Filed 6/26/26 Decloedt v. Radnet Management CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
TREVOR JOSEPH DECLOEDT, B343963
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV25729)
v.
RADNET MANAGEMENT, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Virginia C. Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.
Lindsay M. Holloman, M. Alejandra Jimenez; Squire
Patton Boggs and Jill Louise Ripke for Defendants and
Appellants.
Shegerian & Associates, Carney R. Shegerian, Mahru
Madjidi and Melineh Jingozian for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel
plaintiff and respondent Trevor Joseph Decloedt to submit his
claims to arbitration.
Decloedt sued defendants and appellants Radnet
Management, Inc.; RadNet, Inc.; Radnet Managed Imaging
Services, Inc.; Joe Zambrano; and Susana Ceballos (collectively,
appellants), alleging 11 state-law causes of action, including a
cause of action for sexual harassment under our state’s Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et
seq.).1 The trial court denied appellants’ motion to compel
Decloedt to submit these claims to arbitration. The court based
its decision on the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault
and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–
402), which statute creates an exemption to the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). The EFAA applies to
“a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual
harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (See
9 U.S.C. § 401(4) & § 402(a).)
Appellants contend the EFAA does not apply to Decloedt’s
lawsuit. We disagree. We hold that harassment on the basis of
sexual orientation is a form of sexual harassment under FEHA,
and appellants fail to show the trial court erred in finding
Decloedt sufficiently pleaded a FEHA sexual harassment claim.
As to the latter point, we find Decloedt sufficiently alleged
Ceballos subjected him to severe or pervasive harassment
because of his homosexuality. In sum, we affirm the denial of
appellants’ motion to compel arbitration.
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
2
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
We summarize only those facts relevant to our disposition
of this appeal.
In October 2024, Decloedt filed a complaint alleging:
(1) discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) hostile work
environment harassment in violation of FEHA; (3) sexual
harassment in violation of section 12940, subdivision (j);3
(4) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) failure to provide
reasonable accommodation in violation of FEHA; (6) failure to
engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA; (7) failure
to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation in violation
of FEHA; (8) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention;
(9) wrongful termination of employment in violation of public
policy; (10) whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code
section 1102.5; and (11) intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
As relevant here, Decloedt levelled the second cause of
action for hostile work environment and the third cause of action
for sexual harassment against all five appellants and, with
regard to both causes of action, Decloedt averred he suffered
2 In describing the relevant facts and the procedural
history of this case, we rely in part on undisputed parts of the
trial court’s order denying appellants’ motion and on admissions
made by the parties in their filings. (Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
764, 772, fn. 2 [utilizing this approach].)
3 As we explain in our Discussion, part A, post,
section 12940, subdivision (j) is a provision of FEHA that bars an
employer from, inter alia, harassing an employee because of the
latter’s sex or sexual orientation.
3
harassment because of his sexual orientation.4 Further, Decloedt
averred defendants and appellants Radnet Management, Inc.,
RadNet, Inc., and Radnet Managed Imaging Services, Inc. are his
former employers; defendant and appellant Zambrano is
Decloedt’s former supervisor; and defendant and appellant
Ceballos is Decloedt’s former coworker.
In December 2024, appellants moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement Decloedt had signed at the
outset of his employment. Appellants argued, inter alia, the FAA
governs the arbitration agreement, and the FAA and the
agreement obligate Decloedt to arbitrate all his employment-
related claims against them.
On January 16, 2025, the trial court denied appellants’
motion to compel arbitration. The court found Decloedt had
alleged a claim of sexual harassment under FEHA, thereby
triggering the EFAA’s exemption to the FAA for a case “ ‘relating
to [a] sexual harassment dispute[.]’ ” Appellants timely
appealed.5 On March 12, 2025, the trial court granted
4 In connection with the second cause of action for hostile
work environment, Decloedt also alleged he “was subjected to
harassing conduct . . . in whole or in part on the bases of [his]
physical disability, mental disability, . . . and/or other protected
characteristics . . . .” Elsewhere in the pleading, Decloedt averred
he suffers from cerebral palsy and ADHD.
