Filed 10/16/26 Donis v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
BOSVELY DONIS, B349766
Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
24STCV21366)
v.
SIMPLIFIED LABOR
STAFFING SOLUTIONS,
INC.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed.
Aegis Law Firm, Kashif Haque and Ali S. Carlsen for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Hill, Farrer, & Burrill, E. Sean Mcloughlin and Clayton J.
Hix for Defendant and Appellant.
******
The trial court denied a staffing agency’s motion to compel
arbitration of a former employee’s class action wage-and-hour
lawsuit based on its finding under Code of Civil Procedure section
1281.2, subdivision (c)1 that the arbitration might result in
inconsistent rulings with pending litigation in court. Because the
trial court properly invoked and applied this provision of the
California Arbitration Act (§ 1280 et seq., CAA), we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. Hiring
Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, LLC (Simplified) most
recently hired Bosvely Donis (plaintiff) as a general laborer in
September 2022.2
B. Arbitration documents
During his onboarding process with Simplified, plaintiff
signed two documents regarding arbitration:
-- Mutual Arbitration Policy (the policy). This three-
page document explains that Simplified’s employees, “as a
mandatory condition of employment,” are obligated to arbitrate
“all disputes relating to or arising out of or in connection with
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
2 Plaintiff had previously been hired by Simplified in 2020,
and that employment lapsed in July 2021. He executed the same
arbitration paperwork during that first employment as he did
during the employment at issue here.
2
employment at the Company.” As pertinent here, the policy
specifies that it “shall be governed solely by the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. If for any reason the
FAA is deemed inapplicable, only then will the [policy] be
governed by the applicable state arbitration statutes.” The policy
also provides that “the procedures to be used in arbitration”
would be determined by “[t]he Employment Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association [(AAA)] in place at the time
of the dispute.”
-- Agreement to Arbitrate (the agreement). This one-
page document, signed by the employee, serves as an
“acknowledge[ment]” that the employee has “received a copy” of
the policy, reviewed it and agrees to abide by it as to “any such
claim or dispute against [Simplified] or . . . [its] agents.” As
pertinent here, the agreement states that arbitration “will be
conducted under the [FAA] and the applicable procedural rules of
the [AAA][.]”
C. Placement with Taylored Services, LLC
(Taylored)
In October 2023, Simplified placed plaintiff at Taylored,
where he worked as a forklift driver. In that position, plaintiff
“primarily drove a forklift to load and unload trucks or containers
containing boxes of goods”, but also sometimes “used the forklift
to arrange and organize the boxes within the warehouse.”
“[S]ome” of the “trucks had out of state delivery destinations[.]”
Taylored also used other agencies to staff its warehouse.
At some point during plaintiff’s tenure with Taylored,
Consolidated Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Consolidated), placed Rosa
Hilda Ceja Bodello, Nancy Ceja Bodello, Emilia Ceja Bodello, and
3
Blanca Estela Ceja Bodello (collectively, the Bodellos) at
Taylored’s warehouse.
D. End of employment
Sometime thereafter, plaintiff’s employment with
Simplified and Taylored ended.3
II. Procedural Background
A. Complaint
In August 2024, plaintiff filed a putative class action
lawsuit against Simplified and Taylored on behalf of himself and
similarly situated employees. The complaint alleged five
categories of wage-and-hour claims: (1) failure to pay minimum
and overtime wages (Lab. Code, §§ 510, 1194, 1198); (2) failure to
provide meal periods and rest breaks (id., §§ 226.7, 512); (3)
failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (id., § 226);
(4) failure to pay wages owed upon termination (id., §§ 201, 202,
203); and (5) violations of the unfair competition law (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
B. First and second amended complaints
In November 2024, plaintiff amended his complaint. As
pertinent here, that complaint (1) added the Bodellos as named
plaintiffs, (2) added Consolidated as a defendant; and (3) added
3 The record is ambiguous as to when plaintiff’s employment
ended. Simplified proffered evidence that it employed plaintiff
until “approximately . . . October 2023”—the same time that
plaintiff claims he was placed at Taylored. This raises questions
about whether plaintiff was employed by Simplified, Taylored, or
both after October 2023. However, Simplified and Taylored’s
consistent reliance on Simplified’s arbitration agreement
suggests they do not dispute plaintiff’s assertion that Simplified
remained his employer after his placement with Taylored in
October 2023.
