Filed 7/30/26 Conservatorship of N.S. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
Conservatorship of the Person of N.S. C101409
R.C. et al., (Super. Ct. No. SP20190003)
Petitioners and Appellants,
v.
K.S., as Conservator, etc.,
Objector and Respondent;
N.S.,
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
This is an appeal from a posttrial order awarding attorney fees in a conservatorship
matter, which involved both a petition to remove the conservator for a dependent adult
(Prob. Code, § 2650) and related and competing requests for a permanent restraining
order under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act) (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.).1 Although not specifically identified by the trial court’s
order, on appeal the parties agree the trial court relied on subdivision (t) of section
15657.03, which authorizes an award of attorney fees for a prevailing party in connection
with a request for a restraining order under the Act, to award the fees at issue here.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
1
Appellants, the former legal guardian of dependent adult N.S. and her husband (M.G. and
R.C.), proceeding as self-represented litigants, argue the fee order must be reversed for
various reasons, including the trial court’s failure to apportion fees between those
associated with the removal petition and those associated with the competing requests for
a restraining order. As we shall explain, we find no basis for reversal. Accordingly, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. N.S.’s Medical Condition
Dependent adult N.S. was diagnosed as a young child with encephalitis, a serious
medical condition involving acute inflammation of brain tissue. The condition resulted in
disability such that N.S. required supervision and assistance with daily living activities.
N.S.’s symptoms included grand mal seizures, aphasia (communication disorder), and
behavioral issues. During his childhood and young adulthood, N.S.’s behavioral issues
resulted in multiple incidents of elopement and numerous incidents requiring police
intervention.
B. The Parties and Conservatorship
In 2008, when he was seven years old, N.S. emigrated to the United States from
Nepal. At that time, M.G.,2 a United States citizen, was married to a relative of N.S.’s.
N.S.’s mother (K.S.) and father (A.S.) agreed to allow N.S. to come to the United States
so he could receive better medical care.
At all relevant times, M.G. lived in South Lake Tahoe. She was N.S.’s legal
guardian from 2008 to 2019, when he turned 18 years old. At that time, N.S.’s biological
mother (K.S.), who had emigrated to the United States from Nepal shortly after N.S.,
2 In the appellate record, M.G. is sometimes referred to as C.G. or her middle name,
Catherine. We refer to her as M.G.
2
became his conservator. The other members of N.S.’s biological family (father and two
sisters) emigrated to the United States from Nepal in 2017.
Beginning in November 2017, N.S. lived with his biological family in South Lake
Tahoe, although (as noted) M.G. remained his legal guardian until he turned 18 years old
in 2019. At all times thereafter, N.S.’s father (A.S.) was N.S.’s primary caregiver.
According to M.G., in October 2021, A.S. pinned N.S. to the floor and forcefully
poured a smoothie down his throat. Beginning in late January 2022, after M.G. made a
complaint to the police about the incident, K.S. prevented M.G. from having any contact
with N.S. K.S. also did not allow N.S. to have any contact with M.G.’s new husband
(R.C.), who had been N.S.’s educational advocate since 2016 (after N.S. was expelled
from school).
C. Removal Petition
Less than two weeks later, in February 2022, M.G. and R.C. (appellants) filed a
verified petition to remove K.S. as N.S.’s conservator, as well as related petitions
requesting that they be appointed as successor co-conservators for N.S. In support of
their removal petition, appellants alleged that K.S. allowed and encouraged her husband
(A.S.) to “engage in frequent force-feeding of [N.S].” The removal petition further
alleged that N.S. had “significantly regressed in many areas” since K.S. became his
conservator in 2019, giving examples. As part of their removal petition, appellants
requested an award of attorney fees and costs, citing Probate Code section 2653,
subdivision (c)(1).
In March 2022, K.S. filed a written opposition to the removal petition and the
related requests for the appointment of appellants as successor co-conservators. Among
other things, K.S. denied that her husband (A.S.) was force-feeding N.S. and disputed
that N.S. had regressed. According to K.S., the removal petition appeared to be
retaliation for her repeated requests for appellants to “step back from trying to control
[N.S.’s] health and education,” given that M.G. was no longer his legal guardian. In her
3
opposition, K.S. requested an award of attorney fees and costs without citing a statutory
basis, based on her “good-faith belief” that denial of the removal petition was in N.S.’s
best interests.
