Filed 6/18/26 Delaney v. Delaney CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MICHELLE DOLORES DELANEY, D085442
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. FAMVS2100261)
JASON ESAU DELANEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Guy A. Bovee, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas E. Shinton, for Defendant and Appellant.
Angelique G. Bonanno, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Jason Esau Delaney appeals from an order renewing a domestic
violence restraining order that his former wife obtained against him in 2021
for an additional five-year term. He contends the evidence does not support
the protective order and that the order is unconstitutional, both facially and
as applied, because it infringes upon his rights under the Second Amendment
to the United States Constitution to keep and bear arms. He also asserts the
order violates his First Amendment rights and deprives him of due process,
and that the court violated his due process right to present impeachment
evidence. We reject these contentions and affirm.
BACKGROUND1
Jason and Michelle Dolores Delaney share two children, a daughter
and a son, now 13 and 10 years old. In 2017, police arrested Jason after he
slapped his daughter on the cheek when she was having a temper tantrum.
The incident resulted in a three-year protective order against Jason, which
Michelle had terminated early after Jason “pressured her” to dismiss it.
In February 2021, Michelle requested a protective order, claiming that
Jason sent messages begging her to reconcile, which she characterized as
harassing in both nature and frequency. She further asserted that, although
the parties were ordered to communicate exclusively through the Talking
Parents website, Jason continued to text her directly. In a supplemental
declaration, Michelle stated that Jason’s relentless requests to “ ‘get back
together’ ” caused, among other things, extreme anxiety, sleeplessness, panic
attacks, and stomach pain. In early March 2021, the court issued a
temporary protective order. After a contested hearing the following month,
the court entered a three-year protective order, set to expire on April 2, 2023.
The order allowed “brief and peaceful contact” between the parties “as
required for court-ordered visitation of [the] children.” All nonemergency
communications were ordered to occur through the Talking Parents website.
In a November 2021 order addressing Michelle’s request concerning
custody and parenting time, the trial court found that Jason violated the
protective order in May 2021. The court observed that Michelle appeared
“mentally exhausted at having to continually rebuff [Jason’s] advances.” It
1 We deny Michelle’s August 14, 2025, motion to augment the record
because these documents are either duplicative or not necessary to our
resolution of this appeal.
2
further found Michelle to be genuinely afraid of Jason, including a fear he
“may snap and hit” their daughter again, and concluded her fear was
objectively reasonable. It subsequently awarded Michelle sole legal and
physical custody of the children.
In January 2024, Michelle sought to renew the protective order. At the
hearing, Jason wanted to call his daughter as a witness based on Michelle’s
allegation in her renewal request that he had been communicating with the
children about their relationship. The court conducted a hearing on the issue
and reserved ruling on whether the minor child would be permitted to
testify.2 After hearing the parties’ testimony, Jason renewed his request to
call the minor child as a witness. Michelle’s counsel objected, arguing the
door had not been opened for this testimony. Jason’s counsel responded that
the testimony related to Michelle’s sworn pleadings and would bear on her
credibility, specifically whether Jason used the children to attempt to
reconcile with her.
When Jason’s counsel asked if the court would consider the pleadings,
the court responded that no such request was before it. The court denied
Jason’s request to call the child as a witness, concluding that the proposed
testimony lacked probative value because the alleged violations of the
protective order concerned the Talking Parents messages, and the child’s
testimony would not assist in determining whether renewal was warranted.
After hearing closing arguments, the court renewed the protective
order for an additional five-year term. It found that Jason exceeded the scope
of the protective order by failing to limit his Talking Parents communications
to child visitation issues. It also determined that Michelle’s fear and
2 The court recited its findings into the record but the reporter’s
transcript for this hearing is not part of the record on appeal.
3
apprehension were objectively reasonable and some messages sent by Jason
were abusive.
DISCUSSION
I.
Substantial Evidence Supports Renewal of the Protective Order
Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (the Act, Fam. Code,3
§§ 6200–6460), a court may issue a restraining order upon reasonable proof of
“a past act or acts of abuse.” (Id., § 6300, subd. (a).) “Abuse is not limited to
the actual infliction of physical injury or assault” (id., § 6203, subd. (b)) but
includes “any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section
6320” (id., § 6203, subd. (a)(4)). Section 6320, in turn, authorizes orders
enjoining one party from, among other things, “disturbing the peace of the
other party.” (Id., § 6320, subd. (a).) “Disturbing the peace” means “conduct
that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or
emotional calm of the other party.” (Id., subd. (c).) Accordingly, the Act
authorizes a protective order based on conduct that disturbs a party’s mental
or emotional calm.
