Filed 9/4/26 Coppola v. Variety Media CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
FRANCIS FORD COPPOLA, B345022
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STCV23459)
VARIETY MEDIA, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Reversed.
Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Dan Laidman, and
Sarah Burns for Defendants and Appellants.
Sauer & Wagner, Robert S. Chapman, and Amir A.
Torkamani for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff Francis Ford Coppola (Coppola) filed a complaint
for libel against defendants Variety Media, LLC (Variety), Brent
Lang (Lang), and Tatiana Siegel (Siegel) (collectively, defendants)
based on an article defendants published concerning Coppola’s
conduct on the Megalopolis film set. Defendants responded with
an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 425.16), which the
trial court denied. There is no question that Coppola’s complaint
arises from anti-SLAPP protected activity. The only question we
decide is whether the trial court incorrectly found Coppola proved
his libel claim possesses the requisite “minimal merit” to survive
an anti-SLAPP motion. That question principally turns on
whether Coppola made an adequate showing that the allegedly
libelous statements are false statements of fact.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Variety Article
In July 2024, Variety published an article with the
headline, “Video of Francis Ford Coppola Kissing ‘Megalopolis’
Extras Surfaces as Crew Members Detail Unprofessional
Behavior on Set (EXCLUSIVE).” The byline identifies Lang and
Siegel as the article’s authors.
The article introduces two embedded videos by stating:
“Video has surfaced of director Francis Ford Coppola that shows
the legendary director trying to kiss young female extras on the
set of his ambitious sci-fi epic. Variety has obtained two videos
(posted below) that were taken by a crewmember last year during
the filming of a bacchanalian nightclub scene.” The article
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2
suggests “[t]he videos would appear to corroborate a bombshell
report in the Guardian that claimed the 85-year-old director
‘tried to kiss some of the topless and scantily clad female extras’
and told them ‘he was “trying to get them in the mood.”’” The
Variety piece linked to an article in the Guardian entitled “‘Has
this guy ever made a movie before?’ Francis Ford Coppola’s 40-
year battle to film Megalopolis.”2
Both videos referenced in the article (and included in the
appellate record) appear to feature Coppola (mostly from the
back) walking through a crowded dance floor. There is loud
music and no audible speech. One video, about six seconds long,
begins with Coppola holding a woman’s arm as his head bobs
near the side of her face. She is standing on one foot and Coppola
moves with her as she steps to the side. She steps back, and the
video ends as Coppola walks away. The other video, about 32
second long, shows Coppola interacting with three women in
succession, appearing to briefly press his face to the side of each
woman’s face. None of the women Coppola visibly interacts with
in the videos are topless.
The Variety article also reports statements by anonymous
sources present on set. One of the sources stated Coppola, during
filming of the nightclub scene, “kept leaping up to hug and kiss
2
The Guardian article includes a paragraph discussing
statements by “[s]everal sources” who “felt that Coppola could be
‘old school’ in his behaviour around women. He allegedly pulled
women to sit on his lap, for example. And during one
bacchanalian nightclub scene being shot for the film, . . . Coppola
came on to the set and tried to kiss some of the topless and
scantily clad female extras. He apparently claimed he was
‘trying to get them in the mood[ ].[’]”
3
several women, often inadvertently inserting himself into the
shot and ruining it, which the source said was unusual.” The
article quotes the source as explaining: “‘I’ve worked with really
important directors and that behavior is uncommon—the most
I’ve ever seen any director do is say something like “high energy,
guys[ ]”’ . . . . ‘I’ve never seen anyone on set, and this extends to a
camera operator, so much as touch an actor.’” The source added
“that after multiple takes, Coppola got on a microphone and
announced in earshot of everyone in the room, ‘Sorry, if I come up
to you and kiss you. Just know it’s solely for my pleasure.’”
The article also reported sources “told Variety that Coppola
appeared to act with impunity on set. And unlike traditional
movies, Coppola financed the entire $120 million budget himself,
so there were none of the traditional checks and balances in
place.” Sources said “crew members looked at each other
uncomfortably as Coppola kissed and embraced the background
actors, but one source sa[id] no one publicly objected to his
behavior or tried to stop it. That may have something to do with
how much control Coppola was able to exert since there wasn’t an
outside studio or streamer with its own HR department involved
with the production. [¶] ‘Because Coppola funded it there was no
HR department to keep things in check,’ sa[id] a second source.
‘Who were they supposed to talk to? Complain to Coppola and
report Coppola to himself?’”
