Filed 6/26/26 Domestic Partnership of Harshaw and Hernandez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Domestic Partnership of DANIELLE
HARSHAW and MELISSA HERNANDEZ.
DANIELLE HARSHAW, F090889
Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 24CEFL04568)
v.
OPINION
MELISSA HERNANDEZ,
Respondent.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Glenda
Allen-Hill, Judge.
Danielle Harshaw, in propria persona, for Appellant.
Melissa Hernandez, in propria persona, for Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and DeSantos, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Danielle Harshaw (appellant) appeals from a custody order obtained by
respondent Melissa Hernandez (respondent) during an ongoing dissolution proceeding.
The appealed order awarded joint legal and physical custody to the parties and dictated
that the children would reside with respondent during the week and appellant during the
weekends. Appellant argues this order was an abuse of discretion, because it failed to
adequately consider the evidence she presented. We find no abuse of discretion here and
affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is an appeal following a custody order from the superior court regarding the
two children of the parties. The parties entered into a domestic partnership in
approximately 2020 and thereafter adopted two children. In September 2024, appellant
petitioned for dissolution of the domestic partnership. Prior to the appealed order in this
case, appellant represents the parties had a “2-2-5 shared parenting schedule.”1
Respondent filed a request for order regarding the parties’ custody agreement on August
13, 2025. Respondent requested that the court order the children to reside with her every
week and every other weekend, while allowing appellant visitation every other weekend.
According to respondent, appellant’s work schedule changed periodically, and appellant
had been injured, causing even more frequent schedule changes at work, which resulted
in inconsistency with managing childcare for the couple’s children, who are both under
the age of six. She also requested the court order that 80 to 90 percent of the funds
1 We presume appellant is using shorthand to refer to a schedule in which the
children reside with one parent for two days, the other parent for two days, and then
alternate between parents for the succeeding five days. However, this is not clearly
spelled out in either briefing or the record, the latter of which reflects that prior to the
appealed order in this case, the parties had an informal agreement for a “50/50 visitation
schedule.” The record does contain what appears to be a proposed written custody
agreement; however, it is only signed by appellant, and there is no indication respondent
ever assented to this agreement.
2.
received from the Adoption Assistance Program be awarded to her, as the children
resided with her for that percentage of time. Appellant opposed this request and asked
the court to mandate that appellant and respondent share both custody and the funds from
the Adoption Assistance Program evenly. Both parties submitted declarations and
documentary evidence in the form of text messages and other documents from the
children’s daycare provider.
On December 12, 2025, the trial court issued the appealed order in this case,
finding that the parties would have joint legal and physical custody. The court ordered
the children to reside primarily with respondent, except that they would reside with
appellant every weekend. The court did not apparently make any order on the division of
funds from the Adoption Assistance Program.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The briefing in this case contains virtually no legal citations. It is a critical aspect
of our appellate jurisprudence “that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be
correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) In order to
prevail on appeal, the appellant “must affirmatively establish prejudicial error by
providing an adequate record, citing to the record, and presenting a persuasive argument
with citations to supportive legal authorities.” (LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal
Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070; see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C).) “It is not our role as an appellate court independently to review
the record for error and to construct arguments for appellants that would require reversal
of the judgment,” and absent sufficient legal and record citations, we may treat
appellant’s contentions as forfeited. (LNSU #1, LLC, at p. 1070.)
3.
These burdens are not, and cannot be, relaxed for parties appearing without
counsel. “A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties
who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be
unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Rappleyea v. Cambell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975,
985.) Unrepresented litigants are “held to the same standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi
v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543; see Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284 [“[P]ropria persona litigants are not entitled to special
exemptions from the California Rules of Court or Code of Civil Procedure.”].)
In this case, appellant’s opening brief contains only two legal citations—one to In
re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25 for the general proposition that child
custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and one to Family Code
section 3011 for the statement that the trial court must be primarily concerned with the
health, safety, and welfare of the child. While we agree that we review child custody
orders for abuse of discretion (Burgess, at p. 32; C.C. v. D.V. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
101, 109), and that courts must consider the health, safety, and welfare of the children
(Fam. Code, § 3011, subd. (a)(1)), none of this supports appellant’s argument on appeal
that the court failed to meaningfully consider the evidence in front of it.2 Considering the
paucity of legal citations, appellant’s claims of error are forfeited.