Although restraining orders under the Act can be renewed and made
permanent, they are “subject to termination or modification by further order
of the court,” either upon stipulation or after a noticed hearing. (§ 6345,
subds. (a), (d).) Termination or modification is proper “upon a showing that
there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or
temporary restraining order was granted . . . or that the ends of justice would
be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary
restraining order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 533; Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
4
Cal.App.4th 1495, 1503–1504 [Code of Civil Procedure section 533 applies to
dissolution or modification of restraining orders under the Act].)
Section 6389, subdivision (a), of the Act mandates that a person subject
to a protective order, “shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive a firearm
or ammunition while that protective order is in effect.” (§ 6389, subd. (a).)
The prohibition is mandatory, and the trial court has no authority to modify
or omit it.4 (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1294–1295
(Ritchie).) When a protected party seeks to extend an existing restraining
order, courts have rejected the notion that the party must demonstrate new
incidents of abuse. (Id. at p. 1284.) Such a rule would be anomalous because
it would require proof that the original order was ineffective in deterring the
restrained party’s conduct as a prerequisite to renewing it. (Ibid.) The
proper inquiry is whether the protected party continues to harbor a
reasonable fear of future abuse. (Id. at p. 1290.) A court should grant
renewal only upon finding, by a preponderance of the evidence that this
apprehension is reasonable. (Ibid.) This does not mean the court must
conclude future abuse is more probable than not; rather, it is enough that the
evidence shows a sufficiently likely risk of future harm to support a sincere
and reasonable fear. (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s order granting or
renewing a protective order for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for
substantial evidence. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.)
Jason asserts his Talking Parents messages do not meet the statutory
threshold for disturbing the peace under subdivision (c) of section 6320. He
contends the messages do not justify a “permanent” protective order and
courts have reversed protective orders on purportedly stronger evidence,
4 The only exception is for a firearm “necessary as a condition of
continued employment.” (§ 6389, subd. (h).)
5
citing Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140 (Burquet) for the
proposition that “a single Facebook message was deemed insufficient to
justify a restraining order due to First Amendment concerns.” We disagree
with this characterization of Burquet. Burquet concerned an uninvited in-
person encounter at the protected party’s residence, coupled with a refusal to
leave, which caused fear and supported issuance of the restraining order. (Id.
at pp. 1142–1143.)
To the extent Jason’s opening brief can be construed as arguing the
court abused its discretion in renewing the protective order or that the
evidence did not support the renewal, the argument lacks merit. As an initial
matter, Jason provides little reasoned analysis and cites no authority
supporting the proposition that communications must be “excessive, coercive,
or controlling” to constitute abuse under the Act. A point asserted without
meaningful legal analysis or supporting authority may be treated as forfeited.
(L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620 (Kilrain).)
In any event, the Act does not impose the requirements Jason proposes.
The relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, his
conduct disturbed Michelle’s peace by destroying her mental or emotional
calm. (§ 6320, subds. (a), (c).) Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that it did. The protective order required that all nonemergency
communications occur through Talking Parents and limited contact to “brief
and peaceful” communications necessary for “court-ordered visitation of [the]
children.”
While his messages requesting reconciliation with Michelle may have
abated at the time she sought renewal of the protective order, they did not
stop entirely. The record reflects that Jason repeatedly used the Talking
Parents platform to communicate about matters unrelated to visitation
6
similar to the communications underlying the original issuance of the
protective order. His messages accused Michelle of keeping the children from
him, asserted her “revenge” was hurting the children, expressed a desire to
reunite the family, and blamed her for punishing him and the children.
Rather than acknowledging the impropriety of these communications,
Jason testified that although his attempts to reconcile with Michelle were
inappropriate, he had never done anything wrong to her. He further testified
that he did not view statements accusing Michelle of hurting the children as
manipulative and believed “a hundred percent” that he had never violated
the protective order, notwithstanding a judicial finding to the contrary. The
trial court found this testimony to demonstrate a continuing inability or
unwillingness to recognize and respect the boundaries imposed by the order.
That finding is reasonable and supported by the evidence.
Michelle testified that after issuance of the restraining order, she took
disability leave due to mental or emotional difficulties stemming from Jason’s
communications. She testified that his repeated statements concerning the
children were manipulative and negatively affected her peace of mind. She
also remained concerned Jason could become physically aggressive toward
her, citing prior conduct involving the children and an incident in which he
slammed a door on her father.
