Filed 7/20/26 Cooney v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist. Bd. of Ed. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
NATALIE COONEY, D087159
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CIVRS2501133)
v.
CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Tony Raphael, Judge. Affirmed.
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Mark R. Bresee, William A.
Diedrich, and Anthony P. DeMarco for Defendants and Appellants.
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Hannah Weinstein, Julia Harumi Mass,
and Laura Carver for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Natalie Cooney sued the Chino Valley Unified School District (District)
based on events that occurred when she spoke at a Board of Education
(Board) meeting. She alleged the District violated her free speech and
government petitioning rights at the meeting and then retaliated against her
after the meeting concluded. Cooney named five current and former
members of the Board—Sonja Shaw, Jonathan Monroe, Donald Bridge,
Andrew Cruz, and James Na (together, “the individual defendants”)—as
additional defendants to the lawsuit in their official capacities.
The District and individual defendants (collectively, the District
defendants) filed a special motion to strike three causes of action under the
anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.1 The motion
asserted that Cooney’s claims were based on protected speech of the District
defendants within the meaning of the statute. The trial court denied the
motion.
After conducting an independent review, we affirm. We agree with the
trial court that Cooney sustained her burden of proving her claims have
sufficient probability of success to proceed forward.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
“ ‘SLAPP’ is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 381, fn. 1 (Baral).)
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Statement of Facts2
Cooney is an American Sign Language (ASL) teacher at Ayala High
School, where she has been employed since 2020. She also serves as the
faculty advisor to three student groups, the ASL Club, the Key Club, and the
Gender Sexuality Alliance (GSA). As faculty advisor, she helps the groups
apply for funding, accompanies the student members on field trips, and
assists with event planning.
A. The District Proposes a New Policy at a September 5, 2024 Board
Meeting
At a public meeting on September 5, 2024, the Board “received for
information” a proposed new policy called “Board Policy 0100.1—No
Deception” for District schools that addressed—in broad terms—the
disclosure of information about students to their parents and guardians. The
proposed No Deception policy was listed on the meeting agenda as an
“information” item. It read as follows:
“CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
(CVUSD) IS COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING ITS
HISTORICAL CULTURE OF TRANSPARENCY AND
TRUST BETWEEN ITSELF, EMPLOYEES, AND THE
FAMILIES IT SERVES. . . .
2 Under the governing standard of review, we examine the evidence de
novo and we “accept[ ] the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluate[ ] the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a
matter of law.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 385.)
3
“TO UPHOLD THESE VALUES, CVUSD AND ITS
EMPLOYEES SHALL AT ALL TIMES BE TRUTHFUL
AND HONEST AND NOT MISREPRESENT, EITHER
DIRECTLY OR BY OMISSION, TO ANY PARENT OR
GUARDIAN ANY SCHOOL-RELATED UNDERTAKINGS
AND INFORMATION THAT AFFECTS THEIR CHILD’S
EDUCATION AND WELL-BEING. . . .
“THE CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT IS
COMMITTED TO:
• “FULL TRANSPARENCY: ALL
COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARENTS AND
GUARDIANS WILL BE TRUTHFUL, ACCURATE,
AND COMPLETE. STAFF SHALL PROVIDE ALL
REVELANT INFORMATION, EVEN IF NOT
DIRECTLY REQUESTED BY THE PARENT OR
GUARDIAN, WHEN IT PERTAINS TO THE
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND EDUCATION OF THEIR
CHILD.
• “NO OMISSION: WITHHOLDING INFORMATION
OR PROVIDING PARTIAL INFORMATION THAT
MAY MISLEAD OR CREATE A FALSE
UNDERSTANDING IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.”
B. The Board Allegedly Violates Cooney’s Free Speech Rights at a
September 19, 2024 Board Meeting
Cooney learned about the proposed No Deception policy and was
concerned. As she explained, “Although the language of the [proposed] policy
was vague, I believed that it would be implemented in a way that would
require teachers to disclose students’ gender identities or sexual orientation
to their parents, even if this put the students at risk of harm.”3 Based on a
3 Cooney referred to this type of policy as a “forced outing policy.”
4
recent court ruling against the District, Cooney also believed the proposed
policy was illegal. On September 13, 2024, students in the GSA club asked
Cooney to speak at the next Board meeting about these concerns and the
negative impact they believed the policy would have on students’ mental
health.
The next Board meeting was scheduled for September 19, 2024. The
meeting agenda listed the proposed policy as an agenda item. The agenda
entry appeared in the “INFORMATION” section and provided, “New Board
Policy, Philosophy, Goals, Objectives & Comprehensive Plans 0100.1—No
Deception. [¶] Board President Sonja Shaw recommends the
Board . . . receive for information new Board Policy Philosophy, Goals,
Objectives & Comprehensive Plans 0100.1—No Deception.” (Boldface
removed.)
The materials that accompanied the agenda included a memorandum
from Shaw to the Board. The memorandum stated, “Board policies,
administrative regulations, and Bylaws of the Board are routinely developed,
revised, or deleted as a result of changes in law, mandates, and federal
regulations, and as necessary. [¶] Sacramento has recently created new laws
designed to strip away parental rights by keeping secrets from parents.
