Filed 9/3/26 D.L. v. J.H. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
D.L., 2d Civ. No. B350312
(Super. Ct. No. 17FL00123)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
J.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D.L. requested a renewal of a domestic violence restraining
order (DVRO) against her former partner, J.H. Three days before
the hearing, J.H. filed a notice of intent to seek an evidentiary
hearing and submitted a witness list. The trial court found good
cause to deny the request and renewed the DVRO for five years.
J.H. contends the trial court erred by denying an evidentiary
hearing and by applying the incorrect legal standard in granting
the renewal. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2017, D.L. obtained a three-year DVRO
protecting her and her three children, including the parties’
minor child E.H., from J.H. In 2020, the DVRO was renewed for
another five years. In 2023, the court denied J.H.’s request to
terminate the DVRO.
In July 2025, D.L. filed a request to renew the restraining
order. D.L. averred that she was “afraid or worried that [J.H.]
might abuse [her] in the future” and that J.H. violated the
previous order. She requested a permanent restraining order
and said she believed “that if the restraining order is not
renewed, [J.H.] will harm” her.
D.L. summarized abusive conduct that occurred between
2012 and 2017. She described that in 2017, J.H. assaulted her
partner during a custody exchange of E.H. After the 2017
restraining order was issued, D.L. asserted that J.H. violated the
order “many times” and provided examples, including J.H.
coming to her house and E.H.’s school. D.L. also identified other
incidents that occurred after the restraining order was renewed,
including J.H. showing up at E.H.’s school and driving past D.L.’s
home “daily” from 2021 through 2023.
On August 15, 2025, J.H. filed a response, in which he
requested the trial court terminate the restraining order. J.H.
explained that since 2020, he had “done nothing that would
constitute violations” of the restraining order. He asserted that
circumstances have changed since the restraining order was first
issued in 2017, and that he has not seen D.L. since 2017. He had
since married another woman, had another child, and obtained a
new job. He initially had a custody arrangement with D.L., but
they had a disagreement. He had not seen E.H. since 2022. J.H.
also explained a renewal of the restraining order would impact
his job. He attached his mother’s and wife’s declarations. But
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J.H. did not request an evidentiary hearing nor serve a witness
list on D.L. on that date.
Three days before the scheduled October 3 hearing on the
renewal request, J.H. filed a notice of intent to seek a Family
Code1 section 217 evidentiary hearing and a witness list. The
witness list included D.L., J.H., J.H.’s wife, and J.H.’s mother.
As to each witness, the notice stated that the “evidence to be
introduced at the evidentiary hearing will be sought from oral
testimony” of each witness regarding the “domestic violence
restraining order, and all related issues.”
D.L. filed an objection, contending that the request was
untimely, there was “no basis” for an evidentiary hearing, and
the witness list did not provide what testimony the witnesses
would offer.
At the October 3 hearing, the trial court denied J.H.’s
request for an evidentiary hearing. The court found D.L.’s
objection to the evidentiary hearing “well taken” because the
request for hearing was “late” and the “designation . . .
inadequate.” On that basis, the court found “good cause” to deny
the request. Following argument by the parties, the court
granted a five-year renewal of the restraining order.
DISCUSSION
1. Evidentiary hearing
J.H. contends the trial court erred in denying him an
evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
Section 217, subdivision (a) provides that the court shall
receive live testimony relevant to and within the scope of the
hearing, subject to subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) provides that
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Family
Code.
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“[i]n appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause
to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for
the finding on the record or in writing.” “A party seeking to
present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties
shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a
brief description of the anticipated testimony.” (§ 217, subd. (c).)
The court “must consider the following factors in making a
finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony under
Family Code section 217: [¶] (1) Whether a substantive matter is
at issue—such as . . . requests for restraining orders . . . ; [¶]
(2) Whether material facts are in controversy; [¶] (3) Whether live
testimony is necessary for the court to assess the credibility of the
parties or other witnesses; [¶] (4) The right of the parties to
question anyone submitting reports or other information to the
court; [¶] (5) Whether a party offering testimony from a
non-party has complied with Family Code section 217(c); and [¶]
(6) Any other factor that is just and equitable.” (Cal. Rules of
Court,2 rule 5.113(b).) “If the court makes a finding of good cause
to exclude live testimony, it must state its reasons on the record
or in writing. The court is required to state only those factors on
which the finding of good cause is based.” (Rule 5.113(c).)
We review the trial court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing
for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Hearn (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 380, 390.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the
court exceeds the bounds of reason. (Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 491, 509.)
Here, the trial court found “good cause” to deny the request
for an evidentiary hearing because it found J.H.’s request
2 Further unspecified rule references are to the California
Rules of Court.
