Filed 9/17/26 Dhillon v. Johal CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
INDERJIT DHILLON,
F090469
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-23-103662)
v.
BALKAR SINGH JOHAL et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Kern County.
Thomas S. Clark, Judge.
Frederick C. Kumpel for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Swanson O’Dell and Seth N. O’Dell for Defendants and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
Plaintiff and appellant Inderjit Dhillon (Dhillon) appeals from a judgment
rendered after a court trial and in favor of defendant and respondent Balkar Singh Johal
(Balkar)1 and other named defendants (Balkar and the other defendants are collectively
referred to as defendants).2 Dhillon also appeals the trial court’s order denying her
motion for a new trial.3 We affirm the order and the judgment in their entirety.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Introduction
Dhillon and Balkar were in a romantic relationship for several years and during
that time (and for a period thereafter) were also business partners. Dhillon and Balkar
were co-owners of a business called Platinum 7 Registration Service, Inc. (P7RS) and,
according to Balkar, were also equal owners in a separate business called Platinum
Freightlines, Inc. (Platinum). Balkar contends he bought out Dhillon’s interest in
Platinum and, at trial, produced an agreement that, if authentic, appeared to corroborate
his claim that he purchased Dhillon’s entire interest in Platinum. Dhillon contends the
agreement was fraudulent and that she is the sole owner of Platinum.
The primary issues in the case are (1) who was/were the true and rightful owner(s)
of the real property commonly known as 214 Hammersmith Drive, Bakersfield,
1 We use the first name of Balkar Singh Johal to refer to him because he has the
same surname as several other defendants. No disrespect is intended.
2 Other named defendants included: Prem Johal; Sukhbir Singh Johal; Manmohan
Singh; Hardeep Kaur Johal; Road Liner Logistics, Inc.; Platinum Freightlines, Inc.; all
persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien or interest in the
subject property adverse to plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on the plaintiff’s title to the
subject property; and Does 1 to 12, inclusive. Hardeep Kaur Johal was dismissed from
the case before the matter went to trial.
Although the above individuals and businesses are named as defendants, the
primary disputes at issue involve only Dhillon and Balkar.
3 “ ‘An order denying a motion for a new trial is not directly appealable, but is
reviewable on appeal from the underlying judgment.’ ” (Brown v. American Bicycle
Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 669, fn. 3.)
2.
California (the Hammersmith property) when record title was in Platinum’s name; and
(2) who is/are the true and rightful owner(s) of real property commonly known as
11120 Arundel Way, Bakersfield, California (the Arundel property), which was
purchased, in part, with the proceeds from the subsequent sale of the Hammersmith
property.
II. The Complaint and Answer
On October 30, 2023, Dhillon filed a verified complaint against all defendants
seeking to quiet title to the Arundel property in her name. In addition, Dhillon alleged a
cause of action for fraud and deceit against all defendants except Hardeep Kaur Johal, a
cause of action for declaratory relief against all defendants, and a cause of action against
Balkar for the imposition of a constructive trust over the Arundel property.
On February 8, 2024, defendants filed their verified answer to Dhillon’s
complaint. In it, defendants made several admissions that Dhillon contends are material
and outcome determinative, and which Dhillon contends the trial court ignored. We
discuss those judicial admissions in a later section of this opinion.
III. Factual Background
The trial commenced on March 28, 2025 before a judge sitting without a jury, and
lasted two court days. On May 22, 2025, the trial court issued its tentative statement of
decision. On June 11, 2025, the court entered its final statement of decision (S.O.D.).
The following facts are summarized from the S.O.D.
The trial court concluded that both Dhillon and Balkar “demonstrated that they
have no compunction about misrepresenting or concealing the truth from lenders, taxing
authorities, spouses or the courts when it serves their purposes.” The court did “not find
either party particularly credible.” The court stated that in such cases, corroborating
evidence is important and that it must “rely on logic and experience” to determine which
testimony is credible and which is not. The court “found numerous instances where
… Dhillon was intentionally dishonest and not believable in her testimony on major
3.
issues .…” The court also found the testimony of Hardip Virk, in which he stated that he
had seen Balkar alter documents and signatures on previous occasions unrelated to the
disputes at issue, to be less than credible.4
In its S.O.D., the trial court found that Dhillon and Balkar were in a romantic
relationship when the Hammersmith property was purchased. Balkar was still married at
the time, but his marriage was troubled and, eventually, a marital dissolution action was
filed. Balkar wanted to buy the Hammersmith property, and at one time, both he and
Dhillon intended to live there. Neither Dhillon nor Balkar could qualify for a loan to
make the purchase. As a result, they recruited Dhillon’s cousin, Amandeep Singh, to
purchase the property using his name and credit to obtain the necessary loan. Balkar used
funds from P7RS, a business co-owned by him and Dhillon, to make the $35,000
downpayment. Escrow for the purchase of the Hammersmith property closed on
August 16, 2019, and title was taken in Amandeep Singh’s name.
On October 14, 2019, Amandeep Singh conveyed title to the property to Dhillon
because Balkar “did not want his name associated with the property.” Amandeep Singh
remained obligated on the loan, but Balkar testified that he made all payments on the
loan. When Amandeep Singh discovered that being obligated on the loan was preventing
him from purchasing his own home, he requested that Balkar arrange to have the loan
paid off. The trial court found Balkar was in a position to obtain the funds needed to
satisfy the loan whereas Dhillon was not.
The trial court also found that, because Balkar did not want his name on the title,
Balkar and Dhillon agreed that Balkar would acquire full ownership of Platinum, and that
Platinum would take title to the Hammersmith property. The court found that Amandeep
Singh was “the only fully credible witness in th[e] case” and he testified that, to his
4 Virk was the ex-husband of Balkar’s girlfriend at the time of trial and admitted he
blamed Balkar for ruining his marriage.
4.
knowledge, the Hammersmith property was always intended to be Balkar’s property and
that, to his understanding, that is why Balkar made the downpayment, the regular loan
payments, and paid the loan off.
The trial court acknowledged that Dhillon’s version of events was different. She
contended Amandeep Singh bought the Hammersmith property for her, that is why he
deeded the property to her name, and that all parties intended that she be the sole owner
of the Hammersmith property. The court found Dhillon’s testimony not credible and,
with the exception of the deed from Amandeep Singh to her, largely uncorroborated. The
court concluded that the most logical explanation of the underlying facts was that Balkar
made the initial down payment, regular monthly payments, and paid off the underlying
mortgage because it was intended that he have sole ownership of the Hammersmith
property and that title to the property would be transferred to Platinum upon Balkar
obtaining sole ownership of Platinum.
The trial court found that Platinum was created by both Dhillon and Balkar but
that, during the relevant time periods, Platinum “was inactive, had no assets, and
conducted no business operations.” The court concluded the weight of evidence
demonstrated that Dhillon and Balkar were each 50 percent owners of Platinum up until
the point when Balkar purchased Dhillon’s share of the business pursuant to a March 21,
2020 Stock Purchase Agreement (the Stock Purchase Agreement). The court rejected
Dhillon’s contention that her signature on the Stock Purchase Agreement was forged, and
found that Dhillon actually signed the agreement, which gave Balkar sole ownership of
Platinum. The court found the $17,000 that Balkar paid Dhillon for Platinum “was
calculated to reimburse [Dhillon] for her interest in the [P7RS] downpayment on the
Hammersmith property” and was agreed to by Dhillon because “she desperately needed
money (as she admitted to pay credit cards), and accepted $17,000 for her interest in
[Platinum] even if she believed the interest was worth a little bit more.” The court found
the Stock Purchase Agreement was fully performed.
5.
At trial, Balkar produced an agreement dated December 18, 2020, by which
Dhillon agreed to sell the Hammersmith property to Platinum for $278,000. The trial
court determined that sale price of $278,000 was the amount needed to pay off the loan
Amandeep Singh had secured to purchase the property, and that “[a]ll of the money used
to fund the purchase and payoff the loan came from [Balkar].”
The trial court also found Dhillon not credible when she claimed she had no
knowledge of Balkar’s subsequent sale of the Hammersmith property and his use of the
proceeds to fund, in part, a tax exchange purchase under Internal Revenue Code
section 1031 (1031 exchange) of the Arundel property. The court, acknowledging that
Balkar had admitted in his verified answer that Dhillon had no such knowledge,
nonetheless concluded the evidence demonstrated otherwise and stated that it was “under
no obligation to make findings based upon obviously erroneous pleadings when the
evidence proves otherwise.”
The trial court found that Dhillon sold her 50 percent interest in Platinum to
Balkar for $17,000 on or about March 21, 2020; that Platinum “held title to the
Hammersmith property as the nominee and for the benefit of [Balkar]” from January 27,
2021 to August 22, 2022; that Platinum “participated in a 1031 exchange of the
Hammersmith property for the Arundel property as the nominee and for the benefit of
[Balkar] and held title to the Arundel property from approximately [October 31, 2022] to
[December 19, 2022]”; and that Platinum “deeded the Arundel property to [Balkar] on or
about [December 19, 2022].” The court also found that Balkar had “borrowed money
from [defendant] Road Liner Logistics, Inc.” (Road Liner), “which he used to finance
real estate purchase transactions”; and that Balkar and one or more of his brothers were
the owners of that company.5
5 The trial court addressed Dhillon’s contention that Platinum and Road Liner were
the alter egos of Balkar and Prem Johal. The court found Dhillon did not meet her
burden of proof to establish an alter ego relationship.
6.
The trial court considered several alternative scenarios posited by the parties and
ended up concluding the following scenario was the most plausible and was believed by
the court: “[Balkar] was at all times the intended 100 [percent] equitable owner of [the]
Hammersmith [property], that he provided 100 [percent] of the purchase price of [the]
Hammersmith [property] (after reimbursing [Dhillon] for her share of the $35,000 down
payment … through the mechanism of his purchase of [Platinum][)]; that after the
1031 exchange, [Balkar] was and is the 100 [percent] equitable and record title owner of
the [Arundel] property.” The court determined this version of events was “supported by
the testimony of [Balkar], the testimony of Amandeep Singh, various text messages,
[and] various financial records.”
The trial court determined there was no breach of fiduciary duty by Balkar and
rejected Dhillon’s contention that she was “kept in the dark” concerning the relevant
transactions, concluding the evidence shows otherwise.
The trial court made the following rulings regarding Dhillon’s causes of action: as
to the cause of action to quiet title, the court ruled that title to the Arundel property “is
quieted to and confirmed to [Balkar]”; that the other remaining defendants “claim no
right to said real property”; that Dhillon is entitled to no relief and shall take nothing by
way of her complaint; that the remaining defendants, including Balkar, “are the
prevailing parties” and “are awarded costs of suit.”
With respect to Dhillon’s cause of action for fraud and deceit, the trial court ruled
that Dhillon “take nothing by way of her complaint” and that the remaining defendants,
including Balkar, are the prevailing parties and are awarded their costs of suit.
On Dhillon’s cause of action for declaratory relief, the trial court declared Dhillon
“has no right, equitable or otherwise” to the Arundel property, “no right to a constructive
trust,” and determined her “[c]laims for monetary relief are not appropriate subjects for a
Declaratory Relief action.” The court determined that the remaining defendants,
including Balkar, are the prevailing parties and awarded them their costs of suit.
7.
Finally, on Dhillon’s cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust, the
trial court ruled that Dhillon “take nothing by way of her complaint,” and that Balkar is
the prevailing party and awarded Balkar his costs of suit.
IV. The Judgment, the Motion for New Trial, and Other Matters
On June 20, 2025, after the trial court issued its S.O.D., plaintiff filed requests for
dismissal, with prejudice, of Dhillon’s asserted claims against all defendants who
remained in the action except Balkar. The clerk of court entered the dismissals as
requested.
On July 3, 2025, the trial court entered its judgment in the matter. In it, the court
found that the Stock Purchase Agreement is valid, and entered judgment on each of
Dhillon’s causes of action consistent with the S.O.D. On July 7, 2025, Dhillon filed
notice of entry of the S.O.D. That same day, defendants filed notice of entry of the
judgment.
On July 15, 2025, Dhillon gave notice of her intention to move for a new trial and
on July 24, 2025, filed papers in support of the motion. Defendants opposed the motion.
On August 20, 2025, after hearing the motion, the trial court, in a lengthy ruling, denied
the motion. The clerk of court served the parties’ counsel with a copy of the ruling that
same day.
On September 19, 2025, Dhillon filed a timely notice of appeal of the judgment
and the order denying Dhillon’s request for a new trial. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.108(b)(1)(A).)
Additional facts are discussed as necessary in the DISCUSSION section of this
opinion.
8.
DISCUSSION
I. Dhillon’s Contentions on Appeal
Dhillon contends she “has proven her case of fraud and deceit against [Balkar].”
Dhillon likewise contends she has established that Balkar breached alleged fiduciary
duties owed to Dhillon. Dhillon relies, in large part, on Balkar’s verified answer to
Dhillon’s complaint and the admissions contained therein. Dhillon contends the trial
court erred and abused its discretion by failing to read the verified complaint and by
ignoring Balkar’s admissions, and that the “evidence compels a finding in favor of [her].”
Dhillon also contends that the trial judge was conflicted in the matter due to
having served as a settlement conference judge in separate litigation involving P7RS, and
that the “appearance of bias and a seeming hostile misogyny that permeates the [trial]
court’s written decision raise serious concerns.” Dhillon contends the trial judge was
biased against her.
Based on the above contentions, Dhillon argues the judgment should be reversed
and that the matter be remanded for a new trial on the merits.
II. Standard of Review
“ ‘The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (Juarez v. Ward (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
730, 735, quoting Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712.) The
denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (City of Los
Angeles v. Decker (1977) 18 Cal.3d 860, 871–872.)
“On appeal from a determination of failure of proof at trial, the question for the
reviewing court is ‘ “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as
a matter of law.” ’ [Citation.] Specifically, we must determine ‘ “whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and
weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support
9.
a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 761, 769.).
A cardinal rule of appellate review is that a “ ‘ “ ‘judgment or order of the lower
court is presumed correct[, and a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support
it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” ’ ”
(In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498–499, italics omitted.)
III. The Conflict of Interest Issue
Dhillon contends the trial judge was conflicted in this matter and was required to
recuse himself from hearing the case.
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3 provides, in part: “If a judge who should
disqualify himself or herself refuses or fails to do so, any party may file with the clerk a
written verified statement objecting to the hearing or trial before the judge and setting
forth the facts constituting the grounds for disqualification of the judge. The statement
shall be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts
constituting the ground for disqualification. Copies of the statement shall be served on
each party or his or her attorney who has appeared and shall be personally served on the
judge alleged to be disqualified, or on his or her clerk, provided that the judge is present
in the courthouse or in chambers.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
“A party may seek a judge’s disqualification for cause under the procedure set
forth at [Code of Civil Procedure] section 170.3, subdivision (c). However, the party
must do so ‘at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting
the ground for disqualification.’ [Citation.] This strict promptness requirement is not to
be taken lightly, as a failure to comply constitutes forfeiture or an implied waiver of the
disqualification.” (Tri Counties Bank v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1332,
1337 (Tri Counties Bank).)
“The purpose of the requirement that alleged grounds for disqualification be
asserted at the earliest practicable opportunity is that ‘ “ ‘[i]t would seem … intolerable to
10.
permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately
standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the
proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he
may avoid, if not.’ ” ’ [Citations.] In other words, ‘[a] party should not be allowed to
gamble on a favorable decision and then raise such an objection in the event he is
disappointed in the result.’ ” (Tri Counties Bank, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337–
1338.)
In the instant matter, the trial judge was appointed judge for all purposes on
November 3, 2023. Dhillon bases her contention that the trial judge should have recused
himself in this matter on the ground that, on December 13, 2024, the judge served as a
settlement conference judge in the matter styled Platinum 7 Registration Service, Inc. v.
Road Liner Logistics, Inc. et al. (Super. Ct. Kern County, 2024, No. BCV-23-103263)
(the P7RS litigation).6 Yet, assuming for purposes of argument only that Dhillon
adequately raised this issue to the trial court—an assumption that is not warranted for
reasons discussed post—the issue was not raised until trial commenced on March 28,
2025.
On that first day of trial, prior to the introduction of evidence, the trial court asked
whether Dhillon’s counsel had any oral in limine motions. Relevant portions of the
discussion that followed are set forth below.
“[DHILLON’S COUNSEL]: Just a housekeeping matter, Your Honor.
Just for the record, the—there’s been a submission on the part of
… [d]efendants of the transcript from the proceedings of a settlement
conference which involved the same parties [as] the [P7RS] case. I don’t
know if you’ve got a chance to see that.
6 In the Reporter’s Transcript of Mandatory Settlement Conference Proceedings
(some capitalization omitted), the terms of a settlement reached in the P7RS litigation
were recited on the record by the judge. In it, Dhillon was identified as both a
“non-party” and a “real party in interest who is going to be a party to the settlement
agreement.”
11.
“THE COURT: I have not looked at it….
“[DHILLON’S COUNSEL]: … Here is the issue: I believe, whether the
Court recalls or not, I believe the date of that settlement conference was
December 13th, 2024. It resulted in a settlement. You were the judge that
was the settlement conference judge. The attorneys were the same
attorneys .… My real party in interest client at that time was … Dhillon,
who is the plaintiff in this case. And like I said, it involved [Balkar] and
the defendants.
“THE COURT: So the transcript that was submitted, that I have not yet
looked at, was the transcript that transcribes the terms of the settlement?
“[DHILLON’S COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. [¶] … [¶]
“THE COURT: Okay. I have not seen that yet. And I have not addressed
it. But I gather that [you are] going to object in some fashion to me taking
judicial notice.
“[DHILLON’S COUNSEL]: No, not necessarily. We may have a limiting
instruction on the judicial notice part. I just wanted the Court to know it
was you, you Judge Clark, that presided over that settlement conference.
And if there was any issue on your part, I just thought I’d point that out.
“THE COURT: No. I have no issue. I mean, the transcript speaks for
itself.
“[DHILLON’S COUNSEL]: Right.
“THE COURT: So if it is something that I conclude that is proper for me
to take judicial notice of—and the clerk just handed me what appears to be
the minutes from that session, December 13th, 2024—the transcript speaks
for itself, so unless there is some legal reason for me not to take judicial
notice of it, I don’t have any problem taking judicial notice of it. I will take
that up on this record when and if someone asks that I take judicial notice
of it.
“[DHILLON’S COUNSEL]: And again, the only issue is trial judge here,
you were the settlement conference judge there. I just wanted to point that
out.
“THE COURT: I appreciate you pointing that out there. There is no issue
of conflict. I think probably [the] only remaining issue for me to address, if
it is an issue, would be relevance and that may or may not be an issue.
12.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And—I don’t know whether it will be relevant
or not, it just depends on how the testimony plays out in the trial.
“[DHILLON’S COUNSEL]: Right. That’s fine.
“THE COURT: Right. And that is all the more reason we don’t need to
deal with it now. Wait till we have some context. Is there anything else?
Oh, I got sidetracked. Any oral in limine motion from plaintiff?
“[DHILLON’S COUNSEL]: Not at this time, Your Honor.”
Thereafter, Dhillon’s counsel stated he was ready to proceed with calling his
first witness and he was going to waive an opening statement.
Notably, there was no further discussion concerning the P7RS litigation settlement
conference prior to the taking of evidence. Dhillon’s counsel never attempted to remind
the trial judge of the particulars of the P7RS litigation, never mentioned whether that
litigation presented overlapping issues with the current case, never moved to disqualify
the judge, and never objected to the judge continuing to preside over the trial and hear the
case.
In its order denying Dhillon’s motion for the new trial, the court addressed the
contention that the trial judge was conflicted from hearing the case and observed that
Dhillon’s counsel, in presenting the issue to the court, “carefully avoided mentioning
(1) that his client was not a party to the [P7RS litigation]; (2) that he never claimed or
asserted that there was a conflict of interest; (3) that he never gave any explanation to the
Court as to why he felt there was any relationship with the prior case that would give rise
to a conflict of interest; (4) that he never asked the Court for a recusal; and (5) that he
never objected or took any action after the Court expressed its belief that there was no
conflict of interest. [¶] [Dhillon’s] counsel conceded each of these points during oral
argument [on the motion for a new trial].”7
7 Dhillon elected to proceed without a reporter’s transcript of the hearing on her
motion for a new trial.
13.
The trial court continued: “At no point did [Dhillon’s counsel] object to the Court
proceeding with trial. At no point did [Dhillon’s counsel] express any belief that there
was any relationship between the subject matters of the two cases that would make it
appropriate for the Court to recuse. At no point did [Dhillon’s counsel] request the Court
to recuse.” Our review of the reporter’s transcript of the trial and the clerk’s transcript
leads us to conclude that these statements of the court are accurate.
A. No Conflict of Interest Has Been Demonstrated
On appeal, Dhillon contends, but does not attempt to demonstrate, that there was
an overlap of issues between the instant matter and the P7RS litigation, or that the trial
judge learned information in the settlement conference of the P7RS litigation that might
have a bearing on issues in the present matter. Dhillon cites to pages of the settlement
agreement but provides no discussion of its contents. It is not the function of an appellate
court to comb the record to find a valid basis for an appeal. (People ex rel. Reisig v.
Acuna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 866, 879.) Similarly, “[a]n appellate court is not required
to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties.” (Paterno v. State of
California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.)
Notably, Dhillon did not object to the trial court taking judicial notice of the
reporter’s transcript that recited the terms of the settlement entered into in the P7RS
litigation. Any other trial judge taking judicial notice of the document would have been
privy to the information therein regardless of whether that judge also served as the
settlement conference judge in the P7RS litigation. Thus, information contained in said
transcript cannot rightfully serve as a basis for Dhillon’s conflict of interest allegation.
B. Forfeiture of the Conflict of Interest Issue
By waiting until the first day of trial to raise the issue, Dhillon caused the very
situation that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3 was designed to prevent—i.e., the
ability of a party to “ ‘ “ ‘play fast and loose’ ” ’ ” with the judicial process by allowing
the trial to move forward without any objection to the trial judge serving in that capacity,
14.
then waiting to see whether the outcome is favorable or unfavorable before raising the
objection. (Tri Counties Bank, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337.) By failing to raise
any objection to the trial judge presiding over the trial, with full knowledge of whatever
basis Dhillon believed constituted a conflict of interest, Dhillon effectively forfeited the
ability to argue the issue on appeal. (Id. at p. 1339 [“a litigant should seek to resolve
such issues by the required statutory means and ‘his [or her] … failure to do so may
constitute a forfeiture of his [or her] constitutional claim’ ”].)
C. Allegations of Bias and Misogyny
Dhillon contends there was an “appearance of bias and a seeming hostile
misogyny that permeates the” S.O.D.
“It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.’ ” (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 876.) Dhillon
quotes Caperton, in part, as follows: “[B]ased on an objective assessment of the
circumstances in the particular case, there must exist ‘ “the probability of actual bias on
the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable” ’ ” in order to require disqualification of a judge. (Caperton, at p. 881.)
Dhillon contends “[a] judge’s impartiality is evaluated by an objective, rather than
subjective, standard. That is, ‘ “ ‘due to the sensitivity of the question and inherent
difficulties of proof as well as the importance of public confidence in the judicial system,
the issue is not limited to the existence of an actual bias[,]’ ” ’ ” quoting Catchpole v.
Brannon (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 237, 246, disapproved of by People v. Freeman (2010)
47 Cal.4th 993 as discussed post. The Catchpole court went on to state, “ ‘ “if a
reasonable man [or woman] would entertain doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality,
disqualification is mandated. ‘To ensure that the proceedings appear to the public to be
impartial and hence worthy of their confidence, the situation must be viewed through the
eyes of the objective person.’ ” ’ ” (Catchpole, at p. 246.) However, the Freeman court,
15.
relying on Caperton, held that the mere appearance of bias is insufficient. (Freeman, at
p. 996.)
Freeman expressly disapproved of Catchpole to the extent it held or suggested that
the mere appearance of bias is sufficient to require disqualification of a judge. (People v.
Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1006, fn. 4.) “[W]hile a showing of actual bias is not
required for judicial disqualification under the due process clause, neither is the mere
appearance of bias sufficient. Instead, based on an objective assessment of the
circumstances in the particular case, there must exist ‘ “the probability of actual bias on
the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 996.)
In Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, the court wrote: “A
constitutional finding of judicial gender bias is appropriate only when ‘extreme facts’
demonstrate a probability of actual bias. [Citation.] Appellate courts consider whether it
is reasonably clear the trial judge entertained preconceptions about the parties because of
their gender that made it impossible for a party to receive a fair trial.” (Id. at p. 589.)
Regardless of which formulation of bias or misogyny is used, the evidence relied
on by Dhillon does not suggest the trial judge was infected by either.
The only bases articulated by Dhillon in support of her claim that the trial judge
was biased, or that his ruling was permeated with misogyny, are a comment by the judge
advising counsel, “Don’t tell her what to say”; Dhillon’s contention that the judge
“ignored” or “overruled” judicial admissions contained in defendants’ verified answer to
Dhillon’s complaint; Dhillon’s contention that the judge failed to read the complaint prior
to trial; speculation that Balkar’s attorney might have made disparaging comments about
Dhillon to the judge during the P7RS litigation settlement conference; and the assertion
that “any reasonable person would conclude that the [judge] sees [Dhillon] as more
dishonest than defendant because [Dhillon] is female and [Balkar] is male .…” We
examine these contentions below.
16.
1. “Don’t Tell Her What to Say.”
The trial judge advising Dhillon’s counsel, “Don’t tell her what to say,” came
close on the heels of the judge admonishing Dhillon’s counsel that he was “doing an
awful lot of leading,” i.e., asking leading questions. Dhillon’s counsel asked his client
the following leading question: “And the Platinum Freightline[s], Inc. in December of
2020[,] that was your corporation?” Dhillon responded, “Yes, sir.” It was at that point
the trial judge said, “Let her testify. Don’t tell her what to say.” That statement does not,
in any way, demonstrate bias or misogyny. It merely reflects the trial judge doing his job
of ensuring that the testimony given was that of the witness and not that of the attorney.
2. The Contention that the Trial Judge Ignored Judicial Admissions and
Failed to Read the Complaint
There is no evidence that the trial judge ignored judicial admissions or failed to
read the complaint prior to trial. In fact, the trial transcript reveals the opposite. When
Dhillon’s counsel indicated he was going to waive an opening statement and stated, “[I
would] [j]ust refer you to the verified complaint,” the trial judge indicated he was going
to “take a few minutes and read the verified complaint.” The trial court then went off the
record and, when the judge returned, he stated, “I have read paragraphs 1 through 37 of
the verified complaint. I will deem paragraphs 1 through 37 incorporated into the record
at this point as plaintiff’s opening statement.”
In ruling on Dhillon’s motion for a new trial, the trial court wrote: “In fact, the
Court had read the [c]omplaint at least [five] times before trial commenced, had
personally prepared copies of the complaint for his [t]rial [b]ook, and was familiar with
the contents.” The court also referred to the fact that it reread the complaint after Dhillon
waived an opening statement. In short, the record on appeal supports the fact that the
court did, in fact, read the complaint prior to taking evidence in the case. Dhillon’s
contention to the contrary appears to be based solely on conjecture.
17.
The trial court did not “ignore” judicial admissions. It did, however, make
findings of fact based on evidence actually admitted at trial that were contrary to judicial
admissions. That the court did not “ignore” the judicial admissions is demonstrated both
by its S.O.D. and by its ruling on Dhillon’s new trial motion.
Specifically, in the S.O.D., the trial court, addressing preliminary matters, wrote:
“While it is true, that counsel for the parties made the allegations in the pleadings brought
to the Court’s attention by [Dhillon], some of those allegations are inconsistent with other
pleadings and, as discussed in these findings, are inconsistent with the evidence in this
case. The Court is not bound by admission made by counsel in pleadings when the
evidence proves otherwise.” The court went on to note in its S.O.D. that it found Dhillon
lacked credibility in “her insistence that she did not know about the sale of the
Hammersmith property, or the acquisition of the [Arundel] property, and that she had no
idea that [Balkar] used money from the sale of the Hammersmith property to fund the
1031 acquisition of the [Arundel property].” The court discussed the evidence that led it
to conclude Dhillon was not testifying truthfully in that regard—evidence that included
not only third party testimony, but also texts to which Dhillon was a party discussing the
sale of the Hammersmith property and financing for the Arundel property. The court
noted that Dhillon “did a complete reversal” when her own text showed that “she was
fully aware” of these transactions, and that she “suddenly and instantly remembered”
details related to the issue. The court then discussed Dhillon’s counsel’s contention “that
the Court is bound to ignore this evidence and adopt the legal fiction that [Dhillon] had
no such knowledge because [Balkar’s] counsel admitted in a pleading that she had no
such knowledge.” The court wrote: “The Court is under no obligation to make findings
based upon obviously erroneous pleadings when the evidence proves otherwise.”
The fact that the trial court chose to rely on evidence admitted at trial that may
have contradicted admissions made in defendants’ verified answer to Dhillon’s complaint
does not tend to show bias, misogyny, or a conflict of interest. In a later section of this
18.
brief, we consider the specific judicial admissions relied upon by Dhillon to determine
whether they present grounds for reversal.
3. Speculative Assertions that Balkar’s Attorney Made Disparaging
Remarks Concerning Dhillon
The assertion that Balkar’s attorney may have made disparaging comments to the
trial judge during his service as settlement conference judge in the P7RS litigation is
speculative and unsupported by the record. Moreover, the speculation relates to the
conduct of Balkar’s attorney—not the judge. This speculation is not a valid basis for
attacking the judge’s impartiality.
4. There is No Basis upon which to Conclude the Trial Judge Saw
Dhillon As More Dishonest than Balkar because of the Parties’ Respective Genders.
Dhillon’s assertion that the trial judge viewed Dhillon as less credible than Balkar
due to Balkar being male and Dhillon being female is without any support in the record.
Dhillon’s arguments in this regard are unpersuasive. The record demonstrates that the
judge’s credibility determinations about Dhillon were premised on the fact that Dhillon
changed her testimony on key issues during the course of being examined at trial and the
fact that Balkar’s testimony was largely corroborated by documents entered in the matter.
We also reject Dhillon’s contention that the trial judge displayed animus toward her. The
fact that the judge found her to be not credible in much of her testimony is not evidence
of animus. In Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at page 592, the court
stated, “Finding a witness believable does not demonstrate bias. It demonstrates
judgment.” In our view, the converse of that statement—that finding a witness not
believable—likewise, does not demonstrate bias. (See Guardianship of L.V. (2006) 136
Cal.App.4th 481, 500 [“It [is] the trial judge’s duty to consider and pass upon the
evidence presented to him. An opinion formed by a judge as the result of a judicial
hearing, even though it is adverse to a party, does not amount to bias.”].)
19.
In summary, we conclude the trial judge was not required to recuse himself in this
matter; Dhillon forfeited her right to seek the judge’s disqualification; and there is no
evidence to suggest the judge was biased against Dhillon due to her gender or for any
other reasons.8
IV. Judicial Admissions
Dhillon contends the trial court erred by ignoring the judicial admissions made by
Balkar in his verified answer to Dhillon’s complaint. Dhillon correctly observes that
Balkar, in his verified answer to Dhillon’s complaint, admitted paragraphs 1 through 6,
15, 18, 19, 27, 29, 31, and 32 of the complaint, and made partial admissions of other
allegations.
“ ‘A judicial admission in a pleading (either by affirmative allegation or by failure
to deny an allegation) is entirely different from an evidentiary admission. The judicial
admission is not merely evidence of a fact; it is a conclusive concession of the truth of a
matter which has the effect of removing it from the issues .…’ ” (Walker v. Dorn (1966)
240 Cal.App.2d 118, 120.)
A. Balkar’s Admissions
Dhillon focuses on the following admissions by defendants, including Balkar, in
their verified answer to Dhillon’s complaint:9
8 Dhillon’s citations to the California Code of Judicial Ethics do not alter our
opinion. Specifically, Dhillon wrote: “The Canons state: [¶] Canon 1. A judge shall
uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary[;] [¶] Canon 2. A judge shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities[;] [¶]
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duty of judicial office impartially, competently, and
diligently[;] [and] [¶] Canon 4. A judge shall so conduct the judge’s quasi-judicial and
extrajudicial activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations.”
(Boldface omitted.) For reasons discussed ante, we are not persuaded that the trial judge
violated any of these canons of judicial ethics.
9 Where Balkar’s admission of an allegation is only partial, we have edited the
admission to reflect its full scope and have omitted the portion of the allegation that is
denied.
20.
“On or about October 27, 2020, [Balkar] submitted a new Corporation Statement
of Information and deleted the officers listed for [Platinum].” “Without giving notice or
seeking consent from [Dhillon], [Balkar] then proceeded to list himself as Chief
Executive Officer, Secretary, Chief Financial Officer, Director, [and] Agent [for Service]
of Process for [Platinum]” and “electronically delivered the change[d] articles and
information to the Secretary of State. [Balkar] … deleted [Dhillon’s] name from the
officers list.”
“On or about December 18, 2020, [Dhillon] signed an Agreement to Sell Real
Property in which [Dhillon] sold to [Platinum] the [Hammersmith property] for the total
price in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Eight Thousand Dollars ($278,000.00).”
(Underlining omitted.) “On or about January 07, 2021, Placer Title Company set up the
escrow wire transaction in the amount of $278,000.00 and a balance in the amount of
$10,188.28 due by seller. On or about January 22, 2021, [Dhillon] transferred the
remaining balance in the amount of $10,188.28.” “On or about January 27, 2021[,] a
Grant Deed was recorded granting title to [Platinum] …. [The Hammersmith property]
was owned solely by [Platinum] ….”
Defendants admit, “On or about March 11, 2022, [Balkar] changed the Chief
Executive Officer to his brother’s name [Prem Johal], Secretary to [Balkar], Chief
Financial Officer to [Prem Johal], Director to [Prem Johal], [and] Agent for Service of
Process to [Prem Johal].”
“On or about October 31, 2022, [Balkar], with the collaboration and assistance of
defendants, purchased [the Arundel property] without permission and or knowledge of
[Dhillon], for $646,164.63.”
“[Balkar] purchased [the Arundel property] in the amount of $646,164.63 and
recorded the resulting deed vesting title to [Platinum].”
“On or about October 31, 2022, to complete the money transaction as to the
Arundel property, [Balkar] had the [Platinum] money which was held in escrow for the
21.
sale of [the Hammersmith property] ($412,660.67) transferred to the Seller[ of the
Arundel property]. This transfer served as a partial payment made to purchase the
Arundel property free and clear. Receipt #43992 in the amount of $412,660.67 Payor:
Mission 1031 Exchange, LLC as QI for [Platinum] for the purchase of [the Arundel
property] resulted from this transfer.”
“On or about October 31, 2022, [Balkar] wired $220,890.33 from the funds at
Citizens Bank in which the payor is listed as [Road Liner] Receipt No: 43993 for the
purchase of [the Arundel property] resulted from this transfer of $220,890.33.”
“On or about December 29, 2022, [Balkar] applied [for] a loan from Valley Strong
Credit Union in [the] amount of $514,710.00 against the [Arundel property], by signing a
promissory note, loan #1504635952, signed by [Balkar].”
B. Analysis of Judicial Admissions
On appeal, Dhillon states “[t]he foundation of [Dhillon’s] case includes several
judicial admissions made by all relevant parties, under oath, that [Balkar] had acquired
the Arundel property without the permission or knowledge of plaintiff.” However,
Dhillon does not explain why such admission compels findings in her favor on any of her
causes of action.
Here, the trial court found that Balkar had validly purchased Dhillon’s interest in
Platinum on March 21, 2020 pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement, and that Dhillon
subsequently conveyed the Hammersmith property to Platinum on January 27, 2021
pursuant to the December 18, 2020 sale agreement. Nothing in Balkar’s judicial
admissions is contrary to this finding. Notably, Dhillon acknowledged in her verified
complaint that on December 18, 2020, she signed an agreement to sell the Hammersmith
property to Platinum for $278,000. The court found that all of the funds used to
consummate the sale came from Balkar. Nothing in Balkar’s judicial admissions is
contrary to this finding. These and other findings satisfied the court that Platinum “held
title to the Hammersmith property as the nominee and for the benefit of [Balkar]” and
22.
“participated in a 1031 exchange of the Hammersmith property for the Arundel property
as the nominee and for the benefit of [Balkar].” Nothing in Balkar’s judicial admissions
is contrary to this ultimate finding.
The trial court concluded that Balkar “was at all times the intended 100[ percent]
owner of [the] Hammersmith [property]”; that following the purchase of Platinum and the
Hammersmith property, Balkar was the sole, equitable owner of both properties, and that
following the 1031 tax exchange, Balkar became the sole equitable and record title owner
of the Arundel property. These conclusions are supported by the evidence and not
contradicted by any admission of Balkar.
To the extent Dhillon contends the trial court erred by finding that Dhillon had
actual knowledge of Balkar’s purchase (or, more accurately, Platinum’s purchase) of the
Arundel property contrary to Balkar’s judicial admission—a specific contention repeated
numerous times by Dhillon in her brief on appeal and central to her claim that the trial
judge ignored judicial admissions, Dhillon’s own testimony demonstrates she did know
of Balkar’s intent to purchase another property following Platinum’s sale of the
Hammersmith property, that she assisted Balkar in the process of looking for a new
property, and that she knew Balkar intended to use the proceeds from the sale of the
Hammersmith property to purchase property from the very same developer that sold the
Arundel property to Platinum. Dhillon also conceded that she “might have” sent “a text
message about financial details that needed to be accomplished as it related to [Balkar’s]
purchase of the Arundel property.” Dhillon then admitted her “involvement with
assisting [Balkar] in purchasing the Arundel property.” Thus, Dhillon confirmed, in
essence, that she knew and consented to Balkar’s purchase of the Arundel property. In
addition, the realtor that sold the Arundel property to Balkar (or, more accurately, to
Platinum) testified that Dhillon was present at the Arundel property when the keys to the
property were first handed to Balkar.
23.
As was stated in Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735,
“Facts established by pleadings as judicial admissions ‘ “are conclusive concessions of
the truth of those matters, are effectively removed as issues from the litigation, and may
not be contradicted, by the party whose pleadings are used against him or her.” ’ ” (Id.
at p. 746, italics added.) As the above testimony demonstrates, however, Dhillon herself
contradicted Balkar’s judicial admission that she did not know or consent to the purchase
of the Arundel property. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding
that Dhillon knew and consented to said purchase.
Even if the trial court had concluded Dhillon did not know or consent to the sale of
the Hammersmith property to a third party, or to the subsequent purchase of the Arundel
property, Dhillon does not explain, in light of the court’s other findings and conclusions,
why she would have been entitled to be notified of these transactions or why her
permission and consent was necessary. Given that the court found that Dhillon had sold
her interests in Platinum and the Hammersmith property to Balkar and Platinum,
respectively, prior to both the sale of the Hammersmith property to a third party and the
subsequent purchase of the Arundel property, Dhillon provides no cogent argument or
authority for her contention that Balkar owed her a fiduciary duty to notify her of these
transactions. In our view, Balkar did not owe Dhillon a duty (fiduciary or otherwise) to
advise her of these transactions or to seek her permission with regard to either. Whether
she knew of, and consented to, these transactions is immaterial.
V. Conclusion
Dhillon’s evidence was not “ ‘ “ ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ ” ’ ” (Almanor
Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 769), nor was it
“ ‘ “ ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that
it was insufficient to support’ ” ’ ” findings in her favor (ibid.). Contentions that were
central to her claims were contested and contradicted by the testimony of adverse
witnesses and/or by documentary evidence. She has not demonstrated, on appeal, that the
24.
evidence and the judicial admissions compel findings in her favor. She has not
demonstrated any bias or misogyny on the part of the trial judge, or that he was required
to recuse himself due to an alleged conflict of interest.
As a result, we conclude the judgment must be affirmed, and there is no basis
upon which to order a new trial of the matter.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order denying Dhillon’s motion for a new trial are affirmed
in their entirety. Defendants are entitled to their costs on appeal.
GUERRA, J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, Acting P. J.
HARRELL, J.
25.