4
claims for failure to reimburse business expenses (Lab. Code §§
2800, 2802) and civil penalties under the Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).
In March 2025, plaintiff and the Bodellos filed the
operative second amended complaint, which made minor
modifications not relevant to these proceedings.
C. Motions to compel arbitration
1. Motion by Consolidated (and Taylored) as to the
Bodellos
In May 2025, Consolidated moved to compel arbitration of
the Bodellos’ claims. Taylored joined that motion.
2. Motion by Simplified (and Taylored) as to
plaintiff
In July 2025, Simplified moved to compel arbitration of
plaintiff’s claims “pursuant to the [FAA] . . . []or, alternatively,
only if the FAA is for any reason found inapplicable, then
pursuant to . . . the [CAA],” including section 1281.2. Taylored
joined that motion, arguing that it was entitled to enforce
Simplified’s arbitration agreement as an agent, or, alternatively,
a third-party beneficiary.
Plaintiff opposed Simplified’s motion.4 As relevant here, he
argued that (1) the FAA did not apply because he was exempt
from the FAA as a “transportation worker” (9 U.S.C. § 1), and (2)
under California law, his claims could not be subject to
arbitration or dismissal. He attached a declaration describing his
work responsibilities at Taylored.
4 Plaintiff did not oppose Taylored’s joinder to Simplified’s
motion to compel arbitration or Taylored’s assertion that it was
entitled to rely on plaintiff’s arbitration agreement with
Simplified.
5
In its reply, Simplified argued, among other things, that
plaintiff failed to present admissible evidence qualifying him as a
transportation worker pursuant to the FAA.
3. Hearing and rulings on the motions
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions on
September 12, 2025.
At the conclusion of that hearing, the court denied
Consolidated and Taylored’s motion to compel arbitration as to
the Bodellos, finding insufficient proof that the Bodellos executed
an arbitration agreement.
After taking Simplified’s and Taylored’s motion to compel
arbitration as to plaintiff under submission, the court
subsequently issued a written ruling denying that motion.
Invoking section 1281.2, subdivision (c), the court found that its
earlier denial of the motion to arbitrate the Bodellos’ claims
meant that “there will be active and ongoing litigation concerning
the conditions at Taylored’s workplace as they pertain to . . . [the]
employment practices and conditions [at] Taylored’s warehouse,”
which created a “‘possibility of conflicting rulings on a common
issue of law or fact’” should plaintiff’s claims be arbitrated. The
court rejected Simplified’s argument that the parties had, in the
policy or the agreement, agreed to apply the FAA (which would
have precluded resort to the CAA, of which section 1281.2 is a
part). In light of its latter ruling, the court did not reach the
parties’ arguments regarding the transportation worker
exemption to the FAA and did not rule on Simplified’s
evidentiary objections to plaintiff’s declaration.
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D. Appeal
Simplified timely appealed. Taylored did not appeal.
DISCUSSION
Simplified argues that the trial court erred in denying its
motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claims under section
1281.2, subdivision (c). Given the parties’ arguments, the
propriety of that denial turns on two questions. First, was the
court precluded from applying section 1281.2 because the parties
had agreed to apply the FAA (rather than California law), if the
FAA was “[]applicable”? Second, and if the court was permitted
to apply section 1281.2, subdivision (c), did the court err in its
application of that provision? The first question regarding which
law to apply is largely one of contractual and statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 183, 190 [statutes]; Another Planet
Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1106,
1135 [contracts]); however, we review any subsidiary factual
findings for substantial evidence (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 484, 497). The second question regarding the
application of section 1281.2, subdivision (c) entails the trial
court’s exercise of discretion, which we review for an abuse of
that discretion. (Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 1399, 1406.)
I. Was the Trial Court Precluded From Invoking
Section 1281.2, Subdivision (c)?
