Filed 8/25/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
Conservatorship of the Person 2d Civ. No. B351841
and Estate of K.L. (Super. Ct. No. 25MH00324)
(Santa Barbara County)
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
K.L.,
Objector and Appellant.
Persons subject to a conservatorship under the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 1, § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act)
may be confined and deprived of their rights to vote, drive, enter
contracts, and make decisions about their treatment. Because of
this potential loss of liberty, proposed conservatees are entitled to
a unanimous jury verdict on whether they are gravely disabled
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
beyond a reasonable doubt. As we held in Conservatorship of
Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 384–385 (Heather W.),
trial courts must advise proposed conservatees of their jury trial
right in civil commitment proceedings.
In the absence of substantial evidence that a proposed
conservatee lacks capacity to waive jury or that counsel or the
trial court advised them of their jury trial right, we hold that a
written citation simply informing a proposed conservatee of their
right to a jury trial is inadequate to waive jury. But automatic
reversal is not required if the record affirmatively shows that a
proposed conservatee’s jury waiver is knowing and intelligent
based on the totality of the circumstances.
K.L. appeals from an order under the LPS Act declaring
her gravely disabled and appointing the Santa Barbara County
Public Guardian (Public Guardian) as her conservator. We
reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 2025, the Public Guardian filed an LPS Act
petition to be appointed K.L.’s conservator due to K.L.’s
psychotic, posttraumatic, and major depressive disorders.
(§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) The trial court issued a written citation
for the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS) conservatorship,
personally served on K.L.
K.L. appeared remotely at the December 2025 pretrial
hearing. K.L.’s attorney stated K.L. “objects and wants a Zoom
court trial as soon as possible.” Counsel did not explicitly waive
her client’s right to a jury trial. Nor did counsel indicate that she
had explained to K.L. that she had a right to a jury trial,
discussed the mechanics of a jury trial, or explained the
2
differences between a jury trial and a court trial. Counsel also
did not indicate that K.L. lacked capacity to waive jury.
The trial court did not inform K.L. of her right to a jury
trial, and did not take K.L.’s personal jury waiver. Nor did the
court explain the mechanics of a jury trial or explain how a jury
trial differed from a court trial.
The trial court subsequently held a court trial on the
petition. After hearing testimony from various witnesses,
including K.L., the trial court granted the petition. The court
found K.L. gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 5008,
subd. (h)(1)(A).) It appointed the Public Guardian as conservator
of K.L.’s person and estate for one year, found the least
restrictive facility for K.L. was a locked psychiatric facility, and
prohibited K.L. from possessing firearms, operating a motor
vehicle, and refusing medical treatment relating to her grave
disability.
DISCUSSION
The LPS Act
The LPS Act governs the involuntary treatment of the
“gravely disabled” in California so that they may receive
individualized treatment, supervision, and placement. (§§ 5350,
5350.1; Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 139.) A
person is “gravely disabled” if “as a result of a mental health
disorder, a severe substance abuse use disorder, or a co-occurring
mental health disorder and a severe substance use disorder, is
unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing,
shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical care.” (§ 5008,
subd. (h)(1)(A).)
“When a treatment professional determines a person is
gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment
3
voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may petition to
establish a conservatorship. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5352; see
Conservatorship of K.P. [(2021) 11 Cal.5th 695,] 708–709.) If the
matter proceeds to trial and the person is found gravely disabled,
the court appoints a conservator (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350),
imposes ‘disabilities’ as needed (id., § 5357), and determines an
appropriate treatment placement (id., § 5358). (See
Conservatorship of K.P., at pp. 709–710.) A conservatorship
terminates after one year but may be extended for additional
one-year terms upon petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5361.)”
(Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1095–1096
(Eric B.).)
A finding of grave disability must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d
219, 235 (Roulet) [“The due process clause of the California
Constitution requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a
unanimous jury verdict be applied to conservatorship proceedings
under the LPS Act”].)
K.L.’s right to a jury trial
K.L. contends the trial court committed reversible error
because it did not advise her of her right to a jury trial and obtain
her personal waiver. We agree reversal is warranted here.
We review K.L.’s claims de novo. (Conservatorship of John
L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 894, 904 (C.O.).)
A “ ‘civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty . . . .’ (Addington v. Texas
[(1979)] 441 U.S. [418,] 425; see [People v.] Blackburn [(2015)] 61
Cal.4th [1113,] 1119.) ‘In addition to physical restraint, “[t]he
gravely disabled person for whom a conservatorship has been
4
established faces the loss of many other liberties . . . .” ’
([Conservatorship of] Ben C. [(2007)] 40 Cal.4th [529,] 540.)