2 Appellant’s reply brief does include a few other legal citations. Of course, an
appellant may not advance new arguments in a reply brief, because it deprives the
respondent of the chance to respond to them. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 270, 277–278.) Setting this aside, however, three of these additional
citations relate to support awards, which are not at issue here. (In re Marriage of
Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1272; In re Marriage of Chakko (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 104, 109; In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283.) The
final authority cited by appellant states that where the trial court misapprehends the legal
presumptions that apply to custody orders where there has been admitted domestic
violence by one of the parties, it has erred. (In re Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498–1501.) However, there is no alleged instance of domestic
4.
Even if we reached the merits of appellant’s arguments, we would not find error
here. As referenced above, we review child custody decisions for abuse of discretion.
(In re Marriage of Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32.) This is based on a trial court’s
determination of what is in the “best interests” of the child, based on the evidence in front
of it. (Ramsden v. Peterson (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 339, 345; Fam. Code, § 3011.) This
requires looking to all the circumstances bearing on these interests. (In re Marriage of
LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1087.) In evaluating whether the court abused its
wide-ranging discretion, “ ‘the appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether or not
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being
considered. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] To the extent that a trial court’s exercise of
discretion is based on the facts of the case, it will be upheld ‘as long as its determination
is within the range of the evidence presented.’ ” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146
Cal.App.4th 191, 197.) We apply the substantial evidence test and will find an abuse of
discretion only “ ‘if there is no reasonable basis on which [the court] could conclude that
its decision advanced the best interests of the child.’ ” (Noble v. Superior Court (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 567, 578.)
In this case, appellant maintains the trial court failed to meaningfully consider the
evidence before it, claiming that the court based its finding on a statement purportedly
rendered in court, saying, “ ‘It is in the children’s best interest to reside primarily with
their mother, as the father’s occupation appears to be somewhat unpredictable, and the
children require greater stability.’ ” We note that this statement is found nowhere in the
record, and does not appear in the court’s order. No reporter’s transcript of the hearing
was provided, nor was any substitute—such as an agreed or settled statement—presented
to us. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.130, 8.134, 8.137.) Indeed, later in the same
violence in this case, nor is there any argument that the court misunderstood a legal
presumption it was statutorily bound to apply. Fajota is therefore of little relevance.
5.
brief, appellant again quotes the court, albeit with different language, as saying: “It is in
the children’s best interests to live mainly with their mother, since, dad, your work
appears to be quite unpredictable, and the children require greater stability.” As
mentioned, it is appellant’s burden to provide an adequate record on which to base her
appeal. (LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn., supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.) Appellant cannot prevail on appeal by challenging a purported
statement of the court that does not appear in the record.
Still, to the extent appellant intended to contest whether there was substantial
evidence to support this statement attributed to the trial court, we find there is. The
documentary evidence in the record shows several instances of appellant requesting
assistance from respondent because of appellant’s inability to pick up or care for the
children, or indicating uncertainty about appellant’s work schedule. We understand
appellant’s argument that the records also show instances of the parties working
collaboratively to resolve scheduling issues, and agree that some of the documentary
evidence supports this account too. However, these types of arguments—that certain
evidence is more persuasive or should be believed over other evidence—are precisely
why this decision rests in the discretion of the trial court, which is better situated to make
determinations on the evidence in front of it. All we review here is whether the court’s
decision was within the range of the evidence presented, and we find that it was. (In re
Marriage of Ackerman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 197.)
To the extent appellant’s arguments are based on the purported failure to explain
its reasoning in a statement of decision, we observe there is nothing in the record
indicating appellant requested a statement of decision. California law provides that “[t]he
court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its
decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any
party appearing at the trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 632, subd. (a).) While a statement of
decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632, subdivision (a) is typically
6.
only required following a trial, it may at times be required in custody proceedings;
however, it is certainly not required where no party has requested it. (See Michael U. v.
Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792–793, superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435.) We are pointed to nowhere in the
record where appellant made such a request, and therefore decline to find error in the trial
court’s failure to issue a statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 632, subdivision (a) assuming that was an argument appellant intended to
advance.
DISPOSITION
Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. Respondent shall recover her
costs on appeal.
7.