The Variety article also quotes “[v]eteran intimacy
coordinator Yarit Dor, who was not involved with the film,” as
opining that “‘it is recommended that scenes [with nudity
involving extras] have more than one intimacy coordinator on
set. . . .’” One of the two intimacy coordinators that was working
on Megalopolis, Samantha McDonald, told Variety neither she
4
nor her colleague were present when the nightclub scene was
filmed, though she “‘[could not] really speak to the reason why
they chose to bring [them] in when they did and not when they
didn’t[.]’” The article reported “[a] source close to Coppola said
there was an intimacy coordinator on set during relevant
shooting dates and scenes.”
The Variety article additionally mentions that “[a]
spokesperson for Coppola declined to comment on the videos or
the claims about Coppola’s behavior. However, a source close to
the filmmaker noted that despite the death of Coppola’s wife,
Eleanor Coppola, in April, [ ]‘Megalopolis’ came in on time, on
budget.” The article also reports “Coppola’s team provided two on
the record statements from people involved with the production.
Darren Demetre, an executive producer of ‘Megalopolis,’ noted
that ‘there were two days when we shot a celebratory Studio 54-
esque club scene where [Coppola] walked around the set to
establish the spirit of the scene by giving kind hugs and kisses on
the cheek to the cast and background players. It was his way to
help inspire and establish the club atmosphere, which was so
important to the film. I was never aware of any complaints of
harassment or ill behavior during the course of the project.’”
First assistant director Mariela Comitini told Variety it was “‘an
honor’” to work on the film and she “‘watched as [Coppola]
created a vibrant, professional, and positive environment on
set[.] . . . As one of the industry’s most well-respected master
filmmakers, [Coppola] was undaunted by the enormity of this
undertaking.’”
5
B. The Complaint
After publication of the Variety article, Coppola filed a
complaint for libel in September 2024. The complaint opens by
touting Coppola’s “creative genius” and positing that “[s]ome
people are jealous and resentful of genius” and “therefore
denigrate and tell knowing and reckless falsehoods about those of
whom they are jealous.” The complaint goes on to catalog three
categories of allegedly defamatory statements in the article: those
suggesting Coppola inadvertently ruined shots, those concerning
Coppola kissing extras, and those concerning the lack of a human
resources department. The complaint seeks general and special
damages of “not less than fifteen million dollars,” plus punitive
and exemplary damages.
1. Category one: ruining shots
Paragraphs 14 through 16 of Coppola’s complaint concerns
the first of these three categories, i.e., the Variety article’s
statement that “while directing a scene for Megalopolis, Coppola
was ‘. . . often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and
ruining it . . . .’” The complaint alleges “[t]he average reader
would understand this statement to mean that Coppola, as a
director, was so incompetent that he no longer understood where
cameras were located on the set and no longer understood camera
angles.” The complaint further alleges that, in combination with
details concerning the number of people on set, the average
reader would understand “Coppola was wasting money because
the whole scene, with hundreds of people involved, would have to
be shot again.” Further, the “gratuitous[ ]” statement “that
Coppola is an ‘85-year[-]old director’ whose ‘behavior was
unprofessional’” would cause the average reader to “understand
6
that Coppola was so aged and infirm that he no longer knew how
to direct a motion picture professionally or efficiently.”
The complaint alleges defendants made the “ruining shots”
statement in the article with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard for the truth because it was “anticipated” that
Coppola and crew members would appear in certain shots.
According to the complaint, “there were four cameras shooting
during the above-referenced scene and three of the cameras were
mobile, with the crew often changing positions. . . . That is one
reason why shots are edited.” Additionally, the complaint alleges
“it was planned for Coppola to appear in the referenced scene”
and defendants, who “claimed to have ‘sources’ on the
set[,] . . . knew the true facts and the falsity of their defamatory
statement . . . .”
2. Categories two and three: kissing and lack of
HR oversight
Paragraph 17 of Coppola’s complaint concerns both the
kissing and the HR department statement in the Variety article.
It alleges defendants “falsely accused Coppola of running a
motion picture production that had ‘none of the traditional checks
and balances in place’ and of not having ‘. . . its own HR
department involved with the production.’ These statements
were combined with the false claims that a video attached to the
[a]rticle showed that Coppola ‘. . . “tried to kiss some of the
topless . . . female extras” . . . .’” Coppola alleges the videos
“showed no such thing.” Coppola suggests the HR claim is false
because “Megalopolis was an independently financed production”
and “independent productions do not have separate HR
departments as does a motion picture studio production.” There
7
were, nonetheless, “‘checks and balances’ in place on the
production concerning any claim of sexual harassment.” Coppola
alleges these statements “are libelous on their face because they
accuse Coppola of criminal conduct within the context of a
production scheme he created that did not provide his alleged
victims with any protections from sexual harassment.”
The complaint alleges defendants knew their purported
sources were “unreliable” because “[d]efendants knew that all
cast and crew members on Megalopolis signed an NDA in which
they promised to keep confidential any information about
Megalopolis and its production (among other things).” Moreover,
Coppola alleged, an actor call sheet that was referenced in the
Variety article “reminded all the cast and crew that all private
photography was prohibited on the set.”
