Filed 9/14/26 Conservatorship of B.P. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
Conservatorship of the Person 2d Civ. No. B349940
of B.P. (Super. Ct. No. 22MH-00155)
(Santa Barbara County)
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,
as Conservator, etc.,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
B.P.,
Objector and Appellant.
B.P. appeals from an order under the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code1, § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act) declaring
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
him gravely disabled and reappointing the Santa Barbara Public
Guardian (Public Guardian) as his conservator. We will reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The trial court first appointed the Public Guardian as
B.P.’s conservator under the LPS Act in September of 2022. The
Public Guardian petitioned for reappointment on August 20,
2025. It alleged B.P. had a grave disability based on a mental
health disorder. B.P. was personally served with a written
citation for conservatorship.
B.P. did not attend the trial setting conference. B.P.’s
counsel requested the court “set [B.P.]’s matter for a contested
Zoom court trial.” Counsel did not state whether she and B.P
discussed his right to a jury or the mechanics of a jury trial. She
did not indicate whether B.P. lacked capacity to waive a jury.
Trial took place in October of 2025. The court did not take
a personal jury waiver from B.P. It did not explain the
mechanics of a jury trial or explain how a jury trial differed from
a court trial. It granted the petition after hearing testimony from
a psychiatrist, B.P., and a staff member at B.P.’s mental health
rehabilitation center. The court found him gravely disabled
beyond a reasonable doubt. It reappointed the Public Guardian
as conservator for another year and ordered B.P. placed in an
institution for mental diseases. The court prohibited him, among
other things, from refusing “treatment specific to remedying or
preventing the recurrence” of his grave disability or any
unrelated medical treatment.
DISCUSSION
The LPS Act
The LPS Act governs the involuntary treatment of the
“gravely disabled” in California so that they may receive
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individualized treatment, supervision, and placement. (§§ 5350,
5350.1; Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 139.) A
person is “‘gravely disabled’” if “as a result of a mental health
disorder, a severe substance use disorder, or a co-occurring
mental health disorder and a severe substance use disorder, [the
person] is unable to provide for their basic personal needs for
food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical
care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)
A county’s public guardian may petition to establish a
conservatorship over a person who “is gravely disabled as a result
of mental disorder . . . and is unwilling to accept, or incapable of
accepting, treatment voluntarily.” (§ 5352.) A finding of grave
disability must be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 (Roulet). “A
conservatorship terminates after one year but may be extended
for additional one-year terms upon petition.” (Conservatorship of
Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1096, citing § 5361 (Eric B.).)
Right to a Jury Trial in LPS Act Proceedings
B.P. contends the trial court committed reversible error
because it did not advise him of his right to a jury trial or obtain
his personal waiver. We review the contention de novo.
(Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142;
Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 904 (C.O.)
A “‘civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty . . . .’ [Citations.] ‘In addition to
physical restraint, “[t]he gravely disabled person for whom a
conservatorship has been established faces the loss of many other
liberties . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1103.)
“Apart from their possible confinement, conservatees may lose
the rights to drive, vote, enter contracts, and make decisions
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about their treatment.” (Id. at pp. 1103-1104, citing § 5357.) One
such right is a conservatee’s right to a unanimous jury verdict on
the issue of grave disability. (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235.)
“In light of the potential for such a significant loss of liberty,
conservatorship cases are governed by many of the same
procedural protections that apply in criminal trials.” (Eric B.,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1104, citing § 5350, subd. (d)(1).)
A proposed conservatee is entitled to a jury trial on the
issue of grave disability. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1); Roulet, supra, 23
Cal.3d at p. 230.) “[T]he court shall inform the proposed
conservatee of . . . the right . . . to have the matter of the
establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury.” (Prob. Code,
§ 1828, subds. (a), (a)(6).) “[T]he trial court must obtain a
personal waiver of a jury trial from the conservatee, even when
the conservatee expresses no preference for a jury trial. Absent
such a waiver, the court must accord the conservatee a jury trial
unless the court finds the conservatee lacks the capacity to make
such a decision.” (Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 378, 381 (Heather W.).) A trial court’s failure to
advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial is
statutory error. (Id. at p. 384; C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 909; § 5350, subd. (d)(1).)
