Filed 10/7/26 Daley v. Weigel CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MORRIS WILLIAM DALEY, as
Trustee, etc. A173465
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Alameda County
v. Super. Ct. No. 23PRO00270)
ALLISON DALEY WEIGEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Allison Daley Weigel (Allison) appeals a judgment approving a
proposed distribution of assets from three family trusts and denying her
request to remove and surcharge the trustee, Morris William Daley (Bill or
the Trustee). Allison and Bill are beneficiaries of the trusts, along with their
brother Thomas Daley (Tom).1 Following a consolidated trial, the court
approved Bill’s proposed distribution plan, finding that he had acted in
accordance with his fiduciary duties and the terms of the trusts.
Allison filed the present appeal in the case that pertains specifically to
the Daley Family Trust (the Daley Trust or the Trust). She contends Bill
violated his fiduciary duties and exceeded his discretion as trustee by
1
Like the parties, and with due respect, we use given names to distinguish
among family members.
1
proposing an unequal distribution of assets, and by denying her request to
receive a specific real property asset. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Daley Trust
In 1997, Morris and Nancy Daley established the Trust pursuant to an
agreement that was amended and restated in 2004. The agreement reflects
that the Trustors have three children, Bill, Tom and Allison, and it
designates the Trustors and Bill as trustees. According to the disposition
provisions, assets are to be held and administered for the benefit of the
Trustors during their lifetime; upon the death of the first Trustor to die, the
Trust shall be divided into sub-trusts; and following the death of the
surviving Trustor, the sub-trusts shall be combined and “distributed in equal
shares to those of the Trustors’ children then living.”
The Trust agreement grants the trustee powers to “carry out the
purposes” of the Trust, including the power to “take any action and make any
election to minimize the tax liabilities of the trust and the beneficiaries of the
trust”; the power to “commence or defend, at the expense of the trust,”
litigation concerning the Trust or its assets; and the power to “engage, at the
expense of the Trust,” attorneys, advisors, managers, specialists, or any other
persons on behalf of the Trust.
Article IV, paragraph 5 of the Trust agreement is particularly relevant
to our resolution of the appeal, as it grants the trustee discretion to decide
how best to separate trust property into parts or shares. Entitled
“Distributions and Allocations in Kind,” it provides in full: “If the Trustee is
required or permitted to separate any trust property into parts or shares,
whether by division, partition, allocation, distribution or otherwise, the
Trustee is authorized to make that separation in undivided interests, in kind,
2
or partly in cash and partly in kind, either pro rata or non-pro rata, at
reasonable values determined as of the date or dates of separation, and to sell
such property as the trustee determines to be advisable in order to effect that
separation.”
In January 2009, Morris passed away and the Trust was divided into a
Survivor’s Trust and a Bypass Trust. Nancy was the sole lifetime beneficiary
of both sub-trusts, and she served as sole trustee for several years. In
September 2021, Nancy became incapacitated and Bill became sole trustee of
the sub-trusts. Nancy died January 31, 2022.
In the period following Nancy’s death, Bill was also trustee of two other
testamentary trusts created by his paternal grandparents, which the parties
refer to as the Guy Trust and the Zelma Trust. Morris was the named
beneficiary of those trusts, and pursuant to his power of appointment, Nancy
had a lifetime income interest in them, and upon her death, the assets of both
trusts were to be distributed to Bill, Tom, and Allison. The record on appeal
indicates that proceedings in these two trust matters paralleled proceedings
in the Daley Trust case.