These new laws are in contradiction to a District core value of open trust and
communication. The Board of Education believes that deceptive processes or
systems, including but not limited to false representation, omission, practices
that mislead or are likely to mislead parents/guardians about the true nature
of a situation or event are against the District’s responsibilities, beliefs,
values, and tenets.”
The memorandum stated that “President Shaw submitted this agenda
item in accordance with Board Bylaw 9322—Agenda/Meeting Materials,” and
5
that the agenda item “was provided as information to the Board on
September 5, 2024, and on September 19, 2024, for a second reading as
amended.” The memorandum provided a red-lined copy of the proposed
amended policy. It explained, “New language is provided in UPPER CASE
while language to be deleted is lined through. New language after the first
reading is provided in BOLD UPPERCASE.”
The No Deception policy, as amended, read as follows:
“NO DECEPTION
“CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
(CVUSD) IS COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING ITS
HISTORICAL CULTURE OF TRANSPARENCY AND
TRUST BETWEEN ITSELF, EMPLOYEES, AND THE
FAMILIES IT SERVES. ‘PARENTS AND GUARDIANS
OF PUPILS ENROLLED IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
HAVE THE RIGHT AND SHOULD HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY, AS MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE AND
RESPECTFUL PARTNERS IN THE EDUCATION OF
THEIR CHILDREN WITHIN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, TO BE INFORMED BY THE SCHOOL,
AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EDUCATION OF
THEIR CHILDREN....’ (ED[ ]. CODE § 51101;
EMPHASIS ADDED).) FOR EXAMPLE, EDUCATION
CODE SECTION 51101 LISTS DIFFERENT
PARENT/GUARDIAN RIGHTS WHICH ARE
OUTLINED IN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
5020 (PARENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES).
“TO UPHOLD THESE VALUES, CVUSD AND ITS
EMPLOYEES SHALL AT ALL TIMES BE TRUTHFUL
AND HONEST AND NOT MISREPRESENT, EITHER
DIRECTLY OR BY OMISSION, TO ANY PARENT OR
GUARDIAN ANY SCHOOL-RELATED UNDERTAKINGS
AND INFORMATION THAT AFFECTS THEIR CHILD’S
EDUCATION AND WELL-BEING. CVUSD IS
COMMITTED TO:
6
“THE CHINO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT IS
COMMITTED TO:
• “FULL TRANSPARENCY: ALL
COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARENTS AND
GUARDIANS WILL BE TRUTHFUL, ACCURATE,
AND COMPLETE. STAFF SHALL PROVIDE ALL
REVELANT INFORMATION, EVEN IF NOT
DIRECTLY REQUESTED BY THE PARENT OR
GUARDIAN, WHEN IT PERTAINS TO THE
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND EDUCATION OF THEIR
CHILD.
• “NO OMISSION: WITHHOLDING INFORMATION
OR PROVIDING PARTIAL INFORMATION THAT
MAY MISLEAD OR CREATE A FALSE
UNDERSTANDING IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
“FOR PURPOSES OF THIS BOARD POLICY,
FAMILY CODE SECTION 6924, HEALTH AND
SAFETY CODE SECTION 124260, AND EDUCATION
CODE SECTION 49602[SUBDIVISION] (C),
INCLUSION OF PARENT(S)/GUARDIAN(S) IS
APPROPRIATE UNLESS SPECIFICALLY
PROHIBITED BY LAW. NOTHING IN THIS POLICY
AFFECTS THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE DISTRICT’S
EMPLOYEES, ADMINISTRATORS, AND
CERTIFICATED STAFF AS MANDATED
REPORTERS UNDER ARTICLE 2.5 OF THE CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING ACT
SECTIONS 11164-11174.3 OF THE PENAL CODE,
AND THE DISTRICT POLICY 5141 AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 5141.4(A)).”
Important here, the provisions of the Family Code, Health and
Safety Code, and Education Code that are cited in the new language in the
proposed No Deception policy address the confidentiality of disclosures to
mental health professionals made by minors during mental health
counseling. For minors who are 12 years of age or older who are “mature
7
enough to participate intelligently,” the Health and Safety Code and
Family Code provisions allow mental health professionals to refrain from
involving the minor’s parent or guardian in the treatment when “the
professional person who is treating or counseling the minor, after consulting
with the minor, determines the involvement would be inappropriate.”
(Health & Saf. Code, § 124260, subds. (b)(1), (c); Fam. Code, § 6924,
subds. (b), (d).) The cited Education Code provision allows school counselors
to disclose or refrain from disclosing “information of a personal nature
disclosed by a pupil 12 years of age or older” to the pupil’s parents or
guardians when disclosure or nondisclosure would result or avert a “clear and
present danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the pupil.” (Ed. Code,
§ 49602.)
On September 19, 2024, Cooney arrived at the Board meeting and
“signed up to make a comment during the ‘No Deception’ policy agenda item.”