Particularly significant was Jason’s insistence that he had done
nothing wrong and had never violated the protective order. Michelle testified
that these statements “frighten[ed]” her because they suggested Jason did
not understand the wrongful nature of his conduct and therefore was likely to
continue it. She described the prospect of being without a protective order as
“very scary” and testified that she could not imagine “what [life] would look
like” without its protections. The trial court was entitled to credit this
7
testimony in assessing both whether Jason’s conduct disturbed Michelle’s
peace and whether her continuing fear of future abuse remained reasonable.
Viewed as a whole, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s
decision to renew the protective order. The issue was not whether any
individual Talking Parents message, considered in isolation, was sufficiently
offensive or threatening. Rather, the court properly considered the totality of
the circumstances, including Jason’s repeated disregard of the
communication limits imposed by the order, his attempts to inject blame and
reconciliation efforts into discussions concerning the children, his refusal to
acknowledge wrongdoing, and the effect this conduct had on Michelle’s
emotional well-being. On this record, the court could reasonably conclude
Jason’s conduct destroyed the mental or emotional calm of a reasonable
person in Michelle’s position and that her continued fear of future abuse
remained objectively reasonable. Accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion
in renewing the protective order.5
5 In the trial court, Jason claimed Michelle had engaged in improper
judicial forum shopping because her request to renew the order should have
been presented to the judge presiding over the dissolution action. In his
opening brief, when discussing the evidence presented, he stated Michelle
“forum shopped [the] [protective order]” but presented no analysis or
authority to support this statement. Jason forfeited his forum shopping
contention by not presenting it in his opening brief under a separate heading
or subheading and by failing to support it with analysis and citation to
authority. (Kilrain, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1) [“Each brief must: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) State each point under a
separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each
point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority; and [¶] (C)
Support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume
and page number of the record where the matter appears.”].)
8
II.
The Facial and As-Applied Challenges to Section 6345 Fails
Relying on United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 (Rahimi),
Jason contends section 6345 is facially unconstitutional and as applied to him
because it imposes a permanent firearm ban in violation of his Second
Amendment rights. Consequently, he argues that we must reverse the entire
renewed protective order, not just the firearm restriction. This argument
fails for the simple reason that section 6345 does not itself impose any
firearm restriction.
“[T]he Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual right
to keep and bear arms for self-defense.” (N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1, 17.) The Second Amendment “right to keep and
bear arms is among the ‘fundamental rights necessary to our system of
ordered liberty.’ ” (Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 690.) “ ‘Like most rights’,
though, ‘the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.’ ”
(Ibid.) If “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct”
then “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” (Bruen, at
p. 24.) “The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating
that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct
falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. 680, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a federal statute—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)6—prohibiting possession of
6 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person–
. . . [¶] (8) who is subject to a court order that– [¶] (A) was issued after a
hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such
person had an opportunity to participate; [¶] (B) restrains such person from
9
firearms by persons subject to domestic violence restraining orders “if that
order includes a finding that [the person to be restrained] ‘represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner,’ or a child of
the partner or individual.” (Id. at p. 685.) The court reviewed the history of
disarmament and firearm regulation under English and early American law
and concluded that historical firearm regulations “confirm[ed] what common
sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence
to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.” (Id. at pp. 693–697,
698.) Thus, the constitutional justification for disarmament rests on
dangerousness, not merely the existence of a restraining order.
Constitutional challenges to statutes are reviewed de novo. (People v.
Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 474.) Review begins with a strong
presumption of constitutionality, and all doubts are resolved in favor of
validity. (Beach & Bluff Conservancy v. City of Solana Beach (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 244, 264.) Absent a clear and unmistakable conflict with the
state or federal Constitution, the statute must be upheld. (Ibid.)
We first address Jason’s facial challenge to section 6345. Facial
challenges are generally disfavored because assertions of facial invalidity
frequently rely on conjecture, creating a risk of premature statutory
interpretation based on sparse factual records. (Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
State Republican Party (2008) 552 U.S. 442, 450.) Such challenges also
harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or
child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that
would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the
partner or child; and(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or [¶]
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably
be expected to cause bodily injury; or . . . .”
10
conflict with principles of judicial restraint, which cautions against resolving
constitutional questions unnecessarily or announcing rules broader than the
case requires. (Ibid.) The threshold for mounting a facial constitutional
challenge is exacting. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1138.) It is the most difficult form of
constitutional challenge to sustain, requiring a showing that the statute is
invalid in every conceivable application. (Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 693.)
