Filed 9/30/26 Cortez v. Marmolejo CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL CORTEZ, D085986
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2119001)
v.
RUBY MARMOLEJO et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Stephanie J. Tañada, Judge. Affirmed.
Fullerton, Lemann, Schaefer & Dominick and David P. Colella for
Defendants and Appellants.
Law Office of Jeff Grotke and Jeff Grotke for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After a bench trial, Daniel Cortez prevailed against Ruby Marmolejo
(Ruby) and Christopher Marmolejo (Christopher) on his causes of action for
financial abuse of an elder (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30) and quiet title
(Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020 et seq.), and against Ruby alone on his cause of
action for battery. In addition to awarding damages in the amount of
$26,159.85, the trial court cancelled a 2019 grant deed, by which Christopher
and Ruby took title as joint tenants to Cortez’s residence that he formerly
owned in joint tenancy with Ruby.
Ruby and Christopher advance multiple challenges to the judgment,
including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no error, we
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The dispute in this lawsuit centers on ownership of a house in
San Bernardino that Cortez has lived in since 1996 (the House). Although
the record does not reflect Cortez’s exact birthdate, at the time of trial in July
2024, Cortez was 73 years old. Ruby is Cortez’s stepdaughter and the
biological daughter of Cortez’s late wife, Cecilia. It is undisputed that Cortez
and Ruby’s relationship was close, as Cortez started parenting Ruby when
she was an infant, and they refer to each other as father and daughter.
In 1996, Cortez and his wife purchased the House. Ruby was included
on the grant deed as an additional owner in joint tenancy because her
participation was needed to secure financing for the transaction. In 1997,
Ruby relinquished her ownership interest in the House, and a new grant
deed was recorded that vested ownership in Cortez and his wife alone.
Cortez’s wife died in 2006, and an affidavit of death was subsequently
recorded, which established Cortez as the sole owner of the House.
A. The 2012 Deed
In 2012, Cortez executed a grant deed adding Ruby to the title of the
House as a joint tenant (the 2012 deed). Cortez could not recall the details of
the 2012 transaction during his trial testimony, including that Ruby became
an owner of the House. However, Ruby testified that she was added to the
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title so that Cortez could qualify for a loan under the Home Energy
Renovation Opportunity (HERO) program to install new windows at the
House.
B. The 2019 Deed
On July 16, 2019, Cortez and Ruby signed a grant deed that
transferred ownership of the House to Ruby and her husband, Christopher,
as joint tenants (the 2019 deed). The notarized deed was recorded on August
15, 2019. As a result, Cortez was no longer on the title to the House.
At the time, Cortez owed $88,408.53 on a mortgage to Wells Fargo,
along with $16,162.17 for the loan obtained under the HERO program.
Although no documentation shows the amount of Cortez’s monthly payments
on those obligations, Cortez testified that his monthly payments were
approximately $800. Cortez testified that he was always able to make his
monthly payments by using a combination of his Social Security check of
approximately $700 and the income he received from reselling used items,
which the parties referred to as “junk sales.”
On the same date that the 2019 deed was recorded, Ruby and
Christopher completed a refinancing transaction for the House, which
resulted in a new mortgage in the amount of $182,392.36. Some of the
proceeds were used to pay off the existing Wells Fargo mortgage and the
HERO program loan. The remainder of the proceeds were applied in several
different ways. First, $8,157.71 of the proceeds were used to pay off Cortez’s
child support obligation that the County of Ventura had been garnishing
from Cortez’s Social Security check in a small amount each month.1 Second,
1 According to Cortez’s testimony, $62 was taken from his Social Security
check each month to satisfy his child support obligation.
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$12,012.37 of the proceeds were used to pay off an automobile loan that Ruby
owed to a financial institution. Third, Ruby and Christopher received a cash
payout in the amount of $50,318.57.
C. The Parties’ Differing Version of Events Surrounding the 2019 Deed,
Refinancing Transaction and Cash Payout
The parties gave conflicting testimony about the reason for the 2019
deed and the subsequent refinancing transaction, as well as about the
disposition of the $50,318.57 cash payout that Ruby and Christopher
obtained.
1. Ruby’s and Christopher’s Testimony
According to Ruby, Cortez was the victim of a theft in 2019 when a safe
was taken from the House with $15,000 inside of it. The thief was suspected
to be someone associated with a tenant who was renting a room from Cortez.
As Ruby explained, after the theft Cortez became fearful that “he was going
to lose” the House. Ruby talked it over with Christopher, and they offered
Cortez the solution of renovating the House so that they could obtain “better”
tenants, who would pay a higher amount in rent. Ruby testified that Cortez
was taken off the title to the House “[t]o relieve stress from him so he would
not have to worry about how he would have to make ends meet.”
Ruby and Christoper both testified that approximately $20,000 of the
cash payout from the refinancing transaction was used to renovate the
House, although they were not able to produce any receipts at trial.2 In
addition, Ruby testified that “out of the kindness of [their] hearts” she and
Christopher used $10,000 of funds from the refinance to open a joint bank
2 Cortez agreed that some work was done on the House, although he
performed some of it himself, such as painting and rewiring.
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account for Ruby and Cortez. According to the bank statements, the account
balance was effectively depleted in October 2020, with a substantial amount
transferred to an account numbered 0000****85 in Ruby’s name.
