Filed 8/19/26 Conservatorship of D.A. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
Conservatorship of the Person and B348098
Estate of D.A.
Public Guardian of Los Angeles (Los Angeles County
County, Super. Ct. No.
25NWMH00226)
Petitioner and Respondent.
v.
D.A.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Scott R. Herin, Judge. Affirmed.
B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Laura Quiñonez,
Assistant County Counsel, and William C. Sias, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
Appellant D.A. appeals the trial court’s order granting
respondent Los Angeles County Office of the Public Guardian’s
(Public Guardian’s) petition for appointment as D.A.’s
conservator. The order was made following a jury trial that
resulted in a finding that D.A. was gravely disabled within the
meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (Welf. &
Inst. Code,1 § 5000 et seq.) We are asked to decide whether
substantial evidence supports the jury’s gravely disabled finding
and whether the trial court should have granted D.A.’s mid-trial
request for a continuance to obtain expert discovery.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Petition and Initial Proceedings
In April 2025, the Public Guardian filed a petition for
appointment as conservator of the person and estate of D.A. The
petition alleged D.A. was a 40-year-old resident of Los Angeles
County being held at a criminal detention center. The petition
further alleged D.A. had been evaluated and determined to be
gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, remained
hospitalized due to his unstable and deteriorated mental
condition, and was unwilling or unable to accept treatment
voluntarily. The Public Guardian was issued temporary letters of
conservatorship.
The trial court held a hearing on the petition for
appointment on May 5, 2025. D.A. declined to consent to a
conservatorship and requested a jury trial. The trial court found
good cause to continue the matter. The court set a discovery
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
deadline of June 6, but stated the deadline was set with the
understanding that the parties would have to confirm whether
the physician or forensic psychologist may receive additional
documents on the date of trial readiness. Trial was initially set
for June 23, 2025.
At a trial setting hearing in June, counsel for D.A.
acknowledged the jury trial was set for the following Monday but
represented there was more investigation she would like to do.
Counsel requested the court set a new trial date of July 28, 2025.
The court continued the trial as requested.
At a trial setting conference on July 23, 2025, the trial
court asked the parties to confirm there were no known discovery
issues. Counsel for D.A. asked the Public Guardian if Dr.
Elizabeth Morris (Dr. Morris) was their only witness. The Public
Guardian confirmed she was, and counsel for D.A. then
represented she was ready for trial.2
B. Trial
A jury trial commenced on July 28, 2025. On July 30, after
the jury was seated but before any testimony was presented, the
parties had a discussion with the court. D.A. informed the court
the Public Guardian had provided notes from Dr. Morris that
morning and D.A. wanted to make sure Dr. Morris’s testimony
would not be based on hearsay because she worked in a
supervisory capacity and was not D.A’s treating doctor. The
Public Guardian represented that although Dr. Morris “is in a
2
Counsel asserted the Public Guardian turned over some
discovery the previous day, but she said it should not be a
problem for her to be ready for trial as set.
3
supervisory role, she is also part of the treatment team . . . .” The
court confirmed there were not going to be any records presented
at trial and stated the doctor could explain what she reviewed to
help formulate her opinion, but she was not allowed to relate the
substance of what she reviewed. The court also indicated it
would take a moment with Dr. Morris prior to her testimony to
make sure she understood she could only relay her own
observations and opinion.
The sole witnesses at trial were Dr. Morris, the Director of
Psychology and Social Services and Clinical Training Director at
Gateways Hospital (Gateways) and D.A.
1. Dr. Morris’s testimony
Dr. Morris became involved in D.A.’s case when he was
admitted to Gateways in mid-May 2025, and she was assigned to
be part of his clinical treatment team. Dr. Morris discussed
D.A.’s case with most of the clinical team, including his
psychiatrist, Dr. Jason Lee, and his social worker, Irena. She
also reviewed his charts and records, including clinical notes,
medical records, and information about his prior history.
Dr. Morris first interviewed D.A. on May 13, 2025, the day
he was admitted to Gateways. They discussed his prior mental
health history and symptoms. D.A. stated he received treatment
before and did not currently believe he needed treatment. Dr.