D. Appointment of Counsel for N.S.
In or around April 2022, a public defender was appointed to represent N.S.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, the public defender opposed
appellants’ petition for removal and their related request for a restraining order under the
Act (described below). The public defender requested attorney fees as the prevailing
party pursuant to section 15657.03, subdivision (t), or, in the alternative, as an
exceptional circumstance.
E. Restraining Order Requests and Settlement Conference
In early January 2023, appellants filed a request for a restraining order under the
Act, which “affords certain protections to elders and dependent adults.” (Winn v. Pioneer
Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 152.) Appellants sought an order allowing
them contact with N.S. every week from 10:00 a.m. on Monday to 12:00 p.m. on
Wednesday. This request was based on a change in law effected by Assembly Bill No.
1243 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which was enacted to “ ‘ “help[] prevent isolation of
vulnerable Californians by allowing family members or other persons with a pre-existing
relationship (as defined in the bill language) to petition the court through the existing
elder and dependent adult abuse restraining order process for orders enjoining the
isolation and allowing contact ... as long as the elder or dependent adult wants that
contact.” ’ ” (Newman v. Casey (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 359, 387-388.) In support of
their request, appellants asserted (among other things) that since N.S. moved out of
M.G.’s home in 2019, he had “been extremely enthusiastic” about spending time with
her.
Less than two weeks later, in mid-January 2023, K.S. filed a response to
appellants’ request for a restraining order. She also filed her own request for a restraining
4
order under the Act, which sought an order prohibiting M.G. from having any contact
with N.S. and his family. The next day, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
order in favor of K.S. against M.G. Although unclear as to the date the order was issued,
the record reflects that appellants’ request for a restraining order allowing them contact
with N.S. was “initially denied.”
At a May 2023 settlement conference, the parties agreed that appellants could
have contact/visitation with N.S. for several hours on 10 specific days in May and June
2023. The parties also agreed to other terms, including (as relevant here) that K.S. would
“dismiss” without prejudice the temporary restraining order issued against M.G.
However, due to an incident that occurred during appellants’ second visit with N.S., the
parties’ visitation agreement was terminated.
In August 2023, K.S. refiled her request for a restraining order against M.G. for
the protection of N.S. and his family, which included a request for attorney fees and costs
under section 15657.03. On that same day, a second temporary restraining order was
issued against M.G. In November 2023, M.G. filed a response to K.S.’s request for a
permanent restraining order. In connection with her response, M.G. requested an award
of attorney fees and costs.
F. Bench Trial and Statement of Decision
As set forth in the trial court’s statement of decision, during a seven-day bench
trial that began in August 2023 and concluded in November 2023, the court heard all the
competing claims together as agreed on by the parties. The evidence included testimony
from various witnesses who had observed N.S. interact with his family and appellants, as
well as from two medical doctors, including the former spouse of M.G. In December
2023, the trial court issued a detailed written statement of decision. In denying the
petition for removal, the court found that appellants had failed to prove N.S. was isolated,
neglected, or abused. The court also found that appellants had failed to establish that it
was not in N.S.’s best interest for his mother (K.S.) to remain his conservator. The court
5
later explained, in connection with the parties’ respective motions for an award of
attorney fees, that appellants did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
N.S. wanted to visit with them, that N.S. was being abused, or that it was in N.S.’s best
interest to visit with them or have them appointed as successor co-conservators. Rather,
the court found the evidence showed that appellants “were not suitable caregivers” for
N.S. based on their inability to adequately supervise him, noting that “visitation [with
appellants] outside [N.S.’s] home resulted in potential danger to [N.S.], the public, and
law enforcement.”
As for the parties’ competing requests for a restraining order, the trial court denied
appellants’ request for visitation with N.S. and denied K.S.’s request for a permanent
restraining order against M.G., without prejudice. The court later explained, in
connection with the parties’ respective motions for an award of attorney fees, that it
denied K.S.’s request without prejudice because “there were adequate protections in
place … that would make sure that both [N.S. and his family] were adequately protected,
not because [K.S.] failed [to] prov[e] that it would be an appropriate legal outcome to
have the restraining order in place.” The court noted that it had “likely” erred by failing
to grant the permanent restraining order requested by K.S. and explained that K.S.
“certainly proved” that a permanent restraining order would have been “an appropriate
legal outcome,” and that the only reason such relief was not granted was because the
court wanted to leave open the “possibility for the parties to arrange visits [with N.S.] in
the future.”
