 340.5’s one-year statute of limitations. At the latest, as the
trial court found, Esparza was on notice of the injury and her potential claim
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by the time she served Defendants with her notice of intent to sue on
March 23, 2023. Yet Esparza filed the complaint 15 months later on June 21,
2024—after the statute of limitations had run. The complaint is devoid of
any allegation that Defendants did or said anything that would toll the
statute of limitations or give rise to equitable estoppel. The claims as
presently pled are therefore facially time-barred. Thus, the court did not err
in sustaining the demurrer.
B.
Esparza further contends the court abused its discretion in sustaining
the demurrer without leave to amend “because [she] can readily cure any
perceived deficiencies” by alleging further facts concerning Defendants’
alleged misrepresentations. But Esparza has failed to carry her burden to
identify those facts.
We review the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend for
abuse of discretion. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074,
1081.) “The appellant has the burden to identify specific facts showing the
complaint can be amended to state a viable cause of action” (Minnick v.
Automotive Creations, Inc. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1004) and
“demonstrate how those facts establish a cause of action” (Cantu v.
Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 890).
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to
amend. While Esparza identifies broad categories of facts she could “more
precisely detail” in an amended complaint, like “[t]he timeline of events and
the specific instances of defendants’ misrepresentations that continued to
obscure the true cause of her paralysis,” she fails to identify any such facts.
She accordingly has failed to carry her burden to show amendment could cure
the pleading defects identified by the trial court. (See, e.g., Stein v. Axis Ins.
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Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 673, 685 [arguments that plaintiffs could “allege
more clearly” that policy belied defendants’ positions or “‘more specifically
allege’ conspiracy” insufficient to warrant reversal of sustaining of demurrer
without leave to amend].)
Even if Esparza could allege specific facts to establish concealment
after the surgery on April 29, 2022 to allow delayed discovery, that would not
change that she waited 15 months from the date of her notice of intent to sue
to file suit. (§ 340.5.) By the time Esparza served her notice of intent to sue
letter, she “ha[d] reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing ha[d]
injured” her. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.)
Thus, as a matter of law, Esparza cannot plead sufficient facts to establish
tolling.
The court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to
amend.
III.
We affirm. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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