Petition for Approval of Accountings and Proposed Distribution
On March 20, 2023, Bill filed a petition for approval of accountings and
proposed distribution of assets to the beneficiaries of the Daley Trust. Bill
submitted separate accountings for the sub-trusts and proposed a
distribution of their combined assets, which consist of cash, securities,
vehicles and personal property, and three real properties: 631 Lakeshore
Boulevard, Zephyr Cove, Nevada (the Tahoe cabin); 633 Lakeshore
Boulevard, Zephyr Cove, Nevada (the Tahoe lot); and an approximate 75
3
percent interest in 1990 Monument Boulevard, Concord, California (the
commercial property).2
Bill’s accountings reflected that, as of November 30, 2022, the assets of
the Survivor’s Trust had a fair market value of $3,635,768.20 and the assets
of the Bypass Trust had a fair market value of $8,364,241.57. Bill proposed
distributing assets with a total value of just over $11,000,000, holding back a
$1,000,000 reserve. To provide each beneficiary with an equal share of the
estate valued at $3,667,006.59, Bill proposed the following distribution:
To Bill: The Tahoe cabin, valued at $1,800,000; 28.09% of the
commercial property valued at $1,762,366.60; with the balance
consisting of personal property, vehicles, securities and cash.
To Tom: The Tahoe lot, valued at $595,000; 47.19% of the
commercial property valued at $2,960,700.60; with the balance
consisting of vehicles, securities and cash.
To Allison: Securities and cash with a combined value of
$3,677,006.59.
In April 2023, Bill filed an amendment to his petition, which provided
an updated valuation of the assets as of March 31, 2023, and a revised
distribution proposal, reflecting that the value of each beneficiary’s share had
increased to $3,821,424.42. The specific combination of assets Bill proposed
distributing to himself and Tom did not change, although the reported value
of the two Tahoe assets increased; Bill valued the Tahoe cabin at $2,111,000,
and the Tahoe lot at $690,000. Bill also revised the asset distribution to
Allison, proposing to pay her one-third share all in cash, and reporting that
part of Allison’s distribution had already been advanced to her.
2 The Guy and Zelma trusts each also held interests in the commercial
property.
The Daley Trust previously held a real property asset on Ravenscourt Road
in Hillsborough, which was sold in August 2022.
4
In April 2023, Bill also filed a request for the court to appoint
independent counsel to represent Allison. Bill believed that appointing
counsel for Allison would be in her best interest and in the best interest of the
other beneficiaries because she was paranoid about dealing with third
parties; refused to retain counsel to assist her; and appeared to be incapable
of managing or even collecting the sizeable funds she would be receiving from
the three trusts.
To explain his concerns about Allison, Bill filed a declaration attesting
to the following facts: Around the time of Nancy’s death in January 2022,
Allison cut off contact with her family; Bill did not know where she was
staying or how she was living, but it was his understanding that she resided
in several different hotels, using cash to pay room and board. Bill retained a
legal services company to serve Allison with notice of trust proceedings, and
in June 2022 she was located at a hotel in Walnut Creek. Allison refused to
answer her door, but after confirming her identity, the process server left the
documents outside the door.
Bill attested that he did not hear from Allison until February 2023,
when she requested his financial assistance. Bill paid for Allison to have a
room at a hotel in Burlingame, and began advancing funds to her from the
Trust. Allison was served at the hotel with the petition and related
documents, and Bill offered to advance additional funds so she could retain
counsel to assist her with trust matters. On April 6, he followed up by calling
Allison’s hotel, which was the only way to contact her because she did not use
personal devices, believing she was being hacked. During the April 6 call,
Allison said she objected to receiving all cash, as opposed to other assets, and
Bill encouraged her to retain counsel to assist with her objections. On April
18, Allison told Bill she “ ‘needed more proof’ ” about information pertaining
5
to the proposed distribution, and she had not retained counsel because her
phones had been hacked and she was being stalked. She also refused to
provide information about a bank account she claimed to have, which Bill
requested so that he could wire funds to her.
On May 22, 2023, the court appointed independent counsel to represent
Allison in the present case and related trust matters.
In July 2023, Bill filed a supplement to his petition for approval of his
accountings and proposed distribution of assets. The distribution proposal
expanded to include personal property from the family’s Ravenscourt home,
assigning a value of $8,000 to each beneficiary’s share. Bill also provided
supplemental accountings for the period from December 2022 through May
31, 2023, which showed that the value of the sub-trusts had decreased,
although the value of the two real property assets in Tahoe did not change.