C. The Anti-SLAPP Proceedings
1. Defendants’ motion
Defendants moved to strike the complaint under section
425.16. Defendants argued the libel claim against them arises
from protected speech made in a public forum in connection with
an issue of public interest. Specifically, the article was published
on Variety’s website and addresses the conduct of a famous
director, the production of a film that was already the subject of
public discussion, and touches upon “workplace sexual
harassment” in general and “the treatment of women in the film
industry” in particular. Defendants further argued Coppola could
not demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his
claims both because the allegedly libelous statements are not
actionable and because Coppola, a public figure, failed to plead
8
defendants acted with “actual malice” as defined in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254.
With respect to whether the complaint identified any
actionable libelous statements, defendants maintained the article
did not imply anything about Coppola’s competence as a director
but rather presented (opposing) views regarding his
professionalism on set. Further, defendants argued, even if the
article implied anything about Coppola’s competence as a
director, any conclusion based on disclosed, undisputed facts was
not actionable. Insofar as the complaint was specifically
concerned with the suggestion Coppola “‘inadvertently
insert[ed]’” himself into shots, defendants argued this was a
subjective characterization by on-set sources and, even if
construed as a factual statement, it was substantially true. As to
the statements concerning the lack of an HR department,
defendants argued their reporting is undisputed and includes all
necessary context. As to the statement concerning Coppola
kissing topless actresses, defendants argued that they offered
only a qualified suggestion that the embedded videos “‘would
appear to corroborate’” the Guardian’s reporting to that effect,
that they disclosed all facts on which the statement is based, and
that the statement is substantially true.
With respect to the New York Times “actual malice”
standard, defendants argued Coppola was required to allege
specific facts showing defendants published statements with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard to whether
they were true or false. Defendants argued conclusory
allegations that merely recite the standard are insufficient and
Coppola’s suggestion defendants knew their sources were
unreliable because they violated non-disclosure agreements was
9
“untenable.” Alternatively, even if defendants’ statements were
actionable and Coppola adequately pled malice, defendants
argued the complaint still must be stricken because Coppola
failed to plead special damages. Defendants argued Coppola was
required to do so under the circumstances because any alleged
defamatory meaning required explanatory matter.
2. Coppola’s motion for leave to conduct discovery
Before opposing the anti-SLAPP motion, Coppola filed his
own motion to lift the discovery stay automatically put in place
by the filing of defendants’ motion. Among other things, Coppola
sought to depose defendants and identify their anonymous
sources. Defendants opposed lifting the discovery stay, arguing
their anti-SLAPP motion “raise[d] purely legal issues that
challenge the legal sufficiency of [Coppola’s] [c]omplaint, and
[did] not involve any disputed factual issues.”
At the hearing on Coppola’s motion to lift the discovery
stay, defendants’ attorney explained they were arguing Coppola
had not “pled facts in the complaint to show actual malice, but
[they] [we]re not challenging any evidentiary burden.” Coppola’s
attorney responded, “If that’s the concession, your honor, then we
can go forward with the anti-SLAPP motion, and they have
conceded knowledge of falsity. And we just deal with the other
issues.” Defendants’ attorney then clarified, “the evidentiary
portion of the actual malice, if the court finds it’s been sufficiently
pled, then, yes, it’s done.” Coppola’s attorney indicated “with
that” he did “not need this discovery right now,” and the trial
court denied Coppola’s motion to lift the stay as moot.
10
3. Coppola’s opposition to defendants’ motion
In his opposition to defendants’ motion, Coppola suggested
defendants’ “stipulat[ion] to acting with actual
malice . . . included, by definition, a stipulation of falsity.” In any
case, Coppola argued, defendants’ statements were false.
With respect to the article’s statement that Coppola was
“‘often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining
it[,]’” Coppola submitted a declaration from Eric Jager (Jager), a
professor of English at UCLA, opining that an average reader
would understand Coppola was “so old or infirm that he is
incompetent as a director to film a scene in a major motion
picture, to the point that he fails to recognize the difference
between film and real life.” Coppola also filed his own
declaration in which he suggested his conduct was intentional
and did not ruin shots. He explained that he “used four cameras
simultaneously,” with three hand-held cameras “mov[ing] around
the action to obtain a variety of perspectives. Because of the
number of cameras and the length of the shots . . . , at various
times [Coppola] or some members of the camera crews and
assistant directors appeared in some of the shots. That was to be
expected and unavoidable. Those appearances most certainly did
not ‘ruin’ the shots.” Moreover, Coppola declared, his appearance
in the relevant scene was “intentional.” “The scene was based on
the famed Studio 54 in New York, where celebrities were a main
attraction and regularly a feature in the crowd.” Coppola
suggested “[t]rust is an important part of any motion picture
production. The cast and crew need to trust that the director
knows what he or she is doing and trust the director’s vision.”