Board Bylaw 9323 provides, in relevant part, “The Board shall give members
of the public an opportunity to address the Board on any item on the agenda
either before or during the Board’s consideration of the item.” (Italics added.)
The bylaw further provides, “The Board president may rule on the
appropriateness of a topic, subject to the following conditions: [¶] a) If the
topic would be more suitably addressed at a later time, the Board president
may indicate the time and place when it should be presented; b) The Board
shall not prohibit public criticism of its policies, procedures, programs,
services, acts, or omissions (Government Code [section] 54954.3).” (Italics
added.)
Board Bylaw 9323 also provides, “The Board president shall not permit
actual disruption of Board meetings.” It further provides, “The Board
president or designee may remove an individual for actually disrupting the
8
meeting. Prior to removal, the individual shall be warned that their behavior
is disrupting the meeting and that failure to cease the disruptive behavior
may result in removal. If, after being warned, the individual does not
promptly cease the disruptive behavior, the Board President, or designee,
may then remove the individual from the meeting.” The bylaw defines
“Disrupting” to mean “engaging in behavior during a Board meeting that
actually disrupts, disturbs, impedes, or renders infeasible the orderly conduct
of the meeting and includes, but is not limited to, a failure to comply with
reasonable and lawful regulations adopted by a legislative body pursuant to
section 54954.3 or any other law, or engaging in behavior that constitutes use
of force or a true threat of force.”
According to a transcript of the meeting prepared by the District, five
members of the public asked to speak about “information items” on the
agenda.4 When the first speaker began by stating, “Chino Valley School
Board recently lost in court . . . ,” Shaw, the Board President, immediately
interrupted the speaker and said, “If you’re talking about the court case . . .
you’re going to have to skip over that[;] that was an agenda item.” Shaw
4 In support of their anti-SLAPP motion, counsel for the District
defendants authenticated a link to an archived video recording of the Board
meeting on YouTube. Counsel for the District defendants represented that
YouTube is “where the Board streams then archives videos of all public Board
meetings,” and Cooney agreed in her opposition to the motion that the link is
to an authentic copy of a video recording of the September 19, 2024 Board
meeting. We used this authenticated link to access and review the video
recording.
9
continued, “You’re talking about the item in court, that was [an] agenda item,
so please move on from that and address any other items.5”
The speaker explained that her comments were related to the proposed
No Deception policy. She continued her speech and asserted that, in her
view, the District’s previous “illegal forced outing policy” had been
“rebuke[d]” by the court in pending litigation, and the proposed policy was
“[a] third attempt at a policy [the District had] been told over and over again
is discriminatory.” She expressed concern that the proposed policy would
make the District a place “where students do not feel safe,” and that it would
result in further litigation, “sending even more of our classroom dollars to
lawyers.”
After the first speaker concluded, Shaw said, “If you guys are gonna use
this time as a public comment time[,] I’m gonna have to direct you back. This
is in regards to an item number that’s on information, so, I . . . will ask them
to mute the [microphone] if we can’t follow the rules here.” Cooney was the
next speaker. She announced that she would be speaking about the “new
Board policy,” and she asked for “clarification” as to whether she could
address it. Shaw said, “[T]hat’s fine. We just want you to . . . stick to that
item.”
Cooney began her comments and said, “The . . . Board has consistently
passed policies, like the new policy, that impacts our LGBTQ students in a
negative way . . . .” Shaw interrupted her and said, “I’m gonna have to stop
you. It has to be germane specifically to the item.” Cooney replied, “It is.”
5 The Board’s September 19, 2024 meeting agenda listed as an agenda
item, “conference with legal counsel—existing litigation” to be discussed in a
closed session. (Capitalization and underline removed.) The closed session
had already taken place.
10
Shaw accused Cooney of “yell[ing] out,”6 and told her, “that’s your first
warning.” After Cooney said, “Okay,” Shaw told Cooney that her comments
“cannot be broad, that’s a public comment.”
Cooney attempted to continue and said, “As a GSA club advisor, . . .
several students have expressed the feelings of being unwanted and
unwelcome. [A] 2023 . . . national survey on mental health of the LGBTQ
youth found that 41 students have . . .” But Shaw interrupted again and
said, “[Y]ou’re still not talking about the No Deception [policy],” and cut off
the microphone.
The District Superintendent, Norm Enfield,7 spoke up and told Cooney,
“[W]hen providing comments on this particular Board policy, you need to get
specifically into the language of the policy, and what are your concerns with
that language.” Cooney said, “Okay, and Enfield continued, “What we’re
trying to say [is] because it’s an information item[,] it needs to be that specific
on the item. So you have to go to the language, look at the language, and
address what you think is wrong or what you like, but it needs to be specific
onto the language. I hope that clarifies what we mean by being germane [to]
that language.” Cooney had attended other Board meetings and had “never
observed the Board restrict public comment based on the agenda items
designation as either [an] ‘information item’ or [an] ‘action item.’ ”
Cooney then read out loud from the policy and said she was concerned
that the language did not clearly state what it meant and that it was directed
at “forced outing.” She said, “And so what I’m saying to you is that, that
6 As we noted, we have reviewed the video recording of the meeting.
Cooney was not yelling.