Bill revised his distribution proposal to reflect that each beneficiary’s one-
third interest was valued at $3,830,991.16.
Allison’s Objections
In August 2023, Allison filed an objection to Bill’s petition, and
requested that the court order mediation. Allison made two concrete
objections to the proposed asset distribution. First, she disputed the
allocation of personal property from the Ravenscourt home, arguing there
was no way for her to determine its value or whether the share allocated to
her was equal to her brothers’ shares. Second, Allison objected to the
proposed distribution of the Tahoe cabin to Bill. Allison stated that she
“would like to receive [that] property as part of her distribution from the
Trust,” and she opined that Bill “potential[ly]” breached his duty of
impartiality by allocating the asset to himself rather than to her. Allison also
included in her filing, general allegations that both of her brothers had
6
engaged in misconduct and disregarded the expressed intent of the Trustors
by attempting to cut her out of the family and disown her. Finally, Allison
“question[ed] the legitimacy” of Bill’s accountings but acknowledged having
no specific objections.
After Allison filed her objection, the parties agreed to participate in
mediation. Initially, Allison agreed to mediate in December 2023, but she
subsequently changed her mind, which led to further delay. In April 2024,
the parties completed mediation, which was not successful.
In May 2024, Bill filed a Trustee’s reply brief in support of the petition.
He argued the court should approve his accountings and fees, as there had
been no specific objections to them. Bill also updated his proposed
distribution plan; he proposed the same allocation of assets, but reported
their value as of March 31, 2024. Bill valued the Tahoe cabin at $1,975,00,
the Tahoe lot at $630,000, and the Trust’s interest in the commercial
property at $3,861,679.32. Bill argued his distribution plan was in the best
interest of all beneficiaries and effectuated the Trustors’ intent.
Bill reported that he had determined Allison’s request to receive the
Tahoe cabin as part of her distributive share “should not happen” because she
was not capable of owning and maintaining real property; the Tahoe cabin
had been in the family for many decades, and losing that property would be
both inequitable and contrary to the Trustors’ intent. Bill also determined
that having Allison co-own any real property with another beneficiary was
not a viable option because of her mental health issues and concerns about
potential liability that could result from co-owning property with her.
On June 10, 2024, the court entered an order approving the Trustee’s
accountings. Issues relating to the proposed distribution of assets were
deferred for an evidentiary hearing.
7
In August 2024, Allison filed a petition to remove and surcharge the
Trustee. Allison argued Bill breached his duty of impartiality and engaged in
self-dealing by: “disregarding” her equal interest in the Trust; “deliberately”
excluding her from “the selection process of trust assets”; claiming an asset
for himself despite Allison’s expressed desire for it; and exploiting his role as
trustee for personal gain. Allison argued these alleged actions warranted
removing Bill as trustee and surcharging him for using funds from the Trust
to seek approval of his distribution plan. In a subsequent amendment to her
petition, Allison alleged Bill breached his duty of impartiality by proposing to
exclude Allison from receiving real property.
In November 2024, Allison’s counsel sent a short letter to the Trustee’s
counsel renewing Allison’s request to receive the Tahoe cabin and “offer[ing]
to have the trustee value that property at a value of $2,300,000 for purposes
of distribution” to her. Allison’s counsel opined that her offer “would benefit
the Trust by approximately $189,000,” as it was that much higher than the
highest value Bill had proposed. A few weeks later, the Trustee rejected
Allison’s proposal. He questioned the sincerity of the offer and whether
Allison would change her mind, as she had previously been adamant that the
property be sold on the open market. The Trustee also disputed the merits of
the proposal, opining that Allison was attempting to create an illusion that
his distribution plan would harm the Trust; that the marginal financial gain
to the other beneficiaries was outweighed by their desire to preserve the
Tahoe cabin within the family; and that ensuring the stability of the Tahoe
cabin and safeguarding its future use aligned with the purpose of the Trust.
