IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
Conservatorship of the Person of E.A.
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
E.A.,
Objector and Appellant.
S287241
First Appellate District, Division One
A169299
Contra Costa County Superior Court
P20-00896
July 23, 2026
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and
Delaney* concurred.
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion in which Justices
Kruger, Groban, and Evans concurred.
CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A.
S287241
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act; Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 5000 et seq.)1 authorizes a court, upon the petition of a
designated public official, to impose an involuntary
conservatorship over a person found to be gravely disabled. A
proposed LPS conservatee has a right to demand a court or jury
trial on the issue of grave disability. By statute, a trial on grave
disability must commence within 10 days of the proposed LPS
conservatee’s demand, with an additional 15 days available at
the request of the proposed conservatee. If a proposed LPS
conservatee is found gravely disabled, the court may impose a
conservatorship over the conservatee’s person and estate. The
conservatorship automatically terminates after one year, but
the conservator may petition to renew the conservatorship each
year if the conservatee remains gravely disabled. For each
renewal, the conservatee may again demand a court or jury trial
on the issue of grave disability.
Appellant E.A. accepted an LPS conservatorship in 2020
and accepted its renewal in 2021. After her conservator
petitioned for a further renewal in 2022, E.A. demanded a jury
trial on the issue of grave disability. Her trial was delayed by
nearly a year, largely because of resource constraints and court
congestion. E.A. repeatedly objected to these delays and moved
1
Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
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to dismiss the proceedings as a violation of her statutory and
constitutional rights. When her case was eventually called to
trial, she accepted renewal of her conservatorship pursuant to
an agreement with her conservator that she be placed in a less
restrictive setting.
E.A. appealed that conservatorship order, including on the
ground that the pretrial delays violated her constitutional right
to due process of law. The Court of Appeal found no due process
violation and affirmed. It analyzed the due process question
using a four-factor test originally announced by the United
States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514
(Barker) in the context of a criminal defendant’s right to a
speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, which we adopted for
use in the context of pretrial delays in sexually violent predator
commitment proceedings in Camacho v. Superior Court (2023)
15 Cal.5th 354 (Camacho).
In this court, E.A. contends the Court of Appeal erred by
using the four-factor Barker test instead of the more general due
process framework discussed in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)
424 U.S. 319 (Mathews) and People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d
260 (Ramirez). We disagree. The Barker test is tailored to the
type of constitutional error at issue here, and it is sufficiently
flexible and responsive that its origins in criminal law do not
hamper its utility in this very different proceeding.
Applying the Barker test here, we conclude that E.A.’s due
process rights were violated by the nearly year-long pretrial
delay. By extending almost the entire length of a one-year LPS
conservatorship, the delay effectively nullified E.A.’s right to a
meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of
her liberty. Further, the delay was primarily caused by resource
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constraints and court congestion, and E.A. clearly and
repeatedly insisted on her right to a timely trial. While E.A. has
not shown substantial prejudice beyond the fact of her pretrial
commitment, the lack of such prejudice does not overcome her
showing under other Barker factors.
Under Barker, “the only possible remedy” for violation of
the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right in a criminal
proceeding is “the unsatisfactorily severe remedy” of dismissal
or reversal of the resulting judgment. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S.
at p. 522.) But this principle does not dictate the result in the
context of LPS conservatorship proceedings, where the Sixth
Amendment does not apply and dismissal or reversal may not
be in the conservatee’s best interests. Based in part on these
differences, we conclude that a due process violation based on
pretrial delay in LPS conservatorship proceedings is not a
structural error and may be found harmless on direct appeal
under appropriate circumstances.
Although E.A. was deprived of due process by the lengthy
pretrial delay, we conclude this due process violation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances
presented here. In the appealed conservatorship order, the trial
court found that E.A. was gravely disabled, and there is no
indication this finding would have been different if the pretrial
delays had not occurred. Indeed, there is no indication E.A. was
not gravely disabled during the entirety of the relevant period.
The Court of Appeal was therefore correct to affirm the
conservatorship order. But, because this matter has been
rendered moot by subsequent events (see fn. 2, post), we reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with directions
to dismiss E.A.’s appeal as moot.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August 2020, the director of the Contra Costa County
Health Services Department, acting as the Public Guardian of
Contra Costa County, filed a petition in the trial court for
appointment of a temporary conservator and conservator over
the person and estate of 23-year-old E.A. The Public Guardian
alleged that E.A. was “[g]ravely disabled as a result of [a] mental
disorder and unwilling to accept, or incapable of accepting,
treatment voluntarily.” In a supporting declaration, a licensed
therapist provided the factual basis for the petition. She
explained that E.A. was admitted to an inpatient mental health
facility after she was found near a public transit station dressed
only in her underwear. E.A. was disoriented and did not know
what day it was or how she arrived at the station. A relative
reported that E.A. was “talking to herself constantly, running
out of the house naked, not taking her medications and sleeping
excessive amounts of time.” The relative stated that E.A. did
not remain at home, and the relative had “picked [E.A.] up from
different motels after different people have abused her.” The
therapist diagnosed E.A. with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
type. She wrote that E.A. was “disheveled, unkempt with poor
hygiene.” Her thoughts were “disorganized and she is
disoriented with no insight into her illness or the reason for
hospitalization.” The therapist opined that E.A. was “unable to
care for herself or be properly managed in the community, even
with the support of her family.”
The trial court imposed a temporary conservatorship over
E.A.’s person and appointed the Contra Costa County Public
Defender’s Office to represent her. Two months later, E.A.
accepted the conservatorship, the court found E.A. to be gravely
disabled, and it appointed the Public Guardian as E.A.’s
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conservator. She was placed at a secure mental health
rehabilitation center for treatment.
In September 2021, the Public Guardian petitioned for
reappointment as E.A.’s conservator. Two physicians opined
that E.A. remained gravely disabled. A licensed therapist acting
as a conservatorship investigator reported that E.A.’s symptoms
“remain moderate to severe.” E.A. was unable to care for
herself, take her prescribed psychiatric medication, or
participate in other treatment. The therapist believed that E.A.
remained vulnerable to exploitation, and placement in a less
restrictive or unlocked setting would be “potentially dangerous
for her.” E.A. accepted renewal of her conservatorship, the court
again found E.A. to be gravely disabled, and it reappointed the
Public Guardian as E.A.’s conservator.
A year later, in September 2022, the Public Guardian
again petitioned for reappointment, with the supporting
opinions of two physicians. At a hearing on the petition the next
month, E.A.’s counsel requested a 30-day continuance, which
the court granted. At the continued hearing, E.A.’s counsel
requested a further continuance of two weeks, which the court
again granted.
The next hearing was held on December 2, 2022. E.A.
objected to the renewed conservatorship and requested a jury
trial. The court set a trial date of January 3, 2023, over the
objection of E.A.’s counsel, who apparently sought an earlier
date. On the scheduled trial date, E.A.’s counsel stated that she
was ready for trial, but the court continued the matter two
additional weeks because the court was not available to proceed
with trial. On the next trial date, E.A.’s counsel was again
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ready, but the court was still unavailable. The court continued
the matter an additional two weeks.
At the next trial date, on January 30, 2023, the Public
Guardian’s counsel was “unexpectedly out” because of an illness,
and therefore the Public Guardian was unable to proceed. The
trial court continued trial for a week, although the court
believed trial was “unlikely to go . . . because of another trial
having precedence.” The next week, E.A.’s counsel said she was
able to proceed with trial. The court expressed skepticism,
noting that five or six trials had been scheduled for that day.
E.A.’s counsel responded that if additional courtrooms had been
available, her office would have staffed the matters accordingly.
Counsel for the Public Guardian stated that she was not ready
to proceed because she understood other matters to have
priority. She said, “if we were given notice of a couple days
before, that this would instead be a priority jury trial, we would
be able to prepare for that.” The court found that both counsel
were unavailable and set another trial date in a month’s time.
E.A. filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which the court
denied.
On the next trial date, March 6, 2023, the mental health
rehabilitation center where E.A. was housed produced
documents pursuant to a subpoena, and the Public Guardian
moved for a continuance to review them. The trial court found
good cause and granted the continuance. Its minute order
further stated, “Both parties are unavailable because they are
engaged in a jury trial for another client.” E.A. moved to dismiss
the petition, which the court again denied. The court proposed
to set a further trial date approximately a month later. The
court clerk noted that two jury trials and two court trials had
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already been set for that date, but the court nonetheless believed
the date would work.
At the next hearing, on April 11, 2023, E.A.’s counsel
noted “court and counsel unavailability” and did not object to a
continuance. The court continued the matter another month.
On May 8, 2023, both counsel were unavailable because
they were engaged in another trial. Counsel for the Public
Guardian nonetheless announced she was ready to proceed and
represented that another attorney was available to handle the
matter. E.A.’s counsel also asserted she was ready for trial.
