Filed 8/4/26 Doe 7DC v. Doe 2 CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JOSEPH DOE 7DC, H052624
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22CV408993)
v.
DOE 2 et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
(Santa Clara County
JOSEPH DOE 7DD, Super. Ct. No. 22CV409017)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DOE 2 et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
In December 2022, plaintiffs sued a handful of entities, alleging that each shared
responsibility for multiple sexual assaults perpetrated by a single individual in the 1990’s,
when plaintiffs were minors.1 The timeliness of plaintiffs’ complaint turns on the version
1
Plaintiffs are proceeding under fictitious names—Joseph Doe 7DC and Joseph
Doe 7DD.
of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 that took effect January 1, 2020.2 (Stats. 2019,
ch. 861, § 1 [Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)]; see also S.C., supra,
115 Cal.App.5th at pp. 370, 377–380.) This legislation, as pertinent here, effected two
changes designed to enable more lawsuits based on claims that would otherwise be
untimely under former law. (Compare Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1 with Stats. 2018, ch. 423,
§ 8, subd. (a).) First, it enlarged the limitations period for filing civil actions alleging
harms from childhood sexual assault (§ 340.1, subd. (a)); but for a defendant other than
the alleged perpetrator of the abuse, it barred commencement of an action after a
plaintiff’s 40th birthday unless the nonperpetrator defendant “knew or had reason to
know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that create[d] a risk of childhood
sexual assault … or … failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable
safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.” (§ 340.1, subd. (c)). Second, the
legislation revived claims that would have been untimely under former law and permitted
commencement of revived claims until the later of “within three years of January 1,
2020” or “the time period under subdivision (a).” (§ 340.1, subd. (q).)
At issue in this appeal is whether the heightened pleading standard of
section 340.1, subdivision (c) applies to claims against nonperpetrator defendants revived
under subdivision (q). Plaintiffs, relying on subdivision (q)’s revival provision, maintain
that subdivision (c) does not apply to claims that, like theirs, would have been untimely
2
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. Unless
otherwise noted, we refer to the version of section 340.1 effective from January 1, 2020,
through December 31, 2022. (Cf. S.C. v. Doe 1 (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 365, 380, fn. 9
(S.C.) [identifying later amendments to the statute].) We limit our opinion to this now-
superseded version of the statute because it was in effect when the actions were
commenced, and the dates of the alleged abuse exempt plaintiffs’ claims from the current
statute’s repeal of the limitations period. (See Stats. 2023, ch. 655, § 1 [specifying in
amended § 340.1, subd. (p) that “a claim … in which the childhood sexual assault
occurred on or before December 31, 2023,” is subject to “the applicable statute of
limitations set forth in existing law as it read on December 31, 2023”].)
2
under former law but were filed within the new three-year revival window. But two
defendants—(1) a religious organization’s “local conference,” which operated Doe
Church and a private religious school;3 and (2) the “union conference” that controlled the
local conference and the religious school—successfully demurred on the ground that
plaintiffs were subject as well to subdivision (c) and failed to plead the additional facts
necessary to that subdivision’s enlargement of time.4
Construing section 340.1 de novo, we conclude that plaintiffs’ suits were timely
filed under section 340.1, subdivision (q). (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1; see also S.C., supra,
115 Cal.App.5th at pp. 370, 377–380.) We will reverse the judgment of dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Operative Complaint
Plaintiffs initially filed separate complaints in December 2022. After first
amended complaints and then consolidation of their cases, plaintiffs jointly filed the
operative second amended complaint. Plaintiffs pleaded two claims against the local
conference and union conference: (1) negligent supervision, investigation, and retention
of a church leader who sexually abused plaintiffs; and (2) negligent supervision of
plaintiffs.
In support of these claims, plaintiffs alleged as follows: Plaintiffs, born in 1980
and 1982,5 respectively, were abused from about 1993 through 1995; the abuse occurred
3
Although plaintiffs identified the local conference and Doe Church as separate
defendants, plaintiffs alleged that the local conference was doing business as Doe
Church. On appeal, the local conference agrees that it was doing business as Doe
Church. We understand the parties to agree that Doe Church is not a separate entity.
4
Plaintiffs sued defendants under fictitious names—the union conference is
named as Doe 2 and the local conference is named as Doe 4. The alleged abuser and the
church with which he was affiliated—Doe Church—are also fictitiously named.