2. Cortez’s Testimony
Cortez testified that although he spoke to Ruby about the theft in June
2019, he was not concerned about losing the House, as he had always been
able to manage the mortgage payment using his Social Security check and
the income from his junk sales. However, because Cortez did not realize that
Ruby was added as an owner of the House through the 2012 deed, and he
intended to leave the House to Ruby and another daughter when he died, he
agreed to sign a grant deed in 2019 to add Ruby to the title, along with
himself, to avoid any eventual “red tape” with the inheritance. He trusted
Ruby to handle the transaction for him, and he did not review the 2019 deed
before signing it. Therefore, he did not understand that he was relinquishing
ownership in the House in favor of Ruby and Christopher.3
Cortez also did not agree to the refinance arranged by Ruby and
Christopher, and he did not agree to paying off any debts, although Ruby did
tell him that she planned to take out “a small loan” that she would be “using
around the house.” Further, Cortez testified that he withdrew only $400
from the bank account that Ruby set up and funded with $10,000.
3 The notary present during the signing of the grant deed had no
memory of the transaction, although she agreed that she would not have
notarized any document if she believed that the participants did not
understand what they were signing.
5
After the refinance, the monthly mortgage payment for the House was
$1,130. Cortez was responsible for paying that amount to Ruby in “rent,”
which he gathered from the tenants that Ruby had installed, and from his
own funds.
D. Ruby and Christopher Decide to Sell the House
On December 7, 2020, Ruby notified Cortez by text message that she no
longer wanted to be responsible for the mortgage payment and planned to sell
the House if Cortez did not arrange to take over the loan. Ruby’s text
message to Cortez stated, “Chris and I are in the market to buy another
property. I need to free up my credit. You have until April to either get pre-
approved to take over the loan or we [will] sell.”
Ruby testified that she no longer wanted to be involved with the House
because she was “starting to have problems with the tenants approaching
[her], telling [her] that they’re feeling uncomfortable there. There was
strange activity there. [Cortez] was becoming very like harassing them.”
Christopher testified that he wanted to sell the House because Cortez was
still conducting junk sales at the House and allowing “transients” onto the
property.
Cortez made inquiries about assuming the loan, but he was told he
would not qualify because of his limited income. Although Ruby and
Christopher looked for a place for Cortez to move into, Cortez ultimately
decided that he did not want to leave the House. For one thing, Cortez told
Ruby that he would not be able to engage in his income producing activity of
conducting junk sales if he moved somewhere else.
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E. The Litigation and Bench Trial
On August 6, 2021, Cortez initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint
against Ruby and Christopher.4 Cortez asserted causes of action against
both Ruby and Christopher for (1) financial abuse of an elder (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15610.30); (2) conversion; (3) battery; and (4) quiet title (Code Civ.
Proc., § 760.020 et seq.).
On May 31, 2022, Ruby and Christopher filed an unlawful detainer
complaint against Cortez, which alleged that Cortez refused to vacate the
House after receiving a 60-day notice to quit. Ruby and Christopher sought
possession of the premises and an award of damages in the amount of $40.50
per day from April 13, 2022. The unlawful detainer action was eventually
consolidated with Cortez’s lawsuit.
The trial court held a bench trial over three days in July 2024 in the
consolidated actions. After receiving written closing arguments from the
parties,5 the trial court issued a tentative ruling and proposed statement of
decision, to which the parties filed objections. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1590.)
On October 3, 2024, the trial court issued its “final ruling after court
trial, statement of decision, and judgment” (Statement of Decision).
(Capitalization omitted). The trial court ruled in favor of Cortez and against
4 When designating the appellate record, Ruby and Christopher did not
include Cortez’s August 6, 2021 complaint. On our own motion, we augment
the appellate record to include that document. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155(a)(1) [“At any time, on motion of a party or its own motion, the
reviewing court may order the record augmented to include: (A) Any
document filed or lodged in the case in superior court”].)
5 The written closing arguments are not included in the appellate record.
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both Ruby and Christopher on Cortez’s causes of action for financial abuse of
an elder and quiet title. Those rulings were premised on the trial court’s
conclusion the 2019 deed was obtained (1) for a wrongful use and (2) by
undue influence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(1), (3).)6 The trial
court also ruled that Ruby was liable for battery against Cortez based on
evidence that Ruby “repeatedly used her index finger to ‘poke’ [Cortez] in the
head or the chest.” However, the trial court concluded that Cortez’s
conversion cause of action was without merit, as “ ‘conversion is a tort that
may be committed only with relation to personal property and not real
property.’ ” Having concluded that the 2019 deed was invalid due to financial
elder abuse, the trial court also ruled against Ruby and Christopher in their
unlawful detainer action.
The trial court provided Cortez with several remedies. First, the trial
court awarded economic damages in the amount of $25,159.85, representing
half of the cash payout from the refinance transaction. As the trial court
explained, “[b]ased on the 2012 deed, [Cortez] would have been entitled to
this portion of the refund had the 2019 deed not existed.” Second, the trial
court ordered Ruby to pay noneconomic damages of $1,000 for her battery of
6 In its Statement of Decision, the trial court stated that Cortez
“claim[ed] financial elder abuse as to both the 2019 deed and the 2012 deed,”
but it concluded the claim failed as to the 2012 deed, because Cortez agreed
to add Ruby to the title so he could qualify for the HERO program loan and
benefit from the installation of new windows. We note that Cortez did not
allege in his complaint that the 2012 deed was procured through financial
elder abuse. Indeed, because Cortez was 73 years old during the 2024 trial,
he would not have been at least 65 years old at the time of the 2012 deed as
required for a claim of financial elder abuse as to that document. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 15610.27 [“ ‘Elder’ means any person residing in this state,
65 years of age or older.”].)
