Filed 8/4/26 Dromy v. Ozeri CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ELY DROMY et al., B327150
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV34347)
MENACHEM OZERI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Jacob Reich and Jacob Reich for Defendant
and Appellant.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Brent A.
Kramer and Eric A. Westlund for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
_________________________
This defamation case stems from infighting at a small
synagogue. Defendant and congregant Menachem Ozeri
allegedly disrupted synagogue services to verbally accuse
plaintiff and fellow congregant Ely Dromy of misconduct related
to the synagogue and to assert plaintiff and synagogue rabbi
Aharon Shaltiel is not a rabbi and has no role at the synagogue.
Based on these statements, Dromy and Shaltiel sued Ozeri
for defamation. Ozeri moved to strike their complaint under
California’s statute limiting “SLAPPs” (Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation), which calls for early dismissal of
meritless lawsuits if they arise from acts in furtherance of
petitioning or free speech rights in connection with a public issue.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (e)(1)–(e)(4).)
(Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.) The trial court denied the motion, finding
plaintiffs had shown their claims had minimal merit.
We affirm. But we instead conclude Ozeri failed to
demonstrate the alleged statements giving rise to plaintiffs’
complaint concerned a public issue or an issue of public interest.
I.
In 1978, a small community of Los Angeles-based Yemenite
Jews decided to form the Tiferet Teman synagogue. Dromy was
one of the synagogue’s founders. Ozeri has been with the
synagogue for over 20 years. Shaltiel has served as the
synagogue’s rabbi since 2005.
The synagogue conducts its services out of a storefront
property located in Los Angeles, which has been owned by the
Kehillat Teman Nadlan Corporation (“Teman Corporation”) since
February 2009. Since its formation, Dromy has served on the
Teman Corporation’s board of directors and as its chairman.
2
The evidence does not demonstrate the synagogue’s size. It
reflects, however, that usually less than 10 Yemenite Jews within
the synagogue community are present for services and
congregants need to ask non-Yemenite Jews from outside the
community, including sometimes passersby, to reach the 10-
person minyan required to conduct some gatherings.
In July 2022, a notarized letter signed by Ozeri and four
other synagogue congregants, including Yehiel Gubani, Shmuel
Shaaltiel, and Moshe Arussi, appeared on the synagogue’s
bulletin board. The letter’s signatories claimed to be “the board
members for Tiferet Teman Synagogue . . . [a]lso known under
the name Kehil[l]at Teman Nadlan Corp,” even though none of
them had been appointed to serve as such per the Teman
Corporation’s bylaws.
Soon thereafter, Ozeri and three of the other letter
signatories allegedly disrupted services several times by verbally
accusing Dromy of using the Teman Corporation to illegally
launder money, of stealing money from the Teman Corporation
for his personal use, of falsely holding himself out as a board
member, and of illegally taking title to the synagogue property.
In addition, during synagogue services, these congregants
allegedly yelled out that Shaltiel is not a rabbi and has no role at
the synagogue.
Subsequently, plaintiffs sued Ozeri and the other alleged
disruptors, Gubani, Shmuel Shaaltiel, and Arussi for defamation,
alleging the oral statements they made during services were false
and caused them reputational and emotional harm. Ozeri and
Arussi responded by moving to strike the complaint under the
anti-SLAPP statute.
3
The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion. The court
first rejected the moving defendants’ contention that the speech
in question fell within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), based on
the remarks’ asserted relation with a former congregant’s 2003
lawsuit that concerned a dispute over the synagogue’s control and
management. (Neither plaintiff in this case was a party.)
Because the lawsuit was dismissed in 2006, 16 years before the
moving defendants allegedly uttered the statements underlying
the present case, the court found their remarks were not
connected to an issue currently or imminently pending review in
a judicial proceeding.
The trial court, however, agreed with the moving
defendants that the alleged statements were protected under
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) and (4). On this point, the court
noted the moving defendants showed “there are over 10,000
Jewish Yemenite people in California,” “[t]he Synagogue was
founded to be open to anyone wanting to participate (including
participants who are not Yemeni Jews), and the Synagogue hosts
lectures in addition to religious services.” Given this, and that
the speech in question concerned a longtime dispute over the
management and control of the Teman Corporation and the
synagogue, the trial court found the “Moving Defendants’ alleged
speech concerns a matter of public interest.”