When the court asked E.A.’s counsel if another attorney was
available to handle E.A.’s matter, she replied, “Should the court
have an additional department available, we can provide
additional staffing.” The court found good cause to continue the
matter, since E.A.’s counsel did not represent that a second
attorney was presently available. It denied E.A.’s renewed
motion to dismiss.
On July 10, 2023, the court found good cause to continue
the matter again because the court was engaged in another trial.
The trial judge stated that he had “consulted with the presiding
judge and other departments” but “there [are] not other
departments available.” When a department became available,
E.A.’s matter would be a priority. E.A. filed another motion to
dismiss. The court scheduled the next hearing for July 24, 2023,
but the record does not reflect any proceedings on that date.
The next hearing in the record took place on August 28,
2023. On that date, E.A. was present in court, as was her
brother, whom the Public Guardian had called as a percipient
witness. Both counsel represented they were ready to proceed.
Before trial could start, however, E.A.’s counsel became
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unavailable because another trial in a different department
went forward. E.A.’s trial was continued to October 2, 2023.
In the meantime, in September 2023, the Public Guardian
filed another petition for reappointment as E.A.’s conservator.
This petition was also supported by the declarations from two
physicians, who attested that E.A. was “still gravely disabled as
a result of [a] mental disorder.” As to this new proceeding, E.A.’s
counsel filed a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.6 against the assigned trial judge, who
had also been handling the pending 2022 reappointment
petition. The challenge was accepted, and both matters were
reassigned.
On October 2, 2023, before a new trial judge, the parties
discussed logistics. The court was not available for a jury trial
that day. The court ordered a short continuance, for two days,
and noted that E.A.’s trial would be the highest priority trial on
calendar. E.A.’s counsel filed another written motion to dismiss
(her fifth such motion) the same day.
Two days later, the court announced that it had no
courtrooms available for a jury trial. The court explained, “[A]ll
of the trial departments that I was relying on not only are
currently in time-not-waived [misdemeanor] jury trials . . . but
[they] have backup jury trials once the current trial goes to
deliberation.” The court found good cause to continue the
matter by five additional days, to October 9, 2023. The deputy
public defender appearing for E.A. objected. Counsel for the
Public Guardian noted, however, the deputy public defender
who typically represented E.A. — and would be doing so at
trial — was at that moment engaged in a different trial.
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It appears E.A.’s counsel was still in trial when the matter
was called again, so it was continued a further two days to
October 11, 2023. On that date, both parties announced that
they were ready to proceed. Over the objection of E.A.’s counsel,
the court found good cause for another continuance because no
courtrooms were available. The court told the parties the matter
was “first” priority.
Nonetheless, on October 16, 2023, the court trailed the
matter behind a different trial, and it scheduled a further
hearing two days later. That day, October 18, the court
informed the parties that no courtrooms were available. It
explained that “two auxiliary departments are currently in time
not waived criminal jury trials[,] each with a backup time not
waived criminal jury trial to start” once those juries started
their deliberations. The court intended to continue E.A.’s trial
to October 23, but her counsel was scheduled to be in trial in a
different matter. The court therefore found good cause to
continue E.A.’s trial to November 6, 2023.
At the next hearing, E.A.’s counsel informed the court that
she no longer requested a jury trial, and instead she requested
a court trial. Despite this change, the court still had no available
courtrooms to hear the matter. Over the objection of E.A.’s
counsel, the court continued the matter to November 8, 2023.
On that day, E.A. was ill and unable to attend court. The matter
was continued again. E.A. was also unable to attend the next
hearing, on November 13, 2023, because her residential unit
was “on a quarantine” related to COVID-19. The court found
good cause to continue the matter.
The matter was called for trial on November 28, 2023. At
the outset, E.A.’s counsel informed the court that E.A. would
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accept conservatorship by the Public Guardian, pursuant to an
agreement that she would be housed in a less restrictive
placement at a “super board and care” facility. The court and
the parties discussed the fact that two reappointment petitions
were currently pending. The court did not believe it could grant
the earlier 2022 petition now that the later 2023 petition had
been filed. The court entered a new placement order, but it
deferred entering a formal conservatorship order until an
updated investigator’s report could be prepared. E.A.’s counsel
stated that she was reserving her right to argue “the speedy-
trial issue” on appeal. The court agreed.
The investigator’s report stated that there were “few
changes” in E.A.’s condition since the last report in October
2021. She remained gravely disabled due to mental illness.
E.A.’s brother, who visited her regularly, concurred. In a phone
call, E.A. denied having any mental illness or taking any
psychiatric medications. E.A. said she did not like her current
placement because they refused to feed her, “not one day at all.”
Staff at E.A.’s facility reported that she had been better with her
hygiene practices, but frequently shouted insults at fellow
patients and staff. They said E.A. denied having a mental
illness and did not believe she needed to take psychiatric
medications.
Based on this report and E.A.’s earlier agreement, the
court granted the 2023 petition, found E.A. gravely disabled,
and entered a formal order reappointing the Public Guardian as
conservator of E.A.’s person. The court also ratified the good
faith acts of the Public Guardian since the last conservatorship
formally expired in 2022.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
E.A. appealed the order reappointing the Public Guardian
as her conservator. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of
Appeal affirmed the reappointment order and directed the trial
court to dismiss the earlier 2022 petition as moot. It held the
trial delays E.A. experienced did not require that the
conservatorship order be reversed. The court recognized that
the LPS Act required trial to begin within 10 days of the
proposed conservatee’s demand, with a possible extension of
15 days, but it held that these deadlines were merely directory,
not mandatory. (See fn. 4, post.) The court further held that
E.A. had not established any violation of her constitutional right
to due process. Following the four-factor framework discussed
in Barker, supra, 407 U.S. 514, and adopted in Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th 354, the court assumed without deciding that the
first factor (length of the delay) weighed in support of a due
process violation. It also believed the third factor (assertion of
rights) supported a violation. But it found the second factor
(responsibility for the delay) less supportive because trial had
been continued several times at the prompting of E.A. or her
counsel. As to the fourth factor (prejudice), the court found that
E.A. had not shown any. The court explained that there was “no
reason on this record to question that E.A. remained gravely
disabled when she agreed to extend her conservatorship in
November 2023.” Nor had E.A. shown that the delay “ ‘had [an]
appreciable impact on [her] ability to present [her] defense.’ ”
E.A. had therefore failed to establish a due process violation
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
based on delay. E.A. filed a petition for review in this court,
which we granted.2
2
In January 2025, after this court granted review, the
Public Guardian filed a motion in the trial court to terminate
the conservatorship over E.A.’s person and dismiss the
proceedings. The Public Guardian believed that E.A. was no
longer gravely disabled and “the goals of the conservatorship
have been reached.” A supporting declaration explained that
E.A. had consistently taken her prescribed psychiatric
medication, engaged in activities at her board and care facility,
and otherwise been successful in this placement over the
previous seven months. E.A. had agreed to outpatient therapy
and money management in the event the conservatorship was
terminated. The trial court granted the motion and terminated
the conservatorship. It directed the Public Guardian to ensure
that a care coordination plan was in place for E.A., as required
by statute. (§ 5361, subd. (c)(2).)
Because the underlying conservatorship has terminated,
E.A.’s appeal challenging her conservatorship is now moot.
(Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 705–706, fn. 3
(K.P.); see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2025) Appeal, § 777,
p. 797 [“an action that originally was based on a justiciable
controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions
have become moot by subsequent acts or events”].) We have
observed that the problem of mootness “frequently arises in this
area of law given the short duration of conservatorships.”
(Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1094, fn. 2
(Eric B.).) We therefore exercise our discretion to consider the
issues raised in this matter, notwithstanding its mootness,
“[b]ecause the case raises important issues capable of repetition
but likely to evade review.” (Ibid.) Given this approach, we need
not consider whether E.A.’s acceptance of a conservatorship in
2023 also mooted her challenge to the delay in holding trial on
the 2022 petition.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Framework
“The LPS Act governs the involuntary detention,
evaluation, and treatment of persons who, as a result of mental
disorder, are dangerous or gravely disabled.” (Conservatorship
of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142 (John L.).) “The overall
statutory scheme describes a detailed, calibrated system for
intervention when circumstances indicate a person may be
suffering from a mental health disorder. In addition to
conservatorships, the [LPS] Act permits 3-day, 14-day, and 30-
day involuntary detentions for intensive treatment.” (K.P.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 706.) Although only grave disability as a
result of a mental disorder is at issue here, the LPS Act also
authorizes detentions and conservatorships for “individuals who
are imminently dangerous to themselves or others, or are
impaired by chronic alcoholism.” (K.P., at p. 706, fn. 4.)
