Filed 9/24/26 Dima v. Grasshopper House CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DIMA, LLC, B335815
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV22466
GRASSHOPPER HOUSE, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.
Clyde & Co US, Douglas J. Collodel, Alyssa Telles Wyatt;
Carlson Law Group and Mark C. Carlson for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Schonbuch Hallissy, Michael Schonbuch, Mary R. Fersch
and Carly H. Brown for Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________
Plaintiff and appellant Dima, LLC (Dima) failed timely to
respond to requests for admission (RFAs) served by defendants
and respondents Grasshopper House, LLC and its surety, Federal
Recovery Systems, LLC (together, Grasshopper). The court
granted Grasshopper’s motion to deem the RFAs admitted under
Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280.1 Dima filed three
separate motions for relief from the order, which the court
denied. The court granted Grasshopper’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings, entered judgment in Grasshopper’s favor,
and awarded it attorney fees.
On appeal, Dima argues the judgment and award
of attorney fees must be reversed because the trial court
erroneously refused to grant it relief from the order deeming
the RFAs admitted. We affirm the judgment and the order
awarding attorney fees.
BACKGROUND
1. Grasshopper’s motion under section 2033.280
Dima filed this action against Grasshopper asserting
claims related to the parties’ lease. Grasshopper filed an answer
denying the allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.
In April 2023,2 Grasshopper served Dima with a
set of 33 RFAs. Dima failed timely to respond. On July 24,
Grasshopper filed a motion to deem the RFAs admitted under
section 2033.280. The hearing on the motion was set for
August 18.
Dima did not timely file an opposition to Grasshopper’s
motion. Instead, on the same day Grasshopper served its reply—
1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 Unless noted, all dates are in the year 2023.
2
August 11—Dima filed an untimely opposition. According to a
declaration from Dima’s counsel—Mark Carlson—Dima served
“[i]nformal responses” to the RFAs on July 19 and “formal
discovery” on July 27. But Dima did not submit a copy of
either response with its opposition.
The court granted Grasshopper’s motion on August 18.
The parties did not provide to us a transcript of the hearing or
a statement summarizing it. A minute order notes Dima did
not file a timely opposition. However, the court asserted it “fully
considered the arguments of all parties, both written and oral,
as well as the evidence presented.” According to the court,
Dima’s counsel appeared at the hearing and “was forced to admit
that there was no evidence before the Court which would support
the claim that [Dima] had at any time provided timely and
code compliant responses to the RFAs.”
2. Dima’s motions for reconsideration and relief
under sections 2033 and 473
a. The motions for relief
A few days after the August 18 hearing, Dima filed a
motion for reconsideration under section 1008. Dima asserted
the court granted Grasshopper’s motion on the incorrect basis
that Dima “had not served verified discovery responses.”
According to Dima, it served “draft responses” to the RFAs
on July 19 and a verified response on July 27. Dima argued,
because it provided a verified response before the August 18
hearing, it was “overly harsh and improper” for the court
to deem all the requests admitted.
Dima also argued the court granted Grasshopper’s motion
“on the incorrect basis that [Dima] had not served Oppositions
to those Motions for the Court to review.” Dima asserted its
3
attorney service mistakenly failed to deliver courtesy copies of
its opposition to the court. According to Dima, this led the court
to assume it had not filed any opposition.
Dima alternatively argued it was entitled to relief under
section 473, subdivision (b). Dima asserted relief was warranted
for two reasons: (1) its counsel mistakenly believed the attorney
service had delivered courtesy copies of the opposition; and (2)
its counsel mistakenly believed Grasshopper would withdraw
the motion.
The day after Dima filed its motion for reconsideration,
it filed a separate motion for relief under “Sections 2033 and
473.” Dima essentially repeated the arguments it made in its
motion for reconsideration, with minor edits.
b. The July 27 response and August 21 response
In support of its motions, Dima submitted a verified
response to Grasshopper’s RFAs, with a proof of service reflecting
service on July 27. In the July 27 response, Dima asserted
five general objections to every request and various individual
objections to 15 requests. It objected to nine requests as vague
and ambiguous. It objected to several requests on the ground
that they required Dima “to admit that a disputed mat[t]er
is true and therefore [Dima] can neither admit nor deny
this Request[ ].”3
Dima did not provide substantive answers to 13 of the 15
requests to which it asserted individual objections. It denied
the other two requests with qualifications. One of the qualified
3 Obviously, these objections were frivolous, as the central
purpose of a request for admission is to determine whether
an issue is disputed.