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Cortez. Third, the trial court stated that it was awarding “quiet title to [the
House] to [Cortez].” Fourth, as the trial court explained, although Cortez’s
complaint did not seek an order cancelling the 2019 deed (as distinct from an
order quieting title), it would nevertheless order “per Code of Civil Procedure
section 128 in conjunction with Civil Code section 3412,” that the 2019 deed
be cancelled. Finally, the trial court awarded attorney fees and costs to
Cortez.
Ruby and Christopher appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
A. Ruby and Christopher’s Challenge to the Adequacy of the Statement of
Decision
Ruby and Christopher first argue that we should reverse the judgment
because the trial court’s “findings on financial elder abuse, battery, and quiet
title lacked adequate, reasoned analysis and omitted essential findings
required for appellate review.” According to Ruby and Christopher, their
“Objections to the Tentative were timely filed and specifically identified the
analytical deficiencies, which the [Statement of Decision] failed to adequately
address.” Therefore, according to Ruby and Christopher, “[r]eversal is
appropriate.”
“ ‘The court’s statement of decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the
court’s determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case.’
[Citations.] ‘When this rule is applied, the term “ultimate fact” generally
refers to a core fact, such as an essential element of a claim.’ [Citation.]
‘Ultimate facts are distinguished from evidentiary facts and from legal
conclusions.’ [Citation.] Thus, a court is not expected to make findings with
regard to ‘detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to
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individual items of evidence.’ ” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
970, 983 (Thompson).)
Here, although Ruby and Christopher broadly claim that the Statement
of Decision “lacked adequate, reasoned analysis and omitted essential
findings,” they do not identify any specific manner in which the trial court
failed to “ ‘fairly disclose[ ] the court’s determination as to the ultimate facts
and material issues in the case.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at
p. 983.) Instead, other than a citation to case law, the entire substance of
their argument consists of the statements we have quoted above. When
Cortez, in his respondent’s brief, pointed out the fatal vagueness of Ruby and
Christopher’s argument, Ruby and Christopher’s only substantive response
was a single sentence in their reply brief that referred to a range of seven
pages in their objections to the trial court’s proposed statement of decision.
The reply brief stated that the appellate challenge to the adequacy of the
Statement of Decision is sufficient because Ruby and Christopher’s trial court
objections to the proposed statement of decision “identified specific defects,
including ambiguity and the failure of the Trial Court to explain its decision
related to finding wrongful use, undue influence, quiet title, battery, as well
as the remedies it awarded.” Ruby and Christopher do not elaborate on those
alleged defects appearing in the proposed statement of decision. Nor do they
explain which, if any, of those alleged defects the trial court addressed in its
final Statement of Decision.
“ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record. Rather than scour the record unguided, we may decide
that the appellant has waived a point urged on appeal when it is not
supported by accurate citations to the record. [Citations.] Similarly, we may
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disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal
authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the
conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ” (Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical
Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172.) Moreover, the “appellant may not
simply incorporate by reference arguments made in papers filed in the trial
court, rather than briefing them on appeal.” (Keyes v. Bowen (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656.) Because Ruby and Christopher’s argument is
undeveloped and fails to identify any specific portion of the Statement of
Decision as inadequate, and they improperly attempt to incorporate their
papers filed in the trial court, Ruby and Christopher have forfeited their
contention.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding Against Ruby and
Christopher for Financial Abuse of an Elder
Ruby and Christopher next contend that insufficient evidence supports
the finding in favor of Cortez on the cause of action for financial abuse of an
elder.
1. Standard of Review
“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following
a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a
substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact.”
(Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) In applying a substantial
evidence standard of review, “ ‘ “[i]t is not our role to reweigh the evidence,
redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to
support it.” ’ [Citation] Where multiple inferences can be drawn from the
evidence, we defer to the trial court’s findings.” (Orange Catholic Foundation
v. Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283, 292.)
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2. Applicable Legal Standards
Financial abuse of an elder, as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code
section 15610.30, can occur in several distinct ways: (1) a person “[t]akes,
secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an
elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both”
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(1)); (2) a person “[a]ssists in taking,
secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of
an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or
both” (id., subd. (a)(2), italics added); or (3) a person “[t]akes, secretes,
appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting,
appropriating, obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or
dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 15610.70” (id.,
subd. (a)(3)).7 These are all alternative means to establish financial elder
abuse. (See Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 841, 856–857 [a “defendant will be liable for ‘depriv[ation]’ . . .
of an elder’s property that is taken ‘for a wrongful use or with intent to
defraud’ . . . , or that is committed by ‘undue influence’ ” (citations omitted)].)
As relevant here, a statutory presumption is available when a plaintiff
attempts to establish financial elder abuse by showing property was taken for
a wrongful use: “A person or entity shall be deemed to have taken, secreted,
7 As set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70,
“ ‘Undue influence’ means excessive persuasion that causes another person to
act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in
inequity. In determining whether a result was produced by undue influence,
all of the following shall be considered: [¶] (1) The vulnerability of the
victim. . . . [¶] (2) The influencer’s apparent authority. . . . [¶] (3) The actions
or tactics used by the influencer. . . . [¶] (4) The equity of the result.” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 15610.70.)
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appropriated, obtained, or retained property for a wrongful use if, among
other things, the person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or
retains the property and the person or entity knew or should have known
that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult.”