5 “An aggrieved party may appeal from: [¶] . . . [a]n order
dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).)
4
appellants’ motion to stay the action during the pendency of this
appeal.6
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“As relevant here, the FAA provides, ‘A written provision
in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract or as otherwise provided in chapter 4.’
[Citation.]” (Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
791, 801 (Liu), quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2.)
“Chapter 4 of the FAA, referenced in section 2 [of that
statute], was added by the EFAA, which became effective on
March 3, 2022. It consists of sections 401 and 402. Section 402
provides, in relevant part, ‘Notwithstanding any other provision
of this title, at the election of the person alleging conduct
constituting a sexual harassment dispute . . . , no predispute
arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be
valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under
Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the . . . sexual
harassment dispute.’ [Citation.] As relevant here, section 401
defines ‘ “predispute arbitration agreement” ’ as ‘any agreement
to arbitrate a dispute that had not yet arisen at the time of the
making of the agreement.’ [Citation.] In addition, it defines
6 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the trial court’s
March 12, 2025 minute order staying the action pending
resolution of the appeal, and the minute order correcting that
order nunc pro tunc. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
5
‘ “sexual harassment dispute” ’ as ‘a dispute relating to conduct
that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable
Federal, Tribal, or State law.’ [Citation.]” (Liu, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 801, quoting 9 U.S.C. § 402(a) & § 401(1) &
(4).) We have previously held “the plain language of the EFAA
exempts a plaintiff’s entire case from arbitration where the
plaintiff asserts at least one sexual harassment claim subject to
the act.” (Liu, at p. 796.)
“Where . . . ‘ “the trial court’s denial of a petition to
arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order
de novo.” ’ [Citations.]” (Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.)
Conversely, “ ‘[i]f the trial court resolved contested facts, we
“review the court’s factual determinations for substantial
evidence.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Western Bagel Co., Inc. v.
Superior Court (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 649, 662.)
Appellants argue we should review the trial court’s order
denying their motion de novo “because the issue on appeal
does not turn on conflicting extrinsic evidence.” (Boldface
omitted.) Decloedt counters “the correct standard is substantial
evidence” “because the trial court resolved factual disputes about
the existence and enforceability of the arbitration
agreement . . . .” (Boldface omitted.) To support his invocation of
the substantial evidence standard, Decloedt claims, “The trial
court considered competing evidence and found no enforceable
agreement because the allegations ‘fairly state a “concerted
pattern of harassment” directed [at Decloedt] because of his
sexual orientation,’ sufficient to constitute sexual harassment.”
Decloedt also intimates his unconscionability defense to the
enforcement of the arbitration agreement turns on the resolution
of certain “factual disputes.”
6
We agree with appellants that our standard of review is
de novo because the trial court did not resolve any disputed facts.
The court merely determined whether Decloedt stated a claim for
sexual harassment under FEHA such that the EFAA’s exemption
to the FAA would apply. Whether the court properly interpreted
and applied these statutes to the facts averred in the complaint is
a question of law.7 Furthermore, although Decloedt purports to
“dispute[ ] the existence[ and] authenticity” of the arbitration
agreement in his appellate brief, he does not argue the trial court
erred in finding he did “not dispute that he signed the agreement
or question its contents” during the lower court proceedings, nor
does he offer any cogent argument disputing the existence and
authenticity of the agreement. Lastly, the trial court did not pass
upon Decloedt’s unconscionability defense, and, even if it had,
Decloedt’s appellate briefing indicates his claim of
unconscionability is predicated solely on the text of the
agreement. In short, no contested factual issue is before us.