4
denials was not responsive to the request.4 Dima answered most
of the remaining requests with either “admit” or “deny.”
Dima also submitted with its motions a verified “amended
response,” which it purportedly served on August 21. In the
amended response, Dima asserted five general objections to
every request and individual objections to 15 requests. It failed
to provide substantive answers to 13 requests.
c. Grasshopper’s oppositions
Grasshopper opposed both motions. Among other
arguments, Grasshopper asserted Dima failed to show new or
different facts, circumstances, or law as required for a motion
for reconsideration under section 1008. Grasshopper submitted
declarations from its counsel, Mary Fersch, recounting her
discussions with Carlson. According to Fersch, Carlson sent
her an unverified draft response on July 19, which he claimed
was protected under the mediation privilege. Sometime later,
the parties agreed Grasshopper would withdraw its motion to
deem the RFAs admitted if Dima provided a response without
objections. Dima served an amended response on August 14,
but it contained objections.5 Fersch reminded Carlson that
4 The request asked Dima to admit it was “required by
law to provide an itemized list of repairs” to the property to
Grasshopper. Dima objected that the request was vague and
ambiguous. It then responded, “without waiving [its] objection,
Responding Party denies that a written report of conditions that
need repair due to the acts and omissions of Propounding Party
was never provided to Propounding Party.”
5 On appeal, Dima claims the August 14 amended response
“provided substantive responses to every RFA that previously
contained an objection.” We cannot confirm this because Dima
does not point us to a copy of the August 14 amended response
5
he agreed to provide a response without objections. Carlson
responded, “As I sent you responses before the [July 20]
mediation as you requested I am not going to go through
the exercise of removing the objections.”
d. The order
The court denied Dima’s motions on September 13.
The court concluded reconsideration was not warranted under
section 1008 because Dima failed to identify new or different
facts, circumstances, or law that would justify relief. It concluded
Dima was not entitled to relief under section 473 because
Carlson “admits no fault.” The court stated Carlson falsely
claimed Dima timely served a response to Grasshopper’s RFAs,
wrongly suggested the court had not considered Dima’s untimely
opposition, and ignored the fact that its untimely opposition
did not show that Dima had served a code-compliant response.
3. Dima’s motion for relief under section 2033.300
About two weeks after the court denied the motions for
reconsideration and relief, Dima filed a motion to withdraw
or amend deemed admissions under section 2033.300. Dima
argued it was entitled to relief “because [Dima] served verified
Requests for Admission responses prior to the August 18, 2023
in the appellate record. Instead, Dima cites an email from its
counsel and a copy of an amended response dated August 21.
The August 21 amended response contains numerous objections
—both general and individual—and fails to provide substantive
answers to 13 requests. Obviously, this does not show
substantive responses were served. In any event, Dima admits
the August 14 amended response was unverified. Therefore,
it was “tantamount to no response[ ] at all.” (Appleton v.
Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 635–636.)
6
hearing.” Dima insisted the July 27 response was “substantially
code compliant,” noting it asserted individual objections to only
some requests.
Dima also argued it was entitled to relief because the “late
service and filing of Oppositions to [Grasshopper]’s Motion to
Compel resulted from the mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect of Plaintiff’s counsel.” Dima asserted counsel reasonably,
but mistakenly, believed the service of an unverified draft
response on July 19 had preserved Dima’s objections. Counsel
also wrongly assumed Grasshopper would withdraw the motion,
based on his “civil and cooperative communications” with
Grasshopper’s counsel while resolving a different issue. Once
counsel realized Grasshopper would not withdraw the motion,
he rushed to file an opposition and “mistakenly and inadvertently
did not attach copies of” the July 27 response to it. Counsel also
mistakenly believed courtesy copies of the opposition had been
provided to the court.
Dima attached to its motion a proposed “second amended
response” to the RFAs. Dima removed all objections and
answered every request with either “admit” or “deny.”
But Dima did not verify the response.
Grasshopper opposed the motion, arguing the court
had already denied the same motion on the same grounds.
Grasshopper also argued Dima’s new motion “contains numerous
factual misrepresentations, purposefully leaving out email
correspondence between counsel that demonstrates the
inaccuracies in [Dima’s] claims, and which this Court has
already determined were factual inaccuracies.”
