Doe v. David CA2/1

Filed 9/22/26 Doe v. David CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JANE DOE, B341119 consolidated with
B345361
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV37498)
ALKIVIADES DAVID,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from judgments and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge.
Affirmed.
Bohm Wildish & Matsen, James G. Bohm and Cecilia
Preciado for Defendant and Appellant.
Dordick Law Corporation, Gary A. Dordick, John M. Upton,
Dustin Z. Moaven; Livingston•Bakhtiar and Ebby S. Bakhtiar for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Jane Doe sued businessman Alkiviades David, alleging that
he raped her during her employment with his companies and
then fired her. A few years into the litigation, David, who resided
in Greece, got rid of his trial counsel and proceeded to represent
himself with a lawyer in Greece acting as his agent for litigation-
related communications. When the trial court relieved David’s
trial counsel, both the Greek lawyer and David were served with
documents identifying the trial date. David thereafter sat for his
remote deposition, but failed to respond to requests for admission
(RFAs), failed to provide further medical information to support
his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) request for
accommodations as ordered by the court, refused to meet and
confer concerning pretrial documents, and skipped appearing at
the trial.
Based on Doe’s trial evidence, the court granted a directed
verdict in her favor on claims for sexual battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict of
$100 million in noneconomic compensatory damages and, upon
finding David had acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, $800
million in punitive damages.
David filed a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new
trial, arguing that he did not receive notice of the trial and the
damages awards “shock[ed] the conscience.” The court found
David had had actual notice of the trial but agreed the damages
awards were excessive. The court conditionally granted a new
trial on damages unless Doe accepted reduced compensatory
damages in the amount of $10 million and punitive damages in
the amount of $80 million. Doe accepted the reduction.

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David now argues Code of Civil Procedure1 section 594
prohibited the court from proceeding with trial in his absence
without 15 days’ notice of the continued trial date. He also
argues that he did not receive notice of the motion to deem the
RFAs admitted and that the court failed to rule on his ADA
accommodation requests. David further argues that the reduced
compensatory and punitive damages awards remain excessive or
are otherwise infirm.
Most of the issues David complains about are of his own
making. The record demonstrates that after David fired his trial
counsel, he remained informed about key events in the litigation
and had actual notice of both the trial date and Doe’s motion to
have the RFAs deemed admitted, but chose not to participate or
hire counsel to represent him. Further, contrary to David’s
contention, the court did not “fail” to rule on his ADA
accommodation requests; it exercised its discretion to request
medical information supporting David’s final request, which
David never provided. We also see no merit in David’s
arguments concerning the damages awards.
We therefore affirm.2
BACKGROUND
We set forth only those portions of the record pertinent to
the issues David raises on appeal.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 Doe filed a motion to dismiss David’s appeal pursuant to
the disentitlement doctrine, claiming he has defied discovery
regarding his assets while this appeal is pending. We deny that
motion and consider David’s appeal on the merits.

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A. The Operative Complaint
In October 2021, Doe filed the operative first amended
complaint against David and some of his companies with whom
she had been employed, alleging sexual battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and other claims. Doe alleged
that on different occasions between August 2016 and April 2019,
David attempted to kiss Doe, forced her to help him masturbate,
and violently raped her. Doe sought economic and noneconomic
compensatory damages and punitive damages.
B. Pre-trial Litigation While Counsel Represents David
1. The Court Schedules Trial
Until February 13, 2024, the law firm of Glaser Weil Fink
Howard Jordan & Shapiro LLP (Glaser Weil) represented David
and actively participated in the litigation. While Glaser Weil
represented David, the court scheduled the trial for August 7,
2023, and later continued the trial date to May 28, 2024.
2. Discovery and Accommodation Requests
a. Depositions and Accommodation Requests
Doe and David filed dueling motions to compel the other’s
deposition. In June 2023, David submitted an ADA
accommodation request (the first ADA request) by which he
sought accommodations for his deposition and for trial.
On August 23, 2023, the court heard the motion to compel
David’s deposition and considered the first ADA request. The
request included two parts: (1) that David’s deposition occur via
written questions or be split into at least two sessions, and
(2) that the court allow David to take breaks or appear remotely
for trial and advise the jury of David’s disability. The court
stated it was inclined to deny the written questions but noted

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frequent breaks seemed appropriate. But the court observed that
Doe’s counsel had not yet received information about the first
ADA request or had an opportunity to review the medical record
supporting the request. David’s counsel argued the court should
permit David to finish a course of treatment before sitting for his
deposition and that counsel had additional information that he
wanted to submit to the court for its consideration. The court
therefore agreed that David would file a new or amended ADA
request.
On August 28, 2023, the defense submitted a second ADA
request, which the court considered at a September 25, 2023
hearing. The court again stated it was inclined towards
requiring breaks and multiple deposition sessions but not
towards a deposition via written questions. The court noted that
the second ADA request was unclear with respect to what trial
accommodations David sought. David’s counsel stated David was
in Greece and that counsel had spoken with David’s family’s
Greek attorney (later identified as Themis Sofos) who had
relayed that David was undergoing diagnostic tests in Greece.
David’s counsel argued David’s deposition should be postponed
for three months to allow him to undergo treatment and that
David should not be in the courtroom during trial.
The court implicitly granted part of David’s accommodation
request by continuing the hearing to January 5, 2024 (thereby
preventing David’s deposition from occurring until the court
ruled). It also stated that because the treatment might change
David’s condition or his needs, a further hearing was necessary
before it could rule on the remainder of his accommodation
requests.

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b. David Moves to Compel Doe to Provide
Information About Her Medical Providers
During discovery, David sought information about Doe’s
medical providers from whom she received treatment for any
injuries arising from David’s conduct. Those providers included
Dr. Craig Snyder, her treating psychologist. In her responses,
Doe identified Planned Parenthood (but not Snyder) and objected
to providing further information. In an August 9, 2023 meet and
confer email, Doe’s counsel argued additional discovery was
unnecessary because “[a]t this time, [Doe] will not be calling any
treating physicians in connection with her
emotional/psychological injuries.” David moved to compel further
responses to these interrogatories, which the court granted in
large part on September 13, 2023. These supplemental
interrogatory responses are not in the record, but it appears they
were provided as David’s February 2024 informal discovery
conference statement (filed by Glaser Weil) makes no mention
that the further responses remain outstanding.
3. David Fires Glaser Weil
By a December 18, 2023 email from David to Glaser Weil,
David fired the firm for not advocating for him in the manner he
wanted. He authorized Sofos to contact Glaser Weil about
David’s case files and explained where the files should be sent.
As explained post, Glaser Weil remained David’s counsel for
approximately two more months before it was relieved.