Accordingly, the trial court considered whether plaintiffs
demonstrated their claims bore minimal merit. In concluding
plaintiffs carried their burden, the court found their evidence
showed the statements constituted defamation per se, as they
charged Dromy with illegal conduct and generally undermined
both plaintiffs’ professional qualifications. It also found
4
unpersuasive the moving defendants’ contention that the
statements constituted unactionable opinions.
The moving defendants timely appealed. Following
Arussi’s death while this appeal was pending, Ozeri informed this
court of his intent to pursue the appeal on his own.
II.
“The anti-SLAPP statute is ‘designed to protect defendants
from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their
rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.
[Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion
to strike a claim “arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)’ ” (Bonni
v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1008–1009
(Bonni).)
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step
process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e]
from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’
[Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected
activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.” ’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing,
the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
1009.)
We review the trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion
de novo. (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)
Accordingly, “ ‘ “we apply our independent judgment, both to the
issue of whether the cause of action arises from a protected
activity and whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of
5
prevailing on the claim.” ’ ” (Ibid.) And although our review is de
novo, the “appellant still bears the ‘ “burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
A.
As discussed above, in denying Ozeri’s anti-SLAPP motion,
the trial court found his alleged statements were protected
activity, but plaintiffs showed their claims had minimal merit. In
seeking reversal, Ozeri insists we cannot address the trial court’s
ruling on the anti-SLAPP analysis’s first prong, and must limit
our review to the court’s conclusion on the second prong. This is
so, says Ozeri, because plaintiffs failed to file a cross-appeal.
Ozeri is mistaken. Although a respondent who fails to
appeal a judgment generally cannot urge error, an exception to
this rule permits a respondent to seek, “without appealing from
[the] judgment,” review of “any intermediate ruling, proceeding,
order or decision which involves the merits or necessarily affects
the judgment or order appealed from” to enable the appellate
court to “determin[e] whether or not the appellant was prejudiced
by the error or errors upon which he relies for reversal . . . .”
(§ 906.) This exception “allow[s] a respondent to assert a legal
theory that would result in affirming a judgment even though the
trial court did not rely on that theory.” (Hong Sang Market, Inc.
v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 487.)
We therefore address plaintiffs’ contention that, regardless
of the trial court’s conclusion on prong two of the anti-SLAPP
analysis, affirmance is required because the court erred by
finding Ozeri carried his burden on prong one.
B.
Ozeri failed to demonstrate the statements at issue are
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
6
In the trial court, Ozeri apparently relied on section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2), (3), and (4), to demonstrate the speech at issue
constitutes protected activity.
1.
Ozeri has not met his burden to show his allegedly
defamatory statements fall within the scope of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2).
Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), protects “any written or
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law . . . .”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) On appeal, Ozeri does not renew his
argument that his statements come within subdivision (e)(2)
because they relate to a prior lawsuit. Indeed, his appellate
briefs do not cite, let alone discuss, subdivision (e)(2). We,
therefore, treat the issue as forfeited. (See Golden Door
Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
467, 554–555 [even where our review is de novo, it “ ‘ “is limited
to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in” ’ ”
the appellant’s briefs, and “ ‘ “[i]ssues not raised in an appellant’s
brief are deemed [forfeited] or abandoned” ’ ”].)
We acknowledge that Ozeri, in passing and without citing
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), suggests the anti-SLAPP
statute should protect the alleged statements because synagogue
congregants frustrated with Dromy’s leadership and conduct
“may contemplate suit” against him in the future. This passing,
undeveloped argument without citation to authority, however,
does not adequately raise the issue for our consideration. (E.I. v.
El Segundo Unified School Dist. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1267,
1289.)
