Filed 8/28/26 Doe v. The Regents of the U. of Cal. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JOHN DOE, B346191
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25STCP00745)
v.
REDACTED OPINION FOR
THE REGENTS OF THE PUBLIC VIEW*
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Defendant and Respondent;
LOS ANGELES TIMES
COMMUNICATIONS LLC, et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and
Respondents.
* This case involves material from a sealed record.
In
accordance with Civil Code section 3426.5 and California Rules of
Court, rules 8.45, 8.46(g)(1) and (2), we have prepared both public
(redacted) and sealed (unredacted) versions of this opinion. We
order the unredacted version of this opinion sealed.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.
Hathaway Parker, Mark M. Hathaway and Jenna E.
Parker for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Kelly A. Aviles, Kelly A. Aviles; and Jeff
Glasser for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
_____________________________
Real parties in interest the Los Angeles Times
Communications LLC and its reporter Noah Goldberg
(collectively, the Times) filed a California Public Records
Act (Gov. Code, § 7920.000 et seq.) (CPRA) request asking
the University of California Irvine (UCI)1 to produce records
regarding an investigation of sexual assault allegations against
appellant John Doe conducted by UCI’s Title IX2 office. UCI
informed both appellant and the Times of its intention to provide
records relating to only those allegations UCI “sustained”
following a Title IX investigation and hearing. Appellant filed a
1 The respondent in this appeal is The Regents of
the University of California, the official name of the public
corporation that governs and operates, as a public trust, the
University of California at all its campuses, including UCI.
2 This refers to Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) (Title IX), which requires
universities receiving federal funding to, inter alia, address
formal complaints of sex discrimination, sexual harassment,
and sexual assault. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) & 34 C.F.R.
§§ 106.2, 106.44 (2026).)
2
“ ‘reverse-CPRA action’ ” (Amgen Inc. v. California Correctional
Health Care Services (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 732 (Amgen))
to prevent UCI from disclosing these records. He also sought
a preliminary injunction preventing disclosure, which the trial
court denied. Appellant argues that denial was in error. We
disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. UCI Title IX Office
Title IX requires institutions of higher education that
receive federal funding to address discrimination on the basis
of sex occurring “under any education program or activity.”
(See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).) Title IX implementing regulations
define such discrimination to include sexual harassment and
sexual assault. (34 C.F.R. § 106.2 (2026).) Title IX broadly
defines educational “program or activity” of a university to
include “all of the operations of ” the university (20 U.S.C.
§ 1687), including activities in faculty housing. (See, e.g.,
Conviser v. DePaul University (N.D.Ill. 2023) 649 F.Supp.3d
686, 703 [“accompanying Senate Report” to law adding the
“all-encompassing definition of ‘program or activity’ ” to
Title IX “stated that the . . . phrase ‘all of the operations of ’
encompasses . . . ‘. . . faculty and student housing’ ”].)
To fulfill the university’s obligations under Title IX
and Title IX implementing regulations, UCI created the UCI
Title IX office and instituted a “Sexual Violence and Sexual
Harassment” policy (the sexual misconduct policy) that “applies[,
inter alia,] to all university employees.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The policy explains that “Title IX regulations . . . require the
university to follow a specific grievance process . . . in response
to conduct covered by the regulations.” (Capitalization omitted.)
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(See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.44, 106.45 (2026).) Upon receiving a
Title IX complaint, the first step in this process is for the UCI
Title IX office to “determine . . . whether [the complaint] alleges
[conduct covered by Title IX].” A separate UCI document,
“Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment Investigation and
Adjudication Framework for Senate and Non-Senate Faculty,”
reiterates that the sexual misconduct policy applies to all
faculty and lays out the applicable grievance, investigation,
and adjudication procedures.
B. Underlying Title IX Investigation
Appellant is a professor at UCI. Between 2018 and 2021,
he dated Jane Roe, a UCI professor in a different department.