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4. Continued Litigation Concerning Discovery and
Accommodation Requests (December 2023 to January
2024)
In late December 2023, David filed a third ADA request,
seeking to further delay his deposition to permit continued
treatment.
At the continued January 5, 2024 hearing, Glaser Weil
advised the court that it had learned from Sofos that David was
undergoing treatment in Greece and required more time for his
treatment to take effect before David was deposed. The court
observed that it had previously “give[n David] accommodations
for the treatment.” However, the third ADA request did not
include a “medical prognosis, diagnosis, or treatment update,”
which the court required “in order to say that the deposition
should be held off until April.” The court scheduled a continued
hearing for February 13, 2024. Neither Glaser Weil, David, nor
anyone acting on David’s behalf thereafter provided any of the
requested medical information to the court substantiating a
further need to continue David’s deposition.3
5. Glaser Weil Moves to Be Relieved as David’s Counsel
On January 16, 2024, Glaser Weil moved to be relieved as
David’s counsel. The motion listed the May 28, 2024 trial date
and was served on Sofos by mail and email and on David through
his own email address (which the record establishes David used

3 During this hearing, Doe inquired whether David’s
claimed disability would be put on as part of David’s defense.
Glaser Weil represented that it would provide that information at
the February 13, 2024 hearing, but there is no record of Glaser
Weil’s answer.

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during the litigation). The motion informed David that he should
appear at future hearings, that the court needed to know how to
contact him, and that his failure to keep the court and other
parties apprised of his current contact information could
adversely affect his interests.
In an accompanying declaration served in the same
manner, Glasier Weil stated, “David was served both by email
and care-of his counsel in Greece. . . . David’s Greek counsel has
confirmed that . . . David can be served by email in connection
with the service of all case related documents.”4 The declaration
listed upcoming proceedings, including trial on May 28, 2024. It
further stated, “David has retained separate counsel who is privy
to the developments in this case.”
6. Continued Litigation Concerning Discovery and
Accommodation Requests (February 2024)
On February 5, 2024, Glaser Weil filed a status report
concerning David’s treatment, stating it had been unable to
obtain information about David’s progress.
On February 8, 2024, Doe served RFAs on David via Glaser
Weil (who at that point was still David’s counsel of record).

4 At a February 9, 2024 hearing, Glaser Weil stated that
this representation about service to David’s email was only
intended to mean that Glaser Weil could serve David by email.
The court determined that David could be served via mail to
Sofos in Greece with a follow-up notice by email until Glaser Weil
could better advise on the appropriate method of service.

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7. The Court Relieves Glaser Weil and David Is Again
Notified of the Trial Date
On February 9, 2024, the court granted Glaser Weil’s
motion to be relieved as counsel, which would take effect upon
the firm’s filing of a proof of service of the court’s order. At the
hearing, a Glaser Weil attorney stated, “To my knowledge, there’s
not anyone who’s immediately intending to substitute in.” The
firm represented it would attempt to get additional information.
On February 13, 2024, Doe’s counsel and Glaser Weil
returned to court. Glaser Weil had been unable to obtain more
information. The court concluded that it would proceed with the
understanding that David would represent himself and the entity
defendants would be in default. Doe’s counsel noted she had
served discovery and a deposition notice on David prior to the
court granting Glaser Weil’s motion to be relieved and expected
Glaser Weil would send that discovery to David. Glaser Weil
agreed to contact Sofos “who does represent . . . David at least for
certain things[ to] try to get answers to the questions of how . . .
David and that counsel want to proceed.”
Later that day, Glaser Weil filed and served notice of the
court’s order granting their motion to be relieved as counsel on
Sofos by email and mail and on David via his email. The order
advised David that Glaser Weil no longer represented him,
identified David’s current mailing address in Greece, which was
care of Sofos, stated formal service on David must be made at
that address, and stated the trial was scheduled to begin on
May 28, 2024. The order also advised David that as a self-
represented litigant, he was responsible for his case, his failure to
appear at hearings or comply with court rules could cause him to

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lose his case, and that it was his duty to keep the court informed
of his current address.
C. Pre-trial Litigation While David Proceeds In Propria
Persona
For some time thereafter, David continued to participate in
the litigation with Sofos’s assistance. On March 1, 2024, Doe
took David’s remote deposition, at which Sofos appeared as an
observer and “[f]or [d]efendants.” At deposition, David
demonstrated his ability to access the courts and information
about litigation. He stated that the day before, he had filed a
federal district court case involving Doe’s counsel and against a
“syndicate” of lawyers and judges who were colluding against
him. David claimed the lawsuit was prepared by, among others,
three lawyers in Los Angeles and two lawyers in Texas.
On March 12, 2024, Doe moved to have the RFAs that she
served on February 8, 2024 deemed admitted as David had
provided no response. Doe served the motion on David via Sofos’s
email.
On May 6, 2024, the day before the hearing on Doe’s
motion, David sent several text messages to Doe’s attorney,
including addressing him with various slurs and saying, “I’m
going to fuck you” and “You will regret ever messing with me.”
On May 7, 2024, Glaser Weil attended the hearing to deem
the RFAs admitted. The firm stated, “We were asked very
recently to come back into the case,” and that they expected to
file an appearance within a week. They requested (and Doe
opposed) that the court adjourn the hearing for a week. The
court declined to continue the hearing but noted Glaser Weil
could file a motion for relief after David reengaged the firm.

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The court granted Doe’s motion to deem the RFAs
admitted. Doe served a notice of the court’s ruling on David by
email to Sofos. The notice included the May 28, 2024 trial date.
That same day, Doe’s counsel emailed Sofos to inform
David that they wanted to meet and confer concerning joint trial
documents and advised of the upcoming final status conference.
On May 8, 2024, Doe served on David (via Sofos’s email) a
notice to appear at trial and produce documents, which included
documents relevant to David’s financial condition. After
receiving no response concerning joint trial documents, Doe also
filed and served David (via Sofos’s email) with her individual
trial documents, each of which identified the trial date.
On May 14, 2024, Doe’s counsel declared he had made
several attempts to reach Sofos to discuss the trial documents.
The declaration also stated that that morning, David had sent
multiple text messages to Doe’s counsel. During the exchange,
Doe’s counsel stated, “Please don’t text me again. Please sign the
pre[]trial documents. Your failure to complete the pre[]trial
documents may result in the court sanctioning you.” David
responded, “Fuck off idiot,” and then sent approximately 60 more
expletive-laden text messages to counsel with demeaning and
derogatory insults and threats. Doe served the declaration on
David via an email to Sofos.
In a May 18, 2024 email to Sofos, Glaser Weil discussed
steps that David needed to take to reengage the firm. Glaser
Weil stated, “Based on the [j]udge’s demeanor during the May 15
hearing [suggesting that Glaser Weil came before the court a
second time after being relieved], we believe that the situation
has greatly deteriorated, and that it has become increasingly
difficult (if not impossible) for us to take the steps that we feel

