Filed 10/20/26 Creditors Adjustment Bureau v. Halajian CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC.,
F090331
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 22CECG00386)
v.
BARRY HALAJIAN,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kristi Culver
Kapetan, Judge.
Barry Halajian, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Kenneth J. Freed, Kenneth J. Freed, Tiffanie Brown and George V.
Aposhian, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant and appellant Barry Halajian (appellant), proceeding in pro. per.,
appeals the trial court’s entry of a default judgment against him in favor of respondent
Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. Appellant broadly contends the default should have
been set aside for excusable neglect, as well as that the default judgment should have
been set aside for extrinsic mistake under the court’s equity powers. Appellant also
asserts arguments in his opening brief concerning the merits of his defenses, his pro. per.
status, and respondent’s standing to bring suit. Respondent maintains the entry of default
and default judgment were properly issued, contends appellant fails to raise a claim of
error, argues any appeal of the default judgment is a futile and idle act, and contests that
pro. per. litigants are entitled to special treatment.
We affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 4, 2022, plaintiff and respondent Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc.
(as assignee for the State Compensation Insurance Fund) (respondent) filed a complaint
in Fresno County Superior Court alleging appellant Barry Halajian (d.b.a. Industrial
Electrical) owed $86,858.26 pursuant to four workers’ compensation insurance policies.
The complaint asserted the insurer provided appellant an estimated cost at the start of
each policy, based on appellant’s assertions at the time. However, when the insurer later
attempted to audit appellant’s payroll records under the terms of the policies, he refused
to comply, resulting in the calculation of an estimated amount that increased the amount
appellant owed. Appellant refused to pay.
Respondent served appellant by delivering a copy of the complaint and summons
to a mailbox center he used in all correspondence for his insurance policies, then by
mailing a second copy to his address; it is the same address appellant used for his various
court filings. Appellant did not respond, and the court entered default against him on
May 25, 2022. Respondent filed for default judgment on July 12, 2022.
2.
On August 15, 2022, appellant moved to set aside the default under Code of Civil
Procedure, section 473, subdivision (b).1 Therein, he did not contest service but instead
asserted he failed to timely respond because of extensive out-of-town travel and a heavy
work schedule. On November 10, 2022, the court denied the motion, noting appellant did
not dispute he was served, admitted knowledge of the suit, and did not identify defects in
service. The court rejected appellant’s “press of business” excuse because it is generally
not accepted as a ground for relief and noted appellant did “not indicate that he made any
effort to contact an attorney or seek an extension of time from [respondent].” The court
also noted no grounds to find mistake (legal or factual), inadvertence, or surprise, and
instructed that his pro. per. status was not relevant. However, the court stated it would
“strongly prefer to grant the motion and allow defendant to defend himself on the
merits,” and so it denied the motion to vacate without prejudice to allow appellant to file
another motion and provide “further explanation or facts showing excusable neglect.”
On January 5, 2023, appellant moved to “vacate default judgment … for excusable
neglect pursuant to … [s]ection 473, [subdivision] (b).” Therein, appellant asserted he
had an out-of-town construction project, 90 minutes from Fresno, that “required [his]
personal attention between January of 2022 through early April of 2022.” Therefore,
appellant contended he “was unable to prepare an answer to the complaint within the time
required by the Code of Civil Procedure in California because of extensive out of town
travel and a heavy workload.” He stated in a declaration that he “work[s] out of town
most of the time (three to seven days a week) …, many (12-15) hours in a day,” and
declared that “[s]ometimes I do not check my mail for a few days because of out of town
business.” Appellant dedicated the majority of his filing to the merits of his defenses.
On May 25, 2023, the court construed appellant’s filing as a second motion to set
aside the default and denied relief with prejudice for a lack of excusable neglect. The
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3.
court restated its findings from the November 22 order, including that a “press of
business” excuse and a decision to proceed without an attorney would not qualify as
excusable neglect. The court then stated:
“Unfortunately, [appellant] … has not provided further explanation
or facts sufficient to demonstrate that his neglect was excusable.
Instead, the focus of [his] motion is on the underlying merits of his
defense … [,] [which are] not relevant to the question of whether or
not [his] neglect to timely respond to the summons and complaint
was excusable.”