With respect to the article’s statements concerning Coppola
kissing actresses, Coppola stated in his declaration that “[a]t no
11
time on the set of Megalopolis did [he] ever hug or kiss an actress
who was topless.” Coppola maintained “the video embedded in
the [a]rticle affirmatively establishes the falsity of the assertion
that [he] tried to kiss ‘topless’ female extras.” Coppola also cited
Jager’s declaration to argue the average reader would “overlook
or not even notice” the article’s inclusion of the phrase “‘would
appear to corroborate.’”
With respect to the complaint’s challenge to statements
concerning the lack of an HR department and “‘“traditional
checks and balances,”’” Coppola argued “[i]ndependently financed
movie productions, like Megalopolis, do not traditionally have
separate HR departments,” but “Megalopolis in fact did have
‘checks and balances’ in place.” Coppola submitted a declaration
bfromy Jennifer Rose Locke (Locke), who worked as the extras
casting director on Megalopolis. Among other things, Locke
indicated she gave each extra a “written guide” directing them to
“contact casting right away” if “approached in any manner that
ma[de] [them] feel uncomfortable.” The guide states “we take
sexual harassment issues seriously. We will begin investigating
any claims immediately. When production determines that an
allegation of sexual harassment is credible, it will take prompt
and appropriate corrective action.”
As to the adequacy of his pleading with respect to actual
malice, Coppola argued it is sufficient for a public figure plaintiff
to recite the New York Times actual malice standard, which he
had done. Finally, Coppola argued there was no need to plead
special damages because defendants’ statements tend to injure
him in his profession and therefore constitute libel per se.
12
4. Defendants’ objections and reply
Defendants objected to portions of Coppola and Locke’s
declarations, and to Jager’s declaration in its entirety. In their
reply in support of the anti-SLAPP motion, defendants argued
none of the challenged statements is defamatory in the context of
the article and, in any case, their statements are based on
disclosed and undisputed facts. They reiterated their view that
Coppola’s failure to plead facts showing actual malice is fatal to
his complaint. And they again argued Coppola was required to
plead special damages because he relied on extrinsic evidence to
show the article is defamatory.
5. The trial court’s ruling
The trial court issued a written order denying defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion, albeit with unusual caveats, described post,
that Coppola should be permitted to amend the complaint to
address certain deficiencies.
On evidentiary issues, the trial court sustained defendants’
objection to Jager’s declaration, explaining “Jager’s opinion does
not impact how a reasonable reader would construe the article”
and, “[t]o the extent Jager is opining on a question of law, i.e.,
whether the statements are capable of defamatory meanings of
falsity, that is a question for the court to decide.” The trial court
also sustained defendants’ objections to portions of Locke’s
declaration, including those in which she discussed the guide she
gave to extras directing them to report any sexual harassment to
her.
With these evidentiary issues resolved, the trial court
found the first step of anti-SLAPP analysis (whether a claim
arises from conduct in furtherance of First Amendment rights)
13
was satisfied because Variety’s website is a public forum and the
article discussed a matter of public interest, “i.e., a major motion
picture directed by a renowned director.” On the second step of
anti-SLAPP analysis (whether the plaintiff has shown a
probability of prevailing on claims arising from anti-SLAPP
protected activity), the trial court found Coppola had met the
minimal merit standard because the Variety article includes
several statements “susceptible to a defamatory meaning.”
The trial court believed the statement that Coppola was
“‘often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining
it’” suggested “incompetence as a director.” In the trial court’s
view, Coppola’s explanation that his appearance in certain shots
was intentional and did not “ruin[ ]” them demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on the claim that the statement was
libelous.
The trial court additionally believed the “statement in the
article that [Coppola] ‘tried to kiss some of the topless extras’”
could also be taken to “imply a provably false assertion.” The fact
that defendants framed the videos as appearing to corroborate
the Guardian’s reporting did not insulate them from liability
because, in the court’s view, “‘[c]orroborate’ could mean lends
credence to the claim, or it could mean that it actually depicted[ ]
[Coppola] approaching topless female extras.” The court then
concluded that Coppola’s denial that he kissed topless extras
(even if construed as a tacit admission that he kissed clothed
extras) combined with videos that the court said “may not clearly
show kissing (as opposed to maybe leaning in and whispering)”
demonstrated a probability that Coppola would prove the
statement libelous. The trial court then went further, asserting
that Coppola had shown a probability of prevailing even if it were
14
undisputed that he did kiss female actors because the court could
not be sure whether they wanted it: “[E]ven if [Coppola] did kiss
the women, whether or not they were uncomfortable and thus did
not welcome hugging and/or kissing—a defamatory implication
that [Coppola] was committing unwanted touching (battery)—is
something that can only be ascertained through witness
statements, and thus presents a question of fact.”