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are necessary to put on an adequate defense of [David] in this
case.” Glaser Weil further stated that if it was reengaged, it
would “attempt to get a necessary trial continuance which would
hopefully permit us with some opportunity to develop a defense
at the trial of this matter.” David, acting in propria persona,
later attached this email to his new trial motion, thereby
confirming it had been provided to him.
On May 24, 2024, the court trailed the trial to May 31,
2024. On May 31 and again on June 11, 2024, the court again
trailed the trial. In each instance, the court observed that there
was no appearance for David or any communication why there
were no appearances for him. The court scheduled trial for
June 13, 2024.
On June 6 and 10, 2024, Doe’s counsel spoke by telephone
with Sofos concerning the upcoming trial. Sofos acknowledged
that he was aware of the trial date and Doe’s inability to continue
it. On June 11, 2024, Doe’s counsel also emailed Sofos to inform
him that the trial had been trailed to June 13, 2024.
On June 12, 2024, Doe filed and served (via email to Sofos)
designations from David’s deposition to be used at trial.
D. Trial
The court conducted jury selection on June 13, 2024. On
June 14, 2024, prior to any testimony, Doe filed amended witness
and exhibit lists. The witness list identified Snyder, a “[t]reating
[p]hysician,” for the first time. The lists were served on David via
an email to Sofos.
The record contains no trial transcripts. According to the
court’s June 14, 2024 minute order, Doe, Snyder, and another
witness testified. The court marked (for identification only)
portions of complaints by four other plaintiffs against David for

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sexual torts and the resulting special verdicts in each trial.
Those verdicts included an April 2019 $8 million punitive
damages award, an October 2019 punitive damages award of over
$4.3 million, a December 2019 $50 million punitive damages
award, and a December 2023 $5.5 million punitive damages
award. Doe also played excerpts of David’s deposition for the
jury. One of those excerpts included David’s testimony that his
reference to a “rape room” was a joke.
After the presentation of evidence, Doe moved for a directed
verdict on her causes of action for sexual battery and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the
motion and dismissed Doe’s remaining causes of action without
prejudice.
In granting the directed verdict, the court found the
evidence established 35 facts and instructed the jury to accept
them as true. These included that David attempted to kiss Doe,
raped her, pinned her against a wall and covered her mouth with
his hands while he raped her; raped Elizabeth Taylor (a former
account executive) and a woman named Mahim Khan; fired
female employees (including Doe and Chastity Jones) after they
refused to engage in sexual activity with him; had sexual
relations with Jones against her will; grabbed the throat of an
employee named Lauren Reeves, “shoved her chair into a wall,
and told her that he needed to buy supplies for his ‘rape room’ ”;
wrote an online article where he intentionally revealed Doe’s
name with the intent to harass and intimidate her; acted with
reckless disregard of the probability that Doe would suffer
emotional distress due to David’s unsolicited sexual activity;
engaged in sexual misconduct with Doe with the intent to cause
injury and with a willful and knowing disregard of Doe’s rights

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and safety; disregarded the rights of Doe, Taylor, Khan, and
Jones “when he forced [each of them] to engage in unwanted . . .
sexual activity”; and “knew that forcing his then-employee, . . .
Doe, into having unwanted sexual intercourse with him was
despicable conduct.”
The facts also included that Doe never consented to a
sexual relationship with David, “resisted all of . . . David’s
attempts to have sexual intercourse, including but not limited to
repeatedly yelling ‘No!’ and expressly telling . . . David to
‘S[top],’ ” and that David’s conduct “was a substantial factor in
causing . . . Doe’s severe emotional distress.”
Finally, the facts included that “[i]n April 2019, a
California jury ordered . . . [David] and at least one of his
businesses to pay $11[ million] in punitive and compensatory
damages for . . . sexual battery against . . . Jones,” and “[w]hile
. . . David was on the stand during trial against . . . Jones, he told
. . . Jones to ‘take my card. . . . Go and buy whatever you
want . . . . It’s a Black Amex from Switzerland, if you would like,
madam? Is that interesting? . . . [O]h fuck it, just enter a default
judgment.’ ”
On June 15, 2024, Doe served amended jury instructions
and special verdict forms on David via an email to Sofos.
At trial, the court instructed the jury that David’s liability
had already been established and that the jury was to determine
the amount of compensatory damages, whether Doe was entitled
to punitive damages, and the amount of punitive damages, if any.
The court instructed the jury that Doe sought noneconomic
damages, including past and future pain and suffering.
As to punitive damages, the court instructed the jury
pursuant to CACI No. 3940. The given instruction differed from

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the pattern instruction in that instead of advising the jurors they
were to decide how much was necessary to punish David in light
of his financial resources, the court instructed, “In view of . . .
David’s failure to produce documentation regarding his financial
condition, what amount is necessary to punish and discourage
future wrongful conduct?” The given instruction did not include
bracketed optional language in CACI No. 3940 that the jury could
not use punitive damages to punish David for the impact of his
“alleged misconduct on persons other than” Doe. (Ibid.)
During deliberations, the jury asked (1) what their options
were as to their own anonymity, (2) the amounts of previous
awards against David, separately identifying compensatory and
punitive damages, (3) whether David was charged with criminal
charges or faced jail time, and (4) “Is the ‘[10] times’ amount for
punitive statutorily based or just a suggestion?”
The court responded: (1) The jurors’ names would be
sealed; (2) “The testimony during trial about the previous awards
is the only information available to you. No further evidence or
information can be provided once the case has been submitted to
the jury for deliberations”; (3) “There was no evidence at trial on
this issue, and you should not consider it during your
deliberations”; and (4) “Arguments of counsel are not evidence of
damages. Instruction [CACI N]o. 3940 provides you with the
instruction on how to decide whether to award punitive damages,
and if so, how to determine the amount.”
On June 17, 2024, the jury returned a special verdict in
which it (1) found Doe suffered $100 million in past and future
noneconomic damages; (2) found David engaged in conduct with
malice, oppression, or fraud; and (3) awarded $800 million in
punitive damages.