Morris saw D.A. approximately three times per week around the
hospital and saw him either every week or every other week for a
group or individual session.
Dr. Morris evaluated D.A. on June 3. During the
evaluation, D.A. muttered under his breath and Dr. Morris
believed he was talking to an unseen person. D.A. also made odd
4
facial expressions, took a long time to answer questions, and
could not elaborate upon answers.
Over the ensuing weeks, Dr. Morris observed D.A. sitting
in a group setting verbalizing things that were off topic and
engaging in odd hand gestures. On a different day, Dr. Morris
observed him pacing alone in his room, speaking loudly.
Dr. Morris evaluated D.A. again on July 25, approximately
five days before her testimony at trial. D.A. asserted he had no
mental health symptoms and his medication was not helpful.
During both the June and the July evaluations, Dr. Morris
asked D.A. about his discharge plans. Both times, he said he was
going to go to one of his homes in Santa Clarita to live
independently. When asked how he would provide for his food or
clothing, or access funds, D.A. told Dr. Morris he has millions of
dollars in the bank, is the CEO of Spectrum, and has an
electronics and 3D printing business with celebrity business
partners, including Bill Gates. When asked if he would like
mental health treatment outside of the hospital, D.A. said he
would only engage a particular psychiatrist, but he would not tell
Dr. Morris the psychiatrist’s name. He also stated he did not
want to engage in any outpatient treatment. When asked how he
would clothe himself, D.A. said he has clothing already, could go
shopping with his funds, and had celebrity connections that
would assist him.
Dr. Morris opined D.A. was suffering from schizophrenia
based on his grandiose delusions, hallucinations, disorganized
thoughts, lack of facial expression and emotional expression,
poverty of thought and speech, and lack of insight. Dr. Morris
also opined D.A.’s mental health and mental illness were
impeding his ability to provide for his basic needs. Specifically,
5
his mental illness made it difficult for him to make a viable plan
for food, clothing, and shelter because the plans he articulated
were delusional.
During his time at Gateways, D.A. was compliant or mostly
compliant with taking two different psychotropic medications.
When Dr. Morris asked if he intended to continue taking his
medication if he was on his own, D.A.’s responses were
inconsistent. Sometimes he would say he would continue taking
medication if he could speak with his own unidentified
psychiatrist. Other times he would say no because the
medication was not beneficial. Still other times, D.A. said he
would take the medication if he had to or if the doctor said so.
Dr. Morris did not believe D.A. would continue taking
medication on his own. She also opined D.A.’s lack of insight
would impair his ability to be a voluntary patient at the hospital.
On cross-examination, Dr. Morris stated she writes notes
after she meets with D.A. When asked if she turned her notes
over to the Public Guardian, Dr. Morris explained that the packet
of documents turned over to the Public Guardian was created by
the psychiatric social worker and typically includes the
psychiatrist’s notes and the nursing notes. Dr. Morris did not
play a role in preparing the documentation provided for the trial.
2. D.A.’s counsel requests a continuance
At the beginning of the next trial day, D.A.’s counsel
asserted that prior to Dr. Morris’s testimony, she did not think
Dr. Morris was part of D.A.’s treatment team. Though counsel
had received hundreds of pages of records, they were signed by
D.A.’s psychiatrist and did not include any notes signed by Dr.
Morris. The only documents the Public Guardian had submitted
6
from Dr. Morris were a trial statement dated June 2, which
contained general mental health observations, and the notes
counsel received the prior morning. Counsel represented Dr.
Morris’s curriculum vitae also indicated she works in a
supervisory capacity, which counsel perceived as consistent with
her understanding that Dr. Morris was a supervisor and not on
the treatment team.
Counsel told the court she was not sure she had been able
to do an effective cross-examination because she had not been
able to review Dr. Morris’s records and was unaware of any
exculpatory or impeachment evidence that may exist. D.A.’s
counsel wanted to obtain Dr. Morris’s records so she could review
them and assess whether or not she would like to recall her and
get late discovery. She asked to be given the records and granted
“a short continuance” so she could review them and make an
informed decision about next steps.