“ ‘ “Even when our review on appeal ‘is de novo, it is limited
to issues which have been adequately raised and supported in
[the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.] Issues not raised in
an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.’ ”
[Citation.] To succeed[,] . . . [an appellant] must first establish
error. . . . “ ‘[T]he most fundamental rule of appellate review is
7 (See Lazarin v. Superior Court (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1560, 1569 [“The proper interpretation of a statute and the
application of the statute to undisputed facts are questions of
law, which we . . . review de novo.”]; Holiday Matinee, Inc. v.
Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420 [indicating that
whether a complaint “ ‘state[s] facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action’ ” “raises only a question of law”].)
7
that an appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct.’
[Citation.] It is the appellant who bears the burden of
overcoming that presumption.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To
‘rebut[ ] the presumption of correctness accorded to the trial
court’s decision,’ the appellant must ‘ “ ‘ “supply[ ] the reviewing
court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”
(Cruz v. Tapestry, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 953–954.)
We now turn to whether appellants have discharged this
appellate burden.
DISCUSSION
Appellants claim the trial court erred in concluding the
EFAA applies to this case because: (1) Decloedt alleged Ceballos
harassed him based on his sexual orientation, which is not a form
of sexual harassment under FEHA; and (2) even if sexual
orientation harassment were sexual harassment under FEHA,
Decloedt failed to allege sufficient facts showing the harassment
was severe or pervasive, which is a necessary element of a hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim. Decloedt takes
exception with both arguments, and asserts “the arbitration
agreement at issue was unenforceable as unconscionable because
it lacked mutuality and was for an indefinite duration.”
As a prefatory matter, because the trial court denied
appellants’ motion to compel arbitration on the ground Decloedt
alleged “conduct ‘constitut[ing] sexual harassment . . . under
applicable . . . State law’ ” for the purposes of the EFAA, the court
impliedly found the FAA governs the enforceability of the
8
arbitration agreement.8 Appellants mention the California
Arbitration Act in passing in their opening brief. Nevertheless,
they do not contest the trial court’s presumptively correct ruling
the FAA governs the enforceability of the agreement or argue
state law would require the agreement’s enforcement even if
Decloedt alleged a claim of sexual harassment covered by the
EFAA. We thus proceed on the assumption the agreement to
arbitrate is unenforceable if the EFAA’s exemption to the FAA is
applicable.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that harassment
on the basis of sexual orientation amounts to sexual harassment
under FEHA. (Discussion, part A, post.) We also reject
appellants’ contention Decloedt has not alleged conduct
constituting severe or pervasive sexual harassment. (Discussion,
part B, post.) We thus affirm the order denying appellants’
motion without addressing whether the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable.
A. Sexual Orientation Harassment is a Form of Sexual
Harassment Under FEHA
FEHA provides in pertinent part that the following is an
“unlawful employment practice”: “For an employer . . . because
of . . . sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, . . . [or]
sexual orientation[ ] . . . to harass an employee . . . .” (See
§ 12940, subd. (j)(1); see also § 12900 [providing that part 2.8 of
division 3 of title 2 of the Government Code, which includes
§ 12940, “may be known and referred to as the ‘California Fair
8 (See Liu, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 801 [noting the
EFAA is an exemption to the FAA’s provision requiring
enforcement of arbitration agreements].)
9
Employment and Housing Act’ ”].) Thus, an employer’s
harassment of an employee on the basis of the latter’s sexual
orientation or sex is actionable under FEHA. Whether
harassment because of sexual orientation constitutes sexual
harassment for the purposes of FEHA is the question before us.9
As we noted above, FEHA proscribes harassment “because
of . . . sex . . . .” (See § 12940, subd. (j)(1).) Similarly, title VII of
the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.)
bars an employer from “ ‘discriminat[ing] against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . .’
[Citation.]” (See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. (2020) 590 U.S. 644,
655 (Bostock), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).) In construing
that provision in title VII, the United States Supreme Court held,
“An employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or
transgender defies the law.” (See Bostock, pp. 649–652, 683.)