7 Enfield was also a Board member.
11
policy, which you guys tried to pass and now again are trying to repackage
and regift to us, it impacts our students.” Cooney tried to continue, saying,
“In . . . 2023, last year, the[ ] mental health of youth and LGBT[Q]
students . . .” but Shaw cut off the microphone again and said, “Okay, you
addressed your concerns, if you have any more concerns about the language,
you may speak, if not, then it’s time to move on. [¶] You continue to talk
about the broad policies; we’re not talking about the broad policies we’re
talking specifically about this policy.” When Shaw reinstated the
microphone, Cooney attempted to continue speaking, and said, “I’m talking
about this specific policy being broad, and [¶] therefore impacting our
students, and . . . [af]fecting their mental health . . . .” Again, Shaw cut her
off and called the next speaker.
At the request of the next speaker, a former student, Cooney remained
at the lectern to provide moral support. Shaw interrupted the former student
after she introduced herself and attempted to tell a story. Shaw asked her
whether she had concerns with specific language in the policy. When the
former student responded, “My specific concern is that you are using this
policy to put students in danger,” Shaw cut her off and said, “Okay—we’re
done. Next speaker please. I’ve given you plenty of opportunities to address
the language. I’m sorry.”
Before continuing with the meeting, Shaw accused Cooney of
improperly supporting the former student, saying, “And as an adult, please
don’t put a child in that situation. You should know better as a teacher.
Next speaker please.” When Cooney tried to respond to this comment, Shaw
accused her again of disrupting a public meeting and said the meeting would
not continue until she left. Two security guards then approached Cooney.
After an unrecorded discussion with the security guards, Cooney left.
12
When the meeting reconvened, with Cooney no longer present, Enfield
spoke up again and said, “[W]hen you’re looking at an information item, I just
want to remind the Board, along with the public, that it’s not a conversation
of . . . opinions, it’s looking at the specific language within a policy when it’s
an information item, and it would be a suggestion of, ‘I see we added some
bold language, next time could we remove [the] language?’ or ‘I see we struck
out a piece of the language, I would like to see that language come back. [I]t’s
not a full[-]on conversation and opinions about the policy. It’s about the
specific language in there, and the Board has to be very careful on that,
because it’s not a time for a conversation. When it comes back, on the
consent, or as an action item, that is the time that you would have a full-
blown conversation, and the public would have a conversation regarding that
language. So[,] when an item is under information, it is very limited on what
you can discuss and talk about.”
C. The District Allegedly Retaliates Against Cooney After the Board
Meeting
According to Cooney, the day after the Board meeting, and again on
September 23, 2024, the principal at Ayala High School, Diana Yarboi, called
Cooney into her office. Yarboi told Cooney that she had violated the District’s
social media policy because the ASL Club had posted video clips of the Board
meeting on its social media account and criticized the Board. Based on text
messages shown to her by Yarboi, Cooney concluded the demand to take
down the Club’s social media posts came from Shaw. Cooney explained that
she did not have control or oversight authority over the ASL Club accounts
because they were student-run.
Between September 25 and October 2, 2024, Cooney sent emails to
District administrators about fundraising requests for GSA. The District,
13
uncharacteristically, did not provide a timely response “even though similar
requests for other clubs were being approved at that time.” Then, on
October 2, Enfield and Yarboi came unannounced to Cooney’s classroom
along with Shaw and Bridge, another Board member, who “stared at [her]
from the back of the classroom” for about 10 minutes. Board members had
never before come to observe Cooney teach a class. Next, on October 7,
Yarboi notified Cooney by email that the school had cancelled a GSA field trip
to a Red Cross Blood Drive that had been approved three weeks earlier.
On October 13, 2024, Cooney chaperoned a field trip to an AIDS Walk
with student members of the Key Club and GSA. That evening, a social
media post showed a video clip of the walk and accused her of being a
“groomer.” The posts included the hashtags “ ‘#nogroomersallowed’ ” and
“ ‘#saveourchildrenfrompedophiles.’ ” Shaw and another Board member
responded by liking the post.
On October 16, 2024, the day before the next Board meeting, Cooney
was notified that she was being placed on administrative leave because the
District was investigating allegations of “ ‘inappropriate conduct.’ ” Cooney
had never been subject to disciplinary action. She asked for information
about the allegations and was given none. She was physically escorted off
the campus.
The next day, October 17, 2024, the Board approved the No Deception
policy. Cooney watched the meeting after it was posted on YouTube. During
the time for public comment, two friends of Shaw’s spoke. They each said
that a teacher had been placed on administrative leave, and one of them said
it was for “inappropriate behavior.” Later, speaking as President of the
Board, Shaw said that what she sees “behind the scenes” at the District’s
14
schools “freaks [her] out,” and that she “heard rumors” that a teacher was on
administrative leave “for cussing and profanity.”
