Filed 8/19/26 Cupid v. Lyons-White CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
SABRINA CUPID, B345226, B349907
Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25LBRO00065)
v.
TRACEY MICHELLE LYONS-
WHITE,
Respondent.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Alfred A. Coletta, Judge. Reversed.
Sabrina Cupid, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Tracey Michelle Lyons-White, in pro. per., for Respondent.
__________________________
Sabrina Cupid appeals from the trial court’s order
dismissing without prejudice her petition for a civil harassment
restraining order and the subsequent order awarding attorney
fees to Tracey Michelle Lyons-White.1 Cupid contends the court
erred by continuing the hearing on her petition for lack of
personal service despite Lyons-White’s general appearance, then
dismissing the case when Cupid failed to appear at the continued
hearing. Because Lyons-White did not request dismissal of the
case when Cupid did not appear, the court abused its discretion
under Code of Civil Procedure section 5812, subdivision (b)(5), by
dismissing the petition. We reverse the dismissal order and the
subsequent award of attorney fees.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Cupid’s Request for a Restraining Order and the Initial
Hearing
In January 2025 Cupid filed a petition for a civil
harassment restraining order against Lyons-White.3
1 Although Cupid addressed the attorney fee appeal in her
original case (case No. B345226), she also separately appealed
the order (case No. B349907).
2 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3 On our own motion, we augment the record to include
Cupid’s petition and amended petition for a restraining order, the
orders denying a temporary restraining order, and related filings.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).) We grant Cupid’s
motions to augment the record with Lyons-White’s filings. We
deny as unnecessary her motion to augment the record with
reporter’s transcripts that are already part of the record.
2
In a 17-page attachment to the petition, Cupid stated she
was seeking protection “against the ongoing and harmful
dissemination of personal information, including threats of harm,
defamatory statements, harassment, cyberbullying, [and] online
stalking via social media and other public platforms” by Lyons-
White. Cupid alleged Lyons-White had posted personal
information from a prior court proceeding between the parties—
including Cupid’s driver’s license number and home address—to
Lyons-White’s 47,000 social media followers. Cupid further
alleged Lyons-White had threatened violence by saying she “still
owes [Cupid] an ass whoopin’ ” and referring to keeping a loaded
pistol in her home.
The next day, Cupid filed an amended petition that
repeated the same substantive allegations and added about
70 pages of exhibits, including court records from the prior
litigation and copies of the social media posts. The court denied
Cupid’s request for a temporary restraining order and set the
hearing on the petition for February 3, 2025.
Between January 21 and January 31, Lyons-White,
representing herself, filed several documents. These included
requests to continue hearings, notices of related cases, and a
substantive opposition to Cupid’s petition. In her opposition,
Lyons-White asserted that Cupid’s petition arose from litigation
in which Lyons-White had obtained a $100,000 judgment against
Cupid and attached a final judgment from a Florida defamation
action. She denied Cupid’s allegations of harassment, addressing
Cupid’s claims that she had improperly disseminated Cupid’s
personal information, harassed her through social media and blog
posts, and stalked her. In a declaration, Lyons-White made legal
arguments, including that Cupid’s allegations lacked evidentiary
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support and that the private documents Cupid claimed Lyons-
White had disseminated were already publicly available.
On February 3, counsel substituted in to represent Lyons-
White.
On February 5, the trial court commenced a hearing on the
petition. During the hearing, Lyons-White’s counsel indicated
that Lyons-White wished to move for attorney fees. The court
noted there was no proof of service for Lyons-White and asked if
she was waiving the right to be properly served. Lyons-White
responded she was not waiving service and was uncertain
whether she had been correctly served. The court concluded the
record did not establish proper service because it contained no
proof of personal service. Although the court acknowledged
Lyons-White had filed a substantive response before the hearing,
it nevertheless found service was defective and, because Lyons-
White would not waive service, continued the hearing to
February 26 to allow Cupid another opportunity to serve Lyons-
White.