The high court explained that because the statute’s “plain terms”
“prohibit[ ] employers from taking certain actions ‘because of’
sex,” an employer violates title VII if “the plaintiff’s sex was one
but-for cause of [a challenged employment] decision . . . .” (See
Bostock, at pp. 656, 662.) The court further remarked, “When an
employer fires an employee because she is homosexual or
transgender, two causal factors may be in play — both the
individual’s sex and something else (the sex to which the
individual is attracted or with which the individual identifies).”
(See id. at p. 661, italics omitted.) Therefore, although
9 As we discuss later in this part, section 12940,
subdivision (j)(1) prohibits not only sexual harassment, but also
harassment on the basis of other characteristics, including
mental or physical disability.
10
“homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from
sex,” “discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender
status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex” for the
purposes of title VII. (See Bostock, at p. 669.)
We may rely upon Bostock’s construction of the statutory
phrase “because of . . . sex” in title VII in construing precisely the
same text in section 12940, subdivision (j)(1). (See Hall v. County
of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318, 326, fn. 6
[“Because . . . the antidiscrimination objectives and public policy
purpose of [FEHA and title VII] are the same, California’s courts
routinely rely on federal decisions to interpret analogous parts of
FEHA.”].) We agree with Bostock’s holding that discriminating
against an employee because of his or her homosexuality is
discrimination on the basis of sex. That logic applies with equal
force when determining whether an employer who has harassed
an employee because of his or her homosexuality has engaged in
harassment because of the employee’s sex. For that reason, we
conclude sexual orientation harassment is a form of harassment
because of sex under FEHA.
Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025)
117 Cal.App.5th 75 (Quilala) supports our conclusion. There, an
employee alleged his “supervisors and coworkers questioned his
sexual identity, a manager asked if he ‘suck[ed]’ certain
individuals, and that same manager mocked him by saying [the
employee’s] perceived sexual orientation was ‘so embarrassing.’ ”
(See Quilala, at pp. 80, 86.) The employee “further alleged he
was removed from a work assignment and had his [work] hours
reduced because of [his] perceived sexual orientation[, and that a]
field supervisor[ ] repeated[ly] refer[red] to him as
‘Mrs. Quilala[.]’ ” (See id. at p. 86.) The Court of Appeal agreed
11
with the trial court that these “allegations stated a plausible
claim of sexual harassment under FEHA, bringing the dispute
within the scope of the EFAA.” (See id. at pp. 86–87.) In essence,
Quilala held that the employee’s claim that his employer
harassed him because of his perceived sexual orientation
constituted a claim of sexual harassment under FEHA.
Appellants make two arguments to the contrary. First,
appellants argue, “FEHA specifically differentiates sex-based and
sexual harassment from harassment based on other protected
characteristics such as, e.g., sexual orientation, disability, and
race.” (Citing § 12940, subd. (j)(1) [proscribing harassment
because of, inter alia, “race, . . . physical disability, mental
disability, . . . sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, . . .
[and] sexual orientation”].) Appellants direct us to the following
subparagraph of the provision of FEHA proscribing harassment:
“ ‘[H]arassment’ because of sex includes sexual harassment,
gender harassment, and harassment based on pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions. Sexually harassing
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.” (See § 12940,
subd. (j)(4)(C).) They argue the omission of “sexual orientation”
from subdivision (j)(4)(C)’s list of protected characteristics, and
the inclusion of that term in the provision proscribing workplace
harassment (i.e., subdivision (j)(1)), demonstrates “[s]exual
orientation harassment is a distinct type of harassment under
FEHA, like disability harassment.”
Appellants, however, ignore the “basic principle of
statutory construction[ that] ‘include’ is generally used as a word
of enlargement and not of limitation. [Citation.] Thus, where the
word ‘include’ is used to refer to specified items, it may be
expanded to cover other items.” (See Rea v. Blue Shield of
12
California (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1227.) In accordance
with that principle, we read section 12940, subdivision (j)(4)(C) as
a provision by which the Legislature removed any doubt that
harassment based on gender, pregnancy, childbirth, and medical
conditions relating to pregnancy and childbirth constitute
harassment because of sex, even though that form of harassment
may not be motivated by sexual desire. We do not agree that by
omitting other characteristics inextricably intertwined with an
employee’s sex, the Legislature intended for those omitted
characteristics to be excluded from subdivision (j)(1)’s
proscription of harassment because of sex.