“When a treatment professional determines a person is
gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment
voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may petition to
establish a conservatorship.” (Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 1095; see § 5352.) Grave disability, in this context, means the
proposed conservatee “is unable to provide for their basic
personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or
necessary medical care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) “The purpose
of conservatorship . . . is to provide individualized treatment,
supervision, and placement.” (§ 5350.1.)
“[B]ecause the private interests implicated in an LPS
conservatorship are significant, ‘several layers of important
safeguards’ have been built into the system [citation] to
‘vigilantly guard[] against erroneous conclusions’ in such
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proceedings.” (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 151; see
generally id. at pp. 151–152; K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 707–
710.) As relevant here, the proposed LPS conservatee may
demand a court or jury trial on the issue of grave disability.
(§ 5350, subd. (d)(1); see Conservatorship of Roulet (1979)
23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [“The due process clause of the California
Constitution requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
a unanimous jury verdict be applied to conservatorship
proceedings under the LPS Act”].)
By statute, the trial “shall commence within 10 days of the
date of the demand, except that the court shall continue the trial
date for a period not to exceed 15 days upon the request of
counsel for the proposed conservatee.” (§ 5350, subd. (d)(2).)
“Failure to commence the trial within that period of time is
grounds for dismissal of the conservatorship proceedings.”
(Ibid.)
If the court finds that the proposed conservatee is gravely
disabled and appoints a conservator, the conservatorship
automatically terminates after one year. (§ 5361, subd. (a).) If
the conservator believes the conservatee remains gravely
disabled at that time, the conservator may petition for
reappointment for an additional one-year period. (Id.,
subd. (b).) The conservator may continue to petition for yearly
reappointment for so long as a conservatorship remains
necessary. A conservatee’s right to a court or jury trial on the
issue of grave disability applies in reappointment proceedings
as well. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(3).)
B. Pretrial Delays and Due Process
E.A. contends the pretrial delays she experienced violated
her constitutional right to due process of law because the delay
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nearly encompassed the entire one-year conservatorship period.
We have not previously considered whether pretrial delays in
this context can violate due process and, if so, how courts should
identify whether a pretrial delay amounts to a constitutional
violation.3
“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation
of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ ” (Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 542.) But
“ ‘ “[d]ue process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘[D]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.’ ” (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 334.)
In Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th 354, we considered a
similar due process argument in the context of a different civil
commitment scheme, the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP
Act; § 6600 et seq.). Under the SVP Act, certain convicted sex
offenders may be indefinitely committed if they “are found to
have mental disorders that make them likely to reoffend after
release from prison.” (Camacho, at p. 367.) Like the LPS Act,
the SVP Act “sets forth extensive administrative and judicial
procedures for determining whether an individual is properly
classified as an SVP.” (Camacho, at p. 369.) Also like the LPS
Act, the SVP Act allows a proposed SVP to request a jury trial
on the ultimate question of whether the person is properly
subject to involuntary commitment under the statutory scheme.
3
In her briefing, E.A. refers to both the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution, but she does not
meaningfully distinguish between the two.
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(Camacho, at p. 370.) The proposed SVP in Camacho argued
that a years-long delay in holding such a trial violated his right
to due process. (Id. at p. 368.)
In Camacho, we agreed with the proposed SVP that such
a delay could, under appropriate circumstances, violate due
process. “ ‘The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” ’ [Citation.] Thus . . . individuals facing
commitment under the SVP Act have a due process right to a
timely trial.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 379.)
We embrace the same principle here. Like a proposed
SVP, a proposed LPS conservatee has a due process right to an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner, which necessarily implies a due process
right to a timely trial.
Indeed, neither party here disputes that a proposed LPS
conservatee has a due process right to a timely trial. What they
do dispute is the appropriate framework for identifying a due
process violation in this context. This dispute presents a
question of law that we consider de novo. (John L., supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 142; see Crocker National Bank v. City and
County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888 [“Questions
of law relate to the selection of a rule; their resolution is
reviewed independently”].)
The Court of Appeal, following our opinion in Camacho,
adopted the four-factor test announced in Barker, supra,
407 U.S. 514, which was developed to address a criminal
defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.
The Public Guardian agrees the Barker test is appropriate. E.A.
does not. For the first time in this court, she contends the more
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general due process frameworks described in Mathews, supra,
424 U.S. 319, and Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d 260, should govern.
We disagree and hold that the four-factor Barker test supplies
the appropriate framework for considering whether a pretrial
delay violates due process in this context.
Barker explained that the speedy trial right was “a
‘slippery’ one” because, among other things, “the accused may
not actually want a speedy trial and may perceive a tactical
advantage in delay.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380.)
Moreover, “ ‘the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept
than other procedural rights.’ [Citation.] ‘We cannot definitely
say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to
be swift but deliberate.’ ” (Ibid.) Given these uncertainties, “the
Barker court declined to adopt any bright-line rules for
determining when the right has been violated. The court
instead identified four factors for courts to examine: the length
of the pretrial delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by
the delay. [Citation.] The defendant carries the ‘burden of
demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker’s
multifactor test.’ [Citation.] Because none of these factors is
dispositive, ‘courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive
balancing process’ to determine whether trial has been
unconstitutionally delayed.” (Ibid.)
By contrast, the more general Mathews test provides three
factors for courts to consider in determining whether a
procedure is adequate to protect a person’s right to due process
under the federal Constitution: “First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” (Mathews, supra,
424 U.S. at p. 335.) In Ramirez, this court identified a fourth
factor that courts should consider when the due process
guarantee of the California Constitution is at issue. This
additional factor recognizes “the dignitary interest in informing
individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the
action and in enabling them to present their side of the story
before a responsible governmental official.” (Ramirez, supra,
25 Cal.3d at p. 269.)
In Camacho, we held that it was unnecessary for courts to
consider the Mathews factors to determine whether a proposed
SVP’s due process right to a timely trial had been violated.
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 379.) Instead, it was
sufficient for courts to consider the four-factor Barker test. We
noted that the Barker test had been employed beyond the strict
confines of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial,
including allegedly unconstitutional delays in sentencing
proceedings, in civil forfeiture proceedings, and in furnishing a
reporter’s transcript for use in a criminal appeal. (Id. at p. 380.)
We concluded the Barker factors were “likewise appropriate for
use in evaluating due process claims based on delays in holding
SVP trials.” (Id. at p. 381.) We observed that the significance
of timing in SVP trials was similar in certain respects to its
significance in criminal trials, including the possibility that a
proposed SVP may not want a speedy trial and the impossibility
of defining “with any precision a fixed point at which trial must
occur.” (Ibid.) To the extent differences between SVP trials and
criminal trials might be relevant to the question of timing, we
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held that “the flexibility of the [Barker] test allows courts to
account for those differences.” (Ibid.) The Mathews test, by
contrast, focuses on “the value of additional procedural
safeguards for the sake of reducing error.” (Id. at p. 382.) It is
therefore “more clearly suited to questions about the adequacy
of procedures used in government decisionmaking than to
questions about the timing of those decisions.” (Ibid.)
For similar reasons, we conclude that the Barker factors,
not the Mathews test, supply the appropriate framework for
assessing pretrial delays in LPS conservatorship proceedings.
LPS conservatorship proceedings are analogous to SVP
proceedings in that they involve a singular trial, with a jury
right, that may lead to involuntary commitment upon an
adverse verdict. Additional features of LPS conservatorship
proceedings, like SVP proceedings, support the use of the Barker
factors. For example, the person subject to potential
involuntary commitment (or that person’s counsel) may have a
tactical incentive to delay the proceedings. “From the
individual’s perspective, allowing more time for treatment may
ultimately improve the chance of success at trial, insofar as
treatment may help address a mental disorder” that would
otherwise lead to involuntary commitment. (Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 377; see id. at p. 381 [some individuals “may
perceive a tactical advantage in delay”].) Although a proposed
LPS conservatee may have a lesser incentive to delay the
proceedings than a proposed SVP, given the limited duration of
an LPS conservatorship, a proposed LPS conservatee may still
desire a delay if the outcome of a timely trial would be
unfavorable. Further, because due process is a flexible concept,
no bright-line rule exists to define a constitutional violation, and
the Barker factors properly account for that uncertainty. (Id. at
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p. 381.)4 Thus, the “broadly relevant set of functional, case-
dependent factors” identified in Barker and adopted in
Camacho, at page 381, should be applied to LPS trial delays as
well. Again, to the extent the LPS context differs from either
criminal trials or SVP proceedings, “the flexibility of the
[Barker] test allows courts to account for those differences.”
(Ibid.)