B. The Subsequent Hearing, Dismissal, and Lyons-White’s
Motion for Attorney Fees
Cupid did not appear for the continued hearing on
February 26. Lyons-White’s counsel was present. The court
stated, “Ms. Cupid not only has failed to appear, but she has not
electronically filed anything suggesting she’s seeking a
continuance for any reason. Her last appearance was
February 5. The court granted her a continuance due to the fact
she had no proof of service on the respondent. She’s failed to
appear, call or write, so at this time, the case is dismissed
without prejudice.” The court set a March 27 hearing on Lyons-
White’s anticipated motion for attorney fees.
4
Lyons-White moved for $4,250 in attorney fees. Cupid
opposed the motion, arguing in part that “the dismissal was
rendered … on an improper service basis.”
Cupid again failed to appear at the hearing on Lyons-
White’s motion for attorney fees. The court ordered Cupid to pay
$4,250 in attorney fees.
Cupid timely appealed from both the order dismissing her
petition and the order awarding attorney fees.
Two months later, Cupid filed a new petition for a civil
harassment restraining order against Lyons-White in Los
Angeles Superior Court case No. 25LBRO00982.4 The court
granted Cupid a one-year civil harassment restraining order.
DISCUSSION
A. The Appeal from the Dismissal Is Not Moot
“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to
grant [her] any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 276 (D.P.).) “An appeal is not moot, however, where ‘a
material question remains for the court’s consideration,’ so long
as the appellate decision can grant a party to the appeal effectual
4 We grant Cupid’s request for judicial notice of the
subsequent restraining order. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d),
459.) We deny Cupid’s request for judicial notice of superior
court documents relating to payment for court transcripts in this
case because the documents are not relevant to any issue before
us. (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1530, fn. 7
[“Judicial notice may be granted if the documents for which
notice is sought are at least minimally relevant to the instant
appeal.”].)
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relief.” (Panoche Energy Center, LLC v. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 68, 96.)
Although Cupid obtained a one-year civil harassment
restraining order against Lyons-White in a subsequent
proceeding, this appeal is not moot. Even if that order eliminates
any live controversy over the dismissal of Cupid’s original
petition, Cupid also challenges the attorney fee award. A
decision in her favor on the original appeal could provide effective
relief by requiring reversal of the attorney fee award. (See D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276; Center for Biological Diversity v.
County of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 866, 880-881
[“if the appeal of the order on fees is not subject to dismissal,
neither is the appeal of the judgment on which the fees award
rests”]; Carson Citizens for Reform v. Kawagoe (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 [appeal not moot because “award of
attorney fees depends on the propriety of the trial court’s ruling
on the merits”].)
B. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Dismissing Cupid’s
Petition
Cupid contends the court erred by continuing the
February 5 hearing based on purported service defects and later
dismissing her case. According to Cupid, Lyons-White’s earlier
general appearance gave the court personal jurisdiction over
Lyons-White and made her a participating respondent. Cupid
therefore argues the court improperly treated the case as though
jurisdiction was lacking and then faulted her for failing to
prosecute the action. Lyons-White responds that the court did
not dismiss the case because Cupid failed to serve her, but rather
because Cupid failed to appear at the continued hearing on her
petition.
6
We agree with Lyons-White that the trial court dismissed
Cupid’s petition due to her failure to appear at the continued
hearing on February 26, 2025. We review the trial court’s
decision to dismiss the matter on that basis for abuse of
discretion. (Park v. Guisti (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 197, 202
(Park).) Under that standard, “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact
are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v.
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712, fns. omitted.)
Section 581 “provides scenarios under which the trial court
may, in its discretion, involuntarily dismiss a lawsuit.” (Park,
supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.) As relevant here, section 581,
subdivision (b)(5), provides that an “action”5 may be dismissed
“by the court, without prejudice, when either party fails to appear
on the trial and the other party appears and asks for dismissal.”