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (b).) “A plaintiff is not required to
prove bad faith or fraud to prevail on a claim of financial elder abuse.”
(Cameron v. Las Orchidias Properties, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 481, 507.)
Moreover, financial elder abuse can exist even when the elder agrees to
the transfer of the property “by means of an agreement, donative transfer, or
testamentary bequest.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (c).)
A plaintiff who prevails in proving financial abuse of an elder may be
awarded “compensatory damages and all other remedies otherwise provided
by law,” as well as “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15657.5, subd. (a).)
3. The Trial Court’s Finding of Financial Elder Abuse Is Supported
by Substantial Evidence
The trial court found in favor of Cortez on his cause of action for
financial abuse of an elder on two separate and independent grounds: (1) the
2019 deed was obtained by Ruby and Christopher for a wrongful use; and
(2) the 2019 deed was obtained by Ruby and Christopher through undue
influence. Ruby and Christopher challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as
to both of those grounds. As we will explain, because the two grounds are
independent of each other, and we conclude that substantial evidence
supports a finding that Ruby and Christopher obtained the 2019 deed for a
wrongful use, we need not, and do not, address whether the 2019 deed was
also obtained through undue influence.
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a. The Trial Court’s Findings on Wrongful Use
In setting forth its finding that Ruby and Christopher obtained the
2019 deed for a wrongful use, the trial court gave the following explanation:
“The Court finds [Ruby and Christopher] obtained the real property for a
wrongful use. It should have been obvious to both [Ruby and Christopher]
that removing [Cortez’s] name completely from the title of the home,
particularly at his advanced age, would be harmful to him due to loss of
appreciation, equity, tax benefits, and stability, among other harms. He
would have fewer rights than a property owner, including freedom in his
living space. [Cortez] was subjected to an unlawful detainer action brought
by [Ruby and Christopher] with the potential to lose his home at 73 years old
after living there continuously for 30 years. Deeding [Cortez’s] home away
from him was not a logical step to protect the home from foreclosure. [Cortez]
lost his autonomy and freedom when he was completely removed from the
deed by Ruby and Chris Marmolejo.” The trial court’s finding that the harm
to Cortez “should have been obvious” to Ruby and Christopher, shows that
the finding of wrongful use was based on the presumption of wrongful use
that arises when a person who obtains property “knew or should have known
that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult.”
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (b).)
b. The Loss of Appreciation, Equity and Tax Benefits
First, focusing on the trial court’s observation that Cortez lost
“appreciation, equity, [and] tax benefits” when the House was taken from
him, Ruby and Christopher argue that substantial evidence does not support
a finding that Cortez lost any of those things. Specifically, according to Ruby
and Christopher, there was no evidence of loss of appreciation because there
was “no expert opinion, or any opinion for that matter, as to the value of the
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[House]”; there was no evidence of “any tax benefits [Cortez] received or lost”;
and “[t]he only evidence of equity in the [House] was the $50,000 cashed out”
in the refinance. We are not persuaded.
By referring to appreciation, tax benefits and equity, we understand
the trial court to have been referring in general to the normally-expected
benefits of home ownership. Although there was no specific evidence of any
appreciation in value or tax benefits in Cortez’s case, there was evidence that,
before the 2019 deed, Cortez held an equity interest in the House. The
balance on the prior mortgage was $88,408.53, plus $16,162.17 for the loan
obtained under the HERO program. Ruby and Christopher were able to
refinance the House, with a new mortgage amount of $182,392.36. That
evidence provides ample support for an inference that at the time of the 2019
deed, Cortez benefitted from an equity interest in the House above and
beyond the amount he owed on his mortgage. The 2019 deed deprived Cortez
of that equity interest, as well as any other potential benefits of home
ownership.
c. Loss of Stability, Autonomy and Freedom
Next, Ruby and Christopher argue that there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s finding that, as a result of the 2019 deed, Cortez
lost “stability,” “autonomy” and “freedom in his living space.” According to
Ruby and Christopher, Cortez retained stability, autonomy and freedom
because, as a result of the 2019 deed and subsequent refinance, Cortez was
“free of anxiety” and “retained his freedom and autonomy” to engage in the
“self-induced” damaging conduct of conducting “junk sales” and “renting to a
questionable tenant.” We find no merit to the argument.
With respect to Cortez’s loss of stability, autonomy and freedom in his
living space, ample evidence supports a finding that after Ruby and
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Christopher took ownership of the House, Cortez did, in fact, lose control over
his residence and the activities that he could conduct there. As Ruby and
Christopher admitted at trial, they decided to sell the House and force Cortez
to move out because they disapproved of Cortez’s continued junk sales at the
House, the people that Cortez chose to allow at the House, and how Cortez
was treating the tenants that Ruby and Christopher had placed in the House
for Cortez to live with. Further, when Cortez refused to leave the House,
Ruby and Christopher filed an unlawful detainer action against him in an
attempt to evict him from his long-time residence. After the refinance, Cortez
was unable to assume the mortgage himself and therefore could not satisfy
Ruby and Christopher’s condition for staying in the House. Those facts
provide substantial evidence to support a finding that Cortez lost stability,
autonomy and freedom in his living space as a result of the 2019 deed.