E.A. argues that Camacho is distinguishable because the
SVP commitment at issue there was of indefinite duration,
whereas an LPS conservatorship is limited to one year. While
this difference may affect the analysis of any particular alleged
violation of due process (see pt. II.C., post), Camacho did not rely
on the fact of indefinite duration as a reason to adopt the Barker
test, and the limited duration of an LPS conservatorship does
not undermine the rationales outlined above for the application
of the Barker test in the LPS context. These rationales center
on the unusual characteristics of the speedy trial right and the
analogous due process claim based on pretrial delay. Camacho’s
reasoning applies here because a similar type of pretrial delay
is at issue. E.A. has provided no persuasive explanation why
4
While the LPS Act requires a conservatorship trial to
begin within 10 or 25 days (§ 5350, subd. (d)(2)), the Courts of
Appeal have held that this statutory deadline is merely
directory, not mandatory. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of A.H.
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 227, 248 (A.H.); Conservatorship of T.B.
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1361, 1386 [directory deadline allows
trial courts to “retain the flexibility to accommodate
circumstances beyond a party’s control” for the benefit of both
the proposed conservatee and the public].) E.A. does not argue
otherwise, and the issue is not within the scope of these
proceedings. We therefore need not express any opinion
regarding the directory or mandatory nature of this statute.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
the difference in commitment periods should result in the
adoption of the more general test in Mathews and Ramirez, to
the exclusion of the more tailored Barker test.5
More generally, E.A. contends the Barker test is
inadequate because it does not explicitly require courts to
address the dignitary interests of an individual. As noted, in
Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 269, we held that courts
examining a due process claim under the California
Constitution must consider, in addition to the Mathews factors,
“the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature,
grounds and consequences of the [proposed government] action
and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a
responsible governmental official.”
Although this dignitary interest is not explicitly identified
in Barker, it is necessarily subsumed within its test. The first
Barker factor, the length of the pretrial delay, reflects the same
concern with an individual’s ability to be heard as the dignitary
interest identified in Ramirez. An excessive pretrial delay
necessarily impacts an individual’s ability to be heard.
5
As noted above and discussed further below, courts should
consider the Barker factors in context, which necessarily differs
depending on the type of proceeding at issue (e.g., LPS
conservatorship, SVP commitment, or criminal proceedings). As
relevant here, we note that a criminal conviction may result in
a lengthy term of imprisonment, and in the usual course a
criminal trial represents a defendant’s only opportunity to
contest the issue of guilt. By contrast, LPS conservatorships
must be renewed each year, and an LPS conservatee may
contest the issue of grave disability at each renewal.
Consequently, what constitutes a timely trial in the LPS context
is compressed into a shorter and more definite timeframe than
a criminal proceeding, and any interest a proposed LPS
conservatee may have in delaying trial is more bounded.
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Similarly, the fourth Barker factor, the prejudice to the
defendant caused by the delay, encompasses dignitary interests
as well as substantive ones. For example, we held in Camacho
that the “anxiety and concern” felt by a proposed SVP may be
considered under this factor. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 392.) As such, under the Barker test, courts may take into
account whether an individual has been “treated with respect
and dignity” in the context of a pretrial delay. (Ramirez, supra,
25 Cal.3d at p. 268.)
E.A. also contends the Barker test is inadequate and
inappropriate precisely because it requires consideration of
“prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay” as one factor in
its analysis. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380.) She points
out that Mathews and Ramirez do not explicitly identify
prejudice as a factor. E.A.’s contention is unpersuasive.
Mathews and Ramirez require courts to consider an individual’s
private interest and how it will be impacted by the government’s
action. (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335; Ramirez, supra,
25 Cal.3d at p. 269.) This consideration is similar to Barker’s
prejudice factor, which likewise considers harm to an individual.
Moreover, having found that an individual facing
involuntary commitment (like a proposed SVP or LPS
conservatee) has a due process right to a timely trial, we are not
constrained by Mathews or Ramirez from refining the basic due
process framework to assist courts in determining when a trial
becomes so untimely that it impinges on an individual’s
constitutional rights. In Camacho, we adopted the Barker test
and its prejudice component because it was specifically designed
to address the constitutional import of a pretrial delay. “The
Barker test outlines a broadly relevant set of functional, case-
dependent factors to consider in analyzing questions of trial
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
timing.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 381.) As a more
specific test, the Barker factors do not simply replicate the
Mathews and Ramirez factors. They reflect different areas of
emphasis and concern, and the inclusion of prejudice helps to
identify due process violations in the context of the “slippery
nature of the speedy trial right” where — unlike other possible
violations of due process — the proposed SVP or LPS
conservatee may have an interest in pretrial delay. (Id. at
p. 380.) Thus, E.A. is incorrect that pretrial delay necessarily
impacts an LPS conservatee’s dignitary interests and compels a
finding that due process has been violated, without considering
any other factors.6
E.A. cites People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91 in this
context, but that case is inapposite. In Allen, we considered
whether the deadline for filing a recommitment petition under
the former Mentally Disordered Offenders Act (MDO Act; Pen.
Code, § 2960 et seq.) was mandatory or directory. (Allen, at
pp. 94–95.) We held that the deadline was mandatory, and the
district attorney’s failure to file a timely recommitment petition
invalidated the court’s purported action on the untimely
6
E.A. also fails to acknowledge that, under Mathews and
Ramirez, a court may consider prejudice when deciding whether
a person who suffers a due process violation is entitled to relief.
(See, e.g., People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 870–872
[violation of due process in denying proposed SVP the
opportunity to testify at trial was not reversible error because
the due process violation was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt]; Conservatorship of Jose B. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 963,
974 (Jose B.) [consideration of Mathews factors was unnecessary
to determine whether a proposed LPS conservatee had suffered
a due process violation based on pretrial delay because the
conservatee had not shown prejudice].)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
petition. (Id. at p. 104.) We rejected the Attorney General’s
argument this result was unjustified unless the defendant could
show a due process violation and prejudice. (Ibid.) We noted,
“more often than not, an MDO would be unable to show
prejudice if his or her mental disorder is not in remission.” (Id.
at p. 105.) But because the district attorney failed to file a
timely recommitment petition, the MDO “was denied his annual
review under the MDO Act, which may be deemed prejudicial.”
(Ibid.) Unlike the defendant in Allen, E.A. does not contend here
that the conservatorship order below must be invalidated based
on a failure to comply with a mandatory statutory deadline. In
any event, unlike the failure to meet a mandatory deadline, the
due process right to a timely trial is not defined by a bright-line
rule, and as discussed, a consideration of prejudice is helpful and
appropriate to assist a court in identifying when a due process
violation has occurred.7
In sum, the Barker test is tailored to the unusual type of
due process violation at issue here, whereas the test in Mathews
(and Ramirez) is “more clearly suited to questions about the
adequacy of procedures used in government decisionmaking.”
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 382.) E.A. has not shown
otherwise. We therefore conclude, following our reasoning in
7
E.A. also appears to argue that, under the circumstances
of this case, no showing of prejudice should be required. We
address the circumstances of this case in the next part. E.A.’s
case-specific arguments do not show that the adoption of the
Barker factors, including its prejudice factor, is incorrect as a
general matter. We observed in Camacho that “none of these
factors is dispositive” in any particular case. (Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 380.) “ ‘[C]ourts must still engage in a difficult
and sensitive balancing process’ to determine whether trial has
been unconstitutionally delayed.” (Ibid.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Camacho, that courts should use the Barker factors to assess a
claimed due process violation based on pretrial delay in an LPS
conservatorship proceeding. 8
C. Application to These Proceedings
Applying the Barker test, the Court of Appeal below held
that the pretrial delay in this case did not violate due process.
E.A. contends the Court of Appeal was incorrect. We employ
independent review to decide whether a due process violation
occurred. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1264, fn. 8; see
People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527–528; Conservatorship
of B.C. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1034.) Under this standard,
we agree with E.A. that she was denied due process of law under
the circumstances here when her conservatorship trial was
8
E.A. additionally contends that adoption of the Barker
factors here violates equal protection because LPS conservatees
are situated differently from criminal defendants. E.A. did not
raise this contention below, so we may therefore consider it
forfeited. E.A. also did not properly raise it in her petition for
review, so we may disregard it. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.516(a)(1).) However, it is plainly meritless. The
application of the Barker test in this context does not subject
E.A. to the same standards as a criminal defendant. The test is
flexible and context-specific, and as discussed it should be
applied with awareness of the differences between criminal
proceedings and LPS conservatorship proceedings. Moreover,
even accepting E.A.’s claim that she is being treated similarly to
a criminal defendant, E.A. has not established an equal
protection violation. An equal protection violation arises when
one class of individuals is treated differently from another class,
not when the two classes are treated similarly. (See People v.
Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1102 [“ ‘If the two
groups . . . are not being treated differently, then there can be
no equal protection violation’ ”]; see also People v. Hardin (2024)
15 Cal.5th 834, 847 [an equal protection violation requires
“unequal” or “differential treatment”].)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
delayed for almost a year, effectively swallowing the one-year
conservatorship that was the precise issue to be tried. However,
as we explain in the following part, even if this matter were not
moot, E.A. would not be entitled to reversal of the trial court’s
conservatorship order based on this due process violation
because the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The first Barker factor is the length of the pretrial delay.
(Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 531; Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 383.) The significance of the delay’s length must be
considered with reference to this factor’s animating principles
and the legal and factual context in which the delay arises. The
length of the delay may be important because it may serve as a
proxy for the potential harm to a defendant or proposed LPS
conservatee. (Barker, at p. 530.) The context here includes the
statutory time limit for holding an LPS conservatorship trial,
which the Legislature has fixed at 10 days from the date of
demand. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(2).) This 10-day period can only be
extended “upon the request of counsel for the proposed
conservatee” and only for a further 15 days. (Ibid.) The context
here also includes the statutory time limit for an LPS
conservatorship itself, which is one year. (§ 5361, subd. (a)
[“Conservatorship initiated pursuant to this chapter shall
automatically terminate one year after the appointment of the
conservator by the superior court”].) This statutory time limit
reflects the Legislature’s intent that conservatees enjoy the full
panoply of procedural protections under the LPS Act each year,
including trial if demanded by the conservatee. Indeed, as one
lower court has observed, “The prohibition of indefinite periods
of confinement of the gravely disabled was one of the most
important reforms of the LPS Act.” (Conservatorship of
Kevin M. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 79, 89.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
In this case, E.A. demanded a jury trial on December 2,
2022. The matter was not called for trial until November 28,
2023. In the context of an LPS conservatorship proceeding, the
length of this delay is significant. It far exceeds the
Legislature’s 10-day (or even 25-day) deadline for holding an
LPS conservatorship trial. It also nearly eclipses the one-year
duration of an LPS conservatorship. The length of this delay
raises the possibility of prejudice because it departs so
significantly from the Legislature’s prescribed deadline and
effectively nullifies the requirement that trial occur before a one-
year conservatorship is imposed. (See Conservatorship of
Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1013 [“A conservatee’s
right to a jury trial has little meaning if the conservatee can only
exercise that right after spending nine months of a one-year
term in a custodial setting”].)
The second Barker factor is the reason or reasons for
delay. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 531; Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 383.) Under this factor, both the responsibility
for the delay and the reasons for delay are relevant. (Camacho,
at p. 384.) If the government is at fault, a deliberate “effort at
manipulation ‘should be weighted heavily’ ” against it. (Ibid.)
“ ‘A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded
courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should
be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with
the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.’ ” (Ibid.) By
contrast, delays sought by the defendant (or proposed LPS
conservatee), including by or through counsel, “weigh against” a
claim that the delay violates due process. (Id. at p. 385.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
In this case, the causes of the nearly year-long delay were
numerous and varied, but they were primarily caused by
resource constraints and court congestion. E.A. or her counsel
were responsible for a few continuances. For example, a trial
call on August 28, 2023, appears to have been continued because
E.A.’s counsel was unavailable to proceed, and E.A. was ill or in
quarantine on November 8 and November 13, 2023, resulting in
additional continuances. But trial calls on February 6 and
March 6, 2023 were continued at least in part because the Public
Guardian was unable to proceed, and trial court unavailability
appears to have been the sole cause of continuances on
January 3, January 17, July 10, October 2, October 4,
October 11, October 16, October 18, and November 6, 2023.
Moreover, the record reflects that the length of certain
continuances was related to court congestion, with the trial
court observing that the trial departments available for a court
or jury trial were limited and criminal trials took precedence.
Overall, the history of delays in this case lends moderate
support to E.A.’s due process claim. The delays attributable to
the government stemmed from resource and logistical
constraints, rather than any specific or deliberate effort to delay
E.A.’s trial in particular or conservatorship trials in general.
These delays should therefore “ ‘be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered.’ ” (Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 384.)
The third Barker factor is the individual’s “assertion of his
right to a timely trial.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 390;
see Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 531.) This factor “does not
hinge on ‘ “the number of times the accused acquiesced or
objected; rather, the focus is on the surrounding circumstances,
such as the timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
objections, the reasons for the acquiescence, whether the
accused was represented by counsel, the accused’s pretrial
conduct (as that conduct bears on the speedy trial right), and so
forth. [Citation.] The totality of the accused’s responses to the
delay is indicative of whether he or she actually wanted a speedy
trial.” ’ [Citation.] Viewing the complete picture matters
because ‘[t]he more serious the deprivation [of the right to a
speedy trial], the more likely a defendant is to complain.’ ”
(Camacho, at p. 390.)
This factor, too, is supportive of E.A.’s due process claim.
E.A. repeatedly demanded that her conservatorship trial be set,
she drew attention to the extended pretrial delay, and she filed
five motions to dismiss the proceedings based on excessive
delays. For example, on July 10, 2023, E.A.’s counsel moved for
dismissal based on “egregious” trial delays and argued that E.A.
had effectively “been conserved without due process.” Similarly,
on October 2, 2023, E.A.’s counsel stated she “has been waiting
for a time-not-waived jury trial since December 2nd of 2022 on
an old petition.” The delay was so long that the Public Guardian
had filed a new reappointment petition, which in the view of
E.A.’s counsel “effectively den[ied] [E.A.’s] due process rights to
a jury trial in the first petition.” However, E.A.’s demand for a
jury trial was preceded by a six-week delay that she requested
and received. This initial delay shows that E.A. was willing to
put off her trial and did not necessarily want a speedy trial at
all costs. Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeal below concluded,
“there is no question that from December 3, 2022, E.A. was
persistent in her request for a jury trial and asserting her right
to prompt adjudication.”
The final Barker factor is “prejudice to the defendant.”
(Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532; see Camacho, supra,
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
15 Cal.5th at p. 391.) Although this factor, like all Barker
factors, is derived from the criminal context, it transfers less
easily to proceedings outside a criminal prosecution and must
be applied with awareness of its origin.
In a criminal case, trial delay is presumptively prejudicial
because “a period of lengthy pretrial delay may impose real
detriment to an individual’s ability to mount a defense; defense
witnesses may die, disappear, or lose their memory of the
relevant events.” (Camacho, 15 Cal.5th at p. 391.) In Camacho,
we held that no presumption of prejudice should be employed in
the SVP context because “trial on a petition for commitment
under the SVP Act aims to establish whether a person meets the
definition of an SVP at the time of trial. This inquiry is
categorically different from that of a criminal trial, where the
issue is whether the defendant’s past conduct constitutes guilt
of a particular offense. In the SVP context, then, time ordinarily
will not erase critical evidence for the defense, since the jury
relies on recent expert evaluations to evaluate whether the
individual qualifies as an SVP at the time of trial.” (Id. at
p. 392.) The same reasoning applies here. The issue for the jury
in an LPS conservatorship trial is whether the proposed
conservatee is gravely disabled at the time of trial. Although
past events may be relevant to this issue, the focus of trial is the
proposed conservatee’s present condition. As such, the risk of
prejudice to the defense based on excessive delay is not inherent
in the delay itself and does not support a presumption of
prejudice.
Likewise, in a criminal case, a lengthy pretrial delay may
result in pretrial detention. Such detention may often be
“oppressive” to the individual facing trial. (Barker, supra,
407 U.S. at p. 532.) If an SVP or LPS conservatee is
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
involuntarily committed, it likewise “entails a severe and
oppressive restriction on liberty” and may result in the loss of a
job and disruption to social and familial bonds. (Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 392; see John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at
p. 150 [“There can be no doubt that ‘[t]he liberty interests at
stake in [an LPS] conservatorship proceeding are significant’ ”].)
But involuntary commitment is not oppressive in the same way
as pretrial criminal detention. Involuntary commitment results
in confinement to a hospital or treatment facility, not jail. A
proposed SVP or LPS conservatee “begin[s] receiving mental
health treatment while they await trial. [Citations.] Pretrial
treatment of the underlying mental disorder that caused the
state to seek commitment in the first place may ultimately
facilitate the individual’s release before trial.” (Camacho, at
p. 393.)
Indeed, the involuntary commitment of proposed LPS
conservatees is generally intended to and does benefit the
conservatees themselves, so pretrial detention in the LPS
context is even less inherently prejudicial than the SVP context
we explored in Camacho. “ ‘The sole state interest, legislatively
expressed, [in LPS conservatorships] is the custodial care,
diagnosis, treatment, and protection of persons who are unable
to take care of themselves and who for their own well-being and
the safety of others cannot be left adrift in the community. The
commitment may not reasonably be deemed punishment either
in its design or purpose. It is not analogous to criminal
proceedings.’ ” (Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th
1005, 1015 (Susan T.).) Similarly, the high court has explained
that involuntary commitment of a mentally ill person differs
significantly from the involuntary detention of a person accused
or convicted of a crime. A “genuinely mentally ill person” is not
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
benefitted, and may instead be harmed, by freedom from
confinement. (Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 429.)