“[A] person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in
LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and
voluntarily made.” (K.R. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
133, 143 [collecting authority].) The failure to obtain a knowing
and voluntary jury trial waiver “denies the defendant [or
conservatee] his or her statutory right to a jury trial on the entire
cause in a civil commitment proceeding.” (People v. Blackburn
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1132 [jury trial waivers required in
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proceedings involving offenders with mental health disorders];
see also People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163 (Tran) [jury
trial waivers required in involuntary commitment proceedings
where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity)];
Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250
(Kevin A.) [LPS Act shares same purposes as commitment
schemes for offenders with a mental disorder and those pleading
not guilty by reason of insanity].)
Failing to obtain a valid jury trial waiver requires reversal
because it “defies ordinary harmless error analysis” (People v.
Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134) and is a “‘miscarriage of
justice’ within the meaning of California Constitution, article VI,
section 13 . . . .” (Id. at pp. 1132-1133; see Tran, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 1169 [invalid jury waiver in commitment proceeding
“is not susceptible to ordinary harmless error analysis and
automatically requires reversal”].) In the criminal law context,
“‘knowing and intelligent’” means “‘“‘“made with a full awareness
both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.”’”’” (People v.
Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) Trial courts
should advise criminal defendants of the “basic mechanics of a
jury trial . . . .” (Id. at p. 169.) There is no “specific method for
determining whether a defendant has made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial.” (Id. at
p. 167.) “[W]e examine ‘the totality of the circumstances’ unique
to each case.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753.)
In Heather W. we concluded the trial court’s failure to
advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial was not
harmless. (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-385.)
The trial court “advised Heather W. of her right to testify, but did
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not advise her that she had a right to a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 381.)
We emphasized “the right to a jury trial to contest an LPS
conservatorship is a right guaranteed by the California
Constitution.” (Id. at p. 383.) We reversed.
Here, B.P. did not attend the trial setting conference at
which counsel requested a court trial. His attorney did not
confirm whether she discussed waiver with him or that he lacked
capacity to make the decision. It appears the court implied B.P.’s
waiver from counsel’s request for a court trial. At trial, the court
did not elicit a waiver from B.P. or advise him pursuant to
Sivongxxay. The only notice B.P. appears to have received is on
the second page of the citation of conservatorship, which states,
“You have the right to a jury trial if you wish.”
The Public Guardian nevertheless contends B.P. waived his
rights based on the totality of circumstances. It points to the
citations served on B.P. and emphasizes that he did not object
when the court began a bench trial. The Public Guardian also
relies on C.O. to support its contention that reversal is not
required. (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) Counsel
informed C.O. of the right to a jury trial. (Id. at pp. 901, 908.)
C.O. held that a trial court’s failure to personally advise the
proposed conservatee of a jury trial right does not, standing
alone, warrant automatic reversal. It emphasized such error is
harmless “‘if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality
of the circumstances,’” that the “‘waiver was knowing and
voluntary.’” (Id. at p. 918.)
C.O. is distinguishable. The record “affirmatively
demonstrate[d]” that C.O. “was informed of his right to a jury
trial.” (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) The case
concluded that counsel cannot waive this right if circumstances
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suggest the proposed conservatee was not aware of it. (Id. at
p. 911.) These circumstances are present here. Nothing in the
record shows counsel or the trial court informed B.P. of his right
or explained the mechanics of a jury trial during the 2025
proceedings—or during his prior LPS proceedings in 2022, 2023,
and 2024. As such, we cannot conclude B.P. knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. (See Tran, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 1170 [“the requirement of an affirmative showing
means that no valid waiver may be presumed from a silent
record” (italics omitted)].)
The trial court’s failure to advise B.P. of his right to a jury
trial is reversible error. We do not remand for a capacity
determination because the Public Guardian does not contend
there was evidence B.P. lacked capacity to waive jury at the time
of trial. (Kevin A., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting the LPS conservatorship petition is
reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Colleen K. Sterne, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Hudson Hornick,
Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.