This relationship resulted in three complaints with the UCI
Title IX office. First, in June 2021, appellant filed a complaint
alleging Roe was stalking and harassing him. Second, in
October 2021, Roe filed a complaint alleging appellant had
sexually assaulted her. Third, in August 2022, Roe filed a
complaint alleging additional sexual assaults in UCI faculty
housing and sexual harassment.
The Title IX office conducted investigations into each of
the complaints and held a multi-day formal hearing on the first
complaint. It did not sustain any of the allegations in the first
or second complaint. [REDACTED.]
[REDACTED.]
C. Roe’s Lawsuit
In June 2022, with investigations into the first two Title IX
complaints still pending and before Roe filed the third, Roe sued
appellant, UCI, and five UCI officials. Roe alleged several causes
of action based on the sexual assaults alleged in her Title IX
4
complaints as well as UCI’s handling of those complaints. The
lawsuit describes the alleged sexual assaults and the outcomes
of the Title IX investigations. It attaches the police report
resulting from her contacting police regarding the alleged
assaults, and a letter from the UCI Title IX office describing the
investigation, hearing, and outcome of the first Title IX complaint
(appellant’s complaint against Roe).
Roe also sought a domestic violence restraining order
against appellant.
Roe dismissed the restraining order case and her civil
complaint in January 2024 and March 2024, respectively.
D. The Times’s CPRA Request
On November 22, 2024, the Times submitted a CPRA
request to UCI seeking “records related to two internal UCI
[Title] IX investigations. Firstly, . . . all records related to an
investigation into [Roe], who was accused by [appellant] of
sexual harassment and stalking. Secondly, . . . all documents
related to any investigation into [appellant], who was accused
by [Roe] of sexual assault.” The request specifically sought all
“investigative records, interview details, administrative findings,
[and] disciplinary actions.”
UCI informed the Times that “records for sustained
allegations [were] being processed for release,” but “[a]ny records
related to unsubstantiated allegations [would] not be released.”
UCI sent appellant a courtesy notice informing him of the CPRA
request and attaching copies of redacted records UCI intended
to provide the Times. The notice explained to appellant that UCI
had removed or redacted “[r]eferences to unsubstantiated issues”
and further redacted the documents “to safeguard the identities
of witnesses and reporting parties.”
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E. Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Mandate
Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior
court, seeking to prevent UCI’s proposed response to the Times’s
CPRA request. Days later, the court granted appellant’s ex parte
request for a temporary restraining order and issued an order
to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.
The court conducted an in-camera review of the documents
UCI proposed to provide the Times, after which the court
held a hearing in open court on the order to show cause. The
court concluded appellant “ha[d] not demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits of his petition. To the
contrary, the records at issue fall outside the [CPRA’s] personnel
records exception and are subject to disclosure under the CPRA.
[Appellant did] not show that [respondent/UCI] ‘lacks discretion
to disclose’ the records.” (Italics omitted.) The court denied the
request for a preliminary injunction and dissolved the temporary
restraining order. It stayed its order for 30 days.
F. Appeal and Stay of Lower Court’s Order
Before the trial court’s stay expired, appellant filed a notice
of appeal. He also sought a writ of supersedeas from this court.
We issued an order staying disclosure of the documents pending
resolution of this appeal or further order of the court.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
1. The CPRA
The California Constitution guarantees both the
individual’s right of privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; see Hill
v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 15)
6
and the public’s “right of access to information concerning
the conduct of the people’s business” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3,
subd. (b)(1)), including “the writings of public officials and
agencies.” (Ibid.; see International Federation of Professional &
Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007)
42 Cal.4th 319, 329.) The CPRA dictates that “every person has
[the] right to inspect any public record,” the disclosure of which
another law does not expressly prohibit. (Gov. Code, § 7922.525,
subd. (a).) “To balance [the] competing goals of privacy and
public access,” however, the CPRA also “includes . . . exemptions
that permit public agencies to refuse disclosure of certain public
records. For example, [Government Code] section 7927.700
exempts from disclosure any ‘personnel, medical, or similar
files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.’ Additionally, a catchall exemption
permits a public agency to withhold records if it can demonstrate
‘on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by
not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest
served by disclosure of the record.’ ([Gov. Code,] § 7922.000.)”