The trial court’s ruling also found even aspects of the
Variety article that were not quoted in the complaint as a basis
for libel to be potentially libelous: recounting Coppola’s purported
apology announcement to the cast and crew (“‘Sorry, if I come up
to you and kiss you. Just know it’s solely for my pleasure’”) and
the article’s statement that crew members exchanged
uncomfortable looks with one another when Coppola hugged and
kissed extras. The court did find, however, that “the lack of an
HR department/traditional checks and balances aspect of the
article” was not “defamatory [ ]or false.”3
On the question of malice, the trial court determined
Coppola is a public figure required to plead and prove actual
malice as defined in New York Times, but the court did not decide
whether the standard has to be pled with specificity. Instead, the
trial court found Coppola’s complaint went “beyond simple
recitation of the legal standard of actual malice” because Coppola
3
Although the trial court so found, and although it was
uncontested that all the pertinent allegations in Coppola’s
complaint arose from anti-SLAPP protected activity, the trial
court did not grant defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the
pertinent HR department/traditional checks and balances
allegations. It instead denied the anti-SLAPP motion, which
sought to strike the complaint in its entirety.
15
alleged his appearance in the nightclub scene was intentional
and defendants therefore (somehow) “either knew their [on-set
sources’] description of the scene was false, or acted recklessly
with regard to the truth or falsity of their account of the scene’s
filming.” Because defendants had conceded for purposes of their
motion that Coppola could support allegations of actual malice
with evidence, the court believed it would be appropriate to grant
Coppola leave to amend the complaint “to plead additional facts
regarding actual malice . . . because such amendment goes to the
second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis and would not have the
effect of removing the allegations from the scope of [section]
425.16[.]” The trial court also determined Coppola did not plead
special damages but concluded he was not required to do so
because he alleged defamation per se. The trial court
emphasized, however, that “leave to amend to allege any special
damages which [Coppola] sees fit is also proper.”
II. DISCUSSION
The trial court’s anti-SLAPP analysis is flawed and
requires reversal. As we first summarize and then explain in
greater detail, Coppola did not carry his burden to establish his
libel allegations possess the requisite minimal merit; some of the
statements he attacks do not include a provably false assertion of
fact, and for those that do, he did not make an adequate prima
facie showing of falsity.4
4
Because we so hold, we need not consider any of
defendants’ other arguments for reversal, including the argument
that actual malice was insufficiently alleged.
16
Coppola does not dispute he kissed some female extras
while filming the nightclub scene, and defendants’ suggestion
that their videos appear to corroborate the Guardian’s reporting
is a statement of opinion that is not actionable as libel. The
statement that Coppola often inadvertently inserted himself into
shots and ruined them is a combination of non-actionable opinion
and a factual statement for which Coppola has provided no
evidence of falsity: the idea that Coppola ruined the shots is
obviously a matter of non-actionable opinion (as Coppola’s own
declaration confirms), and although Coppola maintains his
appearance in shots from the nightclub scene was unavoidable in
some instances and intentional in others, he has not shown his
appearance was not at times both avoidable and unintentional.
The HR and “checks and balances” statements in the article are
not false because it is uncontroverted that Coppola’s
independently-financed film did not have the same compliance
infrastructure as a studio film.
A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step
process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e]
from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’
[Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected
activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.’” [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the
court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) An order denying an anti-SLAPP
motion is reviewed de novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)
17
Coppola bears the burden of proof at the second step of
anti-SLAPP analysis, but the burden “is a limited one.” (Wilson
v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891.) A
plaintiff “need not prove her case to the court [citation]; the bar
sits lower, at a demonstration of ‘minimal merit’ [citation]. At
this stage, ‘“[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the
plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima
facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.
It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s
claim as a matter of law.”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Libel is publication of defamatory matter by written or
printed words. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, 45.) “The tort of defamation
‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d)
unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that
causes special damage.’ [Citation.]” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40
Cal.4th 683, 720.) Additionally, “a plaintiff who is a public figure
must prove the defendant intentionally published a false
statement of fact with actual malice.” (OneTaste Inc. v. Netflix
(2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 174, 188.) This standard, which the high
court established in New York Times, requires a public figure
plaintiff to prove the statement was made “with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.” (New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 279-280; accord
Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244,
256.)
18
B. Coppola Failed to Show His Libel Claim Has
Minimal Merit
“‘“The sine qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the
existence of a falsehood.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Brodeur v.
Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 665, 678.)
“Because defamation requires a falsehood, it is sometimes said
that an opinion, which is neither true nor false, is not actionable.
This is an oversimplification. Statements of opinion do not enjoy
blanket protection. [Citation.] The issue is whether the
statement of opinion implies a statement of fact. ‘Statements of
opinion that imply a false assertion of fact are actionable.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Dickinson v. Cosby (2017) 17
Cal.App.5th 655, 685; accord GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141, 156 [“where an expression of opinion
implies a false assertion of fact, the opinion can constitute
actionable defamation”].)
“‘The “crucial question of whether challenged statements
convey the requisite factual imputation is ordinarily a question of
law for the court. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “Only once the court
has determined that a statement is reasonably susceptible to
such a defamatory interpretation does it become a question for
the trier of fact whether or not it was so understood. [Citations.]”
[Citation.] The question is “‘whether a reasonable fact finder
could conclude the published statement declares or implies a
provably false assertion of fact. . . .’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]”5 (Dickinson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 686; accord
GetFugu, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 155-156.)
5
Even if the trial court erred in declining to consider the
Jager declaration, there is no merit to Coppola’s contention that
Jager’s view is dispositive as to whether the challenged
19
When determining whether a statement makes a provably
false assertion of fact, courts look to the totality of the
circumstances. (Dickinson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 686;
GetFugu, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 156.) The court “‘must put
itself in the place of an average reader and determine the natural
and probable effect of the statement . . . .’ [Citation.] Thus, a
court considers both the language of the statement and the
context in which it is made. [Citations.]” (Bently Reserve LP v.
Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 427.)
Among other things, “[i]n considering the language of the
statement itself, we look at whether the purported opinion
discloses all of the facts on which it is based and does not imply
that there are other, unstated facts which support the opinion. If
that is the case, the statement is defamatory only if the disclosed
facts themselves are false and defamatory. [Citation.] We also
consider whether the statement was cautiously phrased in terms
of the author’s impression. [Citation.]” (Dickinson, supra, 17
Cal.App.5th at 686.) “In considering the context of the statement,
we look at facts including the audience to whom the statement
was directed [citation], the forum in which the statement was
statements constitute false statements of fact. Expert testimony
may be admissible to aid a jury in determining how an average
reader would construe the challenged statements (Weller v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d
991, 1007-1009), but courts do not defer to experts in the initial
assessment of whether a statement is reasonably susceptible to a
defamatory interpretation. (Janney v. CSAA Ins. Exchange
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 374, 391 [“‘There are limits to expert
testimony, not the least of which is the prohibition against
admission of an expert’s opinion on a question of law’”].)
20
made [citation], and the author of the statement [citation].”
(Ibid.)
In addition to identifying statements that include factual
assertions, a public figure plaintiff “who seeks to recover
damages for a defamatory statement bears the burden of proving
that the challenged statement was false. [Citation.] The plaintiff
cannot be said to have carried this burden so long as the
statement appears substantially true. To bar liability, ‘“it is
sufficient if the substance of the charge be proved true,
irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.”
[Citations.] . . . [Citation.] . . . Minor inaccuracies do not amount
to falsity so long as “the substance, the gist, the sting, of the
libelous charge be justified.” [Citations.] Put another way, the
statement is not considered false unless it “would have a different
effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded
truth would have produced.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”6 (Vogel v.
Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1021, fn. and italics omitted.)
1. Statements concerning Coppola kissing extras
As we have discussed, defendants’ headline refers to “Video
of Francis Ford Coppola Kissing ‘Megalopolis’ Extras,” and the
article introduces the videos as “show[ing] the legendary director
6
Coppola suggests in the introduction to his respondent’s
brief that defendants’ concession as to evidence of actual malice
also amounts to a concession as to falsity. The trial court did not
read the concession that way, and neither do we. Defendants
conceded only that if Coppola made a sufficient showing of
falsity—and his pleading of actual malice was adequate—he
would not have to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of
actual malice.
21
trying to kiss young female extras on the set of his ambitious sci-
fi epic.” The article then states “[t]he videos would appear to
corroborate a bombshell report in the Guardian that claimed the
85-year-old director ‘tried to kiss some of the topless and scantily
clad female extras’ and told them ‘he was “trying to get them in
the mood.”’”
Coppola alleges defendants falsely claimed he “‘tried to kiss
some of the topless . . . female extras’” because “[t]he video
showed no such thing . . . .” Coppola states in his declaration
that “[a]t no time on the set of Megalopolis did [he] ever hug or
kiss an actress who was topless,” and the video embedded in
defendants’ article “confirms that.”
Of course, Coppola does not deny that he kissed extras
during filming of the nightclub scene, or even that the videos
show him doing so. The only proposition relevant to kissing
extras he alleges is false is that the women were topless at the
time. Defendants’ article, however, did not state they were.