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On June 18, 2024, Doe served a proposed judgment on
David via Sofos’s mail and email addresses.
On July 5, 2024, the court entered judgment in Doe’s favor
and against David in the amount of $900 million. The clerk
served notice of entry of the order on Doe and the court ordered
Doe to give notice.
On July 16 and 17, 2024, Doe filed and served a notice of
the notice of entry of judgment and notice of judgment on special
verdict, respectively, by mail to Sofos in Greece.
E. Post-judgment Proceedings and Entry of an
Amended Judgment
1. David Challenges the Judgment
On July 8, 2024, David filed in propria persona a motion to
set aside and vacate the judgment pursuant to section 663, for a
new trial pursuant to section 659, and “[o]bjections” to the trial.
(Boldface and capitalization omitted.) He argued that, in
violation of his due process, the trial proceeded without notice to
him and that he was thereby deprived of the opportunity to
participate and cross-examine witnesses. David also claimed he
“has been awaiting instructions on how to proceed in the
litigation, and on May 15[], 2024, was suddenly presented with
new facts via email, indicating an upcoming trial, without any
dates stated.” He also argued that the court failed to make any
ADA accommodation for him during the case. He argued that the
$900 million judgment against him (which he claimed to have
learned about through media) was a miscarriage of justice,
shocked the conscience, and should be set aside.
In opposition, Doe argued David had received ample actual
and constructive notice of the trial and that there were no errors

16
or irregularities that caused substantial prejudice to David. Doe
also argued that the damages award was not excessive.
On September 16, 2024, David filed a reply in propria
persona. That day, new counsel substituted in for David and
presented argument at the hearing on David’s motion. David
telephonically appeared for a portion of the hearing. The court
shared its view that David’s only argument that had any merit
was the issue of excessive damages. Following argument, the
court took the matter under submission.
2. Ruling
On September 17, 2024, the court conditionally granted a
new trial limited to damages unless Doe accepted a remittitur
reducing compensatory damages from $100 million to $10 million
and punitive damages from $800 million to $80 million. It found
the jury’s damages award “ ‘shocks the conscience and virtually
compels the conclusion the award is attributable to passion or
prejudice.’ ” The court found “the evidence supports a finding of
$10 million in compensatory damages” and that $80 million in
punitive damages “would preserve the jury’s 8-to-1 punitive
damages ratio, which is within the constitutionally acceptable
limits.”
The court otherwise denied David’s motion. It found, “It
cannot reasonably be disputed that [David] had actual notice of
the impending trial, and did not take any steps to request a
continuance or arrange for participation in the trial.” (Fn.
omitted.) As to David’s ADA arguments, the court noted that
David’s former counsel was relieved before David provided a
complete record of his medical condition and treatment progress
to the court. It also stated, “[David] did not pursue a ruling on
ADA accommodations regarding his deposition before sitting for

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the deposition, and did not seek to postpone the deposition so
that he could provide the [c]ourt with a full medical record and
final proposal for accommodations so that the issue could be
decided before the deposition. Since the parties . . . scheduled
and completed [David]’s deposition without any involvement by
the [c]ourt, the ADA accommodation request was waived with
regard to the deposition. Since [David] did not appear at or
otherwise participate in the trial, any request for
accommodations at trial was moot. [¶] At any rate, a failure to
accommodate under ADA does not constitute a basis for a new
trial under . . . [section] 657. Moreover, [David] has not
presented any evidence of how any disability prevented him from
having a trial that comported with due process.”
3. The Court Enters an Amended Judgment
On September 25, 2024, Doe accepted the remittitur of
damages. In light of the acceptance, the court denied David’s
motion to set aside and vacate the judgment.
On December 23, 2024, the court entered an amended
judgment reflecting the reduction of damages.
David filed timely notices of appeal from the July 5, 2024
judgment, the September 17, 2024 order, and the December 23,
2024 amended judgment.
DISCUSSION
David makes three categories of appellate challenges. The
first concerns allegedly deficient notice. David contends that the
trial proceedings violated section 594, subdivision (a) and his due
process rights because he did not have 15 days’ actual notice of
the continued trial date. He also argues that granting Doe’s

18
motion to deem the RFAs admitted occurred without valid service
of the motion on him and violated his due process.
The second category concerns his ADA requests. David
contends we must reverse the judgment because the trial court’s
purported failure to rule on his accommodation requests was
structural error.
The final category challenges the trial court’s reduced
compensatory and punitive damages awards. David argues those
awards were unconstitutional for lack of fair notice and excessive
such that the awards shock the conscience, result from passion or
prejudice, and violate due process. David also argues the
punitive damages award was not based on evidence of his
financial condition, unfairly punished him for harm to third
parties, and that the court failed to instruct the jury that it
needed to consider his financial condition in awarding punitive
damages.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Section 594 or Due
Process in Proceeding to Trial Without David or
Deeming the RFAs Admitted
1. General Legal Principles
“The due process clauses of the United States and
California Constitutions require that a party be given reasonable
notice of a judicial proceeding.” (In re Marriage of Goddard
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 54.) This notice requirement is codified in
section 594, subdivision (a), which states that a party may
proceed in the absence of an adverse party with a trial that
involves issues of fact upon proof “that the adverse party has had
15 days’ notice of such trial.”
Section 594, subdivision (a) applies only to the original trial
date and not to subsequent continued dates. (In re Phillip F.

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(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 257; People ex rel. San Francisco Bay
Conservation etc. Com. v. Smith (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 113, 126-
127 (Smith).) “[R]equir[ing] repeated 15 days’ notice at every
continuance before the taking of evidence” “would cripple court
efficiency,” and “[n]o continuance of fewer than 15 days would be
possible.” (Smith, supra, at p. 129; see Equinix LLC v. County of
Los Angeles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1108, 1116 [“ ‘ “It is
blackletter law that the Constitution and statutes must receive
practical, common sense construction [citation] and that an
interpretation which would lead to an unreasonable result or
absurdity must be avoided” ’ ”].) Further, a party who has actual
notice of the setting of a trial date has a duty to remain informed
of subsequent proceedings, including continued trial dates.
(Smith, supra, at p. 129; City etc. of San Francisco v. Carraro
(1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 509, 518.)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Proceeding to Trial
David disagrees with In re Phillip F. and Smith and argues
that section 594 does require notice of continued trial dates. In
support, he cites Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958. Au-
Yang did not involve a continued trial date but an advanced trial
date. (Id. at p. 962.) In distinguishing the matter before it from
Smith and concluding section 594 requires notice when a trial is
advanced, the Supreme Court explained “the significant
distinction between” continuances and advances (Au-Yang, at
p. 964): “When a trial, previously set for one date, is continued to
a later date, the absent party’s opportunities to plan and prepare
for trial and to be present at trial are unlikely to be harmed, for it
will have completed its preparations by the previously scheduled
date. This is true even if the party is unaware of the
continuance, for in that case it will have completed its

20
preparations by the original trial date and simply by appearing
at that time it will learn of the new time for trial. But if, as in
this case, a trial date is advanced, failure to give 15 days’ notice
of the new trial date is likely to result in prejudice. A party that
receives . . . no notice of the new trial date may discover that the
court has already conducted a trial and entered judgment against
it.” (Id. at p. 965, italics omitted.)
David also argues In re Phillip F. and Smith are outliers
and that the following cases held that section 594 requires 15
days’ notice (or, based on earlier versions of section 594, 5 days’
notice) of continued trial dates to the absent parties: Heidary v.
Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, Wilson v. Goldman (1969)
274 Cal.App.2d 573, Bird v. McGuire (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 702,
Simon v. Tomasini (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 115, and Hurley v. Lake
County (1931) 113 Cal.App. 291. We are not persuaded. Bird v.
McGuire does not stand for the proposition David claims. It
instead involved a failure of fair notice of any trial date (including
the original trial date). (Bird v. McGuire, at p. 708.) The other
cases are also factually distinguishable—none have a fact pattern
like the one here, where David remained apprised of litigation
events and chose not to participate. But even if these cases can
be read to require notice of continued trial dates in every
instance, In re Phillip F. and Smith reflect the better approach by
both assuring proper notice of the initial trial date and not
crippling court calendar management by preventing continuances
of less than 15 days. (See Fairbank et al., Cal. Practice Guide:
Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 2025) § 1:341.11
[“the underlying policy of providing at least 15 days’ notice for
final trial preparation has been satisfied when a properly noticed
initial trial date is continued”].)