Cooney’s investigatory interview took place on November 6, 2024.
About 20 minutes before it began, she was provided for the first time with a
redacted copy of the parent complaint that triggered the investigation. Based
on the student information in the complaint, Cooney believed it was filed by
Shaw even though her children do not attend Ayala High School. Two days
after the interview, Cooney was notified she could return to work. A month
after that, she was informed the allegations in the parent complaint had been
deemed “ ‘unsubstantiated.’ ”
II.
Pleadings
Cooney sued the District defendants in January 2025. The verified
complaint asserted four causes of action. The first, second, and fourth causes
of action alleged the District defendants violated Cooney’s free speech rights
and the right to petition the government for redress, (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 2–
3), retaliated against her for the exercise of those free speech rights
(Cal. Const. art. I, § 2), and retaliated against her for engaging in protected
activity (Labor Code, § 98.6, 1101, subd. (b), 1102). Against the District only,
Cooney asserted a cause of action for violating the Brown Act (Gov. Code,
§§ 54953, 54954.3, 54960, 54960.1, 54960.2). Cooney sought declaratory and
injunctive relief.
The District defendants answered in June 2025. The verified answer
admitted the individual defendants were current and former members of the
Board.
III.
Anti-SLAPP Proceedings
15
In June 2025, the District defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion
challenging the first, second, and fourth causes of action. They asserted the
first cause of action—for violation of Cooney’s free speech rights—was subject
to anti-SLAPP regulation because it was based on Shaw’s protected speech at
the Board meeting.8 They asserted the second and fourth causes of action—
which assert two theories of illegal retaliation—were based in part on
statements by Shaw that were protected by her right to free speech and also
protected as written or oral statements made in connection with official
proceedings. Because Shaw’s conduct was subject to section 425.16, they
asserted the burden shifted to Cooney to make a prima facie showing that her
claims had at least minimal merit.
To support the motion, the District defendants attached and
authenticated (1) the Board meeting agenda from the September 19, 2024
meeting, (2) a video recording of the Board meeting, and (3) a copy of Board
Bylaw 9323. Additionally, as mentioned, counsel for the defendants
authenticated a link to an archived video recording of the Board meeting on
YouTube. Counsel also transcribed the recorded statements that were made
at the Board meeting during public commentary on the proposed
No Deception policy and attached the transcription as an exhibit.9
8 On appeal, the District defendants contend Cooney’s first cause of
actions is comprised of two claims, one arising from the alleged violation of
her rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress, and a
second based on allegations that the Board’s content-based regulation of
speech is “ ‘void for vagueness.’ ” The defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion,
however, did not address Cooney’s void for vagueness claim; nor did the trial
court’s ruling. Accordingly, we find the issue forfeited and do not address it.
9 Cooney did not dispute the admissibility or accuracy of the transcript
and referred to it in her opposition.
16
Cooney filed an opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion in July 2025. She
contended her claims were not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because
they arose “from concrete actions—censorship, imposition of a vague
restriction on speech, and retaliation for protected speech through adverse
employment actions—not [the District defendants’] expressions,
deliberations, or public statements.” Alternatively, she asserted the evidence
accompanying the District defendants’ motion and set forth in a declaration
she filed in support of her opposition established that her claims had at least
minimal merit.
The District defendants replied in July 2025. They continued to assert
the claims arose from protected conduct, and argued Cooney’s evidentiary
showing was insufficient to establish minimal merit.
The trial court denied the District defendants’ motion on August 14,
2025. Regarding the first cause of action, the court ruled they failed to make
the required threshold showing that Cooney’s alleged claim arose from
protected activity. The court found that the alleged violation of Cooney’s free
speech rights and right to petition the government was not based on
protected statements by Shaw. In the alternative, “even if the gravamen of
the [first] cause of action allegations concern[ed] . . . protected activity,” the
court ruled that Cooney “had a reasonable probability of prevailing” on the
merits.
Regarding the second and fourth causes of action, the trial court ruled
the District defendants established that some of the allegations of retaliation
were subject to anti-SLAPP regulations. In particular, the court found the
District defendants’ placement of Cooney on administrative leave and Shaw’s
comments at the October 17, 2024 board meeting were both protected
activity. Addressing the merits, however, the court ruled “[t]he evidence [of]
17
the events [after] Cooney spoke out sufficiently supports a reasonable
likelihood that Cooney was placed on administrative leave and her status
disclosed [at the meeting] because she engaged in protective speech and
political activities.”
DISCUSSION
I.
General Legal Principles
“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).) The statute applies to causes of
action that “arise[ ] from any act of [a] person in furtherance of the person’s
right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants from any
liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It
only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims
arising from protected activity.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.)
“A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps.” (Wilson,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) First, “the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims arise from protected
activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) Second, if
the defendant carries its first-step burden, the plaintiff must then
demonstrate its claims have at least minimal merit, meaning “there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).) If the plaintiff fails to meet its burden on the second step, the
court will strike the claim. (Wilson, at p. 884.)