Nonetheless, a showing of prejudice under this factor is by
no means impossible for a person awaiting an LPS
conservatorship trial. As noted, involuntary commitment, even
for mental health treatment, “entails a severe and oppressive
restriction on liberty that may give rise to feelings of anxiety
and concern.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 392.) In
addition, “conservatees may lose the rights to drive, vote, enter
contracts, and make decisions about their treatment.” (Eric B.,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 1103–1104.) Depending on the
circumstances, the burdens imposed by a conservatorship may
result in financial, professional, or personal hardship.
Moreover, if a person’s suitability for commitment or other
restrictions is uncertain or subject to substantial dispute, “the
amount of prejudice may increase as the length of the delay
increases.” (Camacho, at p. 393.) Finally, if a proposed LPS
conservatee can show that delay carries the risk of impairing
the proposed conservatee’s ability to present a defense, such a
showing will carry substantial weight because impact to a
proposed conservatee’s defense is “the ‘most serious’ interest”
protected by the right to due process in this context. (Id. at
p. 391.)
When we analyzed this factor in Camacho, we noted at the
outset that “the delay . . . had no appreciable impact on [the
proposed SVP’s] ability to present his defense.” (Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 393.) We further observed that the
proposed SVP had received one favorable and two potentially
favorable expert reports several years earlier. (Ibid.) We
explained, “The length of delay since that point —
approximately seven years — is significant, and [the proposed
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
SVP] has been involuntarily committed throughout that period.”
(Ibid.) Under these circumstances, we found “some amount of
prejudice . . . but no indication that the delay has undermined
the fairness of the proceedings.” (Ibid.)
Here, E.A. has likewise failed to show that the delay
hampered her ability to present a defense. Indeed, it does not
appear she had any substantial defense to the Public Guardian’s
allegation that she was gravely disabled. Every expert who
examined E.A. concluded she was gravely disabled, and her
family did not disagree. E.A. voluntarily accepted
conservatorships in 2020 and 2021. Even after the extensive
delay at issue here, E.A. again voluntarily accepted a
conservatorship in 2023. In other words, E.A. ultimately did not
even contest the issue on which she demanded trial. 9
E.A. points to the agreed disposition in 2023 regarding her
conservatorship, which included a provision for E.A. to step
down to a less secure facility. She contends the pretrial delay
led to a delay in her change in placement. E.A. misreads the
9
E.A. suggests that her 2023 acceptance of a
conservatorship should be discounted or disregarded because it
was somehow caused by the extended delay. E.A.’s argument is
unpersuasive. As the Court of Appeal explained below, “[T]here
is nothing in this record to suggest that E.A.’s ability to prepare
for trial or her defense to the allegations was impaired by the
delay. There is also no reason on this record to question that
E.A. remained gravely disabled when she agreed to extend her
conservatorship in November 2023. The investigator’s report for
this most recent commitment prepared in late 2023 plainly
states that her condition remained essentially unchanged since
she was evaluated in October 2021. Moreover, the agreed
disposition of the September 2023 petition was announced when
her trial was to begin, and she could have proceeded to trial on
that day.”
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
record of proceedings below. The change in placement was the
result of an agreement with the Public Guardian, not trial. E.A.
could have pursued this agreement at any point following the
Public Guardian’s reappointment petition. The timing of the
agreement was not restricted by the timing of trial.
We may presume that E.A. suffered some amount of
prejudice as a result of her involuntary commitment during the
period of delay, including the harm to E.A.’s dignitary interest
inherent in the court’s failure to hear her case in a timely
manner. However, because that commitment was primarily
directed toward her treatment, and took place in a secure facility
for her own safety and protection, the prejudice resulting from
the fact of commitment is less than in the criminal context. Nor
has E.A. shown that she suffered any significant anxiety or
distress as a result of the pretrial delay specifically. In one
motion to dismiss, E.A.’s counsel stated that E.A. has “great
anxiety and concern” as a result of her involuntary confinement,
but it was unsupported by any declaration (from E.A. or her
counsel). It was also vague regarding the source of these
feelings and their extent. It is insufficient to show prejudice.
E.A. claims her family members were impacted as well because
they had to attend “numerous hearings.” E.A. does not support
this claim by reference to any specific hearings, and it appears
that her family was only required to attend one hearing that
ultimately proved unnecessary. Even assuming that the impact
on a proposed conservatee’s family by a pretrial delay may be
considered under this Barker factor, E.A.’s showing is
insufficient. Thus, while E.A. suffered some prejudice as a
result of her involuntary commitment, it was not substantial,
especially in light of her acceptance of conservatorships both
before and after the period of delay.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
After identifying the facts relevant to each factor, “ ‘courts
must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process’
to determine whether trial has been unconstitutionally
delayed.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380.) In doing so,
we keep in mind that these factors are “functional” and “case-
dependent,” and they should be applied with “flexibility” and
sensitivity to the context of each case. (Id. at p. 381; see Barker,
supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 [“A balancing test necessarily compels
courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis”].)
We conclude that E.A. suffered a due process violation
when her LPS conservatorship trial was delayed by nearly a
year. The first factor, the length of the delay, supports this
finding. Because E.A.’s conservatorship trial was delayed by
almost a year, it effectively nullified the procedural protections
that should be satisfied before an LPS conservatee suffers such
a lengthy involuntary commitment. The second factor,
responsibility for the delay, supports this finding as well. The
reasons for the delay were varied and in part caused by E.A. or
her counsel. However, it appears the bulk of the delay was
caused by trial court congestion and resource constraints, which
are chargeable against the government. The third factor, the
individual’s assertion of her due process right, also supports a
finding that due process was violated. After an initial delay,
E.A. clearly and repeatedly requested that her LPS
conservatorship trial be set. The final factor, prejudice, weighs
against a finding that due process was violated. E.A. has not
shown she suffered any prejudice beyond the fact of the delay
itself and any associated impingement on her liberty that it
necessarily caused. However, given her substantial showing
under the first factor, and the moderately supportive showings
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
under the second and third, E.A. has demonstrated a violation
of her right to due process of law based on pretrial delay.
D. Remedy
The existence of a due process violation is separate from
the possibility of a remedy. In Camacho, which involved a
different procedural context, we declined to address the proper
remedy when a court identifies a due process violation based on
pretrial delay in a civil commitment proceeding. (Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 382, fn. 5.) We observed, “In the criminal
context, Barker instructs that the sole remedy for a Sixth
Amendment speedy trial violation is dismissal of the
prosecution — an ‘unsatisfactorily severe remedy,’ but, in the
high court’s view, the ‘only possible’ one.” (Ibid.) However, in
the noncriminal context, other courts had “suggested that there
may be other possible remedies for unreasonable delays in this
context.” (Ibid.) For example, one federal appellate court held
that, even if a person subject to involuntary commitment suffers
a due process violation due to pretrial delay, “the proper remedy
would not be dismissal of the certification [i.e., commitment
petition] and release, but conducting the hearing and
determining on the merits whether [the person] should be
committed as a ‘sexually dangerous person’ ” under federal law.
(United States v. Timms (4th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3d 436, 455, fn. 19
(Timms).)
We conclude that, at least in the context of LPS
conservatorship proceedings, a due process violation based on
pretrial delay is subject to harmless error analysis. Further, in
a direct appeal alleging such a due process violation, the
violation may be found harmless where the LPS conservatee has
been found to be gravely disabled and a court can conclude
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the
same — that is, the court would have imposed a
conservatorship — in the absence of the delay.
In general, an error — even a constitutional error — may
be found harmless if it meets the applicable standard for
determining harmlessness. “There is a strong presumption any
error” may be found harmless, “and it is the rare case in which
a constitutional violation will not be subject to harmless error
analysis.” (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 851.)
Errors that are not subject to harmless error analysis are
deemed “ ‘structural’ ” errors, and they require reversal
regardless of the surrounding circumstances. (In re
Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1074 (Christopher L.).)
In Christopher L., we considered whether an error in a
juvenile dependency proceeding was subject to harmless error
analysis or was a structural error that was reversible per se.
(Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1069.) We observed that
structural errors more commonly arise in criminal proceedings,
and we cautioned “against ‘import[ing] wholesale, or
unthinkingly,’ the analysis of structural error from criminal
cases into other contexts.” (Id. at p. 1074.) Nonetheless, the
concept of a structural error is not limited to the criminal
context, and we had never foreclosed its use in dependency
proceedings. (Id. at pp. 1074–1075.) To determine whether the
error at issue was structural, we referred to the high court’s
opinion in Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. 286
(Weaver), which discussed how to identify errors that are not
amenable to harmless error analysis and are therefore
structural errors that are reversible per se. (Christopher L., at
p. 1077.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Weaver explained that various rationales have been
offered to support the determination that an error is structural.
“First, an error has been deemed structural in some instances if
the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from
erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,”
such as a criminal defendant’s right to conduct his or her own
defense. (Weaver, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 295.) “Second, an error
has been deemed structural if the effects of the error are simply
too hard to measure. For example, when a defendant is denied
the right to select his or her own attorney, the precise ‘effect of
the violation cannot be ascertained.’ ” (Ibid.) “Third, an error
has been deemed structural if the error always results in
fundamental unfairness. For example, if an indigent defendant
is denied an attorney or if the judge fails to give a reasonable-
doubt instruction, the resulting trial is always a fundamentally
unfair one.” (Id. at p. 296.)
Christopher L. found that none of these rationales
supported the conclusion that the error in that case was
structural. (Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 1077–
1081.) The error at issue in Christopher L. was a juvenile court’s
failure “to appoint counsel [for an incarcerated parent] or
provide for [the parent’s] presence at the combined jurisdiction
and disposition hearing” in a dependency case. (Id. at p. 1076.)
We concluded the first Weaver rationale did not support a
determination of structural error because the parent’s own
interest in participating in the proceedings was “not easily
distinguished” from the broader interest in “protect[ing] the
parent from an erroneous determination,” which can be
addressed through harmless error analysis. (Id. at p. 1077.) We
concluded the second Weaver rationale was likewise
unsupportive because it was possible, without speculation, to
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
assess what would have happened had the incarcerated parent
and counsel been present at the hearing. (Id. at p. 1078.)
Indeed, in the Court of Appeal, the parent had not attempted to
show how the juvenile court’s orders would have been different
if he and his counsel had been present. (Id. at p. 1079.) Finally,
with respect to the third Weaver factor, we concluded that
absence of an incarcerated parent and his counsel does not
always result in fundamental unfairness in every case. (Id. at
p. 1081.) We noted that a rule of “automatic reversal for errors
that do not invariably lead to fundamental unfairness would
exact a particularly steep cost,” given the profoundly negative
consequences of delay and uncertainty in the dependency
context. (Ibid.)
Applying the Weaver framework here also leads to the
conclusion that the error is not structural. The first Weaver
rationale may apply “if the right at issue is not designed to
protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead
protects some other interest.” (Weaver, supra, 582 U.S. at
p. 295.) Although in the criminal context the speedy trial right
is arguably separate from the merits of a criminal prosecution,
no strict separation exists in the LPS conservatorship context.
Instead, as explained above, the right to a timely trial in an LPS
conservatorship proceeding stems from an individual’s due
process right to be heard “ ‘ “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” ’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 379.)
It serves primarily to protect and make effective a person’s
procedural right to a court or jury trial under the LPS Act. As
we have explained, “the most important interest” in this context
is “the ‘possibility that the defense will be impaired’ ” because
impairment to an individual’s ability to present a defense
“ ‘skews the fairness of the entire system.’ ” (Id. at p. 391.) In
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
this way, like in Christopher L., the proposed LPS conservatee’s
interest “is not easily distinguished” from the broader “interest
in the accuracy of the proceedings.” (Christopher L., supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 1077.)
The second and third Weaver rationales are likewise
inapplicable. It is not the case that the effects of a lengthy
pretrial delay “are simply too hard to measure.” (Weaver, supra,
582 U.S. at p. 295.) A lengthy delay may or may not have an
effect on the defense a proposed LPS conservatee presents at
trial, but it is straightforward to identify such an effect because
it would impact the evidence offered at trial (or not offered, as
the case may be). The record of an LPS conservatorship
proceeding will generally reflect evidence for and against the
proposed conservatorship at numerous points throughout the
proceedings, including at trial. Based on this record, a court will
generally be able to determine whether any pretrial delay was
prejudicial. Further, a lengthy pretrial delay would not be
expected to result “in fundamental unfairness” as a general
matter. (Id. at p. 296.) In the context of a lengthy pretrial delay,
the protections of the LPS Act still apply. Trial is delayed, but
it must still take place in order for an LPS conservatorship to be
imposed. In the interim, a proposed LPS conservatee may
challenge the conservatorship if the proposed conservatee is no
longer gravely disabled. (See, e.g., People v. Tilbury (1991)
54 Cal.3d 56, 64 [petition for writ of habeas corpus].) This
situation is therefore unlike the example in Weaver, where the
high court observed, “if an indigent defendant is denied an
attorney or if the judge fails to give a reasonable-doubt
instruction, the resulting trial is always a fundamentally unfair
one.” (Weaver, at p. 296.) No similar structural unfairness
arises as a result of a lengthy pretrial delay. This conclusion is
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
supported, as it was in Christopher L., by the focus in LPS
conservatorship proceedings on a proposed conservatee’s
present condition, rather than any specific historical fact.
(Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1081.) A lengthy delay
does not invariably foreclose a fair determination of this issue. 10
Further, as in Christopher L., a determination that a
lengthy pretrial delay is structural error in this context would
be particularly disruptive. (See Christopher L., supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 1081.) An LPS conservatee who has been found
gravely disabled, even after a lengthy trial delay, still requires
the care and treatment that an LPS conservatorship provides.
It would serve neither the public interest nor the LPS
conservatee’s own interest to terminate the conservatorship. It
would also be wasteful and unnecessary to require a new, even
more delayed trial following appeal and reversal for structural
error. A new trial would not remedy the previous delay, and it
would be even further removed from whatever time in the past
the trial should have occurred.
While Barker held that “the only possible remedy” for
violation of the speedy trial right was “the unsatisfactorily
severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment” (Barker, supra,
407 U.S. at p. 522), its reasoning does not apply here. The
speedy trial right in a criminal proceeding is an independent
right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. (See United States
v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 8 [“The Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial is thus not primarily intended to prevent
10
It is possible that an assessment of harmlessness will be
impossible under the specific circumstances of a given case. But
this possibility does not support a rule of automatic reversal in
every case. (Christopher L., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1082.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest
is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes
of limitations”].) If this speedy trial right is violated, there is no
way it can be cured because any satisfactory remedy could only
involve going back in time and holding a timely trial. By
contrast, the speedy trial right in the context of an LPS
conservatorship proceeding is not an independent right. As
noted, it derives from an individual’s due process right to be
heard “ ‘ “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ’ ”
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 379.) Such a right is
amenable to harmless error analysis, as discussed above.
“Categorization of an error as structural represents ‘the
exception and not the rule.’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017)
3 Cal.5th 151, 178.)
Moreover, even if the speedy trial right has some
independent force in this context, the numerous and significant
differences between criminal proceedings and LPS
conservatorship proceedings would still foreclose “the
unsatisfactorily severe remedy” that the Barker court felt
compelled to impose. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522.) “As
much as the private interests at stake are weighty and
deserving of protection, the stated purposes of the LPS Act
foreclose any argument that an LPS commitment is equivalent
to criminal punishment in its design or purpose.” (John L.,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 151; see Susan T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 1015 [“We find no similarity between the aims and objectives
of the act and those of the criminal law”].) What we have stated
in the dependency context applies equally here: “In a criminal
case, reversal of a criminal judgment is virtually always in the
defendant’s best interest. The situation in a dependency
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
case” — or an LPS conservatorship case — “is often different.”
(In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59.)
The conclusion that a lengthy pretrial delay is not
structural error is generally consistent with prior case law
considering such delays in the context of LPS conservatorships.
For example, in Jose B., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at page 974, the
court found a lengthy pretrial delay “troubling” but affirmed an
LPS conservatorship order because the conservatee had not
“shown he was prejudiced by the delay.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in
Conservatorship of James M. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 293, 299,
the court believed dismissal of an LPS petition by a trial court
would be appropriate after a lengthy pretrial delay only “where
the delay in the proceedings has proved prejudicial to the
conservatee’s interests.”
It appears that only one lower court has reversed an LPS
conservatorship order after finding a due process violation based
on lengthy pretrial delay. (A.H., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at
p. 268.) The import of this reversal, however, is somewhat
unclear. The focus of the A.H. court’s inquiry was whether the
trial court’s failure to consider the Barker factors in ruling on a
proposed LPS conservatee’s motion to dismiss was harmless.