In February 2024, the court denied appellants’ motion for new trial.
6
G. Motions for Attorney Fees
In May 2024, after a hearing, the trial court granted K.S.’s motion for attorney fees
and costs, awarding her $73,775 in fees and $3,872.17 in costs.3 The court also granted
the motion for attorney fees filed by N.S.’s court-appointed counsel (public defender),
awarding him $19,035. The court found that K.S. and N.S. were the prevailing parties on
all matters—the removal petition as well as the competing requests for a restraining
order. The court determined that because the issues in this case were intertwined and
because the parties agreed that the court “should hear all of the evidence in all of the
matters during the course of the trial,” the fee awards should not be limited to the amount
of time devoted to the requests for a restraining order. Accordingly, in determining the
reasonable fees to award, the court did not decide what portion of the hours were spent by
the prevailing parties on the removal petition as compared to the hours spent on the
request for a restraining order. However, the court explained that because the basis for
awarding attorney fees was limited to the provisions of the Act, which covered only the
request for restraining order, “there will and should be a discount in the attorney’s fees
requested by” K.S. In deciding not to “parse[]” the fees between those incurred in
litigating the removal petition versus those incurred in litigating the competing requests
for a restraining order, the court explained that apportionment of the fees was not
“necessary because the overarching concern … [was] the best interest of [N.S.].” The
court further explained: “Some of the work on behalf of [K.S.] and all of the work on
behalf of [N.S.] performed by counsel [related to the removal petition] served as a
necessary foundation and familiarity with the facts and legal issues impacting on the
2023 matters [(i.e., requests for a restraining order)]. The Court previously determined
that the issues [involving the Act (i.e., competing requests for a restraining order)] were
3 This award was less than the amount sought by K.S.—$80,605 in fees and $5,697.49 in
costs.
7
intertwined with the other issues [(i.e., removal petition)] so as to make it impossible to
differentiate. The work performed in 2022 [related to the removal petition] allowed
counsel for [K.S.] and [N.S.] to have a ready familiarity with critical issues so as to not
repeat or start anew with the discovery process.”
As for M.G., the trial court denied her motion to strike or tax costs and denied her
motion for attorney fees.
H. Appeal and Appellate Briefing
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. This matter was fully briefed in late
December 2025 and assigned to this panel in late January 2026. While M.G. was
represented by counsel in the trial court, she and R.C. (who was not represented by
counsel in the trial court) proceed as self-represented litigants on appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellants argue the fee order must be reversed because there was no legal basis
authorizing an award of attorney fees to K.S. beyond those which she incurred in
defending against their request for a restraining order under the Act. In other words,
appellants claim reversal is required because the trial court failed to properly apportion
fees by limiting the fee award to the fees associated with their request for a restraining
order. In appellants’ view, the court erred in awarding K.S. fees under the Act for the
time she spent litigating the removal petition. Appellants further argue that reversal is
required because there is no legal basis authorizing an award of attorney fees to the
public defender appointed to represent N.S. Appellants add that even if such authority
existed, the matter must be reversed due to the trial court’s failure to properly apportion
fees by limiting the fee award to the fees associated with their request for a restraining
order.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
The Act (§ 15600 et seq.) was enacted in 1982 to “protect a particularly vulnerable
portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and custodial
8
neglect.” (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 33 [explaining that “ ‘the Legislature
recognized “that dependent adults may be subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment
and that this state has a responsibility to protect such persons’ ”].) Under the Act, a trial
court may issue a protective (or restraining) order to protect a “dependent adult” who has
suffered “abuse” within the meaning of section 15610.07. (§ 15657.03, subds. (a)(1),
(b)(1), (b)(5).) Among other things, “abuse of a dependent adult” means: “(1) Physical
abuse, neglect, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting
physical harm or pain or mental suffering. [¶] (2) The deprivation by a care custodian of
goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering.”