18
Important here, the court’s analysis at the second step of the evaluation
is “limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and
made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384–385.) The court “accepts the
plaintiff’s evidence as true and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 385.)
In evaluating a plaintiff’s evidentiary showing, the court must also draw
“ ‘every legitimate favorable inference’ ” from the plaintiff’s evidence.
(Cuevas-Martinez v. Sun Salt Sand, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117
(Cuevas-Martinez).) After application of these standards, “claims with the
requisite minimal merit may proceed.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82, 94 (Navellier).) Our review is de novo. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006)
39 Cal.4th 299, 325 [first step]; Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019)
7 Cal.5th 781, 788 [second step].)
II.
Anti-SLAPP Motion Was Properly Denied
The District defendants contend the trial court erred when it ruled (1)
the allegations underlying the first cause of action did not arise from activity
subject to anti-SLAPP regulation, and (2) Cooney successfully demonstrated
the claims subject to the District’s anti-SLAPP motion have a reasonable
probability of prevailing. After conducting an independent review, we
conclude that Cooney established a sufficient prima facie showing to proceed
on all claims that were addressed by the anti-SLAPP motion. We thus find it
unnecessary to address whether the allegations supporting the claims arose
19
from protected activity.10 “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs
of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or
petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being
stricken under the statute.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)
A. Cooney’s Declaration Is Competent Evidence.
As a preliminary matter, the District defendants assert that Cooney’s
evidentiary showing was insufficient because she was not permitted to “rely
on the allegations in the [c]omplaint to meet her burden in the second step of
the [a]nti-SLAPP analysis.” To support this argument, they cite a statement
by our high court about competent and admissible evidence at the merits
stage of an anti-SLAPP evaluation. The court said, “As to the second step
inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not
rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made
upon competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist.
v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater).) Using a
chart, the District defendants show that Cooney’s declaration in support of
her opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion largely tracks the allegations she
made in her verified complaint. Based on this overlap, they argue the
content of her declaration is necessarily insufficient to meet her evidentiary
burden. In their view, “If a verified complaint cannot constitute sufficient
evidence to meet a plaintiff’s burden, one cannot be said to have met their
burden only by reiterating the same facts in a separate document.”
10 By electing to decide this appeal on the second prong, we do not mean
to convey doubt as to whether the trial court correctly ruled when it
addressed the first step of the evaluation. We simply need not reach that
aspect of the court’s ruling and therefore express no opinion as to it.
20
The District defendants misread the case law they have cited. Our
Supreme Court in Sweetwater has made clear that, “at the second stage of an
anti-SLAPP hearing, the court may consider affidavits, declarations, and
their equivalents if it is reasonably possible the proffered evidence set out in
those statements will be admissible at trial.” (Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 949.) This includes declarations that track the allegations in the
complaint. (See Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
665, 679.) In San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State
University Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76, 108, the court held
that a declaration by the plaintiff’s attorney that attempted to authenticate
the allegations in the complaint was inadmissible and incompetent evidence.
But that is not what happened here. Cooney herself verified the complaint
and signed her declaration in support of her opposition to the motion to strike
under penalty of perjury.
Cooney, moreover, did not solely rely on her declaration to support her
opposition. She relied on the agenda from the September 19, 2024 Board
meeting, the video recording of that meeting, and Board Bylaw 9323, which
the District defendants authenticated and submitted in support of their
motion. It is inaccurate to say she relied solely on the pleadings to oppose the
motion.
B. As to the First Cause of Action, Cooney Met Her Burden to Establish a
Prima Facie Case That the District Defendants Violated Her Right to
Free Speech and to Petition the Government for Redress
Article I, section 2, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution
provides, “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A
law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” Article I,
21
section 3, subdivision (a) provides, “The people have the right to instruct
their representatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and
assemble freely to consult for the common good.” These rights may be subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions so long as they are
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open reasonable channels for communication. (Baca v. Moreno
Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (1996) 936 F.Supp. 719, 730.)
Here, the District defendants do not dispute that (1) speech criticizing
the Board’s proposed policies is protected by the article I, sections 2 and 3, of
the California Constitution, (2) the public comment portion of the Board
meetings is designated as a limited public forum pursuant to the Brown Act,
and (3) the regulation of speech in a limited public forum must abide by the
same constitutional standards as the regulation of speech in traditional
public fora. (See generally, Baca, supra, 936 F.Supp. at pp. 726–727, 729.)
Nor do they dispute the principle that, “[a]ccess to a designated public forum
may be limited by the government if it designates public property as
available only for ‘use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain
subjects,’ ” but “[i]f the state does limit access to the forum based on subject
matter or speaker identity, access limitations must be reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum and must be viewpoint neutral.” (Id. at
p. 728–729, italics added.) They also do not dispute the principle that, while
a moderator may stop a speaker at a public forum from speaking “if his
speech becomes irrelevant or repetitious,” the “speaker may not be stopped
from speaking because the moderator disagrees with the viewpoint he [or
she] is expressing.” (White v. Norwalk (1990) 900 F.2d 1421, 1425.)