(Iloh v. Regents of University of California (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
513, 523–524 (Iloh).) “The[se] statutory exemptions from
mandatory disclosure under the CPRA . . . are permissive,
not mandatory: They allow nondisclosure but do not prohibit
disclosure.” (Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School
Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1262 (Marken), citing
CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 652 (CBS).) “Thus, ‘a
government agency has the discretion to invoke an exemption
under [the CPRA], but is not required to do so.’ ” (Iloh, supra,
at p. 524.)
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2. Reverse-CPRA Actions
“Although the CPRA includes a statutory procedure for
a party requesting disclosure to challenge an agency’s refusal
to disclose a public record (see [Gov. Code,] § 7923.000 et seq.),
no comparable procedure exists for an interested third party to
prevent the public agency from disclosing public records.” (Iloh,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 524, italics omitted, citing Marken,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) “ ‘ “Therefore, third parties
must bring an independent action for declaratory relief or
traditional mandamus if they believe they will be adversely
affected by disclosure.” [Citation.] This type of mandamus
action is commonly called a “reverse-CPRA action.” ’ ” (Iloh,
supra, at p. 524.)
A reverse-CPRA action asks the court to “prevent a
public agency from acting in an unlawful manner by releasing
information” in response to a CPRA request. (Marken, supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) Because “[m]andamus will not
lie to control an exercise of discretion, i.e., to compel an official
to exercise discretion in a particular manner” (ibid.), “ ‘[a]
party bringing a reverse-CPRA action must show disclosure is
“ ‘otherwise prohibited by law,’ ” that is, that the government
agency lacks discretion to disclose.’ ” (Iloh, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
at p. 524, italics omitted; Marken, supra, at p. 1266 [reverse-
CPRA action requires that the disclosure to be prevented “is
prohibited by law”].)
3. Preliminary Injunctions
“ ‘[A] preliminary injunction is an order that is sought
by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its
claim.’ [Citation.]” (Amgen, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 731.)
“Trial courts ‘ “evaluate two interrelated factors when deciding
8
whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. The first is
the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at
trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely
to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm
that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction
were issued.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Where a petitioner shows
no likelihood of success on the merits, the court “ ‘may not grant
a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim
harm.’ ” (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th
1452, 1463.)
B. The Court Properly Denied the Preliminary
Injunction Because Appellant Did Not Establish
a Likelihood His Reverse-CPRA Action Would
Succeed
Applying the legal frameworks set forth above, the court
denied appellant’s request for a preliminary injunction on the
basis that the Times’s proposed disclosure was not “ ‘prohibited
by law,’ ” thus appellant could not succeed on the merits of
his reverse-CPRA claim. Appellant argues this was error. He
contends he established a likelihood of success on the merits,
because the records at issue are not “public records,” meaning
the CPRA does not apply and cannot require disclosure. In
the alternative, he argues the CPRA’s personnel and catchall
exemptions apply.
The inapplicability of the CPRA would establish only that
the CPRA does not require disclosure; without more, that does
not establish any law prohibits disclosure, a requisite element
of a reverse-CPRA claim. (See Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1262, citing CBS, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 652; see also
Marken, supra, at p. 1266.) Similarly, the applicability of a
9
CPRA exemption would only mean UCI has discretion to refuse
disclosure, not that disclosure is unlawful. (See Iloh, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 524.) Thus, even if appellant is correct
about the applicability of the CPRA or its exemptions, that would
not alone establish the merits of his reverse-CPRA claim. In any
event, for the reasons we identify below, we agree with the trial
court that the CPRA applies and does not exempt the documents
at issue from mandatory disclosure.