Rather, the carefully worded statement in the article is that the
videos appear to corroborate other reporting by the Guardian
concerning kissing of other topless women and, so phrased, the
Variety article’s statement is non-actionable opinion about the
videos’ content.
The words “would appear” signal that an interpretation or
opinion follows.7 (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986)
7
Indeed, Jager acknowledged as much in his declaration—
“the phrase ‘would appear’ undercuts” the suggestion that the
Guardian’s reporting is true because “‘would’ is conditional and
‘appear’ is hypothetical compared to ‘is’ or other forms of the verb
‘to be’”—but he suggested “the average reader w[ould] overlook or
not even notice these nuances.”
22
42 Cal.3d 254, 260-261 [“Where the language of the statement is
‘cautiously phrased in terms of apparency,’ the statement is less
likely to be reasonably understood as a statement of fact rather
than opinion”], fn. omitted.) Coppola’s counterarument is that
defendants characterized the Guardian’s article as a “bombshell,”
which commands attention. But language that signals an author
is expressing an opinion is no less effective simply because the
subject matter is provocative or “commands attention.”
Moreover, even if we assume the impact of “appears” on the
average reader may be diluted by the subject matter, the framing
that the videos appear “to corroborate” the Guardian’s reporting
also signals the videos do not independently prove Coppola tried
to kiss topless extras. Merriam-Webster defines “corroborate” to
mean “to support or help prove with evidence or authority” or to
“make more certain.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corroborate> [as of
Apr. 8, 2026].) Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines
the word to mean “5. To strengthen (an opinion, statement,
argument, etc.) by concurrent or agreeing statements or evidence;
to make more sure or certain; to support, confirm . . . .” (Oxford
English Dict. Online (2025) <https://www.oed.com/dictionary/
corroborate_v?tab=meaning_and_use#8212936> [as of Apr. 8,
2026].) Black’s Law Dictionary is in accord. (Black’s Law Dict.
(12th ed. 2024) [“corroborate” means “[t]o strengthen or confirm;
to make more certain”].)
Read as a whole, defendants’ description of the videos
conveys defendants’ impression that they lend support to the
Guardian’s reporting.8 The implied factual assertion is that the
8
This construction of defendants’ language is reinforced by
the broader context of the article. Defendants do not include the
23
videos may depict conduct supporting the claim that Coppola
tried to kiss topless extras. Insofar as Coppola does not dispute
that the videos show him kissing several extras during a shoot at
which at least some extras were topless, he has not made a prima
facie showing that defendants’ assessment of the evidentiary
value of the videos—an issue distinct from the ultimate truth of
the Guardian’s reporting—is false. The uncontested assertion
that Coppola kissed some of the extras in the scene lends support
to the claim that he tried to kiss other specific extras in the
scene.9 Coppola’s quarrel on this score—if he has one—is with
the Guardian, not Variety.10
word “topless” in their initial summary of the videos: “Video has
surfaced of director Francis Ford Coppola that shows the
legendary director trying to kiss young female extras . . . .” The
reference to the Guardian article appears in a subsequent
paragraph.
9
Coppola’s suggestion that the videos “confirm” he did not
kiss topless extras during filming of the nightclub scene lacks
merit. The videos, totaling less than one minute, are not a
complete record of the shoot. According to Coppola, the nightclub
scene required multiple takes lasting up to 13 minutes each.
Insofar as Coppola alleges liability based on defendants’
statements characterizing his conduct as “unprofessional,” this is
also non-actionable opinion. There is no implication that this
characterization is based on undisclosed facts, and professional
norms are highly subjective. (See Reed v. Gallagher (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 841, 857 [statement characterizing attorney as
“unscrupulous” constituted non-actionable opinion because
“[s]uch subjective judgments are incapable of being proved true or
false”].)
10
Coppola’s assertion that defendants’ reference to the
Guardian’s reporting “does not insulate [them] from liability”
24
2. Statements concerning Coppola’s appearance in
shots
Coppola believes the article’s statement that he was “‘often
inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining it’”
suggests he “was so incompetent that he no longer understood
where cameras were located on the set and no longer understood
camera angles” and he “was wasting money because the whole
scene, with hundreds of people involved, would have to be shot
again.” Because it is undisputed that Coppola was filmed on the
dance floor, the key elements of this statement for our purposes
because they may also be liable for “repeating the false claim that
the videos showed Coppola kissing topless actresses” lacks merit.
It is not settled in California whether a “neutral reportage
privilege” applies to the republication of defamatory statements
concerning public figures. (Khawar v. Globe Intern., Inc. (1998)
19 Cal.4th 254, 271.) But Coppola’s complaint does not allege
defendants are liable for republishing the Guardian’s reporting.
