Filed 9/17/26 Conservatorship of D.T. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
Conservatorship of the Person 2d Civ. No. B352568
of D.T. (Super. Ct. No. 24MH00213)
(Santa Barbara County)
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
D.T.,
Objector and Appellant.
Under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst.
Code1, § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act), persons subject to a proposed
conservatorship are entitled to a unanimous jury verdict on
whether they are gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
This is the second case before us in as many months involving a
proposed conservatee who was not advised of their right to a jury
trial. As we recently held in Conservatorship of K.L. (Aug. 25,
2026, B351841) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2026 WL 2490937] (K.L.),
where a trial court does not advise a proposed conservatee of
their right to a jury trial, and substantial evidence does not
establish the proposed conservatee lacks capacity to waive jury,
automatic reversal is not required if the totality of the
circumstances indicates a knowing and intelligent waiver of that
right.
D.T. appeals from an order under the LPS Act declaring
him gravely disabled and appointing the Santa Barbara County
Public Guardian (Public Guardian) as his conservator. We
reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
D.T. was the subject of a conservatorship, with the Public
Guardian as his conservator, from November 2024 to November
2025. In October 2025, the Public Guardian filed an LPS Act
petition to reestablish the conservatorship due to D.T.’s alleged
schizoaffective disorder and inability to accept voluntary
treatment for his mental illness. The trial court issued a written
citation for the conservatorship, which was personally served on
D.T.
D.T. did not appear at the November 2025 pretrial hearing.
D.T.’s attorney appeared and stated D.T. “objects and wishes to
set his matter for an in-person court trial.” Counsel did not
indicate she had explained to D.T. that he had a right to a jury
trial, discussed the mechanics of a jury trial, or explained the
differences between a jury trial and a court trial. Counsel also
did not indicate D.T. lacked capacity to waive jury.
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The trial court subsequently held a court trial on the
petition. The trial court did not take a personal waiver of jury
from D.T. Thus, the court did not explain the mechanics of a jury
trial or how a jury trial differed from a court trial.
After hearing testimony from two witnesses and D.T., the
trial court granted the petition and found D.T. gravely disabled
beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) The court
appointed the Public Guardian as conservator of D.T.’s person for
one year, found the least restrictive facility for D.T. was a locked
psychiatric facility, and prohibited D.T. from operating a motor
vehicle, entering into contracts in excess of $25, possessing
firearms, and refusing medical treatment.
DISCUSSION
The LPS Act
The LPS Act governs the involuntary treatment of the
“gravely disabled” in California so that they may receive
individualized treatment, supervision, and placement. (§§ 5350,
5350.1; Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 139.) A
person is “ ‘gravely disabled’ ” if “as a result of a mental health
disorder, a severe substance abuse use disorder, or a co-occurring
mental health disorder and a severe substance use disorder, is
unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing,
shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical care.” (§ 5008,
subd. (h)(1)(A).)
“When a treatment professional determines a person is
gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment
voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may petition to
establish a conservatorship. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5352; see
Conservatorship of K.P. [(2021) 11 Cal.5th 695,] 708–709.) If the
matter proceeds to trial and the person is found gravely disabled,
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the court appoints a conservator (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350),
imposes ‘disabilities’ as needed (id., § 5357), and determines an
appropriate treatment placement (id., § 5358). (See
Conservatorship of K.P., at pp. 709–710.) A conservatorship
terminates after one year but may be extended for additional
one-year terms upon petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5361.)”
(Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1095–1096
(Eric B.).) A finding of grave disability must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d
219, 235 (Roulet).)
D.T.’s right to a jury trial
D.T. contends the trial court committed reversible error
because it did not advise him of his right to a jury trial and
obtain his personal waiver. We agree reversal is warranted here.
We review D.T.’s claims de novo. (Conservatorship of John
L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 894, 904 (C.O.).)
A “ ‘civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty . . . .’ (Addington v. Texas
[(1979)] 441 U.S. [418,] 425; see [People v.] Blackburn [(2015)] 61
Cal.4th [1113,] 1119.) ‘In addition to physical restraint, “[t]he
gravely disabled person for whom a conservatorship has been
established faces the loss of many other liberties . . . .” ’
([Conservatorship of] Ben C. [(2007)] 40 Cal.4th [529,] 540.)
