Filed 9/17/26 Correia v. Yim CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
VERONICA CORREIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, F090712
v. (Super. Ct. No. BFL-25-003547)
ROBERT YIM, MODIFICATION OF OPINION
[No Change in Judgment]
Defendant and Appellant.
BY THE COURT:
On the court’s own motion, it is ordered that the following modification be made
to the opinion filed herein on September 15, 2026:
1. On page 1, in the first sentence of the first paragraph, the “Superior
Court of Stanislaus County” is deleted and replaced with the “Superior
Court of Kern County.”
Except for the modification set forth, the opinion previously filed remains
unchanged. This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.
MEEHAN, A.P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HARRELL, J.
GUERRA, J.
Filed 9/15/26 Correia v. Yim CA5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
VERONICA CORREIA,
F090712
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BFL-25-003547)
v.
ROBERT YIM, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Tanya R.
Richard, Judge.
Robert Yim, in propria persona, for Defendant and Appellant.
Veronica Correia, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Meehan, Acting P. J., Harrell, J. and Guerra, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Robert Yim appeals from the grant of a domestic violence restraining
order where he is the restrained party. The order protects Veronica C., and her
two daughters V.Y. and A.C. Appellant argues he was denied meaningful access to the
courts, the trial court violated his due process rights when the court did not arrange to
have appellant appear at the evidentiary hearing despite appellant’s written request, and
the restraining order unlawfully abridges his custody rights.
Based on the record provided, it appears the trial court abused its discretion when
it did not rule on appellant’s request to appear or provide an alternative means for
appellant to be heard at the restraining order hearing. As such, we reverse and remand to
the court, to exercise its discretion and fashion an appropriate remedy affording appellant
meaningful access to the courts.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant is incarcerated in state prison and serving a life sentence. On
September 19, 2022, in Alameda County, appellant appears to have been granted
visitation with his daughter V.Y., where he was permitted to call V.Y. once a week for 30
minutes, and to write letters when he is able.
On August 21, 2025, Veronica moved for an emergency ex parte temporary
restraining order and a domestic violence restraining order. The request for the
emergency order was denied, with the trial court ruling the “[e]mergency [ex parte]
orders are not appropriate as there is no immediate danger. The [r]espondent is
incarcerated in state prison serving a life sentence. No information presented in petition
concerning recent abusive contact.” A hearing was scheduled and ultimately continued
to September 23, 2025.
On September 12, 2025, appellant was served with the restraining order
documents and prepared a written opposition. Appellant denied Veronica’s allegations,
requested the trial court to “email a video court order with zoom passcode” to the
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prison’s litigation coordinator, and included the email address. Appellant’s letter was
marked received by the court on September 18, 2025.
There are no documents in the record indicating the trial court addressed
appellant’s request for a video appearance, and no order was issued for appellant to
appear by video at the hearing. The hearing was held on September 23, 2025, with only
Veronica attending. On October 2, 2025, the court issued a restraining order after
hearing. The order restrained appellant, listing Veronica and minors V.Y. and A.C. as
protected persons.
The order directed appellant not to harass or abuse the protected persons, not to
contact them, to stay away, and prohibited appellant from purchasing, owning or
possessing firearms, ammunition or body armor. The order made an exception allowing
appellant to have contact with his child, V.Y., during court-ordered contact or visits.
Appellant filed a timely appeal on November 7, 2025.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues his inability to attend the hearing and absence of
accommodation resulted in him being denied meaningful access to the trial courts,
violated his due process rights, and that the restraining order interferes with his previous
custody order.
Primarily, it appears that the restraining order does accommodate appellant’s prior
custody order and makes an exception allowing appellant to have contact with V.Y.
during court-ordered contact or visits. This is denoted on page five of the restraining
order, section 15, subsection (b)(2).
On appeal, we review the trial court’s grant or denial of a domestic violence
restraining order request for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 926, 933.) “ ‘ “If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous
understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its
discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.]
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Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect
legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
“The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state
from depriving any person of property without due process of law.” (Payne v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 914.) “Thus, the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized a constitutional right of access to the courts for all
persons, including prisoners.” (Ibid.) A denial of this right constitutes a violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. (Id. at
p. 923.)
Although a prisoner may not compel the trial court to appoint counsel on his or her
behalf, and ordinarily may not compel his or her appearance, courts have wide discretion
and a wide variety of measures at their disposal to ensure a prisoner is provided access to
the courts. (Apollo v. Gyaami (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1483 (Apollo).)
These remedies include but are not limited to, “ ‘(1) deferral of the action until the
prisoner is released [citation]; (2) appointment of counsel for the
prisoner [citations]; (3) transfer of the prisoner to court (Pen. Code, §§ 1567, 2620);
(4) utilization of depositions in lieu of personal appearances (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1997; Pen. Code, §§ 2622–2623; [citations].); (5) holding of trial in prison
[citation]; (6) conduct of status and settlement conferences, hearings on motions and
other pretrial proceedings by telephone [citation]; (7) propounding of written discovery;
(8) use of closed circuit television or other modern electronic media; and
(9) implementation of other innovative, imaginative procedures [citations.]’ ” (Apollo,
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1483.)
“Generally, a trial court has discretion to choose among these and other remedies
in safeguarding a prisoner litigant’s right of meaningful access to the courts to prosecute
or defend against a civil action threatening his or her interests. [Citations.] However, a
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trial court does not have discretion to choose no remedy in cases where the prisoner’s
civil action is bona fide and his or her access to the courts is being impeded.” (Apollo,
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1483–1484.)
In this case, it is undisputed that appellant was in prison when Veronica filed the
restraining order. After appellant was served, he filed a response contesting the
restraining order, which was received by the trial court on September 18, 2025, prior to
the restraining order hearing. Appellant requested to make a video appearance and
provided the court with the prison litigation coordinator’s email address. Upon receipt of
his request, the court was required to “(1) ‘first determine whether appellant is indigent’;
(2) next determine whether the lawsuit involved a bona fide threat to his personal or
property interests, and (3) consider what measures were available to protect appellant’s
right of meaningful access to the courts if the first two conditions (i.e., indigency & bona
fide claim) existed.” (Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 466–467.)
The record does not reflect the trial court responded to appellant’s request, and
appellant ultimately did not appear at the hearing in any manner. The only conclusion we
can reach from the record provided is that the court chose “no remedy” and made no
determination regarding appellant’s meaningful access to the court. (Apollo, supra, 167
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1483–1484.) Thus, the court abused its discretion when it failed to
consider and rule on appellant’s request before holding the evidentiary hearing without
him, or craft an alternative remedy to safeguard appellant’s access to the courts. “A court
is not under a duty to exercise its discretion in a particular manner [citation], but may be
compelled to exercise its discretion in the first instance.” (Payne v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 925.)
The remedy for the trial court’s error is a new hearing that comports with the
principles of due process and equal protection, and safeguards appellant’s access to the
courts. On remand, the court must determine whether appellant is presently indigent,
whether he is incarcerated or otherwise subject to restrictions on his liberty that
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necessitate assistance with meaningful access to the courts, and if so, the court shall
exercise its discretion to select or fashion an appropriate means of affording appellant
meaningful access.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Neither party shall recover costs. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
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