The Court Trial
In late January 2025, the court held a trial on issues pertaining to
distribution of the Daley Trust, which was consolidated with similar pending
8
matters in the Guy and Zelma Trust cases. Relatedly, the distribution plan
proposed by the Trustee at trial, and admitted into evidence as Exhibit 61,
includes assets from all three trusts.3
The asset allocation in Exhibit 61 mirrors prior versions of the
Trustee’s proposal, although the liquid assets increased—as did the interest
in the commercial property, given that the assets of the three trusts were
combined. Notably for our purposes, the Trustee did not change the value of
the Tahoe real properties reported in his reply brief, and he continued to
propose distributing the Tahoe cabin to Bill, the Tahoe lot to Tom, and the
commercial property partially to Bill and partially to Tom.
At trial, the Trustee argued that he properly exercised his authority
under the trusts and California law to craft a distribution that made the most
sense under the circumstances. Proposing joint ownership with Allison of
real property assets was not feasible due to her mental health issues, the
Trustee argued, and the allocation he proposed was both reasonable and
within the bounds of trustee discretion. Allison argued that Bill had abused
his position as trustee to benefit himself personally, and that he had no valid
basis for allocating the Tahoe cabin to himself. Allison argued further that
the alleged personal benefit to Bill of receiving the Tahoe cabin constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty warranting his removal as trustee. (Citing Prob.
Code, § 16004, subd. (c) (section 16004(c)); subsequent statutory references
are to this code.)
The Trustee presented evidence over two court days, eliciting testimony
from Bill, two real property appraisers, Allison, and Tom. Allison did not call
any witnesses.
3 We grant Allison’s unopposed motion to augment the record with several
trial exhibits, including Exhibit 61.
9
Bill testified about Allison’s behavior, elaborating on events mentioned
in the declaration he filed in support of his prior request to appoint counsel
for Allison. Bill also testified about how he decided to equally divide the
Trust assets. It became apparent, because of Allison’s “behaviors,” that he
could not propose that she own any real property or investments jointly with
the other beneficiaries. To give each beneficiary the same one-third equal
value, Bill proposed giving Allison all cash and that he and Tom split the
other properties. allocating the Tahoe cabin to himself, the Tahoe lot to Tom,
and splitting the commercial property between himself and Tom. He chose to
take the Tahoe cabin because it was a “non-performing asset,” and he was in
a better position than Tom to receive it.
Bill testified that he considered selling the commercial property, but
elected not to because of tax consequences. Selling the Tahoe cabin would
also have negative tax implications, Bill testified, but the “main” reason he
did not sell it was “because it was [their] parents’ wish that the property stay
in the family.” Bill denied Allison’s request to receive the Tahoe cabin
because, among other things, she had stated that she would not be able to
visit the property as a “gang of people [were] out to get her”; distributing the
asset to her would mean that no other family members could use it; and Bill
was concerned the property would be lost to Allison’s creditors.
Allison testified that she had “fled [her] home,” and fled from one hotel
to another, because a large group of people were terrorizing her “[n]onstop.”
She also cut off contact with her lifelong friends, and had no current
relationship with her children. She had tried to hire attorneys to assist her,
but her efforts were thwarted by hackers. Allison also testified that her
parents wanted the Tahoe cabin to stay in the family, but if the property was
put up for sale, she would want a third party to get the cabin instead of her
10
brother. Allison acknowledged that if she were to receive the Tahoe cabin,
she would not be able to visit for the foreseeable future because people
pursuing her would be able to locate her there, but she hoped to one day be
able to use it.
Tom testified that the Tahoe cabin is “near and dear” to him, as it was
to his parents, and that they would have wanted that property to stay in the
family. Tom did not ask that the cabin be distributed to him because it “has
a legacy component to it,” and he did not know if he could “do it justice,”
given that he is single and may not have children. Tom testified extensively
about Allison’s troubling behaviors, including incidents that occurred at the
Tahoe cabin prior to her estrangement from the family. Tom also testified
that Bill’s proposed distribution is fair and he does not object to it, and that
Bill has “done an excellent job” as trustee.