1. The Records at Issue Are “Public Records”
to Which the CPRA Applies
The CPRA broadly defines “ ‘public records’ ” to include
“any writing containing information relating to the conduct
of the public’s business prepared, owned, used, or retained by
any state or local agency.” (Gov. Code, § 7920.530, subd. (a).)
“Our Constitution requires that these provisions furthering the
people’s right of access to information be ‘broadly construed.’ ”
(Iloh, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 523.) Appellant does not
dispute that UCI “owned, used, or retained” the documents
at issue, or that UCI is a state agency. He contends, however,
that the documents do not “concern[ ] the public’s business.” We
review this argument for abuse of discretion. (See Iloh, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 522, fn. 3 [reviewing for abuse of discretion
the “largely . . . factual question[ ]” of “whether the records relate
to the public’s business” in context of reverse-CPRA preliminary
injunction analysis].)
Assessing whether this is the case “ ‘will often involve
an examination of several factors, including the content . . .
[of the documents]; the context in, or purpose for which, it was
written; the audience to whom it was directed; and whether the
writing was prepared by an employee acting or purporting to act
10
within the scope of his or her employment.’ ” (Iloh, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 525, quoting City of San Jose v. Superior Court
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 618.) “Communications that are primarily
personal, containing no more than incidental mentions of agency
business, generally will not constitute public records.” (City
of San Jose, supra, at pp. 618–619.)
Here, the proposed disclosure is primarily comprised
of records UCI Title IX office employees compiled and
created during an official investigation of a public employee.
[REDACTED.] The records were thus prepared by UCI
employees not only acting within the scope of their employment,
but fulfilling duties that federal law requires UCI to perform.
(See 34 C.F.R. § 106.44 (2026).) They satisfy the definition of
public records.
Appellant’s reliance on the reasoning in Iloh, supra, in
arguing to the contrary is misplaced. That case involved a CPRA
request seeking “all correspondence” in a certain date range
“between [the university] and [the plaintiff] regarding articles
published in the four journals,” and “all correspondence . . .
between [the university or the plaintiff] and the four journals
regarding articles authored by [the plaintiff].” (Iloh, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) Iloh concluded the trial court had not
abused its discretion in deeming these documents public records,
because “postpublication communications by a professor at a
public university regarding articles she authored on topics in her
field of study at the university involve the ‘public’s business.’ ”
(Id. at p. 525.) The court in Iloh further noted: “The articles
at issue did not concern personal matters unrelated to [the
plaintiff ’s] job as an assistant professor; they discussed topics
directly relevant to her field of study.” (Ibid.) Appellant argues
11
the documents at issue here are like those distinguished in
Iloh, because they concern a private relationship unrelated
to appellant’s job duties. But the distinction the Court of
Appeal made in Iloh was relevant because the CPRA request
in that case sought “correspondence”—not, as here, “records
related to . . . internal UCI [Title] IX investigations.” The
correspondence of a university or its employee is not necessarily
a public record, absent some further connection with public
business (in Iloh, for example, the subject matter of the
correspondence). But records of a public entity’s Title IX
investigation are by definition records reflecting whether and
how the university is performing its duty to enforce Title IX
procedures. (See Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1275
[public has a “legitimate interest in knowing whether and
how the [school] district enforces its sexual harassment policy”
(capitalization omitted)]; see also CBS, supra, 42 Cal.3d at
p. 655 [holding in context of CPRA request for records reflecting
decision making on weapons license applications that public has
an interest in “ascertain[ing] whether the law is being fairly and
impartially applied”].)