Second, appellants assert, “Quilala did not hold that
harassment based on sexual orientation constitutes sexual
harassment or harassment based on sex under FEHA. [The
employee in Quilala] alleged some conduct based on his sexual
orientation, but he also alleged harassing conduct that was
expressly sexual in nature and/or based on his sex/gender.
[Citation.] For example, [the employee] alleged specific lewd,
sexual comments from his coworkers and supervisors in the
workplace, such as accusations regarding whether [the employee]
‘suck[ed]’ certain individuals, intrusive questions about his sex
life, mocking and questioning of his sex/gender, and insults
targeting his sex/gender (e.g., a supervisor taunting the male
[employee] as ‘Mrs. Qulilala’ every time he saw him), in addition
to statements that [the employee’s] perceived sexual orientation
was ‘so embarrassing.’ [Citation.]”
Appellants’ interpretation of the Quilala decision reflects a
misunderstanding of FEHA’s definition of sexual harassment.
“ ‘[I]t is the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of
sex — not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language —
13
that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim [under FEHA].’
[Citation.]” (See Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006)
140 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561.) Indeed, our high court explained,
“[A] plaintiff may establish a hostile work environment without
demonstrating the existence of coercive sexual conduct directed
at the plaintiff or even conduct of a sexual nature.” (See Miller v.
Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 469.) Thus,
whether the employee in Quilala alleged a claim of sexual
harassment under FEHA turned on whether his supervisors and
coworkers harassed him because of his sex, and not on whether
they referred to him with vulgar or sexualized language. The
employee averred facts showing his supervisors and coworkers
subjected him to “repeated and humiliating conduct” because of
his perceived sexual orientation. (See Quilala, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 86.) In concluding the employee “stated a
plausible claim of sexual harassment under FEHA” (see Quilala,
at pp. 86–87), the Quilala court necessarily concluded that
harassment on account of sexual orientation is a type of sexual
harassment.
B. Decloedt Sufficiently Alleged that Ceballos
Subjected Him to Severe or Pervasive Harassment
Because of His Sexual Orientation
To invoke the EFAA’s exemption from the FAA, Decloedt
must “alleg[e] conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute”
“under applicable . . . State law.” (See 9 U.S.C. § 401(4) &
§ 402(a).) Appellants maintain (1) the EFAA required Decloedt to
allege facts “sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule[s] of Civil Procedure[, rule] 12(b)(6)” (Rule 12(b)(6)),
and (2) even if sexual orientation harassment is a type of sexual
harassment under FEHA, Decloedt’s allegations fell short of
14
pleading that Ceballos subjected him to sexual harassment that
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to give rise to liability under
FEHA. Assuming arguendo the pleading standard in Rule
12(b)(6) applies, we conclude Decloedt sufficiently alleged
Ceballos subjected him to severe or pervasive harassment
because of his sexual orientation.
“To prevail on a claim of hostile work environment under
FEHA, an employee must show he or she was subjected to
harassing conduct that was (1) unwelcome, (2) because of sex or
gender, and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [his or] her employment and create an abusive work
environment.” (Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 663, 692.) “ ‘ “ ‘[S]imple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)’ ”
are not sufficient to create an actionable claim of harassment.’
[Citation.] . . . [A] hostile work environment exists when
harassing conduct ‘sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or
intrudes upon its victim,’ such that it disrupts emotional
tranquility or interferes with the victim’s sense of well-being
or ability to perform his or her job.” (Quilala, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 86.) “Harassment of an employee . . . by an
employee, other than an agent or supervisor, shall be unlawful if
the [employer], or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have
known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action.” (See § 12940, subd. (j)(1).)10
10 Although appellants argue Decloedt failed to plead
adequately Ceballos subjected him to sexual orientation
harassment that was “sufficiently severe or pervasive as to have
altered the conditions of [his] employment,” they do not contend
15
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a party to assert by motion the
defense that a pleading “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted . . . .” (See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rule 12(b)(6).)