The court denied Dima’s motion to withdraw or amend its
admissions. The court concluded the motion was procedurally
7
improper. It explained, despite failing to cite section 1008, Dima
sought the same relief and relied on the same arguments as
its prior motions. The court noted one of Dima’s prior motions
explicitly cited section 2033.300.
The court alternatively denied the motion on the merits.
The court explained Carlson did not deny failing timely to
provide a response by the deadline, which waived any objections.
The court noted that, although Carlson referred to his
“ ‘mistake,’ ” he “really blames” a variety of other people and
circumstances “for his failure to comply with basic discovery
demands.” The court also concluded Dima failed to show a
lack of prejudice to Grasshopper.
4. Summary of Dima’s responses
In summary, Dima served the following responses:
a July 19 response that was unverified and protected under the
mediation privilege; a July 27 response that included waived
objections and lacked substantive answers to 13 requests;
an August 14 response that does not seem to be in the record;
and an August 21 “amended response” that included waived
objections and lacked substantive answers to 13 requests.
In addition, Dima attached to one of its motions a “second
amended response” that provided substantive answers to
every request without objections. However, the response was
unverified and, as best we can tell, Dima did not serve it on
Grasshopper.
5. The judgment, award of attorney fees, and appeal
The same day the court denied Dima’s motion under
section 2033.300, it granted Grasshopper’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings. The court concluded, on the basis of the
admitted RFAs, Dima no longer had viable claims. The court
8
entered judgment for Grasshopper, after which it awarded
Grasshopper $329,172 in attorney fees under the terms of the
parties’ contract. Dima timely appealed the judgment and
the award of attorney fees. At the parties’ request, we
consolidated the appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Relevant law
Generally, a party must respond to requests for admission
within 30 days. (§ 2033.250, subd. (a).) The response must be
in writing and under oath. (§ 2033.210, subd. (a).) The response
must “answer the substance of the requested admission, or set
forth an objection to the particular request.” (Id., subd. (b).)
Section 2033.280 sets forth the consequences for failing
timely to respond to RFAs. First, the party that fails to respond
“waives any objections to the requests.” (§ 2033.280, subd. (a).)
The waiver is automatic and does not require a court order.
Second, the requesting party may file a motion to deem the
requests admitted. (Id., subd. (b).) The court “shall” grant
the motion “unless it finds that the party to whom the requests
for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing
on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission
that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Id.,
subd. (c).)
2. The trial court properly denied Dima’s requests
for relief
Dima does not meaningfully challenge the court’s
August 18 order granting Grasshopper’s motion to deem the
RFAs admitted. Nor could it. Dima failed timely to serve a
response to Grasshopper’s RFAs. Dima never showed it served
a substantially compliant response before the August 18 hearing.
9
Dima’s opposition referred in passing to a verified response
it served on July 27. But Dima did not attach the response to
its opposition or present any other evidence showing the July 27
response substantially complied with section 2033.220. Instead,
according to the trial court, Dima’s counsel admitted at the
hearing “there was no evidence before the Court which would
support the claim that plaintiff had at any time provided timely
and code compliant responses to the RFAs.” The court was
required to grant Grasshopper’s motion to deem the RFAs
admitted.6 (See § 2033.280, subd. (c).)
Although Dima does not directly challenge the August 18
order, it argues the court erred by denying its various motions
seeking relief from that order. According to Dima, the court
should have granted it relief under three provisions: (1) section
2033.280, subdivision (c); (2) section 473, subdivision (b); and
(3) section 2033.300. We consider each in turn.
a. Section 2033.280, subdivision (c)
Dima first argues the trial court should have reconsidered
the August 18 order because the July 27 response substantially
complied with section 2033.220, as required under section
2033.280, subdivision (c).
6 Dima suggests the court should have awarded monetary
sanctions, rather than deeming the RFAs admitted. We disagree.
Section 2033.280 plainly states a court “shall” grant a motion
to deem RFAs admitted unless the opposing party serves a
substantially compliant response before the hearing. (§ 2033.280,
subd. (c).) Dima failed to submit evidence showing it served
a substantially compliant response. Therefore, the court
had no choice but to deem the RFAs admitted.
10
Whenever a party asks a court to reconsider a prior order,
the party must comply with section 1008. (See § 1008, subd. (e).)
Under section 1008, a motion for reconsideration must be
“based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law.”