We agree with the trial court that Cooney produced ample evidence to
fulfill her burden of establishing a prima facie case that the District
22
defendants prohibited her from speaking at the September 19, 2024 Board
meeting because of the content of her speech. Board Bylaw 9323 requires the
Board to “give members of the public an opportunity to address the Board on
any item on the agenda either before or during the Board’s consideration of
the item.” (Italics added.) It does not distinguish between “action items” and
“information items.” Nor does it restrict commentary on “information items”
to opinions about proposed word choice in the manner asserted by Enfield at
the meeting. To the contrary, the bylaw instructs that “[t]he Board shall not
prohibit public criticism of its policies, procedures, programs, services, acts,
or omissions.”
Cooney signed up specifically to comment on the proposed No Deception
policy and the Board entertained comment on that agenda item. The agenda
showed the proposed changes to the No Deception policy language to include
(1) a new, broad statement about the rights of parents and guardians to
information about their children, and (2) new references to provisions of the
Family Code, Health and Safety Code, and Education Code that authorized
school counselors and other mental health providers to keep student
information confidential when disclosure would be inappropriate or present a
clear and present danger to a student. A memorandum from Shaw to the
Board about the No Deception policy agenda item explained, in broad policy
terms, that the proposed policy was a response to a disagreement by Board
members with new laws enacted by the Legislature. Shaw’s memorandum
further specifically provided, “The Board . . . believes that deceptive processes
or systems, including but not limited to false representation, omission,
practices that mislead or are likely to mislead parents/guardians about the
true nature of a situation or event are against the District’s responsibilities,
beliefs, values, and tenets.”
23
Yet, when it was Cooney’s turn to speak at the meeting, she was
repeatedly interrupted by Shaw when she attempted to criticize these aspects
of the proposed changes to the policy, even after she explained in response to
Enfield how her comments related specifically to newly added language. As
accurately summarized by the trial court, “[Cooney] asked for clarification
[about] the topic to ensure she was following the rules. Upon clarification
that her comments had to be specific to the policy, she started by expressing
her concern that the policy would have a negative impact on LGBTQ+
students. [But] Shaw interrupted and stated the comments were not
germane to the item. Although Cooney tried to explain that it was, Shaw
talked over her. Cooney then started to s[ay] that students have expressed
feelings of being unwanted and unwelcome, to which Shaw interrupted her
again and cut her microphone off. She was then told to speak specifically
about the language of the policy. So Cooney read a portion of the policy and
stated it was vague and overbroad, and expressed it would require teachers
to forcibly out students. After making this comment, Shaw interrupted and
told her that she could not make broad comments on the policy language.
Although she attempted to explain, Shaw cut off the microphone and called
the next speaker.”
We further observe that Shaw warned Cooney when she first started to
speak that she was disrupting the meeting by “yelling” when Cooney had not
actually raised her voice. And after Cooney supported the former student
who attempted to criticize the No Deception policy in way that directly
implicated the new language—stating that it “put students in danger” (see
Ed. Code, § 49602)—Shaw told Cooney that she had acted inappropriately
and “should know better as a teacher.” When Cooney attempted to respond
to this statement by Shaw, she was told she was disrupting the meeting and
24
it would not continue until she left. After being confronted by two security
guards, Cooney left. Construing this evidence in favor of Cooney, as we must
when reviewing an anti-SLAPP motion, it supports a prima facie showing of
viewpoint discrimination by the District defendants.
The District defendants contend that Shaw’s actions and statements at
the meeting were consistent with a viewpoint neutral regulation of the time
and place for comments, and that Cooney “did not present any evidence that
her viewpoint—the ‘message conveyed’—was the reason[ ] for [Shaw’s]
action[ ]. In their view, Cooney asks us “to assume, without evidence, that
viewpoint drove Shaw’s statements and dialogue with . . . in [her] role of
presiding over the meeting.” We are not persuaded.
The District defendants fail to consider Cooney’s attestation that she
attended other Board meetings and had “never observed the Board restrict
public comment based on the agenda items designation as either [an]
‘information item’ or [an] ‘action item.’ ” They also ignore the evidence of
hostile conduct toward Cooney—by Shaw, the District as an entity, and the
other individual defendants—over the course of the month and a half that
followed Cooney’s attempt to criticize the No Deception policy.
As we have recounted, after Cooney spoke, Shaw accused her of
improperly supporting her former student’s attempt to speak about the
policy, saying, “[A]s an adult, please don’t put a child in that situation. You
should know better as a teacher.” When Cooney tried to respond, Shaw said
she was disrupting the meeting and it would not continue until she left. The
next day, based on text messages Cooney reviewed, Shaw directed the
principal to ask her to remove social media posts by her students that
criticized the meeting. On October 2, 2024, Shaw, Bridge, Enfield, and the
school principal came to Cooney’s classroom unannounced and stared at her,
25
without explanation, from the back of the classroom for 10 minutes. Cooney
did not receive timely responses to requests for funding for GSA events in
September and then, on October 7, a previously approved GSA field trip was
cancelled. And on October 13, Shaw liked a post on social media that accused
Cooney of being a groomer for pedophiles.
