Filed 10/21/26 E.Z. v. N.W CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
E.Z.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A175618
v.
N.W., (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. D25-03420)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
N.W., who is proceeding in propria persona, appeals from a one-year
restraining order issued against her under the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq. (DVPA)).2 We affirm.
In early September 2025, N.W.’s sister, E.Z., filed a request for a
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her. The court issued a
temporary restraining order and set a hearing for September 30. A process
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California
1
Standards of Judicial Administration section 8.1. We provide a limited
factual summary because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or
should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
2
otherwise indicated.
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server declared, under penalty of perjury, that she personally served N.W. at
E.Z.’s address.
N.W. and E.Z. appeared at the unreported hearing, as did several other
witnesses. At the close of testimony, the court issued a three-year restraining
order against N.W. The court’s order stated “No other proof of service” was
required, as both N.W. and E.Z. were in attendance at the hearing.
Less than two months later, N.W. filed a motion to set aside or vacate
the DVRO. She claimed she “was never properly served with all required
court documents,” that E.Z. “made false and misleading statements” in
seeking a restraining order, that E.Z., E.Z.’s husband, and E.Z.’s son were the
ones who presented “[h]arassment and [s]afety [c]oncerns,” and that the
restraining order interfered with N.W.’s care for her mother, who lived with
E.Z. After another unreported hearing, the court issued a shortened
restraining order set to expire on September 30, 2026. The court’s order
again stated, “No other proof of service is needed” as both N.W. and E.Z.
“attended the hearing.”
Two weeks later, N.W. filed a motion to reconsider, again asking the
court to terminate the restraining order. She maintained there were no
findings of “recent abuse,” “reasonable apprehension of future abuse,” or
“ongoing threat,” that her entry into E.Z.’s home “was for caregiving” and at
her mother’s request, and that it was E.Z. and E.Z.’s husband who abused her
mother. The court denied this motion, having “already had a hearing to
reconsider.” N.W. next filed a “Motion to Quash/Vacate DVRO,” again
requesting that the trial court end the restraining order. The court denied
this request as untimely.
N.W. appealed, and a month later filed a proposed settled statement in
the superior court.
2
In her opening brief on appeal, N.W. sets forth numerous complaints
about the trial court’s rulings. However, they generally fall into two
categories: lack of proper service and insufficient evidence of “abuse.”3
The purpose of the DVPA is “to prevent acts of domestic violence,
abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons
involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these
persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) A court
may issue a restraining order under the DVPA on the basis of a declaration
or testimony that shows by a preponderance of the evidence “to the
satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”
(§ 6300, subd. (a); Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 11.) “Abuse” under
the DVPA includes not only physical abuse or injury, but also molesting,
threatening, harassing, and engaging in conduct that “disturb[s] the peace of
the other party.” (§§ 6203, 6320.) The party seeking the DVRO bears the
3 In her opening brief, N.W. variously claims the DVRO is void for lack
of personal jurisdiction because a “court lacks personal jurisdiction where
service of process is defective”; the restraining order is “unsupported by
substantial evidence of ‘abuse’ ” (capitalization, boldface & underscoring
omitted); the trial court stated, “ ‘No matter what the reason, it is not your
house—you should not enter,’ ” (italics omitted) which is not “abuse”; the trial
court issued an order “despite minimal and insufficient evidence” (boldface
omitted); notice was “constitutionally defective” (capitalization, boldface &
underscoring omitted) because the address listed on the proof of service was
her sister’s address and not her own; the trial court violated her due process
by “refus[ing] to allow cross-examination of the process server,” and because
service was “defective,” the court “erred in denying the motion to quash and
motion to vacate” (capitalization, boldface & underscoring omitted); the trial
court “lacked authority” to modify the order from three years to one year
because it “lack[ed] personal jurisdiction” because of defective service;
because there was “no valid service,” (capitalization, boldface & underscoring
omitted) the trial court erred in denying the motion to quash as untimely;
and her presence at the September 30, 2025, hearing does not constitute a
general appearance.
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burden of demonstrating past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137–138.) “Generally, a
trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a petition for
a restraining order under this statutory scheme.” (In re Marriage of Fregoso
& Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.)