(See Park, at p. 204 [“Code of Civil Procedure section 581,
subdivision (b)(5), unquestionably gives the trial court the
authority to dismiss a civil case if one party fails to appear and
the other party requests dismissal.”].)
At the February 28 hearing at which Cupid’s request for a
restraining order was set to be heard and Cupid did not appear,
Lyons-White appeared but did not request dismissal. Instead,
the court sua sponte dismissed the case at the outset of the
hearing before Lyons-White’s counsel made any argument. The
court abused its discretion by dismissing the case when Lyons-
White did not make that request. (See Park, supra,
5 “ ‘Action’ means any civil action or special proceeding”
(§ 581, subd. (a)(1)), and a petition for a civil harassment
restraining order is a “special proceeding” (§§ 21 through 23).
7
116 Cal.App.5th at p. 202 [trial court abused its discretion by
dismissing case for plaintiff’s failure to appear, in part because
the record did not reflect opposing party requested dismissal as
required by § 581, subd. (b)(5)].)
In addition, Cupid is correct that the court mistakenly
believed she still needed to personally serve Lyons-White with
the petition.6 Although Cupid had not personally served Lyons-
White as required by section 527.6, subdivision (m)(1), and
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1160(c)(1), Lyons-White had
already made a general appearance in the case. “A general
appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of
summons on such party.” (§ 410.50, subd. (a).) “ ‘By generally
appearing, a defendant relinquishes all objections based on lack
of personal jurisdiction or defective process or service of
process.’ ” (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198,
210; accord, In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1,
8.) A “ ‘general appearance need not be “ ‘a formal, technical step
or act ...’ ” [citation]; rather the term may apply to various acts
which, under all of the circumstances, are deemed to confer
jurisdiction of the person.’ ” (Sunrise Financial, LLC v. Superior
Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 114, 125-126.) “A general
appearance occurs when the defendant takes part in the action or
in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to
proceed…. [A] party who seeks relief on any basis other than a
motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction will be deemed to
have made a general appearance and waived all objections to
6 The court reiterated that Cupid had failed to serve Lyons-
White when it dismissed her case.
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defects in service, process, or personal jurisdiction.” (Dial 800 v.
Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 52.)
By the time of the initial hearing date, Lyons-White had
made a general appearance, including by filing a response
addressing the merits of Cupid’s harassment allegations and a
declaration with legal arguments challenging Cupid’s claims.
(See City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670,
679-680.) She also made a general appearance near the outset of
the initial hearing by requesting attorney fees. (See Dial 800 v.
Fesbinder, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 54.)
Lyons-White argues she appeared only to preserve her due
process rights and respond to the petition, without waiving her
right to personal service. However, her response did not raise a
jurisdictional or service objection, but rather sought to litigate on
the merits. By seeking relief from the court on grounds other
than personal jurisdiction or service, Lyons-White made a
general appearance, obviating the requirement that Cupid
personally serve her.
Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its
discretion by sua sponte dismissing Cupid’s petition.
C. The Attorney Fee Award Must Be Reversed
Under section 527.6, subdivision (s), “[t]he prevailing party
in an action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded
court costs and attorney’s fees, if any.” The reversal of the court’s
order dismissing Cupid’s petition requires reversal of the award
of attorney fees to Lyons-White as the prevailing party in the
case. (See Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020)
54 Cal.App.5th 482, 513 [“Because we are reversing the judgment
... we must necessarily reverse the trial court’s attorney fee and
costs award.”]; Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank (2013)
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213 Cal.App.4th 545, 551 [“Since we reverse the judgment, we
also reverse the award of attorney fees because [the defendant] is
no longer necessarily the prevailing party in this action.”].)
DISPOSITION
The February 26, 2025 order dismissing Cupid’s petition
and the March 27, 2025 order awarding Lyons-White attorney
fees are reversed. Cupid is entitled to recover her costs on
appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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