(§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)
A petition for a restraining order may be brought on behalf of an abused dependent
adult by a conservator or a trustee of the dependent adult, an attorney-in-fact of the
dependent adult who acts within the authority of a power of attorney, a person appointed
as a guardian ad litem for the dependent adult, or other person legally authorized to seek
the relief. (§ 15657.03, subd. (a)(2)(A).) If the petition for a restraining order alleges
abuse of a dependent adult in the form of isolation (as appellants alleged here), the term
“other person legally authorized to seek the relief” includes an “interested party,”
(§ 15657.03, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)), which means “an individual with a personal, preexisting
relationship with the … dependent adult.” (§ 15657.03, subd. (b)(3).) An interested
party, however, may only obtain an order enjoining a party from abusing a dependent
adult by isolating them. (§ 15657.03, subds. (a)(2)(B)(ii), (b)(5)(E).)
An order may be issued to restrain the respondent (person against whom the
protective order is sought) for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of isolation if the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence, to the satisfaction of the court, that the
following requirements are met: (1) the respondent’s past act or acts of isolation of the
dependent adult repeatedly prevented contact with the interested party; (2) the dependent
adult expressly desires contact with the interested party; (3) the respondent’s isolation of
9
the dependent adult from the interested party was not in response to an actual or
threatened abuse of the dependent adult by the interested party or the dependent adult’s
desire not to have contact with the interested party. (§ 15657.03, subd. (b)(5)(E)(i).)
“The prevailing party in an action brought under … section [15657.03] may be
awarded court costs and attorney’s fees, if any.” (§ 15657.03, subd. (t).) The purpose of
this provision is to protect an especially vulnerable portion of the population by creating
an incentive for attorneys to represent dependent adults who have been abused and/or
neglected. (See Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1, 11-12.)
B. Standard of Review
“Under the American rule, each party to a lawsuit ordinarily pays its own attorney
fees. [Citation.] Code of Civil Procedure section 1021, which codifies this rule,
provides: ‘Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure
and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement,
express or implied, of the parties.’ ” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner
Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751.)
“ ‘ “On review of an award of attorney fees after trial, the normal standard of
review is abuse of discretion. However, de novo review of such a trial court order is
warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees
and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a
question of law.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘it is a discretionary trial court decision on
the propriety or amount of statutory attorney fees to be awarded, but a determination of
the legal basis for an attorney fee award is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.’ ”
(Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 751;
see also Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332 [a trial court’s determination
that a litigant is a prevailing party, along with its award of fees and costs, is reviewed for
abuse of discretion, but interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo
review].)
10
“[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable
fee.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “ ‘The “experienced
trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and
while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the
appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong” ’—meaning that it abused its
discretion.” (Ibid.) Abuse of discretion will be found only when it is shown there was no
reasonable basis for the trial court’s action. (Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 213, 233.) In the context of an award of attorney fees,
reversal is only required where the trial court’s decision “exceeded the bounds of reason.”
(Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.)
The apportionment of attorney fees is also well within the trial court’s discretion.
(El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1365.)
“Attorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue
common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not
allowed.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130; Akins v.
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133.) “Apportionment is not
required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if
not impossible, to separate the attorney’s time into compensable and noncompensable
units.” (Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687; see Drouin v.
Fleetwood Enterprises (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 486, 493 [attorney fees need not be
apportioned between distinct causes of action when the various claims at issue involve a
common core of facts or are based on related legal theories].)
The party challenging a fee award “ ‘bear[s] the burden of affirmatively
establishing that the trial court abused its discretion.’ [Citation.] As with most trial court
orders, we ‘ presume the trial court’s attorney fees award is correct.” ’ ” (In re Marriage
of Minkin (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 939, 954.) The appellant has the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness, regardless of the applicable standard of review. (Association
11
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 777
[appellant must affirmatively show the trial court erred even if the de novo standard of
review applies].)
The burden of demonstrating error requires an appellant to do more than just
criticize a ruling in a conclusory, truncated fashion: an appellant must develop a legal
argument in a sufficiently clear manner to enable us to evaluate its soundness. “ ‘[A]n
appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v . Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146.) “We may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that
are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which
the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ” (Id. at p. 153; see Doe v.
McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 654 [it is not sufficient simply to cite legal
authority without explaining how it applies].) An appellant must convince us, by
reasoned legal analysis, that the trial court committed reversible error, and when an
appellant fails to do so we may reject the appellant’s argument on its face as insufficient
to demonstrate error. (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910.)