The court noted appellant only devoted a small portion of his motion to addressing
the default, doubling down on his “press of business” excuse. Despite the “remedial” and
“liberal” policies behind section 473, the court rejected appellant’s request to vacate the
default. Appellant requested reconsideration, but this too was denied.
The court entered a default judgment against appellant on January 13, 2025. On
March 7, 2025, appellant moved to vacate the default judgment, citing in the header the
court’s “authorit[y] under equitable grounds” and citing section 473, subdivision (b) “for
extrinsic mistake and excusable neglect and fraud.” Therein, he asserted he did not
receive notice of the request for entry of the default judgment; the default judgment and
entry of default should be vacated, and the court should allow him to file his answer; his
defenses in the case are otherwise meritorious; he proceeds without counsel and should
be granted leniency; and respondent lacks standing to sue.
The court denied appellant’s motion to vacate on May 6, 2025: (1) noting
appellant failed to attach a copy of his proposed answer to the motion; (2) stating notice
of the default judgment on appellant was not required because he was in default and so no
longer an active party; (3) finding he presented no evidence to support his claims that he
paid his premiums; and (4) finding appellant did not make a substantially strong showing
of excusable neglect because he provided no additional information why he failed to
answer the complaint. Appellant moved for reconsideration on May 14, 2025, which was
denied on July 15, 2025.
4.
APPELLATE PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 14, 2025, appellant filed a notice of appeal, checking the box that he
was appealing from a default judgment. Thereafter, the court notified appellant that he
failed to file his civil information statement (CCIS) and failed to pay the filing fee.
Appellant’s fees were waived upon his request, but he never filed his CCIS. Later,
appellant failed to timely file his opening brief and reply brief, only doing so after a
warning and with the court’s leave.2
Respondent twice moved to dismiss, arguing appellant failed to timely
appeal; failed to follow multiple appellate rules; failed to raise a claim of reversible error
or otherwise articulate any pertinent legal argument in his brief; has appealed solely to
delay enforcement of the judgment; and has sought a remedy that would be an “idle act.”
Appellant did not oppose the first motion but did so on the second. The court rejected
both of respondent’s motions, finding appellant’s notice of appeal sufficiently cited the
default judgment, noting the policy in favor of decisions on the merits and noting the
delay in enforcement was partly borne by respondent. The court informed respondent
that it could raise its “futile act” argument in its merits brief.
2 On October 9, 2026, appellant filed a document entitled “Appellant[’]s Request
for Mandatory Judicial Notice.” This document presents eight arguments that are either
new or elaborate on matters appellant previously raised. Thus, the document is akin to a
supplemental brief, which is not permitted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(4).)
Further, the materials submitted are not relevant to any issue on appeal. (Hiser v. Bell
Helicopter Textron Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 640, 655 [appellate courts generally
“decline to decide questions not necessary to the decision”]; People ex rel. Lockyer v.
Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [any matter to be judicially
noticed must be relevant to a material issue].) Appellant’s request is denied.
5.
DISCUSSION
I. Relief from the Entry of Default and Default Judgment
Respondent has asserted that the appeal should be dismissed or narrowed because
it is, at times, difficult to determine which orders appellant appeals from and what
arguments he raises in support of his appeal. (See Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012)
211 Cal. App.4th 154, 173, [policy of liberal construction of the notice of appeal “does
not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment or order not
mentioned at all”].) Further, respondent argues that even if we assume appellant appeals
entry of the default judgment, resolution in his favor would be “an idle act” because the
entry of default would still stand. (See Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical, Inc.
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 267, 273; Howard Greer Custom Originals v. Capritti (1950)
35 Cal.2d 886, 889 [“ ‘If the judgment were vacated it would be the duty of the court
immediately to render another judgment of like effect, and the defendants, still being in
default, could not be heard in opposition thereto ….’ ”].)
The court agrees appellant’s arguments in briefing are at times difficult to parse.
However, in his notice of appeal and briefing, appellant has sufficiently cited the entry of
default and default judgment, as well as the trial court’s orders denying his motions for
relief thereon under section 473 for excusable neglect and under the court’s equity
powers for extrinsic mistake and fraud. Thus, we construe appellant’s appeal as reaching
these issues and reject the “idle act” arguments from respondent. (Airline Transport
Carriers, Inc. v. Batchelor (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 241, 244 [construing scope of appeal
of default judgment to include arguments concerning the entry of default, given that
“ ‘the terms of said motion and the contents of the documents attached thereto adequately
apprised [the] plaintiff that [the] defendants were seeking to obtain complete relief under
section 473 from the effect of their default’ ”]; see also California Rules of Court,
rule 8.100(a)(2) [“[N]otice of appeal must be liberally construed”].)