21
The trial court here found, “It cannot reasonably be
disputed that [David] had actual notice of the impending trial.”
Whether a party has actual notice is a question of fact (see Yuba
City Unified School Dist. v. State Teachers’ Retirement System
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 648, 655), for which we review the record
for substantial evidence (Vasquez v. LBS Financial Credit Union
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 97, 109). “Under this deferential standard
of review, . . . we consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 970, 981.)
Even assuming arguendo that David did not have
knowledge of the trial date before Glaser Weil was relieved as his
counsel, substantial evidence establishes that he had actual
notice of the May 28, 2024 trial date well in advance of the trial.
As part of its motion to be relieved as counsel, Glaser Weil sent to
David’s own (and active) email address three documents, each of
which identified the May 28, 2024 trial date. Despite having
such notice, David did not appear in court on May 28, 2024 or
thereafter communicate with the court, suggesting he did not
intend to appear at trial. The record indicates that after the
court relieved Glaser Weil, David stayed informed about
litigation activities. Although Doe’s counsel primarily
communicated with Sofos by telephone and email, the record
suggests this was an effective way to reach David. This is how
Glaser Weil communicated with David before it was relieved and
even after when discussing its possible reengagement. And 17
days after Glaser Weil was relieved, Doe coordinated David’s
deposition with Sofos appearing as an observer on David’s behalf,
from which the trial court could reasonably infer that Sofos was

22
responsive to telephone calls and/or emails and remained a
conduit to David of litigation communications. Indeed, in
connection with Doe’s opposition to the new trial motion, Doe
submitted declarations from two of her attorneys establishing
that prior to trial, they had spoken with Sofos by telephone and
email, advised him of at least two continued trial dates, including
the final date of June 13, 2024. During one such telephone
conversation, Sofos confirmed he was aware of a continued trial
date. To the extent David relied on information from Sofos to
keep him aware of litigation activities, there is no evidence that
Sofos failed to perform his duty. The timing of David’s vulgar
texts to opposing counsel, Doe’s counsel’s statement in those texts
urging David to sign the pretrial documents, Glaser Weil’s
appearance at two hearings in May 2024 after they had been
relieved, and David’s receipt of the May 18, 2024 email from
Glaser Weil concerning its possible reengagement and the need to
seek a continuance to prepare an adequate defense, further
buttress David’s awareness of the occurrences in the litigation,
including the trial date. That the trial court thereafter trailed
the trial to June (even without 15 days’ notice) is therefore
irrelevant for purposes of section 594, subdivision (a). (Smith,
supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 126-127.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Deeming the RFAs
Admitted
David argues the court violated his due process in granting
Doe’s motion to deem the RFAs admitted because he did not have
notice of the motion. We disagree. The record supports the trial
court’s implied finding that David knew of the motion and related
hearing. Doe timely served her motion via an email to Sofos,
David sent threatening text messages to Doe’s attorney the day

23
before the hearing, and Glaser Weil attended the hearing on the
motion and advised the court that the firm had been asked to
come back into the case. Moreover, David could have thereafter
sought relief through motions practice or objected to the use of
the admitted RFAs at trial. He did neither.
B. David Has Not Demonstrated Prejudicial Error
Relating to His ADA Accommodation Requests
1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“It is the policy of the courts of this state to ensure that
persons with disabilities have equal and full access to the judicial
system.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(b).) “To accomplish this
goal, [California Rules of Court,] rule 1.100 allows ‘ “[p]ersons
with disabilities,” ’ . . . to apply for ‘ “[a]ccommodations,” ’
meaning ‘actions that result in court services, programs, or
activities being readily accessible to and usable by persons with
disabilities.’ ” (Friends of South Fork Gualala v. Department of
Forestry & Fire Protection (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1194,
citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(a)(1)-(3).) “Requests for
accommodations must include a description of the
accommodation sought, along with a statement of the medical
condition that necessitates the accommodation. The court, in its
discretion, may require the applicant to provide additional
information about the medical condition.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 1.100(c)(2).)
A court may deny a request for accommodation for only one
of three reasons: “(1) The applicant has failed to satisfy the
requirements of this rule; [¶] (2) The requested accommodation
would create an undue financial or administrative burden on the
court; or [¶] (3) The requested accommodation would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or

24
activity.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(f)(1)-(3).) If the court
denies an accommodation request “in whole or in part, the
response must be in writing.” (Id., rule 1.100(e)(2).)
“The applicable standard of appellate review is abuse of
discretion.” (Friends of South Fork Gualala v. Department of
Forestry & Fire Protection, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1195.)
Under this standard, “ ‘the “trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” [Citation.] A “court
abuses its discretion ‘ “where no reasonable basis for the action is
shown.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
David argues the trial court “failed” to rule on his
accommodation requests. Citing Biscaro v. Stern (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 702, David further argues that this purported failure
to rule is structural error that does not require a showing of
prejudice for reversal.
In Biscaro, the appellant suffered from permanent
cognitive disabilities due to a frontal lobe injury, which affected
his ability to remember, reason, and communicate. (Biscaro v.
Stern, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 706.) At an ex parte hearing
on the respondent’s request for a restraining order, the appellant
asked the court for a neuropsychologist’s assistance in the
courtroom. (Id. at p. 705.) The court denied the ex parte
application on the basis that it should proceed as a noticed
motion, stated it would rule on the appellant’s accommodation
request before the rescheduled hearing, but then never did rule
on the request. (Ibid.) The appellant did not appear at the
restraining order hearing, and the court granted the order. (Id.

25
at pp. 705, 706.) The appellate court concluded the trial court’s
failure to rule on the accommodation request was structural
error: “[I]f the record before us led us to conclude that [the]
appellant had failed to satisfy the requirements of the rule and
that his accommodation should have been denied as a matter of
law, the trial court’s failure to rule might be considered
harmless” (id. at p. 708), but none of the three reasons to deny
the accommodation request applied (id. at p. 710). “[B]ecause an
accommodation’s purpose is to help a party meaningfully
participate,” the trial court’s failure to rule on the request left the
appellate court “unable to assess meaningfully what impact the
grant of accommodation would have had on the proceedings and
concluded, therefore, the error was structural without a showing
of prejudice.” (Ibid.)
Unlike Biscaro, the trial court here did not fail to rule on
David’s accommodation requests. As the hearing on David’s first
accommodation request made clear, an immediate ruling on that
request would have been premature, improper, and contrary to
the defense’s wishes. Doe had to be “given notice and an
opportunity to view the medical records and other material on
which [David] relies” in making his accommodation request.
(Vesco v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 275, 280.) But at
the time of the August 23, 2023 hearing, David had not provided
Doe’s counsel with such information. Further, David’s counsel
represented, “we have developed some . . . additional information
which I think the court should consider. . . . [A]nd I’d like to be
able to submit that to the court as well.” During the hearing,
defense counsel also recharacterized the request: “It’s more
fundamental of a question of timing so that . . . David has the
opportunity to complete a treatment protocol that he has begun.”