C. Analysis
It is clear that subdivision (t) of section 15657.03 authorizes an award of attorney
fees for a prevailing party in connection with a request for a restraining order under the
Act. Here, there were competing requests for restraining orders at play. These requests
were litigated together with appellants’ petition for removal of a conservator. The parties
do not argue on appeal that there is an independent statutory basis to award attorney fees
to a prevailing party in connection with a petition for removal. Thus, the central question
before this court is not whether the trial court could have apportioned the attorney’s fees
between those associated with the removal petition and those associated with the
competing requests for a restraining order, and awarded fees for one but not the other, but
12
whether it erred in declining to do so. Having reviewed the record, we discern no abuse
of discretion, as we next explain.
Here, appellants’ petition for removal alleged that K.S. allowed her husband (A.S.)
to abuse N.S. by force-feeding him. The petition further alleged that K.S. was not acting
in the best interest of her son (N.S.), including rarely taking N.S. out of his home, failing
to “mask train” him so he could participate in activities he was accustomed to, and by
failing to properly address his dental needs and language skills. In response, K.S. denied
the allegations of abuse and asserted that it was not in N.S.’s best interests to remove her
as conservator. K.S. claimed that N.S. was well cared for and had experienced
significant improvement since she became his conservator in 2019. K.S. also asserted
that there were many instances where M.G. (N.S.’s former legal guardian) had not
adequately supervised N.S., and that M.G. became aggressive and disruptive toward
N.S.’s family after K.S. asked M.G. and her husband (R.C.) to stop trying to control
N.S.’s health and education.
While the removal petition was pending, appellants, as “interested parties,” filed a
request for a restraining order under the Act, which sought an order allowing them
contact (or visitation) with N.S. According to appellants, they sought such relief as an
alternative to being appointed as co-successor conservators for N.S. In support of their
request for a restraining order, appellants claimed that N.S. was “extremely enthusiastic”
about visiting with them, but that K.S. had prevented them from having any contact with
N.S. after M.G. objected to the alleged “force-feeding.” K.S. opposed the relief sought
by appellants and filed her own request for a restraining order against M.G. for the
protection of N.S. and his family. After the parties’ May 2023 settlement agreement fell
apart, which included K.S.’s agreement to dismiss the temporary restraining order issued
against M.G. and to allow appellants to visit with N.S., K.S. refiled her request for a
restraining order against M.G. Among other things, K.S. claimed that a restraining order
was necessary due to M.G.’s aggressive and disruptive behavior toward N.S.’s family,
13
including several instances where M.G. came to the family home unannounced, forced
her way into the home, and harassed the family. In response, M.G. claimed that these
allegations were false. As part of her response, M.G. explained that her request for a
restraining order was filed so she could have contact with N.S. in the event the petition
for removal was denied. M.G. also noted that the parties were “currently in the middle of
trial addressing both of these matters and ha[d] stipulated to having the matters alleged in
[K.S.’s request for a restraining order] heard at the same time.” As previously indicated,
the challenged fee order was issued after the trial court denied appellants’ petition for
removal and their related request for a restraining order.
We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allocate attorney’s fees
between those fees associated with the removal petition and those fees associated with
the competing requests for a restraining order under the Act. The record reflects that the
underlying issues concerning these matters were intertwined and even inextricably
linked. The matters involved the same evidence and their resolution ultimately hinged on
what was in the best interests of N.S. In answering that question, the court received
evidence from numerous witnesses about N.S.’s medical condition and how he was cared
for by his parents versus appellants’ care and allegations. This evidence was received
during a seven-day bench trial after the parties agreed that the removal petition and the
competing requests for a restraining order should be “heard at the same time.”
Appellants have not suggested, and we do not discern, a record-supported method for
parsing out the fees associated with the removal petition versus the fees associated with
the parties’ competing requests for a restraining order. Indeed, we do not see (and
appellants do not identify) a distinct boundary or clear line of demarcation between these
matters.4 Nor do we see a logical way to allocate (or apportion) fees in light of the
4 In the trial court, M.G. conceded that the matters before the court (petition for removal
and competing requests for a restraining order) involved “essentially the same” evidence.
14
intertwined nature of the matters before the court, the resolution of which involved
consideration of a common set of facts.
On the record before us, we cannot conclude the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. The court’s refusal to apportion fees was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd. Indeed, given the record and the purpose of the attorney fee provision in the
Act—to protect an especially vulnerable portion of the population by creating an
incentive for attorneys to represent dependent adults who have been abused and/or
neglected (see Bickel v. Sunrise Assisted Living, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11-12)—
the trial court acted well within its discretion when it determined that apportionment was
not required because it was impossible or impracticable to separate counsel’s time into
compensable (work performed related to the restraining orders) and non-compensable
(work performed related to the removal petition) units.