6.
A. Basic Principles
Subdivision (b) of section 473 provides both mandatory and discretionary relief
from judgments and dismissals when certain requirements are met. This appeal involves
the discretionary relief provision, which states that a “[t]he court may, upon any terms as
may be just, relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a judgment, dismissal,
order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) Because the issue turns
on the trial court’s discretion, we review the trial court’s orders denying relief under an
abuse of discretion standard. (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 249, 257 (Zamora).) The party moving for relief carries the burden to show a
basis for relief. (Id. at p. 258.) “ ‘[I]t is generally accepted that the appropriate test of
abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of
the circumstances before it being considered.’ ” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 610 (State Farm).) However, the trial court’s
discretion is “not unlimited,” is to be “ ‘ “ ‘exercised in conformity with the spirit of the
law,’ ” ’ ” and “must serve, rather than impede, the ends of substantial justice.” (Elston v.
City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233 (Elston).)
Regarding requests for relief, the “spirit of the law” refers to the underlying public
policies served by section 473, which requires balancing of competing policies: the
preference for deciding disputes on their merits rather than procedural irregularities; the
deference given a trial court’s exercise of discretionary authority; the judicial efficiency
and certainty that results from the enforcement of procedural rules; and the elimination of
delays in civil proceedings. (Elston, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 233; see McClain v. Kissler
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 405.) Courts have long held that “any doubts in applying
section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.” (Elston,
supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 233 [noting that orders denying relief from default are subjected to
more careful scrutiny than orders granting such relief].) In such instances, only “ ‘very
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slight evidence’ ” is required to obtain relief. (Ibid.) However, this does not mean that
any circumstance can qualify to create doubt or satisfy the “ ‘very slight evidence’ ”
standard. (See ibid. [“Unless inexcusable neglect is clear, the policy favoring trial on the
merits prevails”]; Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206 [“ ‘It is the duty
of every party desiring to resist an action or to participate in a judicial proceeding to take
timely and adequate steps to retain counsel or to act in his own person to avoid an
undesirable judgment’ ”]; Pierson v. Fischer (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 208, 212 [statute
providing for relief from default does not require relief in all cases, but is addressed “to
the judicial discretion of the trial court”].)
Appellant also cited the trial court’s equitable power to vacate a default judgment
or order. “[E]ven where relief is no longer available under statutory provisions, a trial
court generally retains the inherent power to vacate a default judgment or order on
equitable grounds where a party establishes that the judgment or order … resulted from
extrinsic fraud or mistake.” (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
1215, 1228.) But inherent equitable power is available only if the moving party makes a
minimum showing of entitlement under a “stringent three-pronged test.” (Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981‒982 (Rappleyea).) This test is: “ ‘(1) a meritorious
defense; (2) a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense in the first place; and
(3) diligence in seeking to set aside the [order] once discovered.’ ” (Pittman v. Beck Park
Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1025 (Pittman).) As with a section 473
motion, a moving party bears the burden of proving he or she is entitled to equitable
relief. (Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 752.)
B. Analysis
Here, we collapse into a single analysis appellant’s arguments about the trial
court’s denial of his motion to lift the entry of default under section 473 and its denial of
his request to set aside the default judgment on equity grounds. This is because both
inquiries turn on appellant’s neglect in failing to answer the complaint in 2022.
8.
In determining whether appellant’s failure to answer was excusable, “ ‘the court
inquires whether “a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances”
might have made the same error.” ’ ” (Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 258.) “[T]he
moving party must present a reasonable excuse.” (Davis v. Thayer (1980)
113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905.) What qualifies as excusable neglect depends on the facts of
each case. (Pearson v. Continental Airlines (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 613, 617.) However,
courts have long held that the “press of business” does not constitute excusable neglect.
(See Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 319; Phillips
v. Cleaver (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 253, 255; Willett v. Schmeister Mfg. Co. (1926)
80 Cal.App. 337, 339‒340 [accepting “press of business” as excuse “would be to
discourage diligence … and establish a precedent that might lead to vexatious delays”].)