26
The court therefore agreed to permit David to file a new or
amended ADA accommodation request and continued the hearing
to September 25, 2023.
The second accommodation request sought to continue
David’s deposition for approximately three months to permit him
to undergo treatment and, as explained by David’s counsel during
the September 25, 2023 hearing, to allow David not to be in the
courtroom during trial. The court implicitly granted part of
David’s accommodation request in continuing the hearing to
January 5, 2024, and pragmatically recognized that because the
treatment might change David’s condition or his needs, a further
hearing was necessary before it could rule on the remainder of his
accommodation requests. This, again, is not a “failure” to rule on
David’s accommodation request.
The third accommodation request, submitted in December
2023, asked the court to further delay David’s deposition to April
2024 to allow for continued treatment. The court indicated the
request failed to provide sufficient medical information,
continued this hearing for a month, and ordered that David
provide a status medical update before it would rule on that
request. The court was well within its discretion to require such
information. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(c)(2).) Yet, the
record indicates that David never provided any further
information, and, thus, David “failed to satisfy the requirements
of this rule.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(f)(1).)
David argues that the court did not comply with California
Rules of Court, rule 1.100(e)(2)’s requirement that the court set
forth any accommodation request denial in writing. As discussed
above, the court did not deny any of the accommodation requests,
implicitly or otherwise. Rather, for good reasons, it continued its

27
determination as to what specific accommodations should be
provided at David’s deposition and at trial and whether to
continue David’s deposition for another four months. David
thereafter failed to provide the required information or pursue
the issue with the court.
That David fired his counsel and chose to proceed as a self-
represented litigant does not excuse his failure to provide the
additional required information. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8
Cal.4th 975, 984-985 [stating self-represented litigants are held
to the same standards as attorneys].) “[W]hen a litigant accepts
the risks of proceeding without counsel, he or she is stuck with
the outcome, and has no greater opportunity to cast off an
unfavorable judgment than he or she would if represented by
counsel.” (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267.)
C. David’s Damages Arguments Are Unpersuasive
1. David’s Compensatory Damages Arguments
a. General Legal Principles and Standard of
Review
“ ‘The amount of damages is a fact question, first
committed to the discretion of the jury and next to the discretion
of the trial judge on a motion for new trial. They see and hear
the witnesses and frequently . . . see the injury and the
impairment that has resulted therefrom. As a result, all
presumptions are in favor of the decision of the trial court
[citation]. The power of the appellate court differs materially
from that of the trial court in passing on this question. An
appellate court can interfere on the ground that the judgment is
excessive only on the ground that the verdict is so large that, at
first blush, it shocks the conscience and suggests passion,

28
prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.’ ” (Bigler-Engler v.
Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 299, quoting Seffert v. Los
Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 506-507.)
Section 662.5, subdivision (a)(2) permits the trial court to
“issue a conditional order granting the new trial unless the party
in whose favor the verdict has been rendered consents to the
reduction of so much thereof as the court in its independent
judgment determines from the evidence to be fair and
reasonable.” (Ibid.) “We must affirm the court’s decision if the
court states adequate reasons for the decision and substantial
evidence supports the decision.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 688-689.) “[T]he relevant
amount for purposes of our review is not the amount awarded by
the jury, but the reduced amount ordered by remittitur.” (Id. at
p. 689.)
b. The Compensatory Damages Award Is Not
Excessive
David argues the compensatory damages award is so large
that it “shocks the conscience” and is unconstitutional. He claims
that the jury heard inflammatory evidence of prior judgments
against him and “received a misleading jury instruction”
identifying “35 ‘established facts’ ” without being told that the
facts were deemed admitted. Even assuming these contentions
are true and constituted error, in ruling the compensatory
damages award was excessive and reducing it from $100 million
to $10 million, the trial court alleviated any prejudicial effect of
these purported errors. A trial court is presumed to know and
follow the law (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526; see Evid. Code, § 664) and, thus, we
presume the court did not consider the purportedly inflammatory

29
evidence or established facts for an improper purpose. David
cites nothing in the record suggesting otherwise.
David claims $10 million for Doe’s pain and suffering is still
too high and shocks the conscience. We cannot review the
evidence presented at trial relevant to this issue because there is
no reporter’s transcript. As the appellant, it is David’s burden to
provide an adequate record on any challenged issue, and his
failure to do so requires that the issue be resolved against him.
(Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
181, 187.) David attempts to blame Doe and the court for the
lack of a court reporter at trial. But the record leaves no doubt
that David chose not to participate in the trial, and he cites no
authority for the proposition that under such circumstances, he is
relieved of his duty to provide an adequate record.
Moreover, the court’s ruling conditionally reducing
compensatory damages to $10 million identified evidence that
supported that figure: “[Doe] . . . testified to a pattern of
workplace harassment that culminated in an instance of rape,
which is an obviously heinous act causing physical and emotional
injuries for which [Doe] should be justly compensated. [Doe]’s
therapist, Dr. Craig Snyder, testified to the ongoing serious
distress that [Doe] has faced and will continue to face due to
conditions he diagnosed: [p]ost [t]raumatic [s]tress [d]isorder and
[m]ajor [d]epressive [d]isorder. These are not minor emotional
injuries. The [c]ourt found the testimony of [Doe] and her
therapist to be credible.” Thus, David has not demonstrated
insufficient evidence supports the $10 million figure or that that
award is so out of line with reason that it shocks the conscience.
David contends the excessiveness of the award is evident
when compared against the verdict in Carroll v. Trump (S.D.N.Y.