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untimely and the witness designation “inadequate.” These are
sufficient grounds for good cause and the court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to receive live testimony.
“Witness lists required by Family Code section 217(c) must
be served along with the request for order or responsive papers in
the manner required for the service of those documents.” (Rule
5.113(e).) Here, J.H. responded to the DVRO renewal request on
August 15 but did not file his notice of intent to seek an
evidentiary hearing until September 30, a mere three days before
the scheduled hearing. And in contravention of rule 5.113(e),
J.H. did not serve his witness list when he filed his responsive
pleadings in August 2025.
Nothing in section 217 or rule 5.113 required the trial court
to grant a continuance for J.H. to request an evidentiary hearing.
(See § 217, subd. (c) and rule 5.113(e), (f); see also In re Marriage
of George & Deamon (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 476, 481–482 [if the
person seeking live testimony does not follow proper procedure,
the court is not required to receive any such testimony].)
Moreover, denial of a continuance was reasonable because J.H.
had ample time to request live testimony. J.H. provided no
justification for his delay.
Additionally, J.H.’s witness list did not comport with
section 217. J.H.’s witness list failed to establish that his
proffered witnesses would provide “competent testimony that is
relevant and within the scope of the hearing.” (§ 217, subd. (a).)
He did not provide an adequate “brief description of the
anticipated testimony” of the nonparty witnesses (his wife and
mother). (Id., subd. (c).) Instead, the witness list contained only
bare assertions that the witnesses would testify regarding the
“domestic violence restraining order, and all related issues.”
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Good cause to refuse to receive live testimony may be based on
noncompliance with section 217, subdivision (c) or “[a]ny other
factor that is just and equitable.” (Rule 5.113(b)(5) & (6).) The
court did not abuse its discretion by basing good cause to deny an
evidentiary hearing on these factors.
J.H. contends he was deprived of due process because he
was denied his “ ‘right to be heard in a meaningful manner.’ ” (In
re Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935.) We
are not persuaded. J.H. was given the opportunity to identify
witnesses and present live testimony. Because he did not follow
the proper procedures under section 217 and rule 5.113, the trial
court properly found good cause to refuse live testimony.
Furthermore, his written opposition, declarations including those
of his mother and wife, and argument at the hearing were
considered by the trial court. There was no due process violation.
2. Renewal of the restraining order
J.H. contends the trial court applied the incorrect legal
standard when it renewed the restraining order. We conclude
otherwise.
A domestic violence restraining order “may be renewed,
upon the request of a party, either for five or more years, or
permanently, at the discretion of the court, without a showing of
further abuse since the issuance of the original order.” (§ 6345,
subd. (a).) “A trial court should renew the protective order, if,
and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
protected party entertains a ‘reasonable apprehension’ of future
abuse. . . . [T]his does not mean the court must find it is more
likely than not future abuse will occur if the protective order is
not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more
probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find
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the protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable.”
(Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290 (Ritchie).)
In determining whether the protected party has a “reasonable
apprehension” of future abuse, the court may consider relevant
factors such as changes in circumstances, the burdens the
protective order imposes on the restrained party, and the
physical security of the protected party. (Id. at pp. 1291–1292.)
We review the trial court’s order to renew a domestic
violence restraining order for abuse of discretion. (Eneaji v.
Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.) We presume the trial
court’s orders are correct. The burden is on the appellant to
affirmatively show, based on an adequate record, that the trial
court erred. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
“ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the
order] on matters as to which the record is silent.’ ” (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
Here, D.L. stated that she was afraid for her and her
family’s safety and that she believed J.H. would harm her if a
restraining order was not renewed. She recounted the incidents
of physical violence that led to the restraining order and provided
instances where J.H. allegedly violated the order by showing up
at her house and E.H.’s school. She also asserted that J.H. and
his wife would drive past her house “daily” from 2021 to 2023.
From this evidence, the trial court could reasonably find that
D.L. had “reasonable apprehension” of future abuse. (Ritchie,
supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.)
J.H. presented his own evidence refuting D.L.’s allegations.
He also presented evidence of changed circumstances and the
burdens a restraining order would have on his life. We presume
the trial court considered all the evidence, but ultimately found
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in favor of D.L. We defer to the court’s credibility determinations
and make all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s
findings. (Cueto v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 560.)
J.H. does not demonstrate the trial court applied the
incorrect legal standard or otherwise show prejudicial error.
Absent any demonstration to the contrary, we presume the court
applied the correct legal standard.
DISPOSITION
The order renewing the restraining order is affirmed.
Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
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Donna D. Geck, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Law Office of Vanessa Kirker Wright, Vanessa Kirker
Wright; Sorenson Law and Lacey Sorenson for Defendant and
Appellant.
Morales Law and Marcus Morales for Plaintiff and
Respondent.