After the parties presented closing arguments, the court continued the
trial to consider the matter further and then announced its decision on
January 31. The court rejected Allison’s breach of trust claim, addressing her
material arguments in detail, and ultimately concluding that the evidence
“overwhelmingly” establishes Bill did not breach his fiduciary duties, and
that his petition was both justified and necessary to fulfill his fiduciary
responsibilities.
The court then stated that it was struggling with the proposed
distribution plan because Bill had acknowledged during his testimony that he
had no evidentiary support for the $8,000 figure assigned to each
beneficiary’s share of the Ravenscourt personal property. Thus, the court
made an initial ruling to order a further accounting before approving the
proposed distribution, but it reversed that ruling after the Trustee agreed
that the total value he assigned to the Ravenscourt personal property
11
($24,000) would be charged against Bill’s one-third share of the assets. Over
Allison’s objection, the court ruled it would approve the proposed distribution
without requiring further accounting.
Statement of Decision and Judgment
On March 4, 2025, the court filed a six-page Statement of Decision,
finding that the Trustee “acted appropriately and in accordance with his
fiduciary duties and the terms of the trusts.” The court overruled Allison’s
objections, denied her request to remove and surcharge the Trustee, and
granted Bill’s petition. The court supported its rulings with detailed findings
addressing 10 issues.
First, the court found that the plain language of the Trust does not
require pro rata distribution of assets. Throughout the proceedings, Allison
had adopted inconsistent interpretations of the Trust’s distribution
provisions, construing them to require a pro rata distribution of all
properties; the sale of all properties; and also as requiring that the Tahoe
cabin be distributed to her. The court rejected those constructions, finding
the Trust instrument grants the Trustee discretion about how to divide
assets equally, and that “equal” does not mean “pro rata.”
Second, Bill did not exclude Allison from the distribution discussions,
the court found. Instead, she fled the area in December 2021 and was not
reachable for over a year; Bill attempted to contact her by various means; but
no one knew where she was or how to get in touch with her.
Third, the court found that Bill properly considered and rejected
Allison’s “offer” to receive the Tahoe cabin. Concluding the Trustee acted
within his discretion, the court found that the reasons for declining Allison’s
proposal included the views and concerns of the other beneficiaries who did
not view the offer as “a benefit to the trusts,” believed Allison would not be
12
able to maintain the property and keep it in the family, and perceived Allison
as “constantly changing position regarding the property and how to distribute
it.”
Fourth, the court rejected Allison’s assertion that Bill breached a duty
of impartiality by failing to consider Tom’s personal circumstances while
unfairly considering claims about Allison’s personal circumstances that were
“ ‘unsubstantiated.’ ” The court found the Trustee did consider Tom’s
personal circumstances in making his distribution decision, and his
consideration of Allison’s circumstances was based on substantiated facts, not
unfounded allegations. Bill acted within his discretion by considering these
facts in making distribution decisions, the court found.
Fifth, the court rejected Allison’s contention that the Trustee violated
public policy by treating Allison differently due to her mental health and
financial issues. The court found that Bill’s attempts to assist Allison were
“not the actions of a Trustee intent on disadvantaging a beneficiary,” that the
evidence “overwhelmingly” supports a finding that Bill “performed his duties
impartially, and that the actions taken by him have been justified and made
necessary in order for him to fulfill his fiduciary responsibilities . . . in
accordance with the terms of the trusts.”
Next, the court made findings as to the credibility of Bill, Tom, and
Allison. The court found Bill to be “straightforward, sincere, honest,
dedicated, and extremely caring,” and that Tom was also “credible,
straightforward, caring and supportive.” By contrast, the court expressed
concern about Allison’s credibility, giving two reasons. Allison admitted at
trial she would prefer a third party to have the Tahoe cabin rather than her
brother, which indicated her objection was not that she wanted the asset but
rather that she did not want her brother to have it. Moreover, Allison made
13
statements at trial that were not consistent with statements made during her
deposition.