To the contrary, the complaint alleges defendants “false[ly]
claim[ed] that a video attached to the [a]rticle showed that
Coppola ‘. . . “tried to kiss some of the topless . . . female
extras” . . . .’” In other words, Coppola premises defendants’
liability on their assessment of the videos’ contents—not on their
repetition of the Guardian’s reporting. In this context, we assess
defendants’ reference to the Guardian’s reporting as part of the
totality of the circumstances concerning their statements about
the videos. (Vogel, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 1017, fn. 3 [“‘The
general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must
be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the
complaint’”]; Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240,
1263 [“On review of a special motion to strike pursuant to section
425.16, we must take the complaint as it is”].)
25
are that this was “‘often inadvertent[ ]’” and that he was
“‘ruining’” shots.
Whether Coppola often inadvertently walked into shots is a
matter of fact. But Coppola has failed to make a prima facie
showing that it is false. Coppola’s claim that he was to have a
cameo in the scene is not inconsistent with the claim that he
inadvertently appeared in shots at other times. Coppola’s
alternative explanation that it was inevitable he and other crew
members would appear in certain shots—with multiple cameras
“mov[ing] around the action to obtain a variety of perspectives”—
suffers from the same defect. Evidence that Coppola sometimes
intentionally or unavoidably appeared in shots does not amount
to a prima facie showing that he did not also walk into shots
inadvertently.
The assertion that Coppola was “‘ruining’” shots suffers
from the opposite problem: it is not, in context, provably false.
Coppola’s own declaration underscores the subjective judgment
involved in determining whether a shot is good or usable. For
example, he avers that, “[o]ver the years, [he] ha[s] often used
what others consider ‘mistakes’ in filming to achieve success
artistically.” In a similar vein, Coppola emphasizes that a
“motion picture director is the creative force behind a film,” who
“must have a vision of the completed project” that is “carried on
through the editing process.” Moreover, “[i]t is not until the
editing process that a director makes the final decision about
which scenes work, which do not, what is creative, and what is
mundane.” Coppola further stresses the need for “[t]he cast and
crew . . . to trust that the director knows what he or she is doing
and trust the director’s vision.” In other words, a crew member
who lacks trust in Coppola’s undisclosed (or at least difficult-to-
26
communicate) vision is not provably wrong—at most, their
aesthetic judgment is different than Coppola’s.
Coppola attempts to cast the statement that he was
“‘ruining’” shots as a factual proposition by arguing it implies the
scene had to be shot again. Coppola does not, however, dispute
that he shot multiple takes of the nightclub scene, and he does
not discuss why it was necessary to do so. The issue, therefore, is
whether the anonymous source’s opinion regarding the reason for
the multiple takes implies a false statement of fact. And that
brings us back to the (non-factual) question of whether the source
had insufficient trust in Coppola’s vision. Coppola offers no
evidence that his inadvertent appearance in shots filmed for the
nightclub scene was not part of the reason that multiple takes
were needed.
3. Statements concerning the lack of traditional
checks and balances
Coppola alleges “[t]he [a]rticle . . . falsely accused [him] of
running a motion picture production that had ‘none of the
traditional checks and balances in place’ and of not having ‘[ ]its
own HR department involved with the production.’”11 He has
failed, however, to make a prima facie showing that defendants’
statements are false.
Even if Locke’s declaration establishes there were some
“checks and balances” in place, this is not inconsistent with
11
The complaint misquotes defendants’ article. The article
does not assert Coppola’s production lacked “its own HR
department”—it states “there wasn’t an outside studio or
streamer with its own HR department involved with the
production.” (Emphasis added.)
27
defendants’ qualified statement that the production lacked
“traditional” checks and balances. In context, defendants
juxtaposed a self-financed, independent production with a major
studio production, with the latter embodying a “traditional”
compliance infrastructure.12 Coppola effectively concedes the
validity of this dichotomy in his declaration, explaining that
“[w]hen a motion picture is financed by a major studio, the studio
provides its infrastructure in connection with the production,
including, among others, . . . Human Resources departments[ ]
and legal support. An independently financed motion picture
does not come with that same infrastructure.”
The thrust of defendants’ statement, which Coppola does
not dispute, is that Coppola’s financing of the project meant he
did not answer to anyone else. This is true regardless of whether
there were channels through which extras could complain about
Coppola’s conduct—as Locke described in her declaration.
12
As the article puts it, “[U]nlike traditional movies, Coppola
financed the entire $120 million budget himself, so there were
none of the traditional checks and balances in place.”
28
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendants’ motion to strike is reversed.
The trial court is directed to enter a new and different order
granting the motion and striking the complaint in its entirety.
Defendants are awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
29