5
Given the initial filing of separate complaints in December 2022 and alleged
birth years in 1980 and 1982, at least one plaintiff had reached 40 years of age before
3
when plaintiffs attended religious services at Doe Church, attended the church’s school,
and participated as members of its youth club;6 the alleged perpetrator was a church
leader who used his position at Doe Church to sexually assault plaintiffs during school
hours, school-sanctioned events, church events and youth club events—often on school
or church property.
B. Demurrer and Appeal
The local conference and union conference separately demurred to the operative
complaint.7 In challenging the pleading, both defendants raised as alternative grounds
(1) the statute of limitations and (2) the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ factual allegations to
establish a legal duty. Sustaining both demurrers without leave to amend, the trial court
ruled that plaintiffs’ claims against both entities were barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs timely appealed from the ensuing judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
“In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint
de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under
any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
“[W]e accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but
not contentions, deductions, of conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters
subject to judicial notice.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th
initiating this action; it is unclear whether the other had. The younger plaintiff does not
rely on this ambiguity in arguing for reversal.
6
Plaintiffs alleged that the youth club was owned, operated, and controlled by the
local conference and/or the school and/or was under the jurisdiction and control of the
union conference.
7
The union conference had successfully demurred to each plaintiff’s first amended
complaint, subject to leave to amend. The local conference had answered the first
amended complaints.
4
919, 924.) When a defendant asserts the statute of limitations as a basis for demurrer, the
“ ‘ “ultimate question for review is whether the complaint showed on its face that the
action was barred by a statute of limitations.” ’ ” (Van de Kamps Coalition v. Board of
Trustees of Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044.)
In our independent judgment, plaintiffs’ suits were timely under section 340.1,
subdivision (q). As to the union conference’s alternate theory for affirmance, we
conclude that plaintiffs’ allegations regarding a special relationship between themselves
and the union conference are sufficient to withstand demurrer.
A. Statute of Limitations
We interpret section 340.1 de novo. (See, e.g., People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024, 1032.) In doing so, “ ‘ “ ‘ “[o]ur fundamental task … is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language
in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to
determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If
the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal
interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the
statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.” ’ ” ’ ”
(Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 758, 767–768 (Los
Angeles Unified).)
Effective January 1, 2020, section 340.1 required a plaintiff to commence their
action by the later of their reaching the age of 40 years or five years after actually or
constructively discovering that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of
majority was caused by the sexual assault. (§ 340.1, subd. (a).) But as to a defendant
other than the perpetrator, subdivision (c) of section 340.1 provided that a plaintiff was
not permitted to commence an action after their respective 40th birthdays unless the
5
defendant “knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct
that create[d] a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer,
representative, or agent, or the [defendant] person or entity failed to take reasonable steps
or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.”
(§ 340.1, subd. (c).)
But section 340.1 as amended also included a revival provision for certain child
sex abuse claims “that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020” by “the
applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit”:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” such claims “that [have] not been litigated
to finality” are “revived, and … may be commenced within [the later of] three years of
January 1, 2020,” or “the time period under subdivision (a) as amended” in the same “act
that added this subdivision.” (§ 340.1, subd. (q); see also Los Angeles Unified, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 777 [describing subd. (q) as “a revival window for lapsed claims”]; R.L.
v. Merced City School Dist. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 89, 101; Doe 3, Family Services
Organization v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 571, 581; West Contra Costa
Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243, 1254 (West Contra
Costa Unified); Roe v. Doe 1 (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 965, 973; Safechuck v. MJJ
Productions, Inc. (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100.)
Under the prior iteration of section 340.1’s limitations period, plaintiffs’ claims
would have been untimely. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 8; Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1; see
also X.M. v. Superior Court (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1025; Coats v. New Haven
Unified School Dist. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 423.) Plaintiffs would have had to
commence their action within the later of eight years from the date they attained the age
of majority or three years from the date they discovered or reasonably should have
discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was
caused by the sexual abuse. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 8, subd. (a).) And to commence an
action after their 26th birthday against a defendant other than the perpetrator, a plaintiff
6
was required to establish that the defendant (1) “knew or had reason to know, or was
otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer,
representative, or agent” but (2) “failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement
reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that
person.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 8, subd. (b)(2); see also Doe v. City of Los Angeles
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 543 (Doe) [explaining that an earlier version of the statute put at
issue whether the “defendants had knowledge or notice that [the alleged abuser] had
engaged in past unlawful sexual conduct with minors prior to his alleged abuse of
[plaintiffs]”].)