“[A]rbitration-related proceedings in California courts are
governed by the CAA’s procedural rules unless . . . the parties
have expressly agreed that the FAA’s procedural rules apply.”
(Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562,
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576.)5 As noted above, the policy at issue here provides that it
“shall be governed solely by the [FAA]” but that “[i]f for any
reason the FAA is deemed inapplicable, only then will the [policy]
be governed by the applicable state arbitration statutes.”6 Under
this language, the inapplicability of the FAA is an exception to
any general agreement to apply the FAA. As a result, we will
start by assessing whether any exception applies—that is,
whether the FAA is “inapplicable”; if an exception applies, then
we need not reach the precursor question of whether the parties
generally agreed to apply the FAA in the first place.7
5 California’s procedural rules also will not apply if the FAA
preempts them (id.), but the FAA does not preempt section
1281.2, subdivision (c). (Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge
Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394; Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 470.)
6 It is appropriate to rely on both the agreement and the
policy because they relate to the same matter (arbitration), are
between the same parties, and were made as parts of
substantially one transaction. (Civ. Code, § 1642; Silva v. Cross
Country Healthcare, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1311, 1322.)
What is more, Simplified relied on both documents in moving to
compel arbitration, so it cannot now disavow the relevance of
both documents. (GoTek Energy, Inc. v. SoCal IP Law Group,
LLP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1249.)
7 It does not matter that the trial court did not rely on the
“transportation worker” exemption to the FAA in its order
because we may affirm on any ground presented below.
(Wentworth v. Regents of University of California (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 580, 606 [“[W]e must review the trial court’s ruling[,]
not its rationale[,] and must affirm on any ground supported by
the record . . . so long as [the appellant] had an opportunity to
8
Plaintiff asserts that the FAA is inapplicable because he is
a “transportation worker” outside the ambit of the FAA. Section
1 of the FAA provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” (9 U.S.C. § 1.) Determining whether an employee is
an exempt transportation worker entails a two-step analysis:
First, we “defin[e] the relevant ‘class of workers’ to which [the
plaintiff] belongs[,]” “based on what [the plaintiff] does” in the
course of his employment; second, “we determine whether that
class of workers is ‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.’”
(Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022) 596 U.S. 450, 455-456
(Saxon).) The latter step requires that the plaintiff “must at least
play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’” across
borders, or “[p]ut another way, . . . must be actively ‘engaged in
transportation’ of those goods across borders via the channels of
foreign or interstate commerce.” (Id. at p. 458.)
Under this precedent, plaintiff qualifies as an exempt
transportation worker. Saxon held that employees who “load[]
cargo on a plane bound for interstate transit” are transportation
workers because they are “intimately involved with the commerce
(e.g., transportation) of that cargo.” (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p.
458.) That same logic applies to employees who “process[] and
store[]” cargo while it “await[s] further interstate transport”
(Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC (9th Cir. 2024) 95 F.4th
1152, 1158, 1162 [so holding, as to warehouse worker who moved
cargo around in a warehouse from which cargo was subsequently
shipped interstate]) or cargo that has arrived from interstate
present evidence and argue the existence of [relevant] fact[ual]
dispute[s]”].)
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transport (Doss v. Tesla, Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 81, 92-97 [so
holding, as to worker who “moved trailers full of auto parts” that
had “arrived in parking and docking area” from out-of-state
locales]). Plaintiff here provided undisputed testimony in his
declaration that he drove a forklift that loaded cargo on to trucks,
some of which were bound for out-of-state destinations. This
qualifies him as an exempt transportation worker. Simplified
resisted this conclusion below by making evidentiary objections to
plaintiff’s declaration, but the trial court found it unnecessary to
rule on those objections and Simplified does not renew those
objections on appeal. (Ghazarian v. Magellan Health, Inc. (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 171, 183 [evidentiary objections not renewed on
appeal are waived].)
II. Did the Trial Court Abuse Its Discretion In Denying
The Motion To Compel Under Section 1281.2, subdivision
(c)?