We therefore review the trial court’s issuance of a DVRO for abuse of
discretion. (Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 782.) In doing so,
we presume the court’s order is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The appellant, in turn, bears the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error and providing an adequate record on appeal. (Jameson
v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609; Rossiter v. Benoit (1979)
88 Cal.App.3d 706, 712.) Thus, “[i]f an appellant intends to raise any issue
that requires consideration of the oral proceedings in the superior court, the
record on appeal must include a record of these oral proceedings” in the form
of a reporter’s transcript, an agreed statement, or a settled statement. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).)
Mootness. Preliminarily, we note the restraining order has expired, the
one-year order having been issued on September 30, 2025. The appeal
therefore appears moot. (See Malatka v. Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074,
1088 [“ ‘If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief
granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse
party is moot.’ ”].) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting
E.Z.’s request for a restraining order is not a question of broad public interest
that is likely to recur. (Ibid.) Nor does N.W. urge any other discretionary
exception to the mootness doctrine. Although we could dismiss the appeal,
we nevertheless exercise our discretion to consider N.W.’s appeal.
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Insufficient Record. On her notice designating the record on appeal,
rather than selecting the box indicating she was proceeding with a settled
statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.137, N.W. indicated
she was proceeding without a record of the oral proceedings in the superior
court. Thus, while N.W.’s appendix contains a “Proposed Settled Statement
for Appeal,” she did not complete the procedural steps required to obtain a
settled statement in accordance with rule 8.137. The result is that there is
no record of who testified at the unreported hearings, what they testified
about, and what evidentiary findings or rulings the court made. As we
explain, the deficiency of the record precludes review of N.W.’s claims of
improper service and insufficient evidence.
Lack of Proper Service. In the trial court, N.W. raised the issue of
adequate service. For instance, in her “[d]eclaration for motion to set aside or
vacating 3 years DVRO,” she claimed the restraining order was invalid due to
service at the “incorrect address.” (Capitalization omitted.)
However, because there is no transcript of the oral proceedings and no
court-settled statement, we have no way of knowing whether or how the issue
was addressed with the court. (See, e.g., Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d
564, 574 [failure to include transcript of trial precludes review of error; “a
party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by
an adequate record”].)
Moreover, based on the limited record that is before us, which includes
the filed proof of service and the court’s minute orders, it certainly does not
appear that the trial court erred. Section 243, subdivision (a) states: “If a
petition under this part has been filed, the respondent shall be personally
served with a copy of the petition, the temporary restraining order, if any,
and the notice of hearing on the petition. Service shall be made at least five
5
days before the hearing.” The process server here averred personal service
was made on N.W. on September 23, 2025 (seven days before the hearing) at
E.W.’s address. While this was not N.W.’s own address, N.W. admittedly was
present at E.W.’s address as her mother’s caretaker. This satisfies service
requirements. “Proof of service in accordance with [section] 243 . . . must be
made to the court’s satisfaction before the hearing may proceed.” (Hogoboom
et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 5:238.)
We must presume, of course, that the trial court was aware of the law and
correctly applied it, absent any showing to the contrary, of which there is no
such showing here. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130,
1133.) “This presumption has special significance when . . . the appeal is
based upon the clerk’s transcript.”4 (Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d
147, 154.)
Evidence to Support Issuing DVRO. Nor is there a sufficient record for
us to review the merits of the trial court’s issuance of the DVRO. In her
appellant’s appendix, N.W. provided most of the documents submitted to the
court, including E.W.’s request for a restraining order, and N.W.’s opposing
papers. However, she included only the first page of E.W.’s 9-page request
for a temporary restraining order. More significantly, as we have recited,
N.W. has not provided any record of the hearings. Thus, she has not supplied
this court with any record of who testified or the substance of their testimony.
These shortcomings in the record are fatal to her challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the DVRO. (See R.D. v. P.M. (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 181, 186, fn. 5 [presuming restraining order was supported
by substantial evidence where record on appeal did not contain record of trial
4 Indeed, we note N.W. was present at and participated in the hearings
on the initial, three-year DVRO, as well as the amended, one-year DVRO.
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court hearing]; In re Angel L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136–1127
[presuming evidence supported judgment where record of pertinent oral
proceedings not provided]; see also Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973,
992 [appellant who supplies no reporter’s transcript of hearing is precluded
from challenging sufficiency of the evidence].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting the DVRO is affirmed. Parties to bear
their own costs on appeal.
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_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A175618, E.Z. v. N.W.
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