Plaintiffs contend that they timely commenced suit under subdivision (q). Further,
plaintiffs maintain that subdivision (c) plays no role in analyzing whether their claims
were timely under subdivision (q). Defendants declined to brief subdivision (q) on the
merits. Instead, defendants contended that plaintiffs failed to invoke subdivision (q) in
the trial court and cannot now raise it on appeal. Defendants’ assertion overlooks the
relevant record: Sustaining defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ first amended complaints,
the trial court acknowledged and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the action was timely
under subdivision (q) and applied subdivision (c). And even if plaintiffs’ decision not to
renew the argument as to the operative second amended complaint were a basis for
forfeiture, our de novo review would compel us to reach the pure question of law on
undisputed facts. (See Perry v. Stuart (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 472, 503.) In our
independent judgment, subdivision (c) does not limit the application of subdivision (q) to
plaintiffs’ claims.8
8
We express no opinion on whether a formerly time-barred plaintiff who was over
the age of 40 on January 1, 2020, and reliant on the delayed-discovery provision of
section 340.1 subdivision (a) would need to satisfy subdivision (c) to invoke
subdivision (q) for claims against nonperpetrator defendants. Subdivision (q) applies to
plaintiffs without reference to subdivision (c) because they were under the age of 40 on
7
Plaintiffs’ claims are timely if subdivision (q) applies and subdivision (c) does not,
because they filed their complaints within three years of January 1, 2020,9 and no defect
related to the elements of subdivision (q) appears on the face of the complaint. Thus,
there is no basis to conclude that any element is lacking: Plaintiffs’ claim would have
been barred by the statute of limitations as of January 1, 2020, because, absent delayed
discovery of their injuries, they were required to bring suit before their 26th birthday.
Plaintiffs were 40 years of age or younger on January 1, 2020, when the operative
amendment of section 340.1, subdivision (a) took effect, so on that day plaintiffs’ claims
would not have been untimely under the new subdivision (a). But the theoretical
availability of this narrow window of opportunity does not exclude plaintiffs from the
benefit of section 340.1’s revival provision. We understand subdivision (q)’s reference to
claims “barred as of January 1, 2020” to revive nonfinal claims that would have been
barred by any time limit in operation before that date. (§ 340.1, subd. (q).) This is
because merely enlarging the statute of limitations would not have revived already lapsed
claims. (See Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro Bay (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1028–
1030 [refusing to apply extended statute of limitations to revive lapsed claim absent
legislative intent to apply new statute of limitations retroactively]; Nguyen v. Western
Digital Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1542 [“Statutes generally operate only
prospectively, and ‘[a] new statute that enlarges a statutory limitations period [only]
applies to actions that are not already barred by the original limitations period at the time
the new statute goes into effect’ ”].) Our reading of subdivision (q) comports with the
statutory goal of “ ‘ “expand[ing] the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold
January 1, 2020. Nor do we reach plaintiffs’ alternate arguments that they have pleaded
facts sufficient to satisfy subdivision (c).
9
There is no dispute that the operative consolidated complaint relates back to the
initial complaints. (See generally Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408–
409.)
8
to account individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.” ’ ” (R.L., supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 117). The bill was intended to provide “ ‘another chance for
victims, who are currently barred from purs[u]ing claims based solely on the passage of
time, to seek justice.’ ” (R.L., at p. 117.)10 And our understanding is informed by
authority reviving claims (against public entities) that “as of January 1, 2020,” had been
barred by expiration of the time for claim presentation, despite the Legislature’s abolition
of the claim presentation bar effective that same date. (See R.L., at pp. 106–107, 112;
O.B. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 930, 936; West Contra
Costa Unified, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1254; see also Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 3.)
Unlike the trial court, we are not persuaded that claims revived under subdivision
(q) of section 340.1 are subject to subdivision (c). The court reasoned that
subdivision (c) applied to require additional factual allegations because plaintiffs were at
least 40 years old when they filed, even if their suit satisfied subdivision (q).11 But
subdivision (q) provides a three-year revival period “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law.” (§ 340, subd. (q); see also Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025)
18 Cal.5th 310, 332 [“ ‘When the Legislature intends for a statute to prevail over all
contrary law, it typically signals this intent by using phrases like “notwithstanding any
other law” or “notwithstanding other provisions of law” ’ ”].) Thus, where there is a
conflict between subdivision (q)—which provides that a claim “may be commenced”
within three years of January 1, 2020—and subdivision (c)—which provides that in
specified circumstances certain actions may “not be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s
40th birthday”—the former prevails. This is consistent with subdivision (q)’s language
10
Plaintiffs’ unopposed July 16, 2025 request for judicial notice is granted.
11
The trial court provided this reasoning in explaining its decision to sustain the
union conference’s demurrer to Joseph Doe 7DC’s first amended complaint with leave to
amend.