Regarding Ruby and Christopher’s contention that the 2019 deed
relieved “stress” from Cortez, the trial court could reasonably have rejected
such a finding. It was undisputed that Cortez never missed a mortgage
payment and the House was not under threat of foreclosure. Moreover, even
if there had been a threat of foreclosure, as the trial court correctly pointed
out, “[d]eeding [Cortez’s] home away from him was not a logical step to
protect the home from foreclosure.” Although Ruby contended that the House
needed to be refinanced to fund renovations that would result in better
tenants and increased rent, as the trial court accurately described, “[t]here
was no evidence Ruby . . . could not obtain the loan with [Cortez’s] name on
the deed and there was no evidence supporting [Ruby and Christopher’s]
contention that they needed Christopher . . . on the deed to obtain the loan.”
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d. Evidence That the Likely Harm to Cortez Should Have
Been Obvious to Ruby and Christopher
Ruby and Christopher also take issue with the trial’s court finding,
which raised the presumption of wrongful use, that it “should have been
obvious” to Ruby and Christopher that taking Cortez off the title to the House
would be harmful to him. Ruby and Christopher contend that no substantial
evidence supports a finding that the harm “should have been obvious” as
“Cortez offered no expert testimony as to the ‘reasonable person’ standard,”
and because at the time of the 2019 deed “the course of action appeared -- to
everyone including Cortez -- to be agreeable and reasonable.” The argument
fails.
For one thing, Ruby and Christopher have cited no authority to support
their contention that Cortez was required to present expert testimony to
establish that it “should have been obvious” to Ruby and Christopher that he
would likely suffer harm from the 2019 deed. Case law establishes that the
inquiry into whether a person “should have known that [their] conduct [was]
likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15610.30, subd. (b)) “is assessed by reference to an objective ‘reasonable
person’ measure.” (Paslay v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 639, 657–658.) Although expert opinion testimony is
normally limited to subjects that are “sufficiently beyond common experience
that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact” (Evid. Code, § 801,
subd. (a)), “[e]xpert opinion evidence is required in some circumstances. ‘If
the matter in issue is one within the knowledge of experts only and not
within the common knowledge of laymen, it is necessary for the plaintiff to
introduce expert opinion evidence in order to establish a prima facie case.’ ”
(Carson v. Facilities Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 844 (Carson).)
17
“However, appellate courts have repeatedly held that expert testimony is
unnecessary to a plaintiff’s case where the fact sought to be proved is one
within the general knowledge of laymen.” (Id. at p. 845.)
Here, the question of whether it should have been obvious to a
reasonable person in Ruby and Christopher’s position that removing Cortez
from the title of his long-time residence would have harmful effects was not a
subject “ ‘within the knowledge of experts only and not within the common
knowledge of laymen.’ ” (Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 844.) It does not
require expert knowledge to understand that an elderly person will likely be
harmed by taking away the benefits of home ownership and the stability,
autonomy and freedom in his living space that he has previously enjoyed,
including exposing him to eviction from his long-time residence. Therefore,
Cortez was not required to present expert testimony on the matter.
In addition, based on the evidence, the trial court could reasonably
reject Ruby and Christopher’s contention that at the time of the 2019 deed
“the course of action appeared -- to everyone including Cortez -- to be
agreeable and reasonable.” Cortez testified that he was not aware that the
2019 deed was divesting him of his ownership interest in the House, that
Christopher was being added as an owner, or that Ruby and Christopher
would be undertaking a significant refinancing transaction. Based on that
evidence, Cortez did not consent to Ruby and Christopher’s course of action
as “agreeable and reasonable.”
Finally, Ruby and Christopher contend that in concluding that they
should have known the 2019 deed would likely harm Cortez, the trial court
improperly ignored “that Cortez benefit[t]ed from all of his debts . . . being
completely paid off” and that “he continued to reside at the property.” The
argument is not persuasive. Cortez’s debts were paid off only because of the
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refinancing transaction, which reduced the equity held in the House and
significantly increased the monthly mortgage payments so that Cortez did
not qualify to assume the loan and stay in the House. Moreover, although
Ruby and Christopher initially allowed Cortez to reside in the House, they
ultimately demanded that he move out. That fact alone emphasizes the
vulnerable position that Cortez was placed in due to the 2019 deed.
Accordingly, the trial court could reasonably conclude that even though
Cortez’s debts were rolled into the refinance transaction, and Cortez was
initially permitted to reside in the House, Ruby and Christopher should have
known the 2019 deed was likely to harm Cortez for all of the reasons the trial
court identified: loss of equity and other benefits of home ownership, and loss
of stability, autonomy and freedom in his living space.
e. Evidence of Christopher’s Liability
Finally, Christopher argues that he should not have been found liable
for financial abuse of an elder because there was insufficient evidence of his
personal involvement in the transaction that divested Cortez’s ownership of
the House. According to Christopher, “the testimony showed that
Christopher was only involved in renovations and did not participate in the
2019 [d]eed transaction or discussions with Cortez.”
The argument is contrary to the evidence. Christopher testified that
ownership of the House was transferred to him in the 2019 deed based on a
discussion that he participated in with Cortez. Further, he reached an oral
agreement with Cortez, along with Ruby, as to what would happen with the
House before the refinance transaction. Christopher explained that he was
included on the 2019 deed because of his credit score and his income, and he
admitted he was present when the 2019 deed was signed. Therefore, by
Christopher’s own admission, he was aware of and participated in the
19
transfer of ownership of the House to himself from Cortez through the 2019
deed.
As Christopher was a knowing participant in the transaction that
resulted in transfer of ownership of the House to him by the 2019 deed, there
is substantial evidence to support a finding Christopher obtained ownership
of the House for a wrongful use, and that he is accordingly liable for financial
abuse of an elder.