30
2023) 683 F.Supp.3d 302. We disagree. In that case, the jury
awarded $2 million as reasonable compensation for the plaintiff’s
pain and suffering caused by the defendant forcibly inserting his
fingers into the plaintiff’s vagina. (Id. at p. 327; see also Carroll
v. Trump (2d Cir. 2024) 124 F.4th 140, 154 [affirming a total of
$4.7 million in compensatory damages for sexual assault and
defamation].) “While the appellate court should consider the
amounts awarded in prior cases for similar injuries, obviously,
each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.”
(Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 508.)
Without in any way minimizing what occurred in the Carroll
case, a jury could reasonably conclude that what David did to his
employee Doe was worse and, in any event, “[i]njuries are seldom
identical and the amount of pain and suffering involved in
similar . . . injuries varies widely.” (Seffert, at p. 508; see Bigler-
Engler v. Breg, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 300
[acknowledging the difficulty in assessing noneconomic damages
in part because there is no method available to the trier of fact to
objectively evaluate such damages].)
c. David Has Not Demonstrated He “Lacked
Notice” of Compensatory Damages
David claims the compensatory damages award is
unconstitutional for lack of notice on two grounds. First, citing
Roby v. McKesson Corporation (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, David
argues he did not receive notice of the “severity of the penalty” he
would face with respect to the compensatory damages. The
portion of Roby on which David relies concerns punitive damages
(id. at p. 712), and David does not explain how it could apply to
compensatory damages. The wrongs alleged in the first amended
complaint and the prayer for relief by which Doe sought

31
noneconomic damages put David on notice of his potential
exposure to a significant damages award due to the heinousness
of the alleged conduct and the subjective nature of such damages.
Additionally, as Doe states, and David does not contest, section
425.10, subdivision (b) prohibits a personal injury plaintiff from
stating “the amount demanded” in the complaint. Section 425.11,
subdivision (b) permits a defendant to request a statement of
damages to obtain more information about the amount sought.
Nothing in the record indicates David did so.
Second, David argues he lacked notice that Snyder would
testify at trial and implies that the court’s compensatory
damages award was impermissibly based, in part, on this
testimony. He claims Doe engaged in a bait and switch by
seeking to avoid discovery as to Snyder by saying, “At this time,
[Doe] will not be calling any treating physicians in connection
with her emotional/psychological injuries,” but then calling
Snyder as a witness 10 months later. This ignores that after Doe
stated she did not intend to call any treating physicians, David
successfully moved to compel Doe to provide information about
those physicians. It is reasonable to conclude that having had to
provide information about those physicians, Doe decided to call
one of them as a witness. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 776-
777 [“ ‘ “all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor
of [a judgment’s] correctness” ’ ”].)
David also argues that Snyder was not identified as a trial
witness until the morning that he testified, June 14, 2024. A
party challenging the admission of evidence on appeal must make
a timely and specific objection to preserve the issue for appellate
review. (Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 870-871.)

32
David made no such objection here, and his challenge to the
admission of this testimony for lack of notice is not cognizable.
That David decided not to attend the trial did not relieve him of
his obligation to timely object.
2. David’s Punitive Damages Arguments
a. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of
Review
“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and
deterring its repetition.” (BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
(1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568 [116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809].) “The
amount of punitive damages offends due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment as arbitrary only if the award is
‘ “grossly excessive” ’ in relation to the state’s legitimate interests
in punishment and deterrence.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, 558.) “A court determining
whether a punitive damages award is excessive under the due
process clause must consider three guideposts[, known as the
Gore guideposts]: ‘(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed
in comparable cases.’ ” (Ibid., quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. v.
Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 418, 429 [123 S.Ct. 1513, 155
L.Ed.2d 585].)
“Although [the United States Supreme Court] has declined
to ‘impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award
cannot exceed,’ the court . . . has concluded that ‘in practice, few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and

33
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process.’ ” (Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (2016) 63
Cal.4th 363, 372.) Following the high court’s guidance, the
California Supreme Court explained, “ratios between the punitive
damages award and the plaintiff’s actual or potential
compensatory damages significantly greater than 9 or 10 to 1 are
suspect and, absent special justification (by, for example, extreme
reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-to-detect or hard-to-
measure compensatory damages), cannot survive appellate
scrutiny under the due process clause.” (Simon v. San Paolo U.S.
Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1182, italics added, fn.
omitted.)
A defendant’s financial condition is an essential
consideration for a court reviewing a punitive damages award
under California law, and is a permissible consideration under
the due process clause in determining the amount of punitive
damages necessary to further the state’s legitimate interests in
punishment and deterrence. (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding
Co., Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1185-1186.)
“[W]e defer to findings of historical fact if they are
supported by substantial evidence, and we independently assess
each of the . . . guideposts and determine de novo whether the
punitive damages award is excessive under the due process
clause.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., supra, 198
Cal.App.4th at p. 558.) “An appellate court should keep in mind,
as well, that its constitutional mission is only to find a level
higher than which an award may not go; it is not to find the
‘right’ level in the court’s own view.” (Simon v. San Paolo U.S.
Holding Co., Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1188.)

34
b. Analysis
David argues the punitive damages award of $80 million is
excessive and unconstitutional because (1) the 8-to-1 ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages is at the upper end
of what California allows and is “arbitrary,” (2) Doe failed to
present any evidence of David’s financial condition to the jury,
(3) the award punishes David for harm to third parties, and
(4) the court provided an erroneous instruction to the jury
concerning punitive damages.
(i) The 8-to-1 Ratio Between Punitive
and Compensatory Damages Is Not
Excessive or Arbitrary
Due to the extreme reprehensibility of David’s conduct, the
punitive to compensatory damages ratio of 8 to 1 is not excessive
or arbitrary. (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc., supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 1182.) “The high court in both BMW [of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, supra, 517 U.S. 559] and State Farm [Mut.
Ins. v. Campbell, supra, 538 U.S. 408] recognized that ‘the most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct.’ ” (Simon, at p. 1180.)
David’s appellate brief does not address the
reprehensibility of his conduct, but we nonetheless consider this
factor. Reprehensible behavior is that which (1) may cause
physical as opposed to only economic harm, (2) shows indifference
to the health or safety of others, (3) is directed at a financially
vulnerable target, (4) occurs repeatedly, and (5) is not accidental
but based in malice, trickery, or deceit. (Simon v. San Paolo U.S.
Holding Co., Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) Here, all five

35
factors weigh in favor of finding David’s conduct was highly
reprehensible.
As the trial court recognized, David’s rape of Doe was
“heinous,” and Doe and her therapist testified that she suffered
physical, mental, and emotional harm as a result. It is
undisputed that David, as the principal of the companies for
whom Doe worked, was in a position of significant relative power
to Doe and knew that she depended on him for her financial
livelihood. During his deposition, David acknowledged that he
was asked to give her a job as a favor to a friend and Doe “didn’t
have much of a resume.” (See Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins.
Co., supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 374-375 [explaining consideration of
the Gore guideposts is not limited to facts that were before the
jury because the purpose is for the reviewing court to determine
whether the award was excessive].) Further, at the time David
raped Doe, four other female former employees had already sued
him for sexual battery, evincing a continued indifference to the
health and safety of others as well as a so-far undeterred pattern
and practice. Finally, the admitted RFAs establish David’s
conduct was not accidental but done with malice, including that
he covered Doe’s mouth with his hand as she screamed, “No,” and
for him to stop.
David’s citation to Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2006) 137
Cal.App.4th 204 does not compel a different conclusion; it in fact
suggests that an 8-to-1 ratio in a case involving a high level of
reprehensibility like this one is appropriate. In that case, a
Ralphs store director engaged in inappropriate touching, used
profanity, made inappropriate comments about employees’ sex
lives, and threw objects at employees. Six of the employees sued
the store director and Ralphs. The jury awarded each of the