(Id. at p. 257.) The A.H. court found that the Barker factors
supported a due process violation, so the trial court’s error was
not harmless. (Id. at pp. 267–268.) It therefore reversed the
conservatorship order, but it did not provide directions to the
trial court. It noted the underlying conservatorship had ended,
so it need not address whether the finding of a due process
violation would require the conservatee’s release. (Id. at p. 268,
fn. 23.) Ultimately, therefore, the A.H. court did not consider
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
the issue of automatic reversal on the merits, so it has no
bearing on the discussion herein. 11
In her briefing, E.A. relies heavily on the dignitary
interest discussed in Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 269.
But this interest, like the Barker factors we apply here, assists
courts in identifying when due process has been violated, i.e.,
when a person has been deprived of meaningful notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Our consideration of a person’s
dignitary interest in this context does not mean that any
impingement on a person’s dignitary interest is necessarily
structural error. A person’s dignitary interest informs what
procedures and protections are required as a matter of due
process, but the failure to adhere to those procedures and
protections may be found harmless in an appropriate case.
We caution that our discussion of harmless error here
arises in the specific context of a direct appeal from an order
imposing a conservatorship. A reviewing court’s dispositional
options in this context are limited by fundamental principles of
appellate procedure. (See generally F.P. v. Monier (2017)
3 Cal.5th 1099, 1107–1109; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ.
Proc., § 475.) By contrast, a trial court that has identified a due
11
In the context of an SVP proceeding, several lower courts
have held that dismissal or reversal is the only appropriate
remedy when a proposed SVP has suffered a due process
violation based on lengthy pretrial delays. (See, e.g., People v.
DeCasas (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 785, 813; People v. Superior
Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36, 83, fn. 30.) These
opinions follow Barker but do not engage in any extensive
analysis regarding whether Barker’s remedy should apply.
While we need not comment on the question of remedy in the
SVP context, we do not find these opinions persuasive on the
remedy issue before us.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
process violation based on the Barker factors has other options
available to address the violation or remedy such a delay,
including but not limited to an order requiring trial to take place
within a reasonable time. Similarly, a reviewing court
considering a petition for writ of mandate alleging a due process
violation may order appropriate remedial measures, if
warranted by the circumstances of a given case. (See Timms,
supra, 664 F.3d at p. 455, fn. 19.) A proposed LPS conservatee
who has suffered a due process violation might consider
pursuing relief prior to trial, including a writ petition if
appropriate, to avoid the possibility that the violation will be
held harmless on direct appeal from a future conservatorship
order.
In any event, in this direct appeal, because a violation of
due process in this context is not structural error, it may be
found harmless under the appropriate standard of prejudice.
We need not consider what standard applies because the error
here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) As discussed, in the
appealed conservatorship order, the trial court found that E.A.
was gravely disabled. E.A. does not challenge this finding or
contend that it would have been different if the pretrial delay
had not occurred. Indeed, when the court finally called the
matter for trial, E.A. did not contest the Public Guardian’s
allegation of grave disability and accepted a further one-year
conservatorship. Further, based on the entire record, there is
no indication that E.A. was not gravely disabled throughout the
period of delay. Under these circumstances, there can be no
reasonable doubt that the trial court would have found E.A.
gravely disabled and ordered a conservatorship, even if E.A.’s
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
conservatorship trial had been held in a timely fashion. As such,
the due process violation based on pretrial delay was harmless.
Thus, although the Court of Appeal was incorrect to find
that E.A. had not suffered a due process violation as a result of
the pretrial delay, it was correct to affirm the order of
conservatorship. Subsequent events, however, have rendered
this appeal moot. (See fn. 2, ante.) We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand with directions to
dismiss E.A.’s appeal as moot.
Notwithstanding this result, we emphasize, as we did in
Camacho, that the trial court has a “vital role . . . in
safeguarding the timely trial right” of LPS conservatees.
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 368.) State and local
governments likewise have an obligation to devote sufficient
resources to courts and counsel, as well as ancillary services, to
ensure timely adjudication. As one lower court has written, “We
are mindful that the resources of the trial court, the Public
Guardian, and the public defender’s office are stretched thin,
particularly after the pandemic. We also recognize that the
Public Guardian carries out an important (and perhaps
thankless) public service in LPS cases. We imagine that
individuals coming to the Public Guardian’s attention regularly
appear so clearly in need of care and protection that confinement
under a temporary conservatorship is necessary for their health
and safety. Finally, we understand that the number of LPS
defendants demanding a court or jury trial may fluctuate, with
the spikes causing a strain on the system. But the Legislature
has set forth a timeline for LPS cases with all these concerns in
mind, and that timeline must be followed. It is the
responsibility of the court, the Public Guardian, and the public
defender to dedicate the resources to do so.” (A.H., supra,
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 269.) We add today that failure to meet
this responsibility not only runs afoul of the statutory timeline,
but it may also violate fundamental principles of constitutional
due process.
III. CONCLUSION
When a proposed LPS conservatee challenges a lengthy
pretrial delay on due process grounds, courts should apply the
Barker factors to identify a due process violation. If a court
identifies a violation, it is not structural error and may be found
harmless under appropriate circumstances, including where, as
here, the LPS conservatee has been found gravely disabled and
there can be no reasonable doubt that the trial court would have
made the same finding if the pretrial delay had not occurred.
The Court of Appeal was therefore correct to affirm the
conservatorship order. However, because subsequent events
have rendered this appeal moot, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeal and remand with directions to dismiss the
appeal as moot.
GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
DELANEY, J.*
*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
47
CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A.
S287241
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu
Today’s opinion correctly finds that E.A., a Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act (LPS Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)
conservatee, was denied due process of law when she repeatedly
sought but did not receive a trial for nearly a year, the term of
her conservatorship. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2–3, 25–26, 35–36.)
That delay “effectively nullified E.A.’s right to a meaningful
opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of her liberty.”
(Id. at p. 2.) I further agree that a violation of an LPS Act
conservatee’s speedy trial right may be found harmless on direct
appeal and was harmless in this case. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 36,
44–46.)
I write to emphasize the weighty dignitary interests here.
The due process clauses in California’s Constitution require the
government to treat each person “as an equal, fully participating
and responsible member of society.” (People v. Ramirez (1979)
25 Cal.3d 260, 267 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); see id. at p. 279 (conc.
& dis. opn. of Bird, C. J.); Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a); id.,
§ 15.) Due process entails procedures that actualize our
“ ‘collective judgment that human beings are important in their
own right, and that they must be treated with understanding,
respect, and even compassion.’ ” (Ramirez, at p. 268 (plur. opn.
of Mosk, J.).) A “ ‘ “fundamental requirement” ’ ” is a
meaningful opportunity for a person to be heard when the
government seeks to deprive the person of liberty. (Maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 16.) The Legislature recognized that obligation when
1
CONSERVATORSHIP OF E.A.
Liu, J., concurring
it guaranteed proposed conservatees “the full panoply” of rights,
including a trial, each time the government seeks to renew a
conservatorship petition. (Id. at p. 26.) In situations like E.A.’s,
where pretrial delays effectively “eclipse[d]” the duration of the
conservatorship (id. at p. 27), a proposed conservatee has no
opportunity to be heard. This matters, even if the opportunity
to be heard is unlikely to affect whether the person is found
gravely disabled.
The court’s analysis and holdings today follow from the
posture of this case — a direct appeal long after E.A. accepted a
reappointment petition and long after the contested petition
expired. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 44 [“We caution that our
discussion of harmless error here arises in the specific context
of a direct appeal from an order imposing a conservatorship.”].)
Accordingly, the court observes that an infringement on a
proposed conservatee’s dignity is not “necessarily structural
error” on direct appeal. (Ibid.) But a proposed conservatee
seeking to enforce her right to a timely trial may secure
appropriate relief without demonstrating reversible error in
other procedural postures, such as on a petition for writ of
mandate after a trial court’s rejection of a speedy trial motion.
(Id. at pp. 44–45.) In such cases, courts should accord proper
weight to the denial of a proposed conservatee’s right to be
heard. Giving substance to that right is at the heart of what it
means for government to respect the inherent dignity of each
person.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
EVANS, J.
2
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Conservatorship of E.A.
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 8/28/24 – 1st Dist.,
Div. 1
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S287241
Date Filed: July 23, 2026
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Contra Costa
Judge: Frank Riebli
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Brian C. McComas, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Objector and Appellant.
Charles M. Denton, Public Defender (Alameda), for the California
Public Defender Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Objector
and Appellant.
Thomas L. Geiger, County Counsel, Steven P. Rettig, Assistant County
Counsel, Nina Dong and Andrea L. Russi, Deputy County Counsel, for
Petitioner and Respondent.
Jennifer Bacon Henning for the California State Association of
Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Brian C. McComas
The Law Office of B.C. McComas, LLP
PMB 1605, 77 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 101
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 814-2465
Andrea L. Russi
Deputy County Counsel
1025 Escobar Street, 3d Floor
Martinez, CA 94553
(925) 655-2216