The claims fails if the statute is constitutional in even a single set of
applications. (Ibid.)
Section 6345 governs the duration, modification, and termination of
domestic violence restraining orders. An initial protective order may not
exceed five years and remains subject to termination or modification by
further court order. (§ 6345, subd. (a).) The statute authorizes renewal of a
protective order “either for five or more years, or permanently, at the
discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance
of the original order.” (§ 6345, subd. (a), italics added.) It also permits the
restrained party to seek termination or modification of the order at any time
prior to its expiration. (§ 6345, subd. (d).)
Jason contends section 6345 is facially unconstitutional because
renewal of a protective order will result in the continued application of the
firearm prohibition. That argument attacks the wrong statute. Section 6345
does not prohibit anyone from owning or possessing firearms. It merely
governs the duration and renewal of protective orders. The statute that
restricts firearm possession is section 6389.7
7 Section 6389, subdivision (a) provides: “A person subject to a protective
order, as defined in Section 6218, shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive
a firearm while that protective order is in effect.” Section 6218 defines a
protective order as one enjoining, among other things, specific acts of abuse.
11
But Jason does not challenge section 6389, much less argue it is facially
unconstitutional. In his 62-page opening appellate brief, Jason mentions
section 6389 only once. And he never develops any constitutional challenge
to this statute. Although his reply brief asserts that sections 6345 and 6389
operate “in conjunction,” he still does not contend that section 6389 itself
violates the Second Amendment. We are not required to nor will we
construct that argument for him. (City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 670, 679, fn. 8.)
Jason’s as-applied challenge to section 6345 fails for the same reason.
He argues section 6345 is unconstitutional as applied to him because a court
may renew a protective order permanently and, as a consequence,
section 6389 would continue to prohibit him from ever owning, possessing,
purchasing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition.8 This argument conflates
two distinct statutes. As already mentioned, section 6345 governs the
The firearm prohibition is mandatory. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1294–1295.)
8 This section of the opening brief also lacks meaningful citation to
relevant authority. Although our independent research revealed a
substantial body of case law addressing as applied constitutional challenges
in analogous contexts, none of this authority is cited or discussed. Counsel’s
citation to Wis. v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205 and Brown v. Plata (2011)
563 U.S. 493 as examples of successful as applied challenges is misplaced
because neither case supports that proposition. Yoder addresses a Free
Exercise Clause exemption from compulsory education laws, not an as-
applied constitutional challenge in the sense advanced here. (Yoder, at
p. 207.) Plata concerns systemic Eighth Amendment violations arising from
prison overcrowding; it does not analyze or apply the as-applied challenge
framework. (Plata, at pp. 499–500.) Because the issue involves a
constitutional question subject to de novo review, we disregard the
mischaracterized authorities and resolve Jason’s as applied challenge under
the correct legal framework.
12
duration, renewal, modification, and termination of protective orders; it does
not itself prohibit firearm possession. Any restriction on Jason’s ability to
possess firearms arises from section 6389, which imposes a firearm
restriction while a qualifying protective order remains in effect. But he does
not challenge section 6389.
Nor does Rahimi support Jason’s position. Rahimi addressed the
constitutionality of a firearm restriction imposed on individuals found to pose
a credible threat to the physical safety of others. (Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at
pp. 685, 690.) It did not hold that protective orders may not be renewed, nor
did it suggest that statutes authorizing renewal of protective orders are
unconstitutional. At most, Rahimi may bear on the circumstances under
which a firearm prohibition may constitutionally be enforced. It does not
render section 6345 unconstitutional as applied to him.
For these reasons, we reject Jason’s constitutional challenges to
section 6345.
III.
No Due Process Violation from Excluding Impeachment Witness
On appeal, Jason reprises his trial-level argument that his daughter’s
testimony was relevant to impeach statements Michelle made in her
pleadings. He claims that excluding his daughter’s testimony undermined
his defense. Other than citing five U.S. Supreme Court opinions for general
propositions, he provides no meaningful, factually analogous authority
supporting reversal.
“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to
the credibility of a witness . . . , having any tendency in reason to prove or
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) Evidence bearing on a witness’s credibility may
13
be used to impeach their testimony regarding a material fact in the case.
(Evid. Code, §§ 780, subd. (i), 1101, subd. (c).) “As with all relevant evidence,
however, the trial court retains discretion to admit or exclude evidence
offered for impeachment.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9.)