Then, on October 16, 2024, the day before the Board meeting where the
No Deception policy was approved, Cooney was placed on administrative
leave. She was physically escorted off campus and told only that she was
being investigated for “inappropriate conduct.” The next day, at the Board
meeting, two members of the public commented that a teacher had been
placed on administrative leave, and Shaw said that she heard rumors the
teacher was on administrative leave for “cussing and profanity.” The
allegations against Cooney were ultimately found to be “unsubstantiated.”
As we have explained, when evaluating a plaintiff’s evidentiary
showing in response to an anti–SLAPP motion, the court must draw “ ‘every
legitimate favorable inference’ ” from the plaintiff’s evidence. (Cuevas-
Martinez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th p. 1117.) Here, drawing all inferences in
Cooney’s favor, the evidence is sufficient to establish that she followed
protocol to comment on the No Deception policy, but Shaw repeatedly
interrupted her, thereby limiting her comments about the policy in violation
of the Board’s bylaws. Although the bylaws allow the Board to exercise
reasonable discretion to rule on “the appropriateness of a topic for public
comment,” they also provide that “[t]he Board shall not prohibit public
criticism of its policies.” From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact can
readily infer that it was viewpoint hostility that motivated Shaw to interrupt
and censor Cooney’s attempted public comment, not a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction. The trial court ruled correctly that Cooney
26
established a prima facie case with respect to her first cause of action that
the District defendants violated her free speech and petitioning rights.
C. As to the Second and Fourth Causes of Action, Cooney Established a
Prima Facie Case That the District Defendants Illegally Retaliated
Against Her
Cooney’s second and fourth causes of action allege illegal retaliation in
violation of her free speech rights and the Labor Code. The “First
Amendment precludes retaliation by a public employer against an employee
on the basis of certain instances of protected speech by the employee.”
(Wasson v. Sonoma County Junior College (9th Cir. 2000) 203 F.3d 659, 662.)
Under Labor Code sections 98.6, 1102, and 1103, “employers are prohibited
from terminating, discriminating, or retaliating against an employee who
engaged in [protected] political activity.” (Napear v. Bonnevill Int’l Corp.
(E.D. Cal. 2023) 669 F.Supp.3d 948, 963.) Here, the District defendants
challenge Cooney’s ability to establish a prima facie case with respect to two
elements of proof only.
First, with respect to the second cause of action, the District defendants
contend that Cooney failed to establish she spoke at the Board meeting as a
private citizen. “ ‘[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes.’ ” (Burch v. City of Chubbuck (9th Cir. 2025)
146 F.4th 822, 834.) Three factors assist with determining whether an
employee has spoken within the scope of her employment: (1) whether the
employee’s communication was made within her chain of command, (2)
whether the speech was a routine report or instead, “an attempt to raise
alarm bells on an issue not normally within the employee’s purview,” and (3)
whether the employee spoke in defiance of a supervisor’s orders. (Ibid.)
27
Here, Cooney attested that she agreed with the GSA students’ request
to address the Board “even though this fell outside the scope of [her] job
duties,” and did so because of her personal concern “about the impact of th[e]
policy on our students.” In addition, instead of expressing her concerns up
the chain of command, she signed up to speak at the Board meeting during
the time allotted for public commentary on agenda items. This evidence is
sufficient, at this juncture, to establish a reasonable probability of satisfying
the requirement that Cooney spoke at the Board meeting as a private citizen
and not in her capacity as a public employee. The District defendants may
have evidence that contradicts Cooney’s understanding that her job duties as
a club advisor do not include speaking at Board meetings during public
commentary, but they did not present it to support their motion.
Second, with respect to both the second and fourth causes of action, the
District defendants contend that Cooney “failed to present evidence that her
speech on September 19, 2024 was a substantial or motivating factor in any
alleged adverse employment action that occurred subsequently.” They again
fail to persuade us. The same post-meeting evidence that supports an
inference of viewpoint hostility supports a finding that Shaw, the District as
an entity, and the other individual defendants retaliated against Cooney for
her criticism of the No Deception policy by placing her on administrative
leave right before the Board meeting where the policy was scheduled for a
28
vote. Cooney has thus established a reasonable probability of success with
respect to this required element as well.11
For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the District
defendants’ special motion to strike. As always, our conclusion that Cooney
has made the required showing of minimal merit does not affect the parties’
evidentiary burdens going forward. Pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision
(b)(3), “[i]f the court determines that the plaintiff has established a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim, neither that
determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in
evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no
burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by
that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent
proceeding.”
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the District defendants’ anti-SLAPP
motion is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Cooney. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a).)
11 The District defendants asserted at oral argument, for the very first
time, that the evidence was insufficient to establish minimal merit with
respect to Cooney’s claims against some of the individual defendants. The
District defendants’ opening brief, however, contains no independent
discussion of Cooney’s case against any particular individual. Consequently,
the argument is forfeited.
29
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
O’ROURKE, J.
30