Apart from their possible confinement, conservatees may lose the
rights to drive, vote, enter contracts, and make decisions about
their treatment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5357.) In light of the
potential for such a significant loss of liberty, conservatorship
cases are governed by many of the same procedural protections
that apply in criminal trials. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350,
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subd. (d)(1); Ben C., at p. 541; but see Ben C., at p. 538.)” (Eric
B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 1103–1104.)
One such right is a conservatee’s right to a unanimous jury
verdict on the issue of grave disability. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1);
Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235.) Probate Code section 1828,
subdivision (a)(6) states “the court shall inform the proposed
conservatee of all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] The proposed
conservatee has the right . . . to have the matter of the
establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury.” A trial
court’s failure to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a
jury trial is statutory error. (Conservatorship of Heather W.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 384 (Heather W.); C.O., supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 909; § 5350, subd. (d)(1).)
“[T]he trial court must obtain a personal waiver of a jury
trial from the conservatee, even when the conservatee expresses
no preference for a jury trial. Absent such a waiver, the court
must accord the conservatee a jury trial unless the court finds the
conservatee lacks the capacity to make such a decision.” (Heather
W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 381.)
“[A] person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in
LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and
voluntarily made.” (K.R. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
133, 143 [collecting authority].) The failure to obtain a knowing
and intelligent jury trial waiver “denies the defendant [or
conservatee] his or her statutory right to a jury trial on the entire
cause in a civil commitment proceeding.” (People v. Blackburn,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [jury trial waivers required in
proceedings involving offenders with mental health disorders];
see also People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163 (Tran) [jury
trial waivers required in involuntary commitment proceedings
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where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)];
Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250
(Kevin A.) [LPS Act shares same purposes as MDO and NGI
commitment schemes].)
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the failure to
obtain a valid jury trial waiver “defies ordinary harmless error
analysis” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134) and
is a “ ‘miscarriage of justice’ within the meaning of California
Constitution, article VI, section 13,” requiring reversal. (Id. at
pp. 1132–1133; Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [invalid jury
waiver in commitment proceeding “is not susceptible to ordinary
harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal”].)
In the criminal jury waiver context, our Supreme Court has
also emphasized that “ ‘knowing and intelligent’ ” means
“ ‘ “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th at pp. 151, 166
(Sivongxxay).) In determining whether a waiver was knowing
and intelligent, “we examine ‘the totality of the circumstances’
unique to each case.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722,
753.)
In Sivongxxay, our Supreme Court recommended that trial
courts advise criminal defendants of the “basic mechanics of a
jury trial” including that “(1) a jury is made up of 12 members of
the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may
participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously
agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives
the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt
or innocence.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.)
Sivongxxay confirmed that no “specific method for determining
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whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial” is required. (Id. at p. 167.)
In Heather W., we concluded the trial court’s error in failing
to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial was
not harmless and required reversal. (Heather W., supra, 245
Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385.) There, the trial court “advised
Heather W. of her right to testify, but did not advise her that she
had a right to a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 381.) We emphasized that
“the right to a jury trial to contest an LPS conservatorship is a
right guaranteed by the California Constitution.” (Id. at p. 383.)
Heather W. is silent as to whether the proposed conservatee was
informed by her attorney that she had a right to a jury trial. (Id.
at p. 381.)
Here, as in Heather W., the record does not indicate that
counsel advised D.T. of his right to a jury trial. Nor did the trial
court advise D.T. of this right. Nor does the record indicate
whether D.T.’s counsel explained the mechanics of a jury trial,
including a unanimous finding on grave disability, that a jury is
comprised of 12 people from the community, the right to
participate in jury selection, and that in a court trial, a judge
alone would decide whether D.T. was gravely disabled.
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) Indeed, there is no
evidence that D.T. understood what it meant to have a right to a
jury trial.
Instead, the record reflects that in November 2025, D.T.’s
attorney stated her client objected to the continued
conservatorship and wanted “an in-person court trial.” Neither
D.T. nor his attorney explicitly waived D.T.’s right to a jury trial.