In sum, substantial evidence supports a finding against both Ruby and
Christopher on Cortez’s cause of action for financial abuse of an elder because
they took, appropriated or obtained Cortez’s real property for a wrongful use.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(1).)
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding Against Ruby for Battery
Ruby contends that insufficient evidence supports the finding against
her on Cortez’s cause of action for battery.
At trial, Cortez testified about Ruby’s practice of poking him, which
occurred over “years.” “[S]he’d be upset, she’d come to the house and start
poking at me telling me something, ‘Do you understand? Do you
understand?’ Poking me in my head and poking me on the shoulder.” As she
poked him, Ruby would scream at Cortez, and she would say, “ ‘How does
that feel? Does it hurt?’ ” Cortez felt humiliated, and he did experience pain
while Ruby was poking him. Another witness, a long-time tenant in the
House, testified that she saw Ruby poking Cortez in the head and chest.
Ruby denied ever poking Cortez.
“The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are:
(1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the
intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching;
(3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a
20
reasonable person in plaintiff's position would have been offended by the
touching.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669 (So).)
In the Statement of Decision, the trial court found that Ruby
“repeatedly used her index finger to ‘poke’ [Cortez] in the head or the chest.”
As the trial court explained, in our culture “pointing the index finger at
someone is generally considered rude,” and “[t]ouching the person while
doing so turns the act into an aggressive gesture.” Further, as the trial court
stated, Ruby’s “intent to offend [Cortez] is inferred from her repeated use of
this aggressive gesture. A reasonable person would likely find this touching
offensive, although admittedly the act itself would not and did not cause
bodily harm or pain. [Cortez] certainly testified he did not consent to
Ruby . . . touching him in this manner.”
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Ruby first points out that
in two places in the Statement of Decision, the trial court indicated that it did
not find the testimony of Cortez or the tenant to be credible. Specifically, in
the introductory paragraph of the Statement of Decision, the trial court
stated that its ruling was “largely based on the admitted exhibits, as the only
credible witnesses were [the] Notary Public . . . and [a] third-party witness.”
Later, when making findings about what happened to the cash payout from
the refinance, the trial court stated, “[d]isregarding the testimony of all the
witnesses, which the Court does not find credible, the documents establish it
was only [Ruby and Christopher] who benefitted from the cash refund.” As
Ruby interprets these statements, the trial court decided that it was
disregarding all of Cortez’s and the tenant’s testimony because it was not
credible, and was accordingly “left with nothing upon which to base” its
finding on the battery cause of action.
21
However, as we assess the Statement of Decision, the portions that
Ruby and Christopher rely upon do not unambiguously indicate the trial
court’s intent to reject the witnesses’ testimony on all issues. The trial court
stated it was “largely” relying on the documentary evidence rather than the
witness testimony. The trial court’s findings that Ruby poked Cortez without
his consent, and that Cortez intended to leave the House to Ruby after he
died suggest that the trial court did credit some of the witness testimony.
“The doctrine of implied findings requires the appellate court to infer
the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment.”
(Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58
(Fladeboe).) An exception to the doctrine of implied findings exists when a
party brings to the trial court’s attention an omitted or ambiguously resolved
issue in a statement of decision, either before entry of judgment or in
conjunction with a new trial motion or motion to vacate the judgment. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 634.) However, “if a party fails to bring omissions or ambiguities
in the statement of decision’s factual findings to the trial court’s attention,
then ‘that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement was
deficient in these regards,’ and the appellate court will infer the trial court
made implied factual findings to support the judgment.” (Fladeboe, at p. 59.)
Here, the record contains no indication that Ruby and Christopher
brought to the trial court’s attention any ambiguity with respect to its
credibility determinations regarding the witness testimony necessary to
support the finding on the battery cause of action. Therefore, to the extent
the Statement of Decision is inconsistent or unclear about the extent to which
22
the trial court rejected witness testimony for lack of credibility, we will
construe the trial court’s findings to support the judgment.8
Ruby next contends that there was insufficient evidence that Ruby
intended to offend Cortez. According to Ruby, the finding of intent was based
on “speculative and unsupported cultural norms” that poking is offensive.
Similarly, Ruby contends that the trial court “fail[ed] to offer any analysis,
beyond its bare conclusion, that the conduct would be offensive to [a]
reasonable person.” We reject the arguments.
As we have explained, a statement of decision “ ‘is sufficient if it fairly
discloses the court’s determination as to the ultimate facts and material
issues in the case.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.) Thus, the
trial court was not required to explain why it concluded poking a person’s
upper body is an offensive gesture or that Ruby intended it as such. Here,
there was substantial evidence from which the trial court could infer that
Ruby intended the poking as an offensive gesture because Cortez testified
that Ruby poked him while she was upset, screaming at him, and asking him
whether it hurt. The trial court could reasonably conclude from Ruby’s
accompanying conduct and statements that Ruby intended the act of poking
Cortez to be offensive.
8 Ruby and Christopher devote a significant portion of their opening
appellate brief to arguing that, even if the trial court did credit some of
Cortez’s testimony, it should not have done so and should have credited their
testimony instead. The focus on attacking Cortez’s credibility is misplaced.
“Venerable precedent holds that, in a bench trial, the trial court is the ‘sole
judge’ of witness credibility. [Citation] The trial judge may believe or
disbelieve uncontradicted witnesses if there is any rational ground for doing
so. [Citation.] The fact finder’s determination of the veracity of a witness is
final.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582 (Schmidt).)