The Public Guardian represented he did not have
possession or control over the records sought by D.A. He also
stated the proceedings were governed by the Civil Discovery Act,
and the Public Guardian had provided notice as early as June 5
that Dr. Morris would be testifying. He argued the issues being
raised should have been raised earlier, and that it would be
burdensome to continue the case at that point.
The court observed the situation was a recurring problem
with the LPS process because criminal attorneys practice under
the belief there is an automatic requirement for reciprocal
discovery but conservatorship proceedings are governed by the
Code of Civil Procedure. The court stated that when discovery
was turned over and D.A. understood Dr. Morris would be
testifying, D.A. should have demanded Dr. Morris’s records. D.A.
7
had not done so and had not otherwise complied with the Code of
Civil Procedure. The court accordingly declined to continue the
trial, and when counsel for D.A. requested a mistrial, the court
denied that request too.
Prior to the resumption of testimony before the jury, D.A.
requested a jury instruction informing the jury that D.A. had not
received Dr. Morris’s psychological notes prior to cross-
examination. The court denied that request. The court
reiterated that the civil discovery rules require a demand, D.A.’s
counsel was on notice that Dr. Morris was the testifying doctor,
and D.A. should have demanded Dr. Morris’s records upon
realizing they were not included in the discovery. The court
indicated it did not believe there was any direct intention by
either side to keep the information away from the other, but it
could not ignore the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure governs
the discovery process. The court stated, however, it would be
open to giving a more neutral jury instruction stating neither
side had been given access to Dr. Morris’s notes.
3. D.A.’s testimony
D.A. had been conserved once before in 2020, for
approximately six months. He did not want to go through it
again. When asked if he believed he had a mental illness, D.A.
testified he believes he has schizoaffective disorder. He also
identified the medication he was taking for his condition. When
asked if the medication helped him, D.A. said it does, but he does
not want to take anything that will hurt him or is not safe. D.A.
testified he would be willing to talk to his doctor (who he did not
identify), and if the medication was safe and prescribed to him,
he would be willing to take it after he leaves Gateways.
8
D.A. testified he was prepared to leave the hospital. He
asserted he had a trust account with a balance of approximately
$19,000 and a bank account with around $10,000, which could be
used to pay his rent and bills. D.A. asserted he would stay at
Gateways until he found somewhere else to go. He said he and
his social worker, Irena, were in the process of looking for a place
for him to live. D.A. had called some potential housing options
the day before testifying. He asserted some of the places he
called said yes and others said no.
When asked about some of his statements while
hospitalized at Gateways, D.A. testified he did not recall saying
he did not need treatment. He said he has always been eager to
help himself and Gateways was trying to help him. He wanted to
work with them as long as it was safe for him. When asked
where he would obtain his medication if he were on his own, he
identified a Dr. Kay from Santa Clarita Mental Health, who he
last contacted about two years prior. He said if Dr. Kay was no
longer there, he could go to mental health clinics in San
Fernando and Santa Clarita. D.A. asserted he took his
medication after his prior conservatorship ended in 2023 until he
was admitted to Gateways in 2025.
When asked about his occupation, D.A. asserted he works
in 3D animation with others, including Bill Gates. He said
people call him the CEO because he invented the 3D spectrum.
D.A. stated his inheritance was stolen from him in junior high
and a number of people purchased properties, which they put in
both their names and his. D.A. testified he needs to go to his
realtor and have her check the records to investigate. He did not
plan to move to the homes in Santa Clarita until he obtained
something in writing from a realtor.
9
D.A. testified he would access food using the $10,000 in his
bank account. D.A. explained he buys in bulk when he goes to
the grocery store and buys his own clothes because he likes
expensive clothes. When asked how he would access the money
in his bank account, he said he has a card and knows the woman
who works at the credit union. When asked when he last
withdrew money using his debit card, he said 2024. He also
stated he last went to Santa Clarita Mental Health in 2024. D.A.
related he plans to work if he were released from the
conservatorship and he wants to work at a Mercedes Benz
dealership selling cars (though he has never sold cars before).