The reporter’s transcript illustrates there was no mention of a
jury trial whatsoever, let alone D.T.’s waiver of that right, during
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the proceedings. Thus, there is no indication D.T. knew he was
entitled to a unanimous jury verdict on whether he was gravely
disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. While D.T. was subject to a
previous conservatorship, the record does not disclose whether
his lawyer or the trial court in that proceeding advised him of his
right to a jury trial. And even if he was, that fact alone would not
take away his right to be informed in this proceeding.
The Public Guardian contends the trial court’s failure to
advise D.T. of his right to a jury trial is subject to a harmless
error review under C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917–919,
wherein the court applied the harmless error test set forth in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) (an error is
harmless unless it is “reasonably probable” the outcome would
have been different in the absence of the error). Based on the
citation served on D.T. stating he would have a right to a jury
trial upon demand and counsel’s statement that D.T. wanted “an
in-person court trial,” the Public Guardian contends the failure to
advise D.T. and secure his personal waiver is harmless. We are
not persuaded.
In C.O., the proposed conservator was previously subjected
to an LPS conservatorship, the public guardian petitioned for
reappointment, and counsel informed C.O. of the right to a jury
trial. (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 901, 908.) C.O. held
that a trial court’s failure to personally advise the proposed
conservatee of a jury trial right does not, standing alone, warrant
automatic reversal, emphasizing that such error is harmless “if
the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the
circumstances,” that the “waiver was knowing and voluntary.”
(Id. at p. 918.)
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C.O. is distinguishable because the record “affirmatively
demonstrate[d]” the proposed conservatee “was informed of his
right to a jury trial.” (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) In
C.O., there was substantial evidence the proposed conservatee’s
waiver was knowing and intelligent, including the citation mailed
to him, counsel having explained the right to a jury trial, his
presence at the hearing when counsel waived jury, and
communications about how the conservatee “wished to proceed.”
(Id. at pp. 918–919.) Thus, our colleagues in the Sixth District
were “left solely with the error that the trial court did not
personally advise [the proposed conservatee] of his jury trial
right.” (Id. at p. 919.) C.O. concluded the error was harmless
under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, because the record
“affirmatively” demonstrated the proposed conservatee “was
informed of his right to a jury trial, both in writing and by his
counsel.” (C.O., at p. 919.) But that is not the situation here.
The record here is silent as to whether counsel informed
D.T. of his right to a jury trial, including the mechanics of a jury
trial and his right to a unanimous jury verdict on grave
disability. Without this information, and without evidence that
D.T. read or understood the citation, we cannot conclude the
citation was sufficient for D.T. to knowingly and intelligently
waive his constitutional right to a jury trial. (See Tran, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 1170 [“the requirement of an affirmative showing
means that no waiver may be presumed from a silent record”
(italics omitted)]; Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 383.)
The citation’s advisement that D.T. had a “right to a jury trial if
you wish” is insufficient to waive jury without, at a minimum,
being advised of the right to a unanimous jury verdict on the
issue of grave disability. (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235.)
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That D.T. ultimately proceeded with a court trial also does not
evince a knowing and intelligent waiver of his jury trial right
when the record contains no evidence those rights were explained
to him, either by his lawyer or the trial court.
As we held in K.L. and Heather W., trial courts must inform
proposed conservatees of their right to a jury trial. (K.L., supra,
___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2026 WL 2490937]; Heather W., supra, 245
Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385; Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).)
Given the significant liberty interests at stake, “the critical issue
here is [the proposed conservatee’s] fundamental right to decide
who hears the evidence to make that [grave disability] finding—a
judge or a jury.” (Heather W., at p. 384.) But automatic reversal
is not warranted if the totality of the circumstances indicates a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to jury.
We conclude the trial court’s failure to advise D.T. of his
right to a jury trial here is reversible error. And because the
Public Guardian does not contend there was evidence D.T. lacked
capacity to waive jury in November 2025, we do not remand for a
capacity determination. (Kevin A., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1253.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting the LPS conservatorship petition is
reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.
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Colleen K. Sterne, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Hudson Hornick,
Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.