36
plaintiffs compensatory damages ranging from $50,000 to
$200,000. (Id. at p. 208.) The jury also awarded each plaintiff $5
million in punitive damages against Ralphs, based on Ralphs
continuing to employ the store director despite knowledge of his
misconduct. (Id. at pp. 209, 219.) The trial court granted a new
trial as to any plaintiff who did not consent to a reduction in
punitive damages equal to 15 times her compensatory damage
recovery. (Ibid.) Four plaintiffs did not accept this reduction.
(Ibid.) In evaluating whether the punitive damages were
excessive, the appellate court considered the Gore guideposts. It
determined Ralphs acted with “a modest degree of
reprehensibility” and the “case d[id] not contain any of the factors
justifying more than a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages.” (Gober, at p. 222.) It observed, “Ralphs
did not act with extreme reprehensibility and the damages were
not unusually small, hard to detect or hard to measure.” (Ibid.)
The appellate court also determined that comparable civil
penalties could not exceed 1.4 times the plaintiffs’ compensatory
damages. (Id. at p. 223.) Thus, based on these factors, the
appellate court concluded, “a six to one ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages is sufficient to punish Ralphs and deter it
and others from similar conduct in the future. This ratio is also
reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm suffered and
to the compensatory damages that the . . . plaintiffs recovered,
which already contained a punitive element.” (Ibid.) Here,
where David’s conduct was more reprehensible, a greater ratio is
permissible.

37
(ii) Evidence of David’s Financial
Condition
“Because the quintessence of punitive damages is to deter
future misconduct by the defendant, the key question before the
reviewing court is whether the amount of damages ‘exceeds the
level necessary to properly punish and deter.’ ” (Adams v.
Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 110.) “A reviewing court cannot
make a fully informed determination of whether an award of
punitive damages is excessive unless the record contains evidence
of the defendant’s financial condition.” (Ibid.) “However, a
defendant who thwarts a plaintiff’s ability to meet this obligation
may forfeit the right to complain about the lack of evidence of his
or her financial condition.” (Garcia v. Myllyla (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 990, 995.)5
David argues the court’s punitive damages award must be
reversed because Doe failed to provide evidence of his financial
condition at trial. We have no way of knowing whether this is
true. David may not have provided evidence of his financial
condition, but this does not necessarily mean that the jury heard

5 Under section 1987, a plaintiff can compel a defendant to
attend trial and produce documents at trial. Such notice has the
same effect as a subpoena (id., subd. (b)), which “for purposes of
requiring attendance and the production of documents at trial,
. . . is equivalent to a court order” (Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1338). A defendant who, “ ‘[b]y his
disobedience of a proper court order, . . . improperly deprived
[the] plaintiff of the opportunity to meet his burden of proof on
the issue,’ ” is estopped from “ ‘complain[ing] about the absence of
such evidence.’ ” (Garcia v. Myllyla, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at
p. 995, quoting Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
597, 609.)

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no testimony from which it could have inferred David’s
approximate net worth. Although we have no reporter’s
transcript for the trial, the trial court’s ruling on David’s motion
for new trial states, “Because the issue of punitive damages was
not bifurcated, the jury made its determination of noneconomic
compensatory damages after it heard evidence of [David]’s net
worth . . . .” (Italics added.) In any event, David’s failure to
provide an adequate record on appeal means we resolve this issue
against him. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc., supra, 198
Cal.App.4th at p. 187.)
Further, as Adams v. Murakami, supra, 54 Cal.3d 105
counsels, one reason to require financial condition evidence is to
allow a reviewing court to make an “informed determination of
whether an award of punitive damages is excessive.” (Id. at
pp. 110, 120.) This does not require that the evidence be put
before the jury, only that it be in the record. (See Nickerson v.
Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 374-375.) The
record here contains substantial evidence supporting a
determination that an $80 million punitive damages award is not
beyond David’s ability to pay. At deposition, David acknowledged
stating in a court filing that he was a billionaire. David also
testified that his companies, FilmOn.TV and Hologram USA,
each “make[] millions of dollars every month.”6

6 Because David has failed to show that evidence of his net
worth was not presented at trial and that the punitive damages
award exceeds his ability to pay, we need not consider whether
David is estopped from arguing that there was no evidence about
his financial condition as a result of his failure to produce
documents at trial.

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(iii) David’s Remaining Punitive
Damages Arguments Lack Merit
Following the Trial Court’s
Reduction of Damages
“[T]he Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to
use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury
that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly
represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are,
essentially, strangers to the litigation.” (Philip Morris USA v.
Williams (2007) 549 U.S. 346, 353 [127 S.Ct. 1057, 166 L.Ed.2d
940].) David claims the punitive damages award improperly
punished him for harm to third parties. He argues, “The jury
heard overwhelming evidence about multiple rapes of other
women, bad acts, sexual assault, [and] other graphic sexual
misconduct” against other women. The jury also heard other
purportedly inflammatory facts, including that David publicly
ridiculed and mocked his prior victims.
As David acknowledges in his brief, evidence of prior bad
acts is admissible and relevant to the determination of
reprehensibility. (Philip Morris USA v. Williams, supra, 549
U.S. at p. 355.) But David further contends that because the trial
court here failed to instruct the jury with the portion of CACI
No. 3940 that states “[p]unitive damages may not be used to
punish [the defendant] for the impact of [his] alleged misconduct
on persons other than [the plaintiff],” the jury likely used the
evidence to punish David for his misconduct against other
women. In response, Doe argues that other language in the
instruction given to jurors signaled to them that punitive
damages could only be awarded for David’s conduct that harmed
Doe.

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David also argues that the punitive damages jury
instruction given to the jury was erroneous because it failed to
include standard language in CACI No. 3940 about the
defendant’s financial condition.
We need not determine whether the given version of CACI
No. 3940 was erroneous. Even assuming error, instructional
error in a civil case warrants reversal only where “ ‘after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ it
appears the error caused a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Soule v.
General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574.) The operative
punitive damages award is not the one the jury awarded, but the
reduced amount set forth in the trial court’s remittitur.
Regardless of whether the instruction may have impacted the
jury’s consideration, a trial court is presumed to know and follow
the law (In re Marriage of Davenport, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1526; see Evid. Code, § 664), and David has not made any
reasoned argument that the court’s reduced punitive damages
award erroneously included an amount to punish David for his
misconduct against third parties or failed to consider David’s
financial condition.

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgments and order. Doe is awarded her
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, Acting P. J.

We concur:

M. KIM, J.

ZUKIN, P. J.*

* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Four assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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