4. Jury instructions and verdict
As relevant for our purposes, the court ultimately
instructed the jury that “[t]he parties were not aware of
additional discovery that may have been available. You may
consider that when evaluating Dr. Morris’s testimony.” The jury
was also instructed that the parties stipulated D.A. was
unavailable to access money or to have sought mental health
treatment in the community in 2024.
The jury found D.A. was presently gravely disabled due to a
mental disorder. The court appointed the Public Guardian as
conservator over D.A.’s person and estate.
II. DISCUSSION
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that
D.A. is gravely disabled as a result of his schizophrenia because
his grandiose delusions render him unable to provide for his basic
personal needs for food, clothing, and shelter. Additionally, the
LPS Act is a special proceeding of a civil nature to which the
10
rules of civil procedure generally apply. Because D.A. did not
serve a demand for production of Dr. Morris’s documents as
required by the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying D.A.’s mid-trial request for a
continuance.
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict
The LPS Act authorizes one-year conservatorships for those
who are gravely disabled due to a mental health disorder.
(§ 5350.) “When a treatment professional determines a person is
gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment
voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may petition to
establish a conservatorship. [Citations.] If the matter proceeds
to trial and the person is found gravely disabled, the court
appoints a conservator [citation], imposes ‘disabilities’ as needed
[citation], and determines an appropriate treatment placement
[citation]. [Citation.] A conservatorship terminates after one
year but may be extended for additional one-year terms upon
petition. [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12
Cal.5th 1085, 1095-1096.)
“In the trial court, ‘to establish that a person is gravely
disabled, the evidence must support an objective finding that the
person, due to mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered
unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or
otherwise provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or
shelter,’ and the public guardian must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled.
[Citation.] On appeal, we apply the substantial evidence test to
determine whether the record supports the court’s finding of
grave disability. The testimony of one witness may be sufficient
11
to support such a finding.” (Conservatorship of Jesse G. (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 453, 460-461; see also Conservatorship of S.A.
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48, 54.)
D.A. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that
he has a mental illness. He challenges only the finding that his
schizophrenia renders him gravely disabled. That challenge fails
because substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that D.A.
is gravely disabled on account of an inability to provide for basic
needs of food, clothing, and shelter.
Dr. Morris testified that during her interviews with D.A.,
including an interview approximately five days before her
testimony at trial, D.A. asserted his discharge plan was to go live
in one of his homes in Santa Clarita. D.A. was unable to identify
any of those homes other than indicating he knew a home was
available to return to because squatters or inhabitants put up a
“‘welcome home’” sign. D.A. stated he would provide for his food
and clothing using the millions of dollars he had in the bank as a
result of his role as the CEO of Spectrum and his 3D printing
business with Bill Gates. He also said he would rely on his funds
and his celebrity friends to obtain clothing. Based on this, Dr.
Morris opined D.A.’s grandiose delusions, a symptom of his
schizophrenia, impeded his ability to provide for his basic needs
because his discharge plan was based on his delusions. That
conclusion is well supported by D.A.’s statements.
Portions of D.A.’s testimony at trial further corroborated
Dr. Morris’s testimony. For example, he referenced his belief
that he works with Bill Gates, is referred to as the CEO of
Spectrum, and potentially has multiple houses in Santa Clarita.
He asserted he last withdrew money from his bank account using
his debit card in 2024 (though the parties stipulated D.A. was
12
unavailable to access money in 2024). Additionally, though D.A.
asserted he planned to work at a Mercedes Benz dealership
selling cars if he were released from the conservatorship, he also
admitted he had never sold cars before.
D.A. nonetheless contends the finding of grave disability
was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the evidence
that he was willing and able to accept voluntary treatment. He
also argues Dr. Morris’s opinion that he lacks insight into his
mental disorder is similarly unsupported by substantial evidence
and not dispositive. Even if we assume for the sake of argument
that there was credible evidence D.A. was willing to accept
voluntary treatment and has sufficient insight into his mental
illness, neither point negates the evidence, already detailed, that
D.A.’s mental illness rendered him incapable of providing for his
personal needs for food, shelter, or clothing. The jury was
entitled to disregard D.A.’s testimony in light of the other
substantial evidence which supported its finding of grave
disability. (See Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 442, 445-447.) And our review of the record centers
on determining whether substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports the jury’s finding. (Conservatorship of
Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577; Conservatorship of
Amanda B. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 342, 350.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying a Continuance
D.A. contends the trial court abused its discretion by
denying him a continuance to obtain additional discovery. “Trial
continuances are ‘disfavored’ and may be granted ‘only on an
affirmative showing of good cause.’ [Citation.]” (Reales
13
Investment, LLC v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 463, 468.) We
review a trial court’s order denying a continuance for abuse of
discretion. (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984-
985.)