23
In sum, we conclude that Ruby’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence on the battery cause of action lacks merit. Substantial evidence
supports a finding that Ruby poked Cortez with the intent to offend him and
without his consent, and that Cortez was reasonably offended by the conduct.
(So, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 669.)
D. The Trial Court Properly Awarded the Remedy of Cancelling the 2019
Deed
In setting forth the remedies that it was ordering, the trial court stated
that it was cancelling the 2019 deed, citing Code of Civil Procedure
section 128 and Civil Code section 3412.9
According to Ruby and Christopher, the trial court erred by cancelling
the 2019 deed because it “exceeded the scope of the pleadings and relief
requested.” As Ruby and Christopher point out, Cortez’s complaint did not
expressly mention the remedy of cancelling the 2019 deed. Instead, the
complaint included a cause of action for quiet title, along with a prayer for
“an order quieting title in the subject property to [Cortez].” (Capitalization
omitted.)
A cause of action for quiet title is generally distinct from a cause of
action to cancel an instrument. (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 523 (Deutsche Bank).) Thus, it cannot be inferred
solely from the cause of action for quiet title that Cortez was also seeking
cancellation of the 2019 deed. Moreover, as a remedy for financial abuse of
an elder, the prayer for relief sought only damages and attorney fees, even
9 Code of Civil Procedure section 128 sets forth the inherent powers of
the trial court, including “[t]o amend and control its process and orders so as
to make them conform to law and justice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd.
(a)(8).) Civil Code section 3412 sets forth the grounds for cancellation of a
written instrument.
24
though Cortez had available to him “compensatory damages and all other
remedies otherwise provided by law.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5,
subd. (a).)
In making their argument, however, Ruby and Christopher overlook
the “fundamental” principle that “after trial on the merits, the court may
afford any form of relief supported by the evidence and as to which the
parties were on notice, whether requested in the pleadings or not.” (American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Cowan (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 875, 883, italics added.)
“This is true irrespective of the theory upon which the facts were pleaded, the
title of the pleading, or what relief was sought by the prayer.” (Knoblock v.
Waale-Camplan Co. (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 870, 874.) The relief awarded
“must . . . be relief ‘as to which the parties were on notice, whether requested
in the pleadings or not.’ ” (North Coast Village Condominium Assn. v.
Phillips (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 866, 881.)
Here, Ruby and Christopher had ample notice before the beginning of
the trial that Cortez was seeking cancellation of the 2019 deed and that the
authority upon which Cortez was relying was Civil Code section 3412.
Cortez’s trial brief, filed four days before the commencement of the trial,
stated that Cortez sought “to cancel a quitclaim deed dated October 27,
2019, . . . which granted the property to [Ruby and Christopher], without
[Cortez] being included on the deed.” Further Cortez specifically explained
that “Civil Code section 3412 authorizes the court to cancel ‘[a] written
instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left
outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or
voidable.’ ”
Accordingly, because Ruby and Christopher were on notice before the
commencement of trial that Cortez was seeking cancellation of the 2019 deed
25
pursuant to Civil Code section 3412, the trial court was fully authorized to
order that remedy.
Ruby and Christopher also contend that even if the trial court was
authorized to award cancellation under Civil Code section 3412, the trial
court’s “analysis” in the Statement of Decision was “insufficient under the
statutory requirements” because it “did not explicitly address whether Cortez
demonstrated ‘reasonable apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary
loss or the prejudicial alteration of one’s position’ as required for cancellation
under Civil Code [section] 3412.” Civil Code section 3412 states that a
“written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension
that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom
it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered
to be delivered up or canceled.” “To prevail on a claim to cancel an
instrument, a plaintiff must allege and prove (1) the instrument is void or
voidable; and (2) he or she has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury
including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial alteration of their position.”
(Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 889, 900.)
Significantly, Ruby and Christopher do not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s order cancelling the 2019 deed.
Instead, they fault the trial court because it did not “explicitly address”
whether Cortez established that he had a reasonable apprehension of serious
injury if the 2019 deed remained in force. As we have noted, however, “[t]he
doctrine of implied findings requires the appellate court to infer the trial
court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment.”
(Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.) Although Ruby and Christopher
could have defeated the doctrine of implied findings by bringing any
purported omission in the Statement of Decision to the trial court’s attention
26
(Code Civ. Proc., § 634), there is no indication in the record that they did so
regarding the findings related to the cancellation of the 2019 deed. Thus, we
“will infer the trial court made implied factual findings to support the
judgment.” (Fladeboe, at p. 59.)
We conclude that Ruby and Christopher have not identified any reason
for us to reverse the trial court’s order cancelling the 2019 deed.
E. The Amount of the Damages Award
Ruby and Christopher contend that the trial court’s award of
$25,159.85 in economic damages and $1,000 in noneconomic damages was
“unsupported by the evidence and legally excessive.”
1. Challenge to the Award of Economic Damages
The award of $25,159.85 was based on an amount representing half of
the cash payout from the refinancing transaction. Ruby and Christopher
contend that award was erroneous because it failed to take into account that,
according to them, $20,000 was put back into the House as payment for
renovations, and another $10,000 was given to Cortez by depositing it into a
bank account that Ruby set up for him.
The argument fails because it conflicts with the trial court’s findings
regarding the disposition of the cash payout from the refinancing transaction.
The trial court determined that there was “no credible testimony as to what
happened to the cash refund,” and “the documents establish it was only
[Ruby and Christopher] who benefitted from the cash refund.” The award to
Cortez of half of the cash payout from the refinancing transaction is fully
consistent with the trial court’s finding that only Ruby and Christopher
benefitted from those funds. Ruby and Christopher fail to present any
distinct argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
trial court’s finding on that issue, and it is not our role to reevaluate the trial
27
court’s credibility determinations. (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at
p. 582.)
2. Challenge to the Award of Noneconomic Damages
The $1,000 award for Ruby’s battery of Cortez was to compensate
Cortez for his noneconomic damages. “ ‘Such injuries are subjective, and the
determination of the amount of damages by the trier of fact is equally
subjective. [Citation.] There is no fixed standard to determine the amount of
noneconomic damages. Instead, the determination is committed to the
discretion of the trier of fact.’ ” (Phipps v. Copeland Corp. LLC (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 319, 338.)
Ruby first contends the award of noneconomic damages was improper
because it was “based on a single alleged incident” with no physical injury.
That argument misstates the evidence. Cortez testified that Ruby’s practice
of poking him in the head and shoulder took place “for a long time” and “for
years.”
Ruby next contends that the award was improper because it amounted
to an award for “emotional distress,” yet “Cortez offered no medical testimony
or documentation of distress.” In support of that argument, Ruby cites case
law setting forth the elements that must be proven for a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which includes “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘the plaintiff’s suffering
severe or extreme emotional distress.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1609.) Ruby’s argument is misguided because the
cause of action at issue here is battery, not intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Further, no medical testimony or documentation was needed to
support the trial court’s award of damages. In a cause of action for battery, a
plaintiff may recover for the “indignities” and “humiliation” suffered. (Lorenz
v. Hunt (1928) 89 Cal.App. 6, 15; see also Audish v. Macias (2024)
28
102 Cal.App.5th 740, 752 [noneconomic damages include nonpecuniary losses
including humiliation].) Here, based on Cortez’s own testimony that he felt
humiliated by Ruby’s act of poking his head and shoulders, the trial court
was well within its discretion to award $1,000 in noneconomic damages to
compensate Cortez for that humiliation.
F. The Remedy of Quiet Title
Ruby and Christopher’s final argument focuses on the trial court’s
ruling that it was quieting title.
In the portion of the Statement of Decision that explained the remedies
it was awarding, the trial court stated, without elaboration, that it “awards
quiet title to the Subject Property to [Cortez].” In the same paragraph, the
trial court went on to explain that it was also ordering that the 2019 deed be
cancelled.
Ruby and Christopher argue that the trial court’s ruling quieting title
was “ambiguous and uncertain” because Ruby remained on the title to the
House due to the continued validity of the 2012 deed, pursuant to which she
owned the House with Cortez in joint tenancy. According to Ruby and
Christopher, the Statement of Decision is “fundamentally flawed” because it
“fails to address how Cortez can quiet title while Ruby retains a valid 50
[percent] interest.” According to them, “at best, the [j]udgment should have
found quiet title to Christopher, only.”
“A quiet title action is a statutory action that seeks to declare the rights
of the parties in realty.” (Robin v. Crowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 727, 740
(Robin), citing Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a) [“An action may be
brought under this chapter to establish title against adverse claims to real or
personal property or any interest therein.”].) “The purpose of a quiet title
action is to determine any adverse claim to the property that the defendant
29
may assert, and to declare and define any interest held by the defendant, ‘ “so
that the plaintiff may have a decree finally adjudicating the extent of his own
interest in the property in controversy.” ’ ” (Robin, at p. 740.) A trial court
deciding a quiet title action should “ ‘finally settle and determine, as between
the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and . . .
decree to each such interest or estate therein as he [or she] may be entitled
to.’ ” (Deutsche Bank, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 524.)
Although we acknowledge that the trial court could have been more
specific when discussing the quiet title cause of action, when we consider the
Statement of Decision in its entirety, including the order cancelling the 2019
deed, the trial court’s ruling on the quiet title cause of action is evident and
constitutes an adequate declaration of the parties’ rights with respect to the
House. As we understand the Statement of Decision, in quieting title the
trial court declared the rights of the parties as follows: Neither Ruby nor
Christopher hold any ownership in the House by virtue of the 2019 deed, as
that document was the product of financial abuse of an elder. Instead,
ownership of the House is governed by the 2012 deed. Based on that
document, as the trial court established, Ruby and Cortez own the House as
joint tenants.
With respect to Ruby’s contention that the trial court should not have
awarded quiet title against her because she retained ownership due to the
2012 deed, we observe that “ ‘[a] description of the parties’ legal interests in
real property is all that can be expected of a judgment in an action to quiet
title.’ ” (Robin, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 740.) As such, an action to quiet
title is similar to a declaratory relief action, in that “[a] trial court should
ordinarily resolve such dispute” in accord “with the rule that a trial court
should not dismiss a regular declaratory relief action when the plaintiff loses,
30
but instead should issue a judgment setting forth the declaration of rights
and thus ending the controversy.” (Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of
Yuba (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 278, 305.) Therefore, Cortez was entitled to a
ruling quieting title as against both Ruby and Christopher in the form of a
declaration as to both of those parties’ rights, if any, to the House, even
though the resulting ruling established that Ruby was to stay on title along
with Cortez.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Cortez shall recover his costs on appeal.
BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KELETY, J.
CASTILLO, J.
31