Apart from their possible confinement, conservatees may lose the
rights to drive, vote, enter contracts, and make decisions about
their treatment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5357.) Because of the
potential for such a significant loss of liberty, conservatorship
cases are governed by many of the same procedural protections
that apply in criminal trials. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350,
subd. (d)(1); Ben C., at p. 541; but see Ben C., at p. 538.)” (Eric
B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 1103–1104.)
One such right is a conservatee’s right to a unanimous jury
verdict on the issue of grave disability. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1);
Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 230, 235.) Probate Code section
1828, subdivision (a)(6) states “the court shall inform the
proposed conservatee of all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] The
proposed conservatee has the right . . . to have the matter of the
establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury.” A trial
court’s failure to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a
jury trial is statutory error. (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th
at p. 384; C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 909; § 5350, subd.
(d)(1).)
“[T]he trial court must obtain a personal waiver of a jury
trial from the conservatee, even when the conservatee expresses
no preference for a jury trial. Absent such a waiver, the court
must accord the conservatee a jury trial unless the court finds the
conservatee lacks the capacity to make such a decision.” (Heather
W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 381.)
“[A] person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in
LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and
voluntarily made.” (K.R. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
5
133, 143 [collecting authority].) The failure to obtain a knowing
and intelligent jury trial waiver “denies the defendant [or
proposed conservatee] his or her statutory right to a jury trial on
the entire cause in a civil commitment proceeding.” (People v.
Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [jury trial waivers
required in proceedings involving offenders with mental health
disorders]; see also People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163
(Tran) [jury trial waivers required in involuntary commitment
proceedings where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGI)]; Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 (Kevin A.) [LPS Act shares same
purposes as MDO and NGI commitment schemes].)
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the failure to
obtain a valid jury trial waiver “defies ordinary harmless error
analysis” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134) and
is a “ ‘miscarriage of justice’ within the meaning of California
Constitution, article VI, section 13,” requiring reversal. (Id. at
pp. 1132–1133; Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [invalid jury
waiver in commitment proceeding “is not susceptible to ordinary
harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal”].)
In the criminal jury waiver context, our Supreme Court has
also emphasized that “ ‘knowing and intelligent’ ” means
“ ‘ “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th at p. 151, 166
(Sivongxxay).) In determining whether a waiver was knowing
and intelligent, “we examine ‘the totality of the circumstances’
unique to each case.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722,
753.)
6
In Sivongxxay, our Supreme Court recommended that trial
courts advise criminal defendants of the “basic mechanics of a
jury trial” including that “(1) a jury is made up of 12 members of
the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may
participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously
agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives
the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt
or innocence.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.)
Sivongxxay confirmed that no “specific method for determining
whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial” is required. (Id. at p. 167.)
In Heather W., we concluded the trial court’s error in failing
to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial was
not harmless and required reversal. (Heather W., supra, 245
Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385.) There, the trial court “advised
Heather W. of her right to testify, but did not advise her that she
had a right to a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 381.) We emphasized that
“the right to a jury trial to contest an LPS conservatorship is a
right guaranteed by the California Constitution.” (Id. at p. 383.)
Heather W. is silent as to whether the proposed conservatee was
informed by her attorney that she had a right to a jury trial. (Id.
at p. 381.)
Here, as in Heather W., the record does not indicate that
counsel advised K.L. of her right to a jury trial. Nor did the trial
court advise K.L. of this right. Nor does the record indicate
whether K.L.’s counsel explained the mechanics of a jury trial,
including a unanimous finding on grave disability, that a jury is
comprised of 12 people from the community, the right to
participate in jury selection, and that in a court trial, a judge
alone would decide whether K.L. was gravely disabled.
7
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) Indeed, there is no
evidence that K.L. understood what it meant to have a right to a
jury trial.
Instead, the record reflects that in December 2025, K.L.’s
attorney stated her client objected to a conservatorship and
wanted “a Zoom court trial.” Neither K.L. nor her attorney
explicitly waived K.L.’s right to a jury trial. There was no
mention of K.L.’s right to a jury trial, let alone K.L.’s waiver of
that right, during the proceedings. Thus, there is no indication
that K.L. was informed she was entitled to a unanimous jury
verdict on whether she was gravely disabled beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because K.L. was not properly advised, we cannot
conclude she acquiesced in the waiver of her jury trial right
because she later proceeded with a court trial. And because K.L.
was not previously subjected to an LPS conservatorship, such
that she could appreciate the distinction between a jury and court
trial, we cannot surmise that she knowingly and intelligently
relinquished her jury trial right here.