7
Forfeiture aside, the anti-SLAPP statute is not so broad. It
“contemplate[s] an ongoing — or, at the very least, immediately
pending — official proceeding.” (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of
Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 627.) “[I]f an issue is not presently
‘under consideration or review’ by such authorized bodies, then
no expression — even if related to that issue — could be ‘made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘[U]nder consideration or review’ does not mean any issue a
[deliberative] body may conceivably decide to take up months or
years in the future.” (Ibid.) Ozeri’s claim that unspecified
synagogue congregants “may contemplate suit” does not meet
this standard, nor has Ozeri shown that, when he made the
statements, congregants were “seriously and in good faith
contemplating litigation” on issues to which the statements
relate. (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1259;
see also id. at p. 1268 [“if a [pre-litigation] statement ‘concern[s]
the subject of the dispute’ and is made ‘in anticipation of
litigation “contemplated in good faith and under serious
consideration” ’ [citations] then the statement may be petitioning
activity protected by section 425.16”].) Ozeri, in his briefing,
discusses only the possible contemplation of suit without
describing its contours. (See Nirschl v. Schiller (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 386, 401–402 [“Protection of prelitigation
statements ‘only arises at the point in time when litigation is no
longer a mere possibility, but has instead ripened into a proposed
proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under
serious consideration as a means of obtaining access to the courts
for the purpose of resolving the dispute’ ”]; People ex rel. Fire Ins.
Exchange v. Anapol (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 809, 824 [even
“hollow threats of litigation are not protected” (italics added)].)
8
Four years on from the alleged 2022 statements, no evidence of
any relevant suit is before us. It was Ozeri’s burden to show
subdivision (e)(2) applies, and he has not met that burden.
2.
Nor has Ozeri met his burden to show his allegedly
defamatory statements come within the scope of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3) and (4).
Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3), protects “any written or
oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest . . . .”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).) Subdivision (e)(4), the anti-SLAPP
statute’s “catchall provision” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1238, 1243 (Geiser)), protects “any other conduct in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
To determine whether speech is in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3) or (4), we ask what “ ‘public issue or . . . issue of
public interest’ the speech in question implicates . . . . [Citation.]
Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the
speech and the public conversation about some matter of public
interest.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
133, 149–150; see Doe v. Ledor (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 731, 744;
Bernstein v. LaBeouf (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 15, 22.) Throughout,
context matters. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1252.)
In deciding whether a public issue or a matter of public
interest is implicated, courts consider several factors, including
whether: “1. The statement concerns a person or entity in the
public eye; [¶] 2. the statement concerns conduct that could
9
directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct
participants; [¶] 3. the statement concerns a topic of widespread
public interest; [¶] 4. the issue is of concern to a substantial
number of people; or [¶] 5. the issue has been the subject of
extensive media coverage.” (Dubac v. Itkoff (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 540, 549 (Dubac).) Several of these factors
“stress the significance of how many people are affected by, or are
interested in, a purportedly public issue.” (Ibid.) Contextual
factors may include “the identity and number of speakers, the
audience, the location of the communication, and the purpose and
timing of the communication.” (Ibid., italics omitted; see also
Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1241 [“Language, of course, cannot
be interpreted apart from context, and what a particular
statement or act is ‘about’ often cannot be discerned from words
alone”].)
Applying these principles and the panoply of case-specific
factors, we conclude Ozeri has not shown his allegedly
defamatory statements were in connection with a public issue or
a matter of public interest. With respect to his speech’s content,
Ozeri asserted Shaltiel is not a rabbi and has no role at the
synagogue. As to Dromy, Ozeri accused him of laundering money
through and stealing money from the Teman Corporation, falsely
holding himself out as a board member, and illegally acquiring
title to the synagogue property. These statements stem from a
dispute within the synagogue community relating to the
legitimacy and integrity of the synagogue’s religious leader and
one of the Teman Corporation’s board members. As Ozeri himself
puts it in his declaration in support of his anti-SLAPP motion, it
was (with our emphasis) an “internal struggle about the running
of the synagogue” — “internal fights and suspicions.”