(Id., subd. (a).) We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. (Dickson v. Mann
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 935, 951.)
Dima does not directly address the court’s findings
that it failed to comply with section 1008 in that Dima never
identified “ ‘new or different facts, circumstances or law’ which
would justify relief. Instead, [Dima] . . . wrongly assumes that
[its] electronically filed documents were not considered by the
Court.” Dima does not challenge those findings on appeal, which
forfeits the issue. (See Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685 (Paulus).) This alone defeats Dima’s
argument that the court erred by refusing to grant it relief under
section 2033.280, subdivision (c).
Even if we were to assume the July 27 response constituted
“new or different facts” for purposes of section 1008, Dima still
has not shown error. A trial court may deny a motion to deem
RFAs admitted only if it finds the opposing party served a
response that substantially complies with section 2033.220.
What is required for substantial compliance depends on the
meaning and purpose of the statute. (St. Mary v. Superior Court
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 779 (St. Mary).)
To determine whether a proposed response to RFAs
substantially complies with section 2033.220, a court must
“evaluate qualitatively the proposed response to RFAs in toto.”
(St. Mary, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 779–780.) The analysis
focuses on the substantive answers in the proposed response.
11
(Katayama v. Continental Investment Group (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 898, 909 (Katayama).)
Whether a proposed response substantially complies with
section 2033.220 is an issue of law that we review de novo. (See
Community Youth Athletic Center v. City of National City (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 416, 427.)
Here, the trial court correctly concluded the July 27
response does not substantially comply with section 2033.220.
As the court observed, the response is replete with “objections
which [Dima] was not entitled to make.” It includes general
objections to all 33 requests and specific objections to 15 requests,
all of which Dima had waived by failing to serve a timely
response. (See § 2033.280, subd. (a).) The July 27 response
lacks meaningful, substantive answers to nearly half the
requests. It provided a non-responsive answer to one request
and failed to provide a substantive answer to 13 requests.
That is, Dima failed to provide meaningful, substantive answers
to 14 of the 33 requests.
We reject Dima’s suggestion that, when deciding whether
its response substantially complies with section 2033.220, we
should consider the fact that its objections were valid. Even were
all the objections valid it would make no difference. Dima failed
timely to respond to the RFAs, which waived “any objections”
to the requests. (§ 2033.280, subd. (a).)
There is no help for Dima in Katayama, supra, 105
Cal.App.5th 898. In Katayama, the plaintiff failed timely to
respond to RFAs, and the defendants filed a motion to deem
the requests admitted. The plaintiff served a proposed verified
response “that included one-word answers—either ‘Deny’ or
‘Admit’—to all but one of the RFAs.” (Id. at p. 902.) The
12
one exception consisted of “a reasonably clear two-sentence
qualification . . . that did not claim an inability to answer.”
(Id. at p. 908.) The trial court concluded the response failed
substantially to comply with section 2033.220 solely because
the answers were prefaced with general objections, which the
plaintiff had waived under section 2033.280, subdivision (a).
(Katayama, at pp. 902–903.)
The Court of Appeal reversed. The court explained the
presence of waived objections in a proposed response is relevant
to the substantial compliance issue, but not determinative.
(See Katayama, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 909–910.)
Courts instead should prioritize the “nature of the substantive
answers.” (Ibid.) Applying that standard, the court concluded
the plaintiff’s proposed response substantially complied with
section 2033.220. (Katayama, at pp. 909–910.) The court
explained, ignoring the objections, the “substantive answers
were far more ‘complete and straightforward’ than not.” (Id.
at p. 908.) The court also noted the types of objections the
plaintiff asserted—relevance, admissibility, and privilege—
“did not negate the complete and straightforward nature of
the answers because none of the objections claimed an inability
to understand and respond to the RFAs.” (Ibid.)
Here, Dima’s lack of compliance went far beyond the
assertion of waived objections. Unlike the proposed response in
Katayama, Dima’s July 27 response does not contain “one-word
answers—either ‘Deny’ or ‘Admit’—to all but one of the RFAs.”
(Katayama, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) Instead, Dima
failed to provide meaningful, substantive answers to nearly half
the requests. These answers were not “far more ‘complete
and straightforward’ than not.” (Id. at p. 908.)
13
St. Mary, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 762 also is
distinguishable. There, the court held a response to 105
RFAs was substantially compliant where 64 answers were
“unquestionably code compliant” and “at least most” of the
remaining 41 answers contained “meaningful, substantive
responses.” (Id. at p. 782.) The court explained, although
the proposed response did not comply with all the statutory
requirements, it was “facially a good faith effort to respond to
RFAs in a manner that is substantially code compliant.” (Ibid.)
The same cannot be said of the July 27 response. Even
setting aside the waived objections, Dima failed to provide
meaningful, substantive answers to nearly half the requests.
Unlike the response in St. Mary, the July 27 response is not
“facially a good faith effort” to respond to Grasshopper’s RFAs
“in a manner that is substantially code compliant.” (St. Mary,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.)
b. Section 473
Dima argues the trial court should have granted it relief
under section 473, subdivision (b). Section 473, subdivision (b)
provides, in relevant part, “The court may, upon any terms as
may be just, relieve a party or the party’s legal representative
from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken
against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.”
But a party cannot seek relief from deemed admissions
under section 473. (See Demyer v. Costa Mesa Mobile Home
Estates (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 393, 394, disapproved of on other
grounds in Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983, fn. 12
(Wilcox).)
14
In arguing otherwise, Dima cites a case—Carli v. Superior
Court (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1095—that was decided under
former section 2033, which required a party to seek relief
from a deemed admission under section 473. The Legislature
subsequently replaced the provision with new procedures to
obtain relief from erroneous admissions. (See St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 843, 852,
disapproved of on other grounds in Wilcox, supra, 21 Cal.4th
973.) Those procedures are now found in section 2033.300,
to which we now turn.7
c. Section 2033.300
Dima argues the trial court should have granted its motion
to withdraw or amend its admissions under section 2033.300.
Dima contends the court erred to the extent it concluded its
motion was procedurally improper and lacked merit.
Under section 2033.300, the court “may permit withdrawal
or amendment of an admission” if the court finds both (1) the
admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, and (2) the other party will not be “substantially
prejudiced in maintaining that party’s action or defense on
the merits.” (§ 2033.300, subd. (b).) A party may seek relief
under section 2033.300 even if the requests were deemed
7 Although Dima ignores this issue on appeal, it
acknowledged in the trial court that section 473 typically cannot
afford relief for a failure to respond to RFAs. Dima suggested
this case presents an exception to that general rule, but it did
not meaningfully explain why. Instead, Dima simply repeated
its arguments that it filed a code-compliant response before
the August 18 hearing and its attorney service failed to deliver
courtesy copies of its untimely opposition.
15
admitted under section 2033.280. (See Wilcox, supra, 21 Cal.4th
at p. 975.)
We review an order denying a motion for relief under
section 2033.300 for an abuse of discretion. (See New Albertsons,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420–1421.)
The trial court properly denied the motion on procedural
grounds. Dima seems to argue the trial court mistakenly
believed section 2033.300 does not apply to RFAs deemed
admitted under section 2033.280. But the court did not deny
the motion for that reason. The court plainly stated the motion
was procedurally improper because “there is no question that
[Dima] is seeking the same relief and relying on the same
arguments as were made previously” in its motions for relief.
The court noted that one of Dima’s prior motions—its August 23
motion for relief—cited section 2033.300 as grounds for relief.
Therefore, Dima’s September motion to withdraw was essentially
a motion for reconsideration, which was subject to section 1008.
Dima never argued why the September motion was based on
new or different facts, circumstances, or law, as required under
section 1008. Thus, the trial court properly concluded the motion
was procedurally improper.
The court also properly denied Dima’s motion on the
merits. Dima failed to show a pertinent mistake; further, the
court noted Grasshopper would be prejudiced by being forced
to conduct substantial additional discovery on issues it believed
had been settled. On appeal, Dima addresses only the prejudice
issue. It does not meaningfully address the court’s finding that
it failed to show a pertinent mistake, which forfeits the issue.
(Paulus, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 685.) Accordingly, Dima
has not shown the trial court erred on the merits. (See Yield
16
Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547,
556–557.)
3. Dima has not shown the trial court erred
in awarding Grasshopper attorney fees
Dima’s sole argument concerning the award of attorney
fees is that it must be reversed if the judgment is reversed.
Because we affirm the judgment, we also affirm the award of
attorney fees.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment and order. Grasshopper House,
LLC and Federal Recovery Systems, LLC shall recover their costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KARNOW, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
Retired Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.
17