Appellant argues the documents address a personal
relationship between two professors unrelated to their job duties
or UCI’s public business. But appellant does not—and cannot—
contend Title IX relieves UCI of its duty to investigate and
address sexual harassment complaints when the alleged conduct
involves a personal or romantic relationship. Indeed, appellant
himself asked the UCI Title IX office to investigate just such
conduct. Investigating a formal Title IX complaint is, by law,
part of the university’s public business. (See 34 C.F.R. § 106.44
(2026) [requiring Title IX coordinator of institution to investigate
12
and address formal Title IX complaints in particular ways].) The
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the documents
UCI proposes to disclose constitute public records.
2. No CPRA Exemption Applies
Appellant next argues that even if the documents are
“public records,” they are the type the CPRA exempts from
mandatory disclosure, either as personnel records, disclosure
of which would “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy” (Gov. Code, § 7927.700), and/or because, under the
“catchall exemption” “the public interest served by not disclosing
the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by
disclosure of the record.” (Gov. Code, § 7922.000; see Marken,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275–1276.)
“ ‘Courts apply a three-step analysis in determining
whether [either of these exemptions] applies.’ ” (Associated
Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist. (2018)
30 Cal.App.5th 530, 539 (Associated Chino).) First, “ ‘the
court must determine whether the records sought constitute
a personnel file, . . . or other similar file. If so, the court
must determine whether disclosure of the information would
“compromise substantial privacy interests; if privacy interests
in given information are de minimis[,] disclosure would not
amount to a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,’
[citation] . . . .” [Citation.] [Further,] the court must determine
whether the potential harm to privacy interests from disclosure
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. [Citations.]’ (Versaci
v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 805, 818 [(Versaci)].)
In weighing these competing interests, ‘we must determine
“the extent to which disclosure of the requested item of
information will shed light on the public agency’s performance
13
of its duty.” [Citation.]’ ” (Associated Chino, supra, at p. 539.)
We review the court’s assessment of the first two factors for an
abuse of discretion (Iloh, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 522), and
“independent[ly] review . . . the trial court’s statutory balancing
analysis” in step three. (CBS, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 651.)
As to the first step, the parties do not dispute, and
we agree, that the documents at issue are part of appellant’s
“personnel file . . . or other similar file.” (Associated Chino,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 539.)
As to the second step, appellant argues the proposed
disclosure would violate his privacy because it “concerns deeply
personal and disputed allegations arising from a private romantic
relationship.” The Times notes that Roe made these same
allegations in her publicly filed civil complaint and police report.
We disagree with the Times that this means the proverbial
bell cannot be unrung, [REDACTED]. The proposed disclosure
thus could further harm appellant’s privacy interest. But Roe’s
public allegations lessen the extent of the “potential harm to
privacy interests from [the proposed] disclosure.” (Versaci, supra,
127 Cal.App.4th at p. 818.) We bear this in mind in weighing
that harm against “the public interest in disclosure” in the third
step of the analysis. (Ibid.)
In this third step, a “public employee[’s] privacy must
give way to the public’s right to know” where documents involve
“well-founded” allegations of a “public employee’s wrongdoing . . .
of a substantial nature.” (Bakersfield City School Dist. v.
Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1046 (Bakersfield),
citing American Federation of State etc. Employees v. Regents
of University of California (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 913, 918.)
[REDACTED.] Appellant’s privacy interests must “give way
14
to the public’s right to know” about these allegations against a
professor compensated with taxpayer dollars and still teaching at
a public institution. (Bakersfield, supra, at p. 1046; see Marken,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276 [discussed post, holding CPRA
mandatory disclosure exceptions inapplicable to personnel
records of high school teacher reflecting he harassed students];
accord, Bakersfield, supra, at p. 1047 [CPRA mandatory
disclosure exceptions inapplicable to documents reflecting “well
founded” allegations of serious misconduct by a public school
teacher ].) The public “has a significant interest in knowing
how [a public education entity] . . . responds to allegations of
misconduct committed by” an employee. (BRV, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 757; see Marken, supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1275 [noting this reasoning applies to a
public educator who, unlike in BRV, is not a high-profile public
employee].)