The remainder of the court’s findings pertained to adjustments to the
distribution plan to address the value of the Ravenscourt personal property,
and to the court’s decision not to compel a further accounting. We note as
well that the court revised the Trustee’s Exhibit 61 before it approved the
proposed distribution, but it did not change the proposed allocation of the real
property assets.
On March 7, 2025, the court entered a final judgment approving the
Trustee’s proposed distribution, overruling Allison’s objections, and denying
Allison’s request to remove and surcharge the Trustee.
DISCUSSION
“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following
a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a
substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact.
[Citation.] Under this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are
liberally construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable
inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981; see Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 602, 613 [substantial evidence standard applies to express and
implied findings of fact in a statement of decision].)
I. Allison’s Breach of Trust Claim
Allison contends the trial court committed reversible error by
approving the revised distribution plan because Bill breached his fiduciary
duties by allocating the Tahoe cabin to himself. We reject this claim, which is
not supported by Allison’s legal authority or the trial evidence.
14
Allison relies heavily on section 16004, which pertains to the trustee’s
duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and precludes the trustee from taking “part
in any transaction in which the trustee has an interest adverse to the
beneficiary.” (Id., subd. (a).) Section 16004(c) further provides that any
“transaction between the trustee and a beneficiary . . . by which the trustee
obtains an advantage from the beneficiary” creates a presumption affecting
the burden of proof that the trustee’s fiduciary duties have been violated.
Allison argues that Bill breached his fiduciary duty under section 16004
because his distribution proposal was a transaction between the trustee and
the beneficiaries, which he used to obtain an advantage over Allison and Tom
by distributing the Tahoe cabin to himself.
Allison assumes, without analysis or authority, that a proposal to
distribute the assets of a trust is a transaction between the trustee and the
beneficiary. The word transaction generally refers to the act of conducting
business, or a business dealing involving more than one party. (Black’s Law
Dictionary.) A trustee’s proposal to distribute trust assets, by contrast, is a
unilateral obligation arising from a trust instrument. And even if a proposed
distribution could be construed as a transaction, the trustee’s counterparties
would appear to be the trustors, who set forth the trustee’s obligations,
rather than the beneficiaries.
Nor do we accept Allison’s contention that Bill obtained an advantage
from the beneficiaries simply by proposing to distribute the Tahoe cabin to
himself. The cabin is one of multiple assets that he was required to allocate
among the three beneficiaries. And, to the extent Bill exercised his power to
divide the assets in accordance with the Trust provisions, he did not breach
any fiduciary duty as a matter of law. (Copley v. Copley (1981) 126
Cal.App.3d 248, 279 [trustee’s duty of loyalty and prohibitions against self-
15
dealing imposed on trustee “must give way to directions in the governing
trust instrument”].)
The Trust agreement names Bill as both a trustee and a beneficiary,
thus evincing the Trustors’ intent for Bill to have a dual role with respect to
the distribution of assets. (Estate of Miller (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 888, 908–
909 [intent of settlor as shown in trust instrument “most important single
element in the determination of the rights of the trustee”]; § 21102, subd. (b)
[intent of transferor as expressed in instrument controls legal effect of
disposition].) Moreover, the trial court found that the distributive provisions
give the Trustee discretion to decide how to distribute the assets in order to
give each beneficiary an equal share of corpus, and that those provisions do
not require a pro rata distribution of any asset or assets, including the Tahoe
cabin. Allison does not challenge the court’s construction of these provisions,
but even if she had, we would reach the same conclusion applying our
independent review. (Blech v. Blech (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 989, 1001–1002
[absent conflicting extrinsic evidence, interpretation of trust presents
question of law].)
Allison argues Bill abused his discretionary powers by failing to
exercise them reasonably and in accordance with fiduciary principles.