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], the
plaintiff’s complaint ‘must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” ’ [Citation.]” (See Boquist v. Courtney (9th Cir. 2022)
32 F.4th 764, 773 (Boquist).) In analyzing whether the complaint
survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[t]he facts in the complaint are
liberally construed in the plaintiff’s favor and are generally
accepted as true.” (See Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Sec.
(9th Cir. 2012) 669 F.3d 983, 992 (Ibrahim).) “A claim is facially
plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.’ [Citation.] A court must ‘draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.’
[Citation.] ‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.’ [Citation.] Ultimately, ‘[d]ismissal is proper under
Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the non-movant can
prove no set of facts to support its claims.’ [Citation.]” (Boquist,
at pp. 773–774.)
Allegations of Ceballos’s sexual harassment of Decloedt
appear in paragraphs 13.b and 13.c of the complaint, which
provide:
Decloedt failed to allege sufficiently that Ceballos’s conduct was
unwelcome or that the pleading does not show Ceballos’s conduct
can be imputed to her employer.
16
“b. In early 2022, Decloedt began working at
a desk adjacent to another patient service
representative, Ceballos, who began subjecting him to
harassment based on his sexual orientation. She
made derogatory comments such as, ‘you shouldn’t be
gay; it’s not okay; it’s sinning.’ Ceballos not only
continually harassed Decloedt for his sexual
orientation but also exhibited aggressive behavior
when he tried to assist her with client issues. She
frequently expressed anger, even going as far as
threatening him with comments like ‘I am so angry, I
could kill you’ and attempting to physically harm him
by pulling his hair. At other times, Ceballos would
switch from being angry to inappropriately caressing
his hair and running her fingers through it, engaging
in unwanted and invasive physical contact. Decloedt
reported these incidents to Zambrano and the patient
service representative lead, Juan Mercado
(‘Mercado’), but no action was taken.
“c. In November 2022, Tobias physically
attacked Decloedt by grabbing his hair, forcing him to
seek refuge in the bathroom after advising her to
calm down following a client interaction.[11] Again,
Decloedt reported this incident to Zambrano, but was
met with no action. A few days later, HR called
Decloedt into their office and attempted to write him
up, based on a complaint from Ceballos that he had
11 Both parties agree in their briefing the “Tobias”
referenced in this passage from the complaint is Ceballos.
17
been disrespectful. However, he informed HR of all
the physically, sexually, and emotionally harassing
actions Ceballos had taken, as well as the numerous
times he had reported them to Zambrano and
Mercado, who had not taken any action. Decloedt
also expressed that the harassment had taken such a
toll on him that he had contemplated suicide. No
action was taken by HR to address the situation with
Ceballos.”12
These excerpts from the complaint may reasonably be
construed to allege Ceballos repeatedly informed Decloedt at
work she believed his homosexuality was an abomination.
Ceballos’s alleged statement that Decloedt’s sexual orientation
was a “ ‘sin[ ]’ ” demonstrates she believed his homosexuality was
morally reprehensible and worthy of condemnation. Although
Decloedt does not aver Ceballos made these anti-gay remarks on
the occasions in which she threatened him or pulled his hair, one
could reasonably infer from the frequency with which she
expressed her disapproval of his sexuality and the intensity of
that disapproval that her anti-gay animus motivated that
behavior.
Accordingly, the complaint may reasonably be read as
alleging (1) over the course of several months, Ceballos
(a) repeatedly chastised Decloedt for his homosexuality, and
(b) “frequently expressed anger” by (i) stating she was so angry
she could kill him and (ii) pulling his hair several times, (2) on
12 Decloedt further alleges, “On February 28, 2023,
Decloedt was abruptly terminated by Sarah from HR while at
work. When asked for the reason, she simply stated, ‘it’s not
working anymore,’ without providing any further explanation.”