In Elston, supra, even though our Supreme Court set forth a “very slight evidence”
standard, it reminded that any assertion from the appellant that he “was busy with other
matters during the relevant period” would not have constituted excusable neglect.
(38 Cal.3d at p. 234 (citing 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Attack on Judgment in
Trial Court, § 139, p. 3714 [press of business standing alone insufficient to warrant relief
from default].)
Here, appellant only offered a “press of business” excuse to the trial court in his
quest to proceed on the merits. Appellant’s first motion for relief in August 2022,
brought under section 473, subdivision (b), asserted he failed to timely respond because
of extensive out-of-town travel and a heavy work schedule. The trial court informed
appellant this would not suffice as a ground for relief for excusable neglect, and
specifically found appellant did “not indicate that he made any effort to contact an
attorney or seek an extension of time from [respondent].” However, the trial court noted
it “would strongly prefer to grant the motion and allow [appellant] to defend himself on
the merits,” and so denied his motion without prejudice so appellant could provide
“further explanation or facts showing excusable neglect.” Unfortunately for appellant,
9.
his second motion only elaborated further on his out-of-town business activities as his
excuse for not answering the complaint. The trial court again rejected his excuse for lack
of excusable neglect and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. (Bellm v. Bellia (1984)
150 Cal.App.3d 1036, 1038 (Bellm) [no abuse of discretion in trial court’s finding of no
excusable neglect, where the defaulted party failed to answer the complaint because he
was “buried over [his] head” in sales orders for the holiday season]; see also Elston,
supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 234; Willett v. Schmeister Mfg., supra, 80 Cal.App.at pp. 339‒340.)
As to appellant’s request in March 2025 for equitable relief from the default
judgment, the trial court was similarly within its discretion to reject his assertions of
extrinsic mistake and fraud. As aptly summarized by the court in Manson, Iver & York v.
Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, “ ‘extrinsic fraud “arises when a party is denied a fair
adversary hearing because he has been “deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or
proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or
defense.’ ” (Id. at p. 47.) Extrinsic mistake arises with the “excusable neglect of the
defaulting party to appear and present his claim or defense.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Critically, relief
is unavailable “if the complaining party’s negligence permitted the fraud to be practiced
or the mistake to occur.” (Ibid.) Appellant’s request for equitable relief merely stated,
multiple times, that he previously “supplied the court with ample justification for my lack
of response.” The trial court noted this assertion in its rejection of equitable relief and
was within its discretion to do so. (Pittman, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1025 [reminding
the test for equitable relief includes “a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense in
the first place”].)
In pressing his arguments before this court, appellant cites three cases where the
lower court abused its discretion in denying relief from default: Olivera v. Grace (1942)
19 Cal.2d 570; Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th 975; and Gamet v. Blanchard (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1276 (Gamet). These cases are distinguishable for multiple reasons. The
party seeking relief in Olivera v. Grace “sustained a serious head injury which resulted in
10.
a complete loss of mentality … [and] rendered her wholly devoid of understanding and
incapable of transacting business of any nature,” a fact the opposing party knew of and
used to its advantage in moving for dismissal. (Olivera, at p. 572.) Rappleyea involved a
miscommunication from the court clerk, where the defaulting party timely responded to
the complaint but failed to pay the full fee for the filing. (Rappleyea, at pp. 978‒979.)
Gamet concerned a defaulting party living halfway across the country who was
“permanently disabled after a scuba accident shattered a disc in her neck”; whose
attorney withdrew during the period where she defaulted (but continued to be served with
notices despite new counsel appearing); and who was given “confusing, indeed
misleading” orders from the trial court. (Gamet, at pp. 1280, 1284.)