Appellants, for their part, have failed to carry their burden to establish reversible
error. We find unpersuasive the various arguments they advance for reversal, including
their contention that neither K.S. nor N.S. was a prevailing party under the Act. The
record makes clear that K.S. and N.S. prevailed on a practical level, as they realized their
litigation objectives while appellants did not. Appellants insist the trial court erred by
declaring K.S. the prevailing party because it denied her request for a permanent
restraining order without prejudice. As we next explain, this argument fails to persuade.
Because section 15657.03 does not define “prevailing party,” the general
definition of “prevailing party” in Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 may be used.
This concession was made in a pretrial document—Issues Conference Statement—filed
by M.G. in May 2023. Although this document was not part of the appellate record, N.S.
moved to augment the record to include it after oral argument was scheduled. K.S. filed
a joinder to N.S.’s motion. At oral argument, R.C. indicated that he had no objection to
the motion, and no written opposition was filed to the motion by R.C. or M.G. Under the
circumstances presented, we grant N.S.’s motion to augment the record. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)
15
(Adler v. Vaicius (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777.) On this record, the court could
have reasonably concluded that K.S. was the prevailing party because appellants did not
recover any relief against her. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4) [“prevailing
party” includes “a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and
a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that
defendant”].) Alternatively, the court could have reasonably concluded that, even if K.S.
was not the prevailing party under any of the enumerated grounds set forth in section
1032, subdivision (a)(4), K.S. was the prevailing party because she prevailed on a
“practical level.” (See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
140, 150-151 [when a statute authorizing an award of attorney’s fees does not define the
term prevailing party, the court should determine prevailing party status based on which
party succeeded on a practical level by analyzing which party realized its litigation
objectives].) Here, the record reflects that K.S. achieved her litigation objectives, which
were the denial of the removal petition and the avoidance of a restraining order that
would have permitted appellants to visit with N.S. Realizing a litigation objective is a
permissible reason to award attorney fees where, as here, “any party recovers other than
monetary relief and in situations other than as specified” in section 1032, subdivision
(a)(4). (See Pirkig v. Dennis (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1565-1566; Friends of Spring
Street v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104 [explaining that the “ ‘in
situations other than as specified’ ” prong of Code of Civil Procedure section 1032
authorizes the trial court in its discretion to determine the prevailing party by comparing
the relief sought with that obtained, along with the parties’ litigation objectives, as
disclosed by their pleadings, briefs, and other such sources].)
As for N.S., we conclude appellants have failed to demonstrate the trial court
abused its discretion in finding that he was a prevailing party. The record reflects that
N.S. succeeded at a practical level by realizing his litigation objectives. As noted ante,
N.S.’s court-appointed counsel—the public defender—opposed the removal petition and
16
appellants’ related request for a restraining order under the Act, both of which were
denied by the trial court. On appeal, appellants’ opening brief offers no reasoned legal
analysis, supported by citation to pertinent authority, convincing us the trial court erred.
As such, we reject the appellants’ argument on its face as insufficient to demonstrate
reversible error. (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 910.) And
appellants have not cited any authority convincing us that reversal is required under the
circumstances presented. The cases appellants rely upon are inapposite, including
Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 498; see id. at pp. 501, 503-505
[addressing whether fees were recoverable for defending antitrust claims under the
Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720 et seq.) (which contained a unilateral fee-
shifting provision that only allowed fees for a prevailing plaintiff) and other overlapping
contract claims].)
Citing Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 498 and other
cases, appellants argue that the unilateral fee-shifting provision set forth in Probate Code
section 2653 only allows a prevailing petitioner to recover attorney fees when a
conservator is removed for cause. They contend this statutory provision “operate[s] to
prevent any fee award” for the time spent by K.S. and N.S. defending against the removal
petition and any “overlapping facts and issues,” including the competing requests for a
restraining order under the Act. Although we find Carver inapposite, this argument fails
for a more fundamental reason: It was not raised in the trial court. As a result, we deem
the argument forfeited. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins.
Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 [“Failure to raise specific challenges
in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal”].)
17
III. DISPOSITION
The fee order is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
/S/
RENNER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
/S/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
18