9
affording plaintiffs the benefit of “the later of the three-year period under …
subdivision [(q)] or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that
added … subdivision [(q)]” and the aforementioned statutory purposes.12
B. Duty
Defendants in the alternative demurred on the ground that plaintiffs’ allegations, if
proven, do not show that defendants owed plaintiffs any affirmative legal duty of
protection that could support their liability for alleged abuse by another.13 We decline the
union conference’s urging to affirm on this ground.14
“ ‘[T]he law imposes a general duty of care on a defendant only when it is the
defendant who has “ ‘created a risk’ ” of harm to the plaintiff, including when “ ‘the
defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff’s position worse.’ ” [Citations.] ….’
[Citations.] But this ‘no-duty-to-protect rule’ is not absolute. [Citation.] ‘Under some
circumstances, a defendant may have an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff from
harm at the hands of a third party, even though the risk of harm is not of the defendant’s
own making.’ ” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 657, 669–670 (Roman Catholic Archbishop).)
A special relationship between the defendant and either the dangerous third party
or the victim may support a duty to protect the victim. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021)
11 Cal.5th 204, 211.) “A special relationship between the defendant and the victim is one
12
Because prospective plaintiffs will have reached different ages as of January 1,
2020, and because section 340.1 subdivision (a) includes a delayed discovery rule, the
limitations period in subdivision (a) could in some cases expire after the limitations
period in subdivision (q).
13
The local conference raised the issue in its demurrer but did not address it in its
supporting points and authorities or on appeal.
14
The trial court sustained the union conference’s demurrer to the Doe 7DC’s first
amended complaint on this ground, with leave to amend. The court did not address the
sufficiency of the allegations in the operative second amended complaint.
10
that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant, while a special
relationship between the defendant and the dangerous third party is one that ‘entails an
ability to control [the third party’s] conduct.’ ” (Id. at p. 216.) “The ‘common features’
of a special relationship include ‘an aspect of dependency in which one party relies to
some degree on the other for protection’ and the other party has ‘superior control over the
means of protection.’ ” (Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 670.)
Accepting the allegations in the operative complaint, both the local conference and
the union conference were in a special relationship with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that
their abuser was a church leader employed by, or volunteering on behalf of, both
defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that the union conference controlled the local conference
and that the local conference controlled the church, religious school, and religious youth
club where plaintiffs were sexually assaulted. Plaintiffs also alleged that the union
conference controlled the religious school. Accepting as true that the union conference
controlled (1) the activities during which plaintiffs—church members, students, and club
members—were sexually abused as minor children and (2) the person who committed the
abuse, plaintiffs have adequately alleged the existence of a special relationship. (See
Roman Catholic Archbishop, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 671–672 [“Like schools,
athletics organizations, junior recreational leagues, and youth programs, the Archdiocese,
through its teachers and priests, assumed responsibility for the safety of students in its
catechism classes”]; cf. Roman Catholic Bishop v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
1556, 1559, 1567 [summary judgment appropriate where church did not place minor in
abuser’s custody or control, where nearly all of the contact between minor and priest
occurred when the priest took the minor “from her home to various public places and
hotels,” and where minor did not attend a church school].)
Plaintiffs’ allegations suffice, despite the arguments of the union conference. The
union conference first argues that plaintiffs’ allegations are legal conclusions and not
well-pleaded ultimate facts. (See Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 551, fn. 5.) But even if
11
plaintiffs’ allegations about the level of control exercised by the union conference might
be viewed as legal conclusions, plaintiffs also pleaded the factual basis for their belief by
providing excerpts from the union conference’s website. (See ibid.) Next, citing its own
unsupported factual assertions in trial court briefing, the union conference denies any
exercise of control over plaintiffs, the alleged abuser, or any school or church where the
abuse occurred. In a threshold challenge to the pleadings, we must of course accept the
truth of the material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint. Defendants will
have their opportunity to challenge plaintiffs’ ability to prove these allegations.
We recognize that even where a special relationship exists, courts must analyze
the Rowland15 factors to assess whether policy considerations justify limiting any duty of
protection resulting from the special relationship. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 221.)
But the union conference’s demurrer argument in the trial court and on appeal rests
exclusively on the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations to establish a special relationship,
not on any other considerations. Nor on the limited record at this stage of the litigation
do we independently identify a basis to limit any duty of protection resulting from the
special relationship alleged by plaintiffs.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
15
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.
12
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
GROVER, Acting P. J.
WILSON, J.
Doe 7DC et al. v. Doe 2 et al.
H052624