Filed 10/9/26 Doyle v. Colglazier CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ANDREW DOYLE, a Minor, etc.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084925
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1806905)
NATHANIEL SHANE COLGLAZIER, OPINION
Defendant, Cross-complainant,
Cross-defendant and Appellant;
JOHN J. HWANG,
Cross-complainant, Cross-
defendant and Respondent;
QUALITAS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Intervener and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.
Affirmed.
Law Offices of Cleidin Z. Atanous and Cleidin Z. Atanous; Wesierski & Surek and
Ronald Zurek for Appellant.
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Hawkins Parnell & Young, Ryan M. Sellers, and Melanie M. Smith for
Respondents John J. Hwang and Qualitas Insurance Company.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
An intoxicated driver crashed his car into the back of a tractor-trailer on the
freeway, seriously injuring his front-seat passenger, who is also his brother. In this
personal injury suit, a jury found the tractor-trailer’s driver was not negligent, leaving the
intoxicated driver solely responsible for nearly $60 million in damages. The intoxicated
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driver here challenges the denial of his motion for a new trial on liability. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Shortly after midnight on April 24, 2016, 19-year-old Colglazier was driving with
his girlfriend (who is not a party here) and his 16-year-old brother Doyle, returning from
a party. Doyle was in the front passenger seat, and Colglazier’s girlfriend was asleep in
the back seat of Colglazier’s small hatchback (a Toyota Matrix).
On the westbound I-10 freeway, shortly past the I-10 and I-60 split in Beaumont,
Colglazier was driving in the left-most (or number one) lane at about 80 miles per hour,
faster than the 70 mile per hour speed limit for cars. On the same stretch of the I-10,
Hwang was driving a tractor-trailer at, or a bit below, the 55 mile per hour speed limit for
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Defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, and appellant Nathaniel Shane
Colglazier is the intoxicated driver. Plaintiff and respondent Andrew Doyle is
Colglazier’s passenger and brother; Doyle’s guardian ad litem brought this lawsuit on his
behalf. Cross-complainant, cross-defendant and respondent John J. Hwang is the driver
of the tractor-trailer. Intervener and respondent Qualitas Insurance Company (Qualitas)
is the insurer for Hwang’s employer, defendant American Eagle Transportation.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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trucks. There was conflicting evidence at trial, and the parties continue to dispute on
appeal, whether Hwang was driving in the number two or number three lane. In the
relevant part of the freeway, between the 6th Street on-ramp and the Oak Valley exit,
there was effectively a fourth lane for a short stretch, for traffic entering from 6th Street
and merging from the right into the number three lane, and again for traffic exiting to the
right at Oak Valley.
Colglazier encountered slower traffic in the number one lane and moved to the
number two lane to try to go around it. As he did so, however, a vehicle merged into the
number two lane in front of him—there is conflicting evidence as to whether that vehicle
merged from the number one lane or the number three lane. There is no dispute that
Colglazier again tried to pass on the right and found himself behind Hwang’s tractor-
trailer. Colglazier tried to move back to the left, but the passenger side of his car struck
the back left corner of Hwang’s trailer.
Colglazier’s blood alcohol level was above the legal limit at the time of the
accident, as determined by a blood alcohol measurement of .06 three hours after the
accident, and he had also used cannabis and methamphetamines that evening. He was
arrested and eventually pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence. By the time
of trial in this personal injury action, he had completed serving a sentence of four years
and four months in prison.
Trial was bifurcated into a liability phase and damages phase. As to liability, the
jury found Colglazier was negligent and his negligence was a substantial factor in
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causing harm to Doyle (both are issues Colglazier conceded) and that Hwang was not
negligent. In the damages phase, the jury found Colglazier liable to Doyle for
$9,913,928.32 in economic damages consisting of past and future medical expenses, plus
$50,000,000 for past and future noneconomic damages.
Colglazier moved for a new trial only as to liability. The trial court denied the
motion without explaining its reasoning.
II. DISCUSSION
Colglazier argues that three aspects of respondents’ closing arguments unduly
prejudiced the jury, resulting in a “tainted verdict.” He takes exception to attorney
argument about the definition of “substantial factor,” an animation shown to the jury
during closing arguments, and what he characterizes as personal attacks on himself,
Doyle, and their counsel. He also argues respondents’ accident reconstruction expert’s
opinions were grounded in speculation and should have been excluded. None of these
arguments is persuasive.
A. Applicable law
“‘An order denying a motion for new trial is nonappealable. [Citation.] Such an
order, however, may be reviewed on appeal from the underlying judgment.’” (Defries v.
Yamaha Motor Corp. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 846, 854 (Defries).)