The Public Guardian contends the trial court’s failure to
advise K.L. of her right to a jury trial is subject to a harmless
error review under C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917–919,
wherein the court applied the harmless error test set forth in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) (an error is
harmless unless it is “reasonably probable” the outcome would
have been different in the absence of the error). Based on the
citation served on K.L. stating she had a right to a jury trial and
counsel’s statement that K.L. wanted “a Zoom court trial as soon
as possible,” the Public Guardian contends the failure to advise
K.L. and secure her personal jury waiver is harmless. We are not
persuaded.
8
In C.O., the proposed conservatee was previously subjected
to an LPS conservatorship, the public guardian petitioned for
reappointment, and counsel informed C.O. of the right to a jury
trial. (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 901, 908.) C.O. held
that a trial court’s failure to personally advise the proposed
conservatee of a jury trial right does not, standing alone, warrant
automatic reversal, emphasizing that such error is harmless “ ‘if
the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the
circumstances,’ ” that the “ ‘waiver was knowing and voluntary.’ ”
(Id. at p. 918.)
C.O. is distinguishable because the record “affirmatively
demonstrate[d]” the proposed conservatee “was informed of his
right to a jury trial.” (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) In
C.O., there was substantial evidence the proposed conservatee’s
waiver was knowing and intelligent, including the citation mailed
to him, counsel having explained the right to a jury trial, his
presence at the hearing when counsel waived jury, and
communications about how the conservatee “wished to proceed.”
(Id. at pp. 918–919.) Thus, our colleagues in the Sixth District
were “left solely with the error that the trial court did not
personally advise [the proposed conservatee] of his jury trial
right.” (Id. at p. 919.) C.O. concluded the error was harmless
under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, because the record
“affirmatively” demonstrated the proposed conservatee “was
informed of his right to a jury trial, both in writing and by his
counsel.” (C.O., at p. 919.) But that is not the situation here.
The record here is silent as to whether counsel informed
K.L. of her right to a jury trial, including the mechanics of a jury
trial and her right to a unanimous jury verdict on grave
disability. Without this information, we cannot conclude that the
9
citation was sufficient for K.L. to knowingly and intelligently
waive her constitutional right to a jury trial. (See Tran, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 1170 [“the requirement of an affirmative showing
means that no waiver may be presumed from a silent record”
(italics omitted)]; Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 383.)
The citation’s advisement that K.L. had a “right to a jury trial if
you wish” is insufficient to waive jury without, at a minimum,
being advised of the right to a unanimous jury verdict on the
issue of grave disability. (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235.)
Our colleagues in Division Four of the First District
recently examined a conservatorship case with facts similar to
C.O. (coincidentally involving a proposed conservatee with the
same initials) and held that a proposed conservatee’s jury trial
waiver communicated through counsel is permissible under the
LPS Act. (Conservatorship of C.O. (Aug. 3, 2026, A174646) ___
Cal.App.5th ___ [2026 WL 2236818 at p. *5].) We do not disagree
with this proposition. A proposed conservatee’s waiver of their
jury trial right made through counsel is permissible if the record
affirmatively shows the waiver is knowing and intelligent based
on the totality of the circumstances. In C.O., the proposed
conservatee had previously been subjected to a conservatorship,
counsel indicated on the record that they had discussed C.O.’s
“rights to have a jury or judge trial,” and the conservatee
indicated they wanted a “judge trial.” (Id. at p. *2.) None of
these facts are present here.
Trial courts must inform proposed conservatees of their
right to a jury trial. (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp.
384–385; Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).) Given the significant
liberty interests at stake, “the critical issue here is [the proposed
conservatee’s] fundamental right to decide who hears the
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evidence to make that [grave disability] finding—a judge or a
jury.” (Heather W., at p. 384.) But automatic reversal is not
warranted if the totality of the circumstances indicates a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to jury.
We conclude the trial court’s failure to advise K.L. of her
right to a jury trial here is reversible error. And because the
Public Guardian does not contend there was evidence that K.L.
lacked capacity to waive jury in December 2025, we do not
remand for a capacity determination. (Kevin A., supra, 240
Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting the LPS conservatorship petition is
reversed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
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Colleen K. Sterne, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Ava Wallace, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Objector and Appellant.
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Hudson Hornick,
Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.