10
Disputes internal to collective organizations and personal
feuds do not tend to implicate the anti-SLAPP statute. (Dubac,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 551.) We note an accusation of
criminal conduct, particularly when divorced, as here, from an
ongoing criminal prosecution or investigation, does not itself
establish speech in connection with a public issue. (See Weinberg
v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1134 [“The fact that
defendant allegedly was able to vilify plaintiff in the eyes of at
least some people establishes only that he was at least partially
successful in his campaign of vilification; it does not establish
that he was acting on a matter of public interest,” even when the
accusations were of criminal activity]; see also Dubac, at p. 546
[accusations of mail fraud and “illegal antics” sent within a six-
unit HOA].) If the rule were “[o]therwise, wrongful accusations of
criminal conduct, which are among the most clear and egregious
types of defamatory statements, automatically would be accorded
the most stringent protections provided by law, without regard to
the circumstances in which they were made.” (Weinberg, at p.
1136.)
Other contextual factors surrounding Ozeri’s statements
suggest they did not connect to public issues or matters of public
interest. Ozeri, along with three other congregants, made the
statements during services held at the synagogue, which are
regularly attended by no more than 10 individuals at a time.
Usually, less than 10 Yemenite Jews within the community are
present and congregants need to ask non-Yemenite Jews from
outside the community, including sometimes passersby, to reach
the 10-person minyan required to conduct some gatherings.
Thus, the statements were uttered by a small group of speakers
(four) to a similarly small audience (six or fewer) within the
11
synagogue’s walls. The statements were not made to “the general
public or to a sizable portion” thereof. (Dubac, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 550; cf. Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1243–
1244 [demonstration held on a public sidewalk].) Nor were the
statements “in reaction to a specific triggering event” that
captured public interest. (Dubac, at p. 551; cf. Geiser, at p. 1253
[demonstration prompted by corporate eviction of long-time
residents from their home].) Ozeri, also, does not argue that
Dromy or Shaltiel is a public figure in the public eye, nor does he
point to any media coverage or broader public interest.
The record does not, as Ozeri contends, reflect the disputes
over the synagogue’s “governance and religious leadership
impacted a far broader Yemenite Jewish community” beyond the
synagogue’s congregation. Ozeri’s declaration, filed in support of
his anti-SLAPP motion, avers that 10,000 Yemenite Jews reside
in California, and the synagogue is open to all who wish to attend
its services, including non-Yemenite Jews. But the evidence does
not show people in these broader communities have expressed
sustained interest in the synagogue or its programs. Nor,
moreover, does the evidence show these communities have taken
any interest in the internal leadership dispute simmering
beneath the allegedly defamatory statements.
We are not persuaded by Ozeri’s argument that “[d]isputes
concerning nonprofit governance, fiduciary responsibility,
organizational control, and leadership within a community
institution” necessarily “constitute matters of public concern
under anti-SLAPP jurisprudence.” In support of his position,
Ozeri cites Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85
Cal.App.4th 468 (Damon).
12
Damon is inapplicable here. In Damon, the former
manager of a homeowner association for a residential community
of more than 3,000 people filed a defamation complaint based on
(1) homeowner-written articles, letters to the editor, and
editorials published in a newsletter circulated to community
members, which criticized the plaintiff’s competence to manage
the association and urged residents to replace him with a
professional management company; (2) comments by two
association board members during board meetings criticizing the
plaintiff’s performance and questioning his competence and
veracity; and (3) a memorandum written by one of those board
members discussing the plaintiff’s management of the
community’s security department and criticizing the plaintiff’s
performance. (Damon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 471–473.)
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to strike the
complaint as a SLAPP, finding, among other things, defendants’
speech fell within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3). (Damon, at
p. 473.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed. (Damon, supra,
85 Cal.App.4th at p. 471.) In holding the statements connected to
an issue of public interest, it recognized the political nature of the
speech, observing the statements “concerned the very manner in
which [a] group of more than 3,000 individuals would be
governed” and “were made in connection with the Board elections
and recall campaigns.” (Id. at p. 479.) The Court of Appeal also
found significant “the size of the Ocean Hills community,” noting
it represented “a large segment of [the] local population,” as well
as the Legislature’s treatment of homeowner association boards
as quasi-governmental entities. (Id. at pp. 479–480.)
13
The present case is distinguishable in several respects.