18
one occasion, Ceballos grabbed Decloedt’s hair with such force he
fled to the restroom to escape from her, and (3) Ceballos engaged
in this abusive conduct because she disapproved of Decloedt’s
sexual orientation. Because Decloedt alleged Ceballos’s
misconduct caused him to flee for his safety and “contemplate[ ]
suicide,” one could reasonably infer her behavior “disrupt[ed his]
emotional tranquility and interfere[d] with [his] sense of well-
being or ability to perform his . . . job” such that it was
“sufficiently severe or pervasive” to support a claim of sexual
harassment. (See Quilala, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 86.)
Appellants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
First, appellants contend Decloedt did “not allege that
Ceballos’[s] angry or aggressive conduct was based on sex or even
his sexual orientation” because “the [c]omplaint expressly
distinguishes between (a) the conduct based on sexual orientation
(i.e., the comment(s) mentioned [in the pleading]), and (b) the
angry/aggressive conduct based on [Decloedt] getting involved in
Ceballos’[s] handling of client issues.” (Boldface omitted from
second quotation.) In support of this purported dichotomy,
appellants rely heavily on the following sentence in the
complaint: “ ‘Ceballos not only continually harassed Decloedt for
his sexual orientation but also exhibited aggressive behavior
when he tried to assist her with client issues.’ [Citation.]”
(Boldface & italics added by appellants.) They further note
Decloedt averred Ceballos made threatening comments and
pulled his hair when he advised her on client issues.
In effect, appellants are inviting us to ignore an essential
principle governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions, that is, a court
“liberally construe[s]” the complaint’s allegations “in the
plaintiff’s favor . . . . [Citation.]” (See Ibrahim, supra, 669 F.3d
19
at p. 992.) They advance a technical construction of the
complaint that hinges on a supposed distinction between
continual harassment on the basis of sexual orientation and
anger directed at Decloedt when he offered to assist Ceballos
with her client interactions. This is not the only permissible
reading of the complaint. One could reasonably interpret the
passage in question as merely distinguishing between two forms
of harassment Decloedt endured because of his sexual
orientation: (1) Ceballos’s continual harassment of Decloedt via
her criticism of his sexual orientation, and (2) her aggressive
behavior directed at Decloedt when he attempted to assist her
with client issues. We thus reject appellants’ argument that
Ceballos’s oral statements constituted the only form of
harassment based on sexual orientation that appears in the
complaint.
Second, appellants argue that we should disregard as
conclusory Decloedt’s allegation that Ceballos “ ‘continually
harassed [him] for his sexual orientation[,]’ ” and deem him to
have alleged only the one specific anti-gay comment identified in
his complaint. The federal “pleading standard . . . does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations[.]’ ” (See Ashcroft v. Iqbal
(2009) 556 U.S. 662, 678.) To plead a FEHA sexual harassment
claim, Decloedt thus did not have to specify the precise frequency
with which Ceballos subjected him to harassment. Further, the
assertion that Ceballos “continually” made anti-gay statements
to Decloedt is not “ ‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation’ ” that federal courts may not accept as true at the
pleading stage. (See ibid.) Rather, we may infer from that
allegation that Ceballos expressed her disapproval of Decloedt’s
20
sexual orientation on multiple occasions between early 2022 and
November 2022.
In sum, the trial court did not err in ruling Decloedt
sufficiently alleged a FEHA claim of sexual harassment
triggering the EFAA’s exemption to the FAA.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s January 16, 2025 order denying
the motion to compel arbitration filed by defendants and
appellants Radnet Management, Inc., RadNet, Inc., Radnet
Managed Imaging Services, Inc., Joe Zambrano, and Susan
Ceballos. Plaintiff and respondent Trevor Joseph Decloedt is
awarded his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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