Filed 8/18/26 Conservatorship of R.F. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of R.F. C103931
SACRAMENTO COUNTY PUBLIC GUARDIAN, (Super. Ct. No. 24MH002656)
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
R.F.,
Objector and Appellant.
Objector and appellant R.F. appeals from a judgment imposing a conservatorship
on him under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS or LPS Act) pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 5350 et seq. (Statutory citations that follow are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.) The trial court appointed respondent
Sacramento County Public Guardian (Public Guardian) as R.F.’s conservator after a court
trial. On appeal, R.F. contends reversal is required because the trial court failed to obtain
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial. Because the one-year LPS
Act conservatorship has terminated by operation of law, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Dr. Damanvir Garcha, medical director of the Sacramento County Mental Health
Treatment Center, diagnosed R.F. with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar-type. The trial
court granted the appointment of a temporary LPS conservator on October 4, 2024. R.F.
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had been transferred to the psychiatric facility under section 5150 after the trial court
determined that he was incompetent to stand trial for a misdemeanor and ordered R.F.
evaluated for an LPS conservatorship. R.F. was found homeless and walking around
public areas when he was arrested. R.F. was disoriented to the point where he did not
know where he was in the United States, could not articulate the reason for his coming to
the treatment center, and did not understand the circumstances of his initial arrest for
violating his mother’s restraining order for the third time. R.F. stated that he had not
been taking medication “because I don’t like taking psychiatric medications.”
On October 8, 2024, the Public Guardian petitioned for appointment as LPS
conservator of R.F. The citation to R.F. to appear at a hearing on the petition included as
its final sentence: “You have the right to a jury trial if you wish.” At a conference on
December 31, 2024, counsel for R.F. initially stated—before R.F. joined the conference
remotely—that, “I think he is asking for a bench trial,” adding, “We can clarify when we
bring him in.” When R.F. joined the conference, the trial court inquired of R.F.’s counsel
whether he “is requesting a bench trial?” Counsel for the Public Guardian responded,
“That’s correct, your Honor.” The trial court set a date for a bench trial. R.F. interjected,
“Why would I need a bench trial? I don’t think I need anybody else’s opinion. I don’t
think I need conservatorship.” The trial court did not advise R.F. of his right to a jury
trial or ask him if he waived that right.
On March 3, 2025, after a contested trial, the trial court found R.F. to be gravely
disabled as a result of a mental disorder. The trial court placed R.F. in a one-year
conservatorship and imposed special disabilities, restricting him from refusing medical
treatment related to his grave disability, refusing routine medical treatment, entering into
contracts, having a driver’s license, and possessing a firearm.
On May 29, 2025, R.F. filed a request for permission to file a notice of appeal
under the constructive filing doctrine, which this court granted. The case was not fully
briefed until May 4, 2026. On March 3, 2026, the conservatorship terminated by
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operation of law, one year from the date of the order appointing the conservator. (§ 5361,
subd. (a) [“Conservatorship initiated pursuant to this chapter shall automatically
terminate one year after the appointment of the conservator by the superior court”].)
We deferred ruling on and now deny the Public Guardian’s requests for judicial
notice of (1) the January 27, 2026, petition for renewal of R.F.’s conservatorship; and (2)
the February 24, 2026, minute order renewing R.F.’s conservatorship, both offered to
demonstrate that the present appeal is moot. Because LPS conservatorships terminate
automatically in one year by operation of law, judicial notice of these orders is
unnecessary to resolution of the appeal.
DISCUSSION
R.F. contends the trial court erred in granting the LPS conservatorship because he
was not advised on the record of his right to a jury trial. He further contends that his
appeal should not be moot because an appellate court has discretion to review a moot
case that raises important issues likely to recur while evading review. R.F. notes that in
conservatorship proceedings “timeframes are very short” and asserts “he was not
afforded the most basic right to a trial by jury in 2025.”
The challenged conservatorship ended on March 3, 2026, rendering R.F.’s appeal
moot. (Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 705, fn. 3.) As the Supreme
Court has observed, “[t]his problem frequently arises because a conservatorship’s
duration is short, compared to the appellate process.” (Ibid.) However, even when an
appeal has become moot, “courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the
merits of the dispute.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282.) “As a rule, courts will
generally exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue
of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the
controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s
determination.’ ” (Ibid; see also Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131,
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142 & fn. 2 [exercising discretion to consider whether trial court violated conservatee’s
constitutional rights by holding a conservatorship hearing in his absence];
Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 960, 962 [exercising
discretion to consider appeal of conservatorship order where conservatee argued trial
court erred by interpreting his request for a hearing on a conservatorship petition as a
request for a court trial]; but see Conservatorship of K.Y. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 985,
988-989 [noting court’s discretion to resolve moot appeals on the merits but declining to
do so].)
In this instance, we conclude there is no issue of continuing public concern likely
to evade review, because the LPS Act expressly requires the trial court to advise
proposed conservatees of their right to jury trial. The LPS Act incorporates Probate Code
section 1828, subdivision (a), which provides that “the court shall inform the proposed
conservatee” of various matters, including “the right ... to have the matter of the
establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury[.]” (Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6);
§ 5350; see also Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 908 (C.O.)
[interpreting Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6) as “requir[ing] a trial court to personally
advise a proposed conservatee of his [or her] jury trial right”].) There is a split of
authority on whether a trial court must obtain a personal, on-the-record waiver of the jury
trial right. (See K.R. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 133, 143 (K.R.); compare
Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383-384 [holding personal
waiver required], with C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 911 [absent certain
circumstances, counsel may validly waive conservatee’s jury trial right].) The decisions
agree, however, “that a trial court must personally advise a person of the statutory right to
a jury trial in LPS proceedings.” (K.R., at p. 143; Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).)
Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to review the merits of R.F.’s
appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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