Appellant’s argument to the contrary ignores the crucial
Title IX context of the documents, mischaracterizing them
as merely “records arising from a prior private romantic
relationship between two adult, co-equal faculty members
that ended acrimoniously for reasons unrelated to their faculty
responsibilities.” But the documents at issue are not love notes
the Times is asking UCI to retrieve from appellant’s private
computer; they are materials UCI gathered or created in the
context of an official investigation into possible misconduct
by a public educator.
The court’s analysis in Marken is instructive. There,
the Court of Appeal held that neither the personnel records
exemption nor the catchall exemption applied to documents
from a school district’s investigation into allegations that the
15
plaintiff, a high school teacher, was sexually harassing his
students. (Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276.) The
court explained that “[the plaintiff] occupie[d] a position of
trust and responsibility as a classroom teacher, and the public
has a legitimate interest in knowing whether and how the
district enforces its sexual harassment policy.” (Id. at p. 1275,
capitalization omitted.) “In light of . . . the district’s conclusion
based on [the investigator’s] findings that [he] had violated
its board policy prohibiting the sexual harassment of students
and imposition of discipline[,] the exemption from mandatory
disclosure in [the CPRA] [was] inapplicable[,] and release of
the investigation report and disciplinary records . . . [was]
required under the CPRA. . . . [T]he public’s interest in disclosure
of this information—the public’s right to know—outweighs
[the plaintiff ’s] privacy interest in shielding the information
from disclosure.” (Id. at p. 1276, capitalization omitted.)
[REDACTED.] The public has an interest in knowing how UCI
enforces this policy and carries out UCI’s Title IX obligations.
(Accord, Bakersfield, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1046–1047.)
Appellant urges this case is more like Associated Chino,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 530, a reverse-CPRA action seeking
to block disclosure of school district documents regarding
parents’ complaints against a high school volleyball coach.
(Id. at pp. 534–535.) These complaints alleged the coach
conducted practices in an abusive manner. (Id. at p. 535.)
After investigating, the district issued a written disposition
of the complaints, a letter of warning, and a letter of concern.
(Ibid.) The coach retired soon thereafter. (Ibid.) Appellant,
a teachers association, filed a reverse-CPRA petition arguing
16
the interest in protecting the coach’s privacy outweighed any
public interest in these documents. (Id. at pp. 530–531.)
The Court of Appeal considered whether the CPRA
personnel records and catchall exemptions applied. (Associated
Chino, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 538–539.) Citing Marken
and BRV, the court acknowledged that disclosure would serve
the public’s “significant interest in the conduct of public school
teachers and coaches, and in knowing how [the school district]
handles allegations of their misconduct.” (Id. at p. 541.) To
determine “whether the potential harm . . . to [the coach’s]
privacy interest” from disclosure “outweighs the public interest
in disclosure,” the court “consider[ed] whether the letters contain
allegations of misconduct that are substantial in nature.” (Id.
at pp. 541–542.) The court concluded they did not—indeed,
it further concluded the alleged “conduct was objectively
reasonable.” (Id. at p. 543.)
Associated Chino does not compel a different result.
[REDACTED.]
In sum, the infringement on appellant’s privacy from UCI’s
proposed disclosure—which, as noted, is lessened as a result of
Roe’s public allegations—does not outweigh the public interests
that disclosure serves.
3. Disclosure Is Not “Prohibited by Law”
As the court in Marken explained, because “the proposed
disclosure . . . does not fall within the [privacy-based CPRA]
exemption[s], it necessarily does not violate [appellant]’s
constitutional right to privacy . . . and its disclosure is not
prohibited.” (Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1271, fn. 18.)
Nor does appellant identify any other law prohibiting disclosure.
The court thus correctly concluded appellant’s reverse-CPRA
17
claim could not succeed on the merits and correctly denied the
preliminary injunction.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Real parties in interest and
respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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