Section 1281.2, subdivision (c) grants a trial court the
discretion to deny an otherwise valid motion to compel
arbitration brought by a party to an arbitration agreement once
the court determines that “one of the part[ies] to the arbitration
agreement is also a party to a pending court action . . . with a
third party,” (2) the potential arbitration and pending action
“aris[e] out of the same transaction or series of related
transactions,” and (3) “there is a possibility of conflicting rulings
on a common issue of law or fact.” (§ 1281.2, subd. (c); Acquire II,
Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959,
967-968 (Acquire).) For these purposes, “[t]he term ‘third party’ .
. . mean[s] a party that is not bound by the arbitration
agreement.’” (Acquire, at pp. 976-977.)
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All three conditions are met here. First, one of the parties
to the arbitration involving plaintiff—namely, Taylored—is also a
party to the pending court action brought by the Bodellos (who
are not bound by the agreement to arbitrate between plaintiff
and Simplified). Second, the arbitration involving plaintiff and
the pending court action involving the Bodellos arise out of the
same transaction or series of related transactions because they
all involve the employment conditions at Taylored’s warehouse
during the same period: Were workers in that warehouse given
their meal and rest breaks, were they required to work overtime
that was not properly documented, and were they required to pay
for reimbursable expenses? Third, there is a possibility that the
arbitrator in plaintiff’s case and the finder of fact in the pending
action involving the Bodellos could make conflicting findings
about what was happening factually at the warehouse and
whether it violated the Labor Code. The trial court also did not
abuse its discretion in determining that this possibility of
inconsistent rulings warranted the denial of Simplified’s motion
to arbitrate in plaintiff’s case.
Simplified responds with what boils down to three
arguments.
First, Simplified argues that the trial court was not allowed
to invoke section 1281.2, subdivision (c) because none of the
parties raised that issue in their briefing before that court. But
the trial court invoked the statute in its tentative ruling and the
parties had ample opportunity to address it at the hearing; no
one objected to the trial court’s citation to section 1281.2,
subdivision (c), or asked the court for the opportunity for further
briefing. On these facts, there was no procedural defect that is
cognizable in this appeal. (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57
11
Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3 [issues raised for the first time on
appeal are waived].)
Second, Simplified argues that plaintiff is “weaponiz[ing]”
section 1281.2, subdivision (c) by invoking it to deny arbitration
based on potentially inconsistent rulings with the judicial
proceeding between the Bodellos and Consolidated, which is a
“entirely separate lawsuit” wholly unrelated to plaintiff’s claims.
Rewarding plaintiff by denying arbitration, Simplified continues,
will just encourage plaintiffs to override otherwise valid
arbitration agreements by the simple expedient of adding wholly
unrelated plaintiffs and defendants to their lawsuits. We do not
share Simplified’s fear of section 1281.2, subdivision (c) being
used to negate all arbitration agreements. That is because
Simplified’s argument overlooks that this case has a party
common to the claims by both sets of plaintiffs—namely,
Taylored. Taylored is a party to the Bodellos’ judicial proceeding
against Consolidated, and would have been a party to plaintiff’s
arbitration proceeding against Simplified. Thus, the trial court’s
reliance on section 1281.2, subdivision (c) does not present the
apocalyptic scenario Simplified posits.
Third and lastly, Simplified argues that plaintiff’s claims
do not arise from the same series of transactions or events as the
Bodellos because plaintiff did not “prove” that Simplified’s and
Consolidated’s employment practices were similar or that
Taylored controlled them, such that there is no danger of
inconsistent rulings. This argument ignores that a party
invoking section 1281.2, subdivision (c) “‘does not bear an
evidentiary burden to . . . make any . . . showing regarding the
viability of the claims and issues that create the possibility of
conflicting rulings,’” chiefly because it is too early in the litigation
12
to mandate such a burden. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v.
Safety National Casualty Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 471, 483.)
The allegations in the pleadings are sufficient to support reliance
on section 1281.2, subdivision (c). (Ibid.) Here, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in determining that the working
conditions regarding breaks and overtime would be the same for
all workers at a warehouse run by Taylored, regardless of which
staffing agency placed those workers in that warehouse.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to his costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
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