Specifically, Allison invokes section 16003, which provides: “If a trust has
two or more beneficiaries, the trustee has a duty to deal impartially with
them and shall act impartially in investing and managing the trust property,
taking into account any differing interests of the beneficiaries.” Allison
argues Bill violated this duty because his decision to allocate the Tahoe cabin
to himself was influenced by personal bias and animosity toward Allison.
(Citing Rest.3d Trusts, § 79, com. b.)
16
Throughout her appellate briefs, Allison relies on allegations that the
Trustee was biased against her and that he abused his discretion by basing
his decisions on an arbitrary consideration of Allison’s personal
circumstances. We reject these allegations, as they are inconsistent with
findings of fact by the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence.
Not only does Allison disregard factual findings in the Statement of Decision
that undermine her arguments, she also fails to provide this court with a
summary of trial evidence. “When an appellant’s opening brief states only
the favorable facts, ignoring evidence favorable to respondent, the appellate
court may treat the substantial evidence issues as waived and presume the
record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.” (Slone v. El Centro
Regional Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173–1174 (Slone); see
also Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 209, 218; Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 1014, 1072.)
Even if Allison did not forfeit substantial evidence contentions, she fails
to carry her burden on appeal to show that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is not sufficiently substantial to
support the judgment. (Slone, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1176.) Instead,
she relies on isolated snippets of testimony, which she takes out of context
and construes in a light that favors only herself. Accordingly, we reject every
permutation of Allison’s claim that Bill’s decisions were motivated by
personal bias.
Allison also contends that Bill failed to act impartially because he
favored himself over the other two beneficiaries by rejecting Allison’s offer to
receive the Tahoe cabin at a higher value than he proposed. The trial court’s
findings establish that Bill did not base his decision about how to distribute
17
the Tahoe cabin on self-interest, but on the legitimate concerns of the
majority of beneficiaries, including that Allison’s offer was not genuine or
reliable, and that her mental health issues prevented her from enjoying or
preserving the property.
Allison argues that even if Bill did not breach a fiduciary duty, he
exceeded his discretion as trustee because allocating the Tahoe cabin to
himself resulted in an unequal distribution of assets. Indisputably, the Trust
requires an equal distribution of assets among the three beneficiaries, but the
same instrument confers broad authority on the trustee to decide how best to
achieve that result. The fact that Bill allocated an asset to himself over
Allison’s objection does not mean the assets were distributed unequally, or
that Bill abused his discretion. (See Trolan v. Trolan (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th
939, 955 [trust instrument requiring distribution of trust assets just as
“clearly and unambiguously” conferred discretion on trustee regarding
method of distribution]; Pratt v. Ferguson (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 102, 115
[“ ‘[t]o determine the extent of the trustee’s discretion, we look to the
intention of the trustor, as manifested in the trust instrument’ ”].)
Allison fails squarely to address whether the overall division of assets
approved by the court was an equal one, instead focusing only on the Tahoe
cabin. Construing the distribution of the Tahoe cabin as a sale, Allison
argues that Bill’s decision to sell the property to himself deprived Tom and
Allison of their equal shares of that asset as reflected in the higher price that
Allison was willing to pay for it. According to Allison, the difference between
the value she assigned to the Tahoe cabin and the value adopted by the
Trustee must be treated as an asset of the Trust to which each beneficiary
was owed an equal share. And, Allison posits, Bill took that entire interest
for himself. This argument is riddled with flaws.
18
To begin with, the Tahoe cabin was not sold; it was distributed to Bill
as part and parcel of a distribution of the entire holdings of the Trust.
Allison mistakenly relies on Bohnett v. County of Santa Barbara (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 1128, as that case considered the tax implications of an actual
sale of a trust asset to one of the beneficiaries. (Id. at pp. 1132–1133.)