D.A. requested a mid-trial continuance of unspecified
length in order to obtain and review records from Dr. Morris, the
Public Guardian’s expert witness. Though the record does not
disclose exactly when the Public Guardian provided D.A. notice of
the identity of its witness, the Public Guardian orally represented
to the court that it provided notice that Dr. Morris would testify
“as early as June 5th” and also produced records on July 22nd
and 23rd. The Public Guardian also represented it did not have
possession or control over any of Dr. Morris’s documents.
An LPS proceeding is a special proceeding of a civil nature.
(Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 432.) As
such, the rules of civil procedure generally apply.
(Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 438, 444.)
Because the relevant LPS statutes are silent with regard to
discovery rights, civil discovery rules also apply. (See City of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 286
[“discovery act applies to statutorily-enacted special proceedings
that are silent with respect to discovery”].) Those rules require
parties to demand the exchange of documents related to expert
witnesses. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2034.220, 2034.230.) The
onus was accordingly on D.A. to demand production of Dr.
Morris’s notes regardless of whatever informal discovery took
place, or usually takes place, in LPS proceedings.
D.A. protests that the due process right to a timely trial
would be frustrated by requiring a proposed conservatee to
14
strictly adhere to the Code of Civil Procedure.3 But the question
before us is not whether there was error because the trial court
strictly enforced normal civil discovery deadlines. Rather, the
question is whether it was error for the court to deny the
continuance based on D.A.’s contention that the reciprocal rules
of criminal discovery should apply to LPS proceedings. Those
rules do not apply, and there was accordingly no error.
D.A. also argues the documents he received from County
Counsel suggested Dr. Morris worked in a supervisory capacity,
rather than in a treatment capacity, and he was blindsided with
the information at trial. Since D.A. has not provided an appellate
record including any of the documents produced in discovery, we
cannot say whether this was a reasonable assumption to make.
But in any event, counsel for D.A. could have taken steps to
confirm the assumption, either informally by asking the Public
Guardian (or, indeed, her own client) or formally by demanding
information and documents under the Code of Civil Procedure.
D.A. further complains that though the court set a
discovery deadline of June 6, 2025, some documents were not
produced until July 22. D.A., however, did not complain about
3
It is hard to understand why. The only formal discovery
D.A. would have needed to propound was a demand for exchange
of information concerning expert trial witnesses, with a demand
for production of discoverable reports and writing. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2034.210.) Such a demand must be served “no later than
the 10th day after the initial trial date has been set” and the
exchange may be set “50 days before the initial trial date, or 20
days after service of the demand, whichever is closer to the trial
date, unless the court, on motion and a showing of good cause,
orders an earlier or later date of exchange.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 2034.220, 2034.230.)
15
the timing of the production below and any such objection is
forfeited. (Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
475, 489 [“failure to raise an issue in the trial court typically
forfeits on appeal any claim of error based on that issue”].)
Finally, D.A. argues the trial court erred by failing to
consider California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, which
enumerates facts and circumstances relevant to ruling on a
request for continuance, and he contends that if the court had
considered the rule, a continuance would have been warranted.
D.A. did not file a noticed motion, ex parte application, or an
accompanying declaration in compliance with rule 3.1332(b). Nor
did D.A. challenge the trial court’s decision on this ground below.
This contention too is forfeited (Howitson, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at 489), and regardless, we presume the trial court was aware of
and followed applicable law absent evidence to the contrary—of
which there is none (McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior
Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1103).4
4
D.A.’s contention in reply that the trial court ignored
section 5122 is doubly forfeited; it was not raised in the trial
court or the opening brief.
16
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. All parties will bear
their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
17