Conversely, appellant was properly served with process under section 415.20,
subdivision (b). (Sweeting v. Murat (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 507, 513 [“[S]ervice at a
private or commercial post office box is allowed”].) Appellant never contested service,
nor did he identify defects in service, and appears to have waited until August 2022 to
take any action in the case. Appellant has consistently maintained he failed to respond
simply because he was busy with business affairs 90 minutes from town. Under these
facts, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of his multiple motions for
relief under section 473, subdivision (b) or the court’s equitable powers (Compare Davis
v. Thayer, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 906 [a party who fails to read a complaint is
grossly negligent; a party who reads a complaint and disregards its allegations is careless
and indifferent: in either case the neglect is inexcusable]; Stiles v. Wallis (1983)
147 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1148–1149 [defendant failed to show excusable neglect where the
notice on the face of the summons “was calculated to inform anyone capable of reading
English (or Spanish, since the same instruction is set forth in that language) of the
necessity of filing an answer with the court”] with Ellard v. Conway (2001)
94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 [finding abuse of discretion for the trial court’s failure to relieve
11.
the defaulting party from default where the statutory procedure for service of process was
not followed].)
Appellant also cites Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 258 and Minick v. City of
Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15 for the proposition that his “failure to pick up the mail
for over a month” because of his heavy work schedule was an error or mistake that a
“ ‘reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances’ might have made”
(Minick, at p. 26). These cases are also distinguishable on the facts, as each concerned
mistakes made by counsel to the detriment of their clients; the statute draws a distinction
between counsel’s actions and those of their clients. (See section 473, subd. (b)
[providing mandatory relief from judgments and dismissals when based on counsel’s
actions]; Rodriguez v. Brill (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 715, 727 [“[Section] 473(b) means
relief is not available when the negligence or willful misconduct of the client contributes
to the dismissal.”]; see also Manson, Iver & York v. Black, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at
p. 47 [noting that equitable relief from judgment is typically denied “if the complaining
party’s negligence permitted the fraud to be practiced or the mistake to occur”].) Further,
Zamora involved a clerical mistake, and Minick involved counsel’s serious illness, and
each mistake was brought to the court within a week of the relevant order. (See Zamora,
at p. 258; Minick, at p. 26.) Conversely, appellant’s failure to answer was based on his
own negligence, for which and he only offered a “press of business” excuse, which the
trial court had discretion to reject.3 (Elston, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 234.)
3 Appellant’s assertions in his brief, that he failed to “pick up the mail for over a
month,” are in tension with other of his assertions in the record. He does not say which
“month” his mailbox went unchecked but has previously stated he was out of town “most
of the time (three to seven days a week)” and that “[s]ometimes I do not check my mail
for a few days because of out of town business.” He has also stated he was out of town
“almost every day” between January and April 2022. Appellant does not detail his
actions in May, June, or July, he waited until August to move for relief, and the trial court
noted in November 2022 that appellant did “not indicate that he made any effort to
contact an attorney or seek an extension of time from [respondent].” The inferences the
trial court appear to have drawn are that there may have been days when appellant could
12.
Because appellant has failed to demonstrate neglect that is excusable (Elston,
supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 234) or “a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense in the
first place” (Pittman, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1025), the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellant’s requests for section 473 and equitable relief. (Bellm v.
Bellia, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 1038 [“Denial of relief from the default was perhaps a
harsh measure, but Bellia’s showing of excuse was not strong enough to require relief as
a matter of law”].) Given this, appellant’s challenges to the court’s order entering default
and court’s entry of default judgment fail.
II. Remaining Arguments
Appellant, at times, references his decision to proceed without the assistance of an
attorney before the trial court and on appeal. To the extent he argues he should not be
held to the same standards as a litigant with attorney assistance, such an argument is
rejected. (County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1444.) [“[The] in
propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney”].)
Appellant’s arguments concerning the corporate structure of the insurer and respondent’s
ability to bring suit on the insurer’s behalf are entirely without merit and are summarily
rejected. (See Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817 [rejecting “rambling
and disjointed series of accusations …, none of which can be considered ‘meaningful
legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that
support the claim of error’ ”].)
In appellant’s reply brief, he generally appears to make arguments concerning the
right to due process. No such arguments were made in his opening brief, and so we
have seen to his mail and could have taken other actions—well before August 2022—to
defend himself. To the extent appellant requests this court draw different inferences, we
are without the authority to do so. (State Farm, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 610
[“[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing
court lacks power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court”].)
13.
decline to address them here. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218‒1219
[“ ‘[I]t is axiomatic that arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be
entertained because of the unfairness to the other party’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal not subject
to appellant’s fee waiver. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.26(e), 8.278(a)(1)&(2).)
SANDHU, J.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P. J.
DETJEN, J.
14.