Similarly misplaced is her reliance on River Farms Co. v. Gibson (1935)
4 Cal.App.2d 731, 758 for a legal principle that on its face is limited to “a
trustee, when making [a] sale.” Here, Bill did not sell the Tahoe cabin to
himself, nor did Allison offer to use her own funds to purchase the property
from the Trust. Her offer was only to receive the cabin as part of her
distribution at a higher value. Accepting that offer would have required the
Trustee to revise his distribution proposal by reducing the amount of liquid
assets that had been allocated to Allison, but it would not have changed the
composition of the Trust corpus, or infused it with additional funds or assets.
Moreover, rejecting Allison’s offer to agree to a higher assigned value if
the Tahoe cabin was distributed to her may have deprived the other
beneficiaries of a small financial windfall, but neither of them is claiming any
harm from the trustee’s decision. Allison fails to show that the rejection of
her offer caused her any harm.
Finally, the Trust instrument does not require pro rata distribution of
any asset, nor that any asset be assigned to the beneficiary offering to take it
at the highest value. Instead, the Trust instrument expressly gives the
trustee discretion to distribute assets “in undivided interests, in kind, or
partly in cash partly in kind, either pro rata or non-pro rata, at reasonable
values to be determined as of the date or dates of separation.” Other than
stating she should have been assigned the Tahoe cabin at the value she
proposed, Allison makes no effort to challenge the reasonableness of the value
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the trustee actually placed on the cabin. Indeed, her reply brief insists “[t]his
is not a valuation dispute.” (Boldface omitted.) Because Allison fails to show
that the Trustee’s valuation of the Tahoe cabin was unreasonable, she does
not show that allocating the cabin to Bill at that value resulted in an unequal
distribution of the Daley Trust assets.
II. Public Policy
At trial, Allison argued the Trustee violated public policy by treating
her differently due to her mental health issues. The trial court rejected that
argument, and Allison does not challenge the ruling here. Instead, she
argues the court itself violated public policy by failing to hold the Trustee
accountable and allowing him to override the explicit terms of the Trust
agreement. These new policy arguments are not properly raised for the first
time on appeal. (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1409.) Nor are
we persuaded to apply an exception to the forfeiture rule for arguments that
involve important questions of public concern. (See Saurman v. Peter’s
Landing Property Owner, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1148, 1167.) We do
find, however, that if these claims have not been forfeited, they lack merit.
Allison contends the trial court violated public policy because it
approved of the Trustee’s decision to contravene the Trustors’ intent by
basing his distribution plan on (1) “arbitrary consideration” and improper
“scrutiny” of Allison’s personal circumstances; and (2) “the ‘goal’ ” of keeping
the Tahoe cabin in the family. The first prong of this argument incorporates
factual allegations about the Trustee that the trial court rejected. As
explained above, Allison has forfeited any substantial evidence challenge to
this aspect of the trial court’s findings. Thus, we focus on her contention that
the court violated public policy by permitting the Trustee to consider the goal
of keeping the Tahoe cabin in the family.
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As our background summary reflects, all three beneficiaries—including
Allison—testified at trial that the Trustors did want to keep the Tahoe cabin
in the family. Allison ignores this undisputed evidence. She contends that
trustor intent must be gleaned from the trust instrument itself, and since the
Trust agreement does not express any goal to keep the Tahoe cabin in the
family, the trial court set a dangerous precedent by permitting the Trustee to
substitute his goal for that of the Trustors. We disagree with this reasoning.
Every trustee has a duty “ ‘to carry out the terms of the trust according
to the expressed intent of the trustor.’ ” (Donkin v. Donkin (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 469, 472–473.) Moreover, the trust instrument itself is the best
indicator of trustor intent. (Estate of Miller, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d at
pp. 909–910.) The Daley Trust agreement requires the Trustee to distribute
a large number of nonfungible assets amongst himself and his two siblings,
giving him discretion as to how to divide the assets equally, and expressly
stating that pro rata distribution of any given asset is permissible but not
required. These provisions do not evince any intent by the Trustors to
preclude considering the goal of keeping the Tahoe cabin in the family, a goal
that was shared by the Trustors and at least two of the three beneficiaries.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on
appeal.
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
Weigel v. Daley (A173465)
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