First, Ozeri has not demonstrated the Teman Corporation’s board
of directors “ ‘functions as a second municipal government’ ”
similar to a homeowner association for a large residential
community. (Cf. Damon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 479.)
Second, the challenged speech, Ozeri’s alleged service-
interrupting statements, did not take place during an election, as
was the case in Damon, or propose any course of action related to
such a process. And if the speech may have been “of critical
importance” to the synagogue regulars, Ozeri has presented no
concrete evidence of the congregation’s size, let alone shown it
represents “a large segment” of a local population. (Ibid.) The
evidence shows a synagogue service size of 10 or fewer people, of
whom about half were Ozeri and his co-defendants. The public
interest Damon recognized is not present here.
Although not cited by the parties, we find Grenier v. Taylor
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471 (Grenier) appropriate for discussion.
In Grenier, a pastor of a nondenominational church and his wife
sued his stepson and another church member for defamation
based on their comments, posted on the Internet, accusing the
pastor of corruption, molesting children, and stealing money from
the church. (Id. at pp. 476–479.) In denying the defendants’
special motion to strike the complaint as a SLAPP, the trial court
found the speech protected under section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(3), but determined the defendants failed to demonstrate a
probability of success. (Id. at p. 476.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed. (Grenier, supra,
234 Cal.App.4th at p. 476.) In support of its holding, it agreed
with the trial court that the defendants’ comments concerned an
issue of public interest. (Id. at p. 483.) The Court of Appeal
14
observed the issues raised by the statements — namely, the
pastor’s theft and misuse of church funds, as well as other
behavior on his part calling into question his character and
fitness to serve as the church’s spiritual and moral leader — were
of interest to the church’s membership, a community consisting of
between 500 and 1,000 people, and, thus, “large enough to qualify
as a ‘community’ for purposes of section 425.16.” (Ibid.) But
more than this, because the defendants posted the comments on
the Internet, the Court of Appeal found their remarks “analogous
to consumer protection information,” as they sought to warn
people away from attending the pastor’s church and thereby
“provided . . . aid [to] consumers choosing among churches . . . .”
(Ibid.) Also, the comments extended beyond the pastor’s church,
and raised issues with child molestation and abuse in other
churches within an umbrella organization. (Ibid.) Thus, the
Court of Appeal reasoned, the statements also concerned
“allegations of abuse by members of the clergy and the protection
of children,” which are “issues of public interest.” (Ibid.)
We acknowledge that, similar to some of the comments by
the Grenier defendants, Ozeri’s statements raise concerns with a
religious institution’s leadership. But the similarities end there.
As noted above, Ozeri has not shown the size of the synagogue
community, which the evidence suggests is quite small.
Regardless, Ozeri has not demonstrated his alleged defamatory
statements were shared with the public or in public, or that those
statements aided the public in “choosing among” synagogues.
(Cf. Grenier, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 483.) Again, the
evidence reflects Ozeri and his co-defendants made the alleged
statements during a small religious gathering to perhaps six
others. Moreover, Ozeri’s remarks concerned only the
15
synagogue’s leadership and did not address issues relating to
other nonprofits or institutions or the hot-button public safety
issue of protecting children from molestation. Using Grenier,
then, as a guidepost by which to compare the facts in this case,
we remain convinced Ozeri’s statements do not implicate a public
issue or an issue of public interest.
Finally, Ozeri appears to argue his statements should
receive anti-SLAPP protection because Dromy and Shaltiel each
seek $500,000 in damages. Ozeri, however, cites no legal
authority demonstrating the amount of relief sought determines
or otherwise bears upon whether speech implicates an issue of
public interest. We, consequently, treat it as forfeited and decline
to consider it further. (See L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
616, 619–620 [appellate courts are not required to “search . . . the
law books to test [an appellant’s] claim” and may treat points
unsupported by citations to legal authority as forfeited].)
In sum, we conclude Ozeri failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating the statements underlying plaintiffs’ defamation
claims concern a public issue or a matter of public interest. Thus,
Ozeri has not shown the statements fall within section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3) or (4).
16
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Ozeri’s anti-SLAPP motion
and award plaintiffs their costs on appeal.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
17