“‘[A] trial judge is accorded a wide discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial,’
and ‘the exercise of this discretion is given great deference on appeal.’ [Citation.] ‘We
will not disturb the trial court’s determination of a motion for a new trial unless the court
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has abused its discretion.’ [Citation.] However, when the court has denied a motion for
new trial, ‘we must determine whether the court abused its discretion by examining the
entire record and making an independent assessment of whether there were grounds for
granting the motion.’” (Defries, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 854.)
The potential grounds for new trial that Colglazier argues apply here are (1) an
“[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court” that “prevented [him] from having a fair
trial,” (2) “[a]ccident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against,” (3) “[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the
verdict or other decision is against law,” and (4) “[e]rror in law, occurring at the trial and
excepted to by the party making the application.” (§ 657, subds. (1), (3), (6), & (7).)
B. Analysis
1. Adequacy of the record, record citations
A fundamental principle of appellate procedure is that, in the absence of an
affirmative showing to the contrary that is supported by an adequate record, “we presume
the judgment is correct.” (Stasz v. Eisenberg (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039.)
Additionally, to demonstrate error, an appellant’s arguments must be supported by
citations to the record. (See Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
735, 745 [the court “‘“cannot be expected to search through a voluminous record to
discover evidence on a point raised by [a party] when his brief makes no reference to the
pages where the evidence on the point can be found in the record.”’”].) “Rather than
scour the record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged
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on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record.” (WFG National
Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894-895.)
Colglazier runs afoul of these principles. He seeks a new trial in part based on
respondents’ closing arguments, but the reporter’s transcript does not include those
closing arguments. There are snippets of closing arguments attached as exhibits to
Colglazier’s new trial motion, which is included in the clerk’s transcript. It does not
appear, however, that these snippets include all the relevant portions. Moreover, the
argument section of Colglazier’s opening brief includes no citation to either the clerk’s
transcript or the reporter’s transcript. These faults were pointed out in the respondents’
brief, but Colglazier did not attempt to remedy them in his reply brief, nor did he attempt
to augment the record.
Nevertheless, “if possible, appeals should be heard and decided on the merits.” (In
re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 458.) We therefore exercise our discretion to decide
the appeal on the merits to the extent possible on the incomplete record, instead of
deeming Colglazier’s arguments forfeited on these grounds.
2. Respondents’ Closing Argument
Colglazier argues that during closing arguments respondents’ counsel presented
“several unauthorized and improper definitions of ‘substantial factor,’ a legal term of art
with a specific meaning in the context of proximate causation.” The limited record we
have does not establish that as a fact; Colglazier’s counsel’s description on appeal of what
was shown or said to the jury is not part of the record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
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8.120.) Our record includes a picture of a slide defining “substantial” (not “substantial
factor”) that may have been presented to the jury, but there is no record of the slide being
shown to the jury and what, if anything, was said about it, nor is there any record of an
objection to it by any party, including Colglazier. Assuming that an incomplete or
incorrect definition of “substantial factor” was shown to the jury, Colglazier has made no
cogent argument as to why the jury would not have been able to understand and apply the
correct definition, which was not only included in jury instructions but which the court
read again to the jury before Doyle’s rebuttal argument. (See People v. Fauber (1992) 2
Cal.4th 792, 823 [absent evidence to the contrary, reviewing court presumes jury
understands and follows instructions from the trial court]; People v. Thornton (2007) 41
Cal.4th 391, 441 [reviewing court presumes that jurors treat the court’s instructions as
statements of the law, and the arguments of counsel as words spoken by an advocate to
persuade].) Moreover, the jury never had to apply any definition of substantial factor to
the evidence, since Colglazier conceded his negligence was a substantial factor in causing
Doyle’s harm, and the jury found Hwang was not negligent at all.
Colglazier also points to an animation shown to the jury during the respondents’
closing arguments as a basis for new trial. The animation is not in our record, and we
have only a small part—less than a page of reporter’s transcript, cutting off in the middle
of a sentence—of respondents’ counsel’s commentary to the jury about what it depicted.
That small part, however, includes counsel’s explanation to the jury that the animation is
an approximate representation in visual form of an expert’s opinion testimony and the
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testimony of several eyewitnesses. We have no record of any objection by any party that
the animation did not accurately reflect that expert and eyewitness testimony, and on
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appeal Colglazier does not identify any specific inaccuracy. And Colglazier identifies no
authority holding it is beyond the discretion of the trial court to allow an animation to be
used as a visual aid to illustrate a party’s theory of what the evidence at trial showed. The
relevant section of his opening brief cites no legal authority for that proposition—or, for
that matter, any other proposition. (See, e.g., People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983,
1029 [“‘“[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the
points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived
and pass it without consideration.”’”].) Even if we do not find the animation challenge
waived or forfeited, we have no basis to overturn the jury’s finding where the record is so
lacking.
Finally, Colglazier argues respondents’ closing arguments included written and
verbal ad hominem attacks against himself, Doyle, and their counsel, portraying them as
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“We made a demonstrative, and it’s not to scale, it’s not meant to be exact or
anything like that. It’s just showing you the movement of the vehicles as the witnesses
specifically testified to, and it gives you some points of views from the witnesses and the
Matrix. So it’s just a demonstrative.[¶]. . . Now, this you have seen before with Mr.
Fugger. That is his drawing. He cut it a little bit for his testimony, but it pinpoints the
various debris that was found in the road after the impact that the officers noted.[¶] The
vehicles came to rest after the bridge with the Matrix in front of the tractor trailer, and as
Mr. Fugger stated, most of the debris was found on the right side of the . . . .”
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Doyle’s counsel objected that he had not previously seen the animation; our
record does not include any objection by Colglazier’s counsel. On appeal, Colglazier
asserts in conclusory terms that the animation “contradicts the evidence,” but offers no
specifics.
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committing fraud and resulting in a “miscarriage of justice that requires a new trial.” We
have no transcript, however, of any comments of this sort by respondents’ trial counsel.
Colglazier refers to several slides he says were used during respondents’ closing
argument. The record does not establish, however, whether the slides were used, how
long or under what circumstances these slides were shown to the jury, whether any
contemporaneous objection was interposed, or any instructions the trial court may have
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given regarding them. Moreover, in the pictures of the slides in our record, we find
argument, but nothing resembling the “unlawful, hyperbolic, and prejudicial vitriol” that
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Colglazier claims. Even if some statements on the slides were objectionable or
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A declaration submitted in support of Colglazier’s reply papers for his new trial
motion includes as an exhibit a written motion by Doyle entitled “Plaintiff’s Motion
Seeking Admonishment of Defendant John Hwang’s Counsel and Striking All
References Related to This Case as a ‘Sham,’” described as having been “filed during
trial.” According to the register of actions, however, this document was filed after
closing statements in the liability phase of the trial, while the jury was deliberating. Our
record does not reflect any ruling by the trial court on the motion.
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One slide, entitled “Smoke and Mirrors—Lawsuit” has five bullet points:
“Plaintiff Andrew Doyle and Nathaniel Colglazier’s mother filed this lawsuit not a
disinterested ‘third party’ who thought it was in the ‘best interest’ of Andrew Doyle,”
“[Doyle’s counsel] Mr. Carpenter previously said the guardian ad litem made the
decision. Andrew Doyle’s mother was his guardian ad litem when the decision was
made, not Ms. Nelms sitting in the courtroom,” “Doyle’s mother did not sue her own son,
Nathaniel Colglazier,” “Nathaniel Colglazier was added as a defendant because it would
look bad in front of the jury if Plaintiff was not suing the drunk driver who caused his
injuries,” and “Plaintiff ‘prosecuting’ this case against his own brother is a sham—Both
Mr. Carpenter and [Colglazier’s counsel] Mr. Zurek have shown you throughout this case
that it’s a sham.”
A second slide, entitled “Summary,” also has five bullet points: “This case is
about what happened to Plaintiff at the hands of his brother,” “Plaintiff is not really
prosecuting his brother—Colglazier is in this trial for the sake of appearances,” “John
[footnote continued on next page]
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improper, we find nothing so inflammatory that appropriate instruction from the court
upon a timely objection could not have been effective to cure any undue prejudice.
Thus, Colglazier has not demonstrated any abuse of the trial court’s discretion in
denying his new trial motion based on respondents’ closing arguments.
3. Expert testimony
Colglazier characterizes the testimony of Thomas Fugger, respondents’ accident
reconstruction expert, as inadmissible speculation unsupported by evidence because
Fugger opined that Hwang was driving in the number three lane at the time of the
accident, rather than the number two lane. Colglazier characterizes Fugger’s opinion as
“completely contrary to statements made both by Hwang and by witnesses to the accident
to the investigating police.”
Colglazier’s assertion that Fugger’s opinion lacked evidentiary support is
undermined by his own testimony, as well as other evidence in the record. Both in his
deposition and again at trial, Colglazier testified that Hwang was driving in the number
three lane at the time of the accident. Both in his deposition and at trial, Hwang testified
that he was driving in the number three lane when Colglazier ran into him. Two other
eyewitnesses, both in their depositions and at trial, testified Hwang was driving in the
number three lane. No eyewitnesses testified otherwise. Moreover, Fugger’s opinion
was based not only on witness testimony, but also his analysis of the available physical
Hwang is not responsible for the conduct of every driver on the road,” “John Hwang
cannot control the conduct of other drivers,” and “John Hwang did not increase any risk
to Plaintiff.”
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evidence, including where debris from the accident was found and the damage to the
vehicles involved. Even if other evidence, or a different interpretation of the same
evidence, could reasonably lead to a different expert opinion, Fugger’s testimony was not
speculation. Colglazier’s argument to the contrary—again, unsupported by citation to the
record or to legal authority—is without merit.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
P. J.
MENETREZ
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
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