A trial court’s authority to admit or exclude impeachment evidence is
necessarily expansive, given the wide range of factual circumstances in which
such issues arise, and its exercise of that discretion is ordinarily upheld on
appeal. (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 932.) To obtain reversal, a
party must show that this discretion was exercised in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that produced a manifest miscarriage
of justice. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 9–10.)
Jason fails to meet this demanding standard. While he correctly notes
Michelle stated in her sworn declaration that he was “using our children to
try [to] get me back and his [sic] manipulating them.” He ignores, however,
that Michelle made this statement after listing Jason’s Talking Parents
messages where Jason stated:
“ ‘Why would it be so wrong if I was still with you and our
kids they obviously miss me and you like crazy when there
[sic] not with us.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“ ‘I want one of these days I can make a nice dinner and we
can watch a movie night with our kids or lunch and you can
watch them play outside with me. [Son] is on two wheels
now and [daughter] is off to the races with whatever she
wants to ride. I’m trying to make this easy for you. There’s
no reason we can’t be figuring this out. [daughter] says
your [sic] gunna say no but she says try anyways I wish you
would figure this out.
14
“If you want to bring them over [daughter’s] friend keeps
coming over asking to play with [daughter] before it gets
too late. You can come watch them outside with me if you
would like.’ ”
Michelle’s declaration includes limited hearsay statements attributed
to the children.9 Significantly, however, at the hearing on the request to
renew the protective order, the focus remained on Jason’s own
communications—particularly the Talking Parents messages—rather than
on any hearsay statements attributed to the children. In this context, the
marginal impeachment value of the proposed testimony was limited at best.
The trial court could reasonably conclude that calling a minor child to testify
about collateral matters—primarily to challenge statements already
supported by Jason’s own messages—would add little, if anything, to the
evidentiary record.
Under these circumstances, Jason has not demonstrated that the trial
court’s ruling exceeded the bounds of reason or resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. This conclusion is reinforced by the ages of the children. Requiring
children of such young ages to testify, particularly in a contentious parental
dispute, carries an inherent risk of emotional harm and undue stress. The
trial court was entitled to weigh those considerations against the limited
9 Specifically, Michelle stated: “Our daughter comes home telling me
Daddy wants to know if I have a boyfriend. She says Daddy wants to be my
boyfriend. I have to respond to our daughter, . . . that I do not feel that
Daddy is a horrible person. [Daughter] also asked me, “What happened in
Court?” She also stated: “The children still ask me when Daddy and I will be
getting back together. He told our son, ‘When we win in Court, I will get to
see you everyday.’ I then have to discuss with our son, . . . why he does not
see Daddy every day without talking about this case.”
15
probative value of the proposed testimony, which was directed at collateral
impeachment rather than a central disputed issue. On this record, the court
acted well within its discretion in declining to compel the children’s
testimony.
IV.
The First Amendment and Due Process Challenges Fail
Jason asserts “the permanent [protective order] infringes on [his] First
Amendment rights.” (Capitalization omitted.) This section is devoid of
meaningful legal authority. It relies solely on a passing reference to Burquet,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, purporting to suggest the Legislature was
concerned about chilling protected speech, but provides no pinpoint citation
or developed analysis.
In any event, the argument fails. The trial court found that Jason’s
messages exceeded the scope of the existing restraining order, constituted
abusive conduct, and Michelle’s fear and apprehension were objectively
reasonable. Moreover, “[a] statute that is otherwise valid, and is not aimed
at protected expression, does not conflict with the First Amendment simply
because the statute can be violated by the use of spoken words or other
expressive activity.” (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999)
21 Cal.4th 121, 134, disapproved on other grounds by Bailey v. San Francisco
Dist. Attorney's Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 631, fn. 6.)
He also claims, “the permanent [protective order] violates due process
by triggering federal firearm restrictions without adequate basis.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Counsel argues: “The trial court’s reliance on
‘disturbing the peace’ alone, untethered from any credible threat, fails to
satisfy the due process requirement of a rational nexus between the
restriction and a legitimate state interest.” The only authority cited in this
16
section is Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. 680 which involves an as applied challenge
and expressly declines to address due process concerns because no such claim
was presented. (Id. at p. 701, fn. 2.) Due process requires fair notice and an
opportunity to be heard. (See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319,
348.) Here, Jason had notice of the renewal proceeding and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Moreover, he did not claim a violation of due process
in the trial court and